Lance v. Coffman

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

KEITH LANCE ET AL. v. MIKE COFFMAN, COLORADO

SECRETARY OF STATE

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

No. 06–641. Decided March 5, 2007

PER CURIAM.

The Elections Clause of the United States Constitution

provides that the “Manner of holding Elections for Sena

tors and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State

by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any

time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to

the Places of chusing Senators.” Art. I, §4, cl. 1 (emphasis

added). When Colorado legislators were unable to redraw

congressional districts after the 2000 census to accommo

date an additional Representative, a state court did it for

them. See Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P. 3d 642 (Colo. 2002)

(en banc). The legislature was able to pass a redistricting

plan in 2003, which Colorado’s Governor signed into law.

See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §2–1–101.

Colorado’s attorney general, however, filed an original

action in the Colorado Supreme Court to enjoin Colorado’s

secretary of state from implementing this new plan, noting

that Article V, §44, of the Colorado Constitution limits

redistricting to once per census. The Colorado General

Assembly intervened in the action to defend its plan. The

Colorado Supreme Court granted the injunction, holding

that “judicially-created districts are just as binding and

permanent as districts created by the General Assembly,”

and that the court-drawn plan must remain in effect until

the next decennial census. People ex rel. Salazar v. David

son, 79 P. 3d 1221, 1231 (2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 541

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Per Curiam

U. S. 1093 (2004). The court further held that this result

did not offend the Elections Clause of the United States

Constitution. 79 P. 3d, at 1232.

Immediately after Salazar was decided, four Colorado

citizens—none of whom had participated in Salazar—filed

the instant action in Federal District Court. They argued

that Article V, §44, of the Colorado Constitution, as inter

preted by the Colorado Supreme Court, violates their

rights under the Elections Clause.

The District Court initially determined that it lacked

jurisdiction to hear the suit in light of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, but we vacated and remanded for further pro

ceedings. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U. S. 459 (2006) (per cu

riam). On remand, the District Court held that the citi

zen-plaintiffs had standing to bring their Elections Clause

challenge. Lance v. Dennis, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154–

1155 (2006). The court went on, however, to hold that the

suit was barred by issue preclusion because the plaintiffs

“stand in privity with the Secretary of State and the Gen

eral Assembly,” who were on the losing side in the Salazar

litigation. 444 F. Supp. 2d, at 1161. The concurring judge

concluded that appellants lacked standing to sue in the

first place. Id., at 1162 (Porfilio, J., concurring in result).

Plaintiffs appeal once again.

Federal courts must determine that they have jurisdic

tion before proceeding to the merits. Steel Co. v. Citizens

for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 94–95 (1998).*

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of

federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” One com

ponent of the case-or-controversy requirement is standing,

which requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the now-familiar

——————

* Our prior decision in this case did not violate this principle because

Rooker-Feldman concerns a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 291

(2005), and “there is no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy,” Ruhrgas

AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 578 (1999).

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Per Curiam

elements of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561

(1992). “We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising

only a generally available grievance about government—

claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in

proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seek

ing relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him

than it does the public at large—does not state an Article

III case or controversy.” Id., at 573–574. See also Daim

lerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. ___, ___ (2006) (slip

op., at 8) (refusing to create an exception to the general

prohibition on taxpayer standing for challenges to state

tax or spending decisions, and observing that taxpayer

standing has been rejected “because the alleged injury is

not ‘concrete and particularized,’ but instead a grievance

the taxpayer ‘suffers in some indefinite way in common

with people generally’ ” (citation omitted)).

Our refusal to serve as a forum for generalized griev

ances has a lengthy pedigree. In Fairchild v. Hughes, 258

U. S. 126 (1922), for example, a citizen sued the Secretary

of State and the Attorney General to challenge the proce

dures by which the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified.

We dismissed the suit because it was “not a case within

the meaning of . . . Article III.” Id., at 129. The plaintiff

sought to assert “only the right, possessed by every citizen,

to require that the Government be administered according

to law and that the public moneys be not wasted.” Ibid.

“Obviously,” we held, “this general right does not entitle a

private citizen to institute [a suit] in the federal courts.”

Id., at 129–130.

Similarly, in Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U. S. 633 (1937) (per

curiam), we dismissed a citizen suit claiming that Justice

Black’s appointment to this Court contravened the Consti

tution’s Ineligibility Clause, Art. I, §6, cl. 2. We found that

the petitioner had no interest in the suit “other than that

of a citizen and a member of the bar of this Court.” 302

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Per Curiam

U. S., at 634. That was not enough. To have standing, we

observed, a plaintiff must have more than “a general

interest common to all members of the public.” Ibid. See

also Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts

v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923) (taxpayer standing

cannot be predicated upon an injury the plaintiff “suffers

in some indefinite way in common with people generally”).

Cf. Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U. S. 405,

406 (1900) (“[E]ven in a proceeding which he prosecutes

for the benefit of the public . . . [the plaintiff] must gener

ally aver an injury peculiar to himself, as distinguished

from the great body of his fellow citizens”).

A pair of more recent cases further illustrates the point.

In United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974), a

federal taxpayer challenged the Government’s failure to

disclose certain CIA expenditures as a violation of the

Constitution’s Accounts Clause, which requires that “a

regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Ex

penditures of all public Money shall be published from

time to time.” Art. I, §9, cl. 7. Relying on Lévitt, this

Court dismissed the claim as a “generalized grievance”

that is “plainly undifferentiated and ‘common to all mem

bers of the public.’ ” Richardson, 418 U. S., at 176–177.

See also id., at 191 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The power

recognized in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), is

a potent one. Its prudent use seems to me incompatible

with unlimited notions of taxpayer and citizen standing”).

The same day, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to

Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974), we addressed standing

to bring a challenge under the Constitution’s Incompatibil

ity Clause, which provides that “no Person holding any

Office under the United States, shall be a Member of

either House during his Continuance in Office.” Art. I, §6,

cl. 2. Citizen-taxpayers brought a lawsuit contending that

Members of Congress who were also members of the mili

tary Reserves violated the Incompatibility Clause. This

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

Per Curiam

Court dismissed for lack of standing. It “reaffirm[ed]

Lévitt in holding that standing to sue may not be predi

cated upon an interest of the kind alleged here which is

held in common by all members of the public, because of

the necessarily abstract nature of the injury all citizens

share.” 418 U. S., at 220. Refusing to entertain general

ized grievances ensures that “there is a real need to exer

cise the power of judicial review” in a particular case, and

it helps guarantee that courts fashion remedies “no

broader than required by the precise facts to which the

court’s ruling would be applied.” Id., at 221–222. In

short, it ensures that courts exercise power that is judicial

in nature.

The instant case parallels Fairchild, Lévitt, and their

progeny. The plaintiffs here are four Colorado voters.

Three days after the Colorado Supreme Court issued its

decision in Salazar, they filed a complaint alleging that

“Article V, §44 of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted

in Salazar, violated [the Elections Clause] of the U. S.

Constitution by depriving the state legislature of its re

sponsibility to draw congressional districts.” Lance v.

Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (2005). In light of

the discussion above, the problem with this allegation

should be obvious: The only injury plaintiffs allege is that

the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been

followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferenti

ated, generalized grievance about the conduct of govern

ment that we have refused to countenance in the past. It

is quite different from the sorts of injuries alleged by

plaintiffs in voting rights cases where we have found

standing. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 207–208

(1962). Because plaintiffs assert no particularized stake

in the litigation, we hold that they lack standing to bring

their Elections Clause claim.

Our two decisions construing the term “Legislature” in

the Elections Clause do not contradict this holding. Each

6 LANCE v. COFFMAN

Per Curiam

of these cases was filed by a relator on behalf of the State

rather than private citizens acting on their own behalf, as

is the case here. See State ex rel. Smiley v. Holm, 184

Min. 647, 238 N. W. 792 (1931) (per curiam), rev’d

sub nom. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 (1932); Ohio ex rel.

Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565 (1916). In neither case

did we address whether a private citizen had alleged a

“concrete and particularized” injury sufficient to satisfy

the requirements of Article III.

The judgment of the United States District Court for the

District of Colorado is therefore vacated in part, and the

case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the Elec

tions Clause claim for lack of standing. We affirm the

District Court’s dismissal of the Petition Clause claim.

It is so ordered.