Opinion

Uttecht v. Brown

  • 551 U.S. 1
  • 127 S. Ct. 2218
  • 167 L. Ed. 2d 1014
  • 2007 U.S. LEXIS 6965
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Jun 4, 2007
Status
Published
On the bench
Kennedy, Roberts, Scalu, Thomas, Alito, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
Cited by
584 cases
Authority
More cited than 56.7%

explaining that “[mjillions of Americans oppose the death penalty,” and that “[a] cross section of virtually every community in the country includes citizens who firmly believe the death penalty is unjust but who nevertheless are qualified to serve as jurors in capital cases”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that “[mjillions of Americans oppose the death penalty,” and that “[a] cross section of virtually every community in the country includes citizens who firmly believe the death penalty is unjust but who nevertheless are qualified to serve as jurors in capital cases”
  • explaining that "[m]illions of Americans oppose the death penalty," and that "[a] cross section of virtually every community in the country includes citizens who firmly believe the death penalty is unjust but who nevertheless are qualified to serve as jurors in capital cases"
  • explaining the deference to be accorded to the trial court due in part to its position to assess the demeanor, attitude, and qualifications of the individuals who comprise the venire and noting the importance of even non-verbal communications
  • emphasizing at least in individual voir dire process that a trial court is to make a judgment regarding substantial impairment based in critical part on demeanor of the venire and of the individuals who compose it, and the deference to be paid to that determination

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by State v. Robinson, 303 Kan. 11 (2015)

    Uttecth is inapposite.
    Supreme Court of KansasNov 6, 2015Read it

The opinion

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UTTECHT, SUPERINTENDENT, WASHINGTON

STATE PENITENTIARY v. BROWN

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 06–413. Argued April 17, 2007—Decided June 4, 2007

A Washington jury sentenced respondent Brown to death, and the state

appellate courts affirmed. Subsequently, the Federal District Court

denied Brown’s habeas petition, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, find

ing that under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, and its progeny,

the state trial court had violated Brown’s Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by excusing “Jurors Z” for cause on the ground

that he could not be impartial in deciding whether to impose a death

sentence.

Held:

1. Courts reviewing claims of error under Witherspoon and Wain

wright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412, especially federal habeas courts, owe

deference to the trial court, which is in a superior position to deter

mine a potential juror’s demeanor and qualifications. This Court’s

precedents establish at least four relevant principles. First, a crimi

nal defendant has the right to an impartial jury drawn from a venire

that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective

prosecutorial challenges for cause. Witherspoon, supra, at 521. Sec

ond, the State has a strong interest in having jurors who are able to

apply capital punishment within the framework state law prescribes.

Witt, 469 U. S., at 416. Third, to balance these interests, a juror who

is substantially impaired in the ability to impose the death penalty

under the state-law framework can be excused for cause, but if the

juror is not so impaired, removal for cause is impermissible. Id., at

424. Fourth, in determining whether a potential juror’s removal

would vindicate the State’s interest without violating the defendant’s

right, the trial court bases its judgment in part on the juror’s de

meanor, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts. Id., at 424–

2 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Syllabus

434. The trial court is in a superior position to assess demeanor, a

factor critical in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential

jurors. Id., at 428. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996’s requirements provide additional, and binding, directions

to accord deference, creating an independent, high standard to be

met before a federal court may issue a habeas writ to set aside state-

court rulings. By not according the required deference here, the

Ninth Circuit failed to respect the limited role of federal habeas relief

in this area. Pp. 2–7.

2. In applying the Witherspoon-Witt rule, it is instructive to con

sider the entire voir dire in Brown’s case and then turn to Juror Z’s

questioning. Pp. 7–12.

(a) Here, 11 days of voir dire were devoted to determining

whether potential jurors were death qualified. During that phase, 11

of the jurors the defense challenged for cause were excused. The de

fense objected to 7 of the 12 jurors the State challenged for cause, and

only 2 of those 7 were excused. Before deciding a contested chal

lenge, the court allowed each side to explain its position and recall a

potential juror. It also gave careful and measured explanations for

its decisions. Before individual oral examination, the court distrib

uted a questionnaire asking jurors to explain their attitudes toward

the death penalty and explained that Brown was only eligible for

death or life in prison without possibility of release or parole. It re

peated the sentencing options before Juror Z’s group was questioned.

Pp. 7–10.

(b) The transcript reveals that, despite the preceding instructions

and information, Juror Z had both serious misunderstandings about

his responsibility as a juror and an attitude toward capital punish

ment that could have prevented him from returning a death sentence

under the facts of this case. He was told at least four times that

Brown could not be released from prison and stated six times that he

could follow the law. But he also gave more equivocal statements

that he would consider the death penalty only if there was no possi

bility that Brown would be released to reoffend. When the State

challenged Juror Z on the grounds that he was confused about the

conditions under which death could be imposed and seemed to believe

it only appropriate when there was a risk of release and recidivism,

the defense volunteered that it had no objection. Pp. 10–12.

3. The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that both the state trial

court’s excusal of Juror Z and the State Supreme Court’s affirmance

were contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly estab

lished federal law. Pp. 12–19.

(a) Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion, the State Supreme

Court explicitly found that Juror Z was substantially impaired. Even

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Syllabus

absent this explicit finding, the only fair reading of the opinion is

that the state court applied the Witt standard in assessing his ex

cusal. Regardless, there is no requirement in a case involving the

Witt-Witherspoon rule that a state appellate court make particular

reference to each juror’s excusal, for it is the trial court’s ruling that

counts. Pp. 12–14.

(b) On this record, the trial court acted well within its discretion

in granting the State’s motion to excuse Juror Z. His answers, on

their face, could have led the trial court to believe that he would be

substantially impaired in his ability to impose the death penalty ab

sent the possibility that Brown would be released and would reoffend.

The trial court, furthermore, is entitled to deference because it had

an opportunity to observe Juror Z’s demeanor. The State’s challenge,

Brown’s waiver of an objection, and the trial court’s excusal of Juror

Z support the conclusion that the interested parties all felt that re

moval was appropriate under the Witherspoon-Witt rule. While there

is no independent federal requirement that a state-court defendant

object to the prosecution’s challenge to preserve a Witherspoon claim,

voluntary acquiescence to, or confirmation of, a juror’s removal can be

taken into account. The defense did not just deny a conscientious

trial judge an opportunity to explain his judgment or correct an error;

it also deprived reviewing courts of further factual findings to help

explain the trial court’s decision. The need to defer to the trial court’s

demeanor decision does not foreclose the possibility of reversal where

the record discloses no basis for a substantial impairment finding,

but the record here does not show the trial court exceeded its discre

tion in excusing Juror Z. The State Supreme Court recognized the

deference owed and, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s misreading of its

opinion, identified the correct standard required by federal law and

found it satisfied. Pp. 14–17.

(c) The Court is not persuaded by Brown’s additional arguments

to depart from the State Supreme Court’s determination of the state

law at issue or to ignore Brown’s failure to object to Juror Z’s excusal.

Pp. 17–19.

451 F. 3d 946, reversed and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and SCALIA, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a

dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ.,

joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, J.,

joined.

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–413

_________________

JEFFREY UTTECHT, SUPERINTENDENT, WASH-

INGTON STATE PENITENTIARY, PETITIONER v.

CAL COBURN BROWN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 4, 2007]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Cal Coburn Brown robbed, raped, tortured,

and murdered one woman in Washington. Two days later,

he robbed, raped, tortured, and attempted to murder a

second woman in California. Apprehended, Brown con

fessed to these crimes and pleaded guilty to the California

offenses, for which he received a sentence of life impris

onment. The State of Washington, however, sought the

death penalty and brought Brown to trial. Based on the

jury’s verdicts in the guilt and sentencing phases of the

trial, Brown was sentenced to death. His conviction and

sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State

of Washington. State v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d. 529, 940

P. 2d 546 (1997) (en banc).

Brown filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

United States District Court for the Western District of

Washington. The District Court denied the petition, App.

to Pet. for Cert. 77a–79a, 91a, but the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Brown v. Lam

bert, 451 F. 3d 946 (2006). The Court of Appeals consid

2 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

ered, among other arguments for setting aside the capital

sentence, the contention that under Witherspoon v. Illi

nois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), and its progeny, the state trial

court had violated Brown’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amend

ment rights by excusing three potential jurors—whom we

refer to as Jurors X, Y, and Z—for cause. The State moved

to excuse these jurors due to the concern that they could

not be impartial in deciding whether to impose a death

sentence. The Court of Appeals held it was proper to

excuse Jurors X and Y, but agreed with the defense that it

was unconstitutional to excuse Juror Z for cause. On this

premise the court held that Brown’s death sentence could

not stand, requiring that Brown receive a new sentencing

trial more than a decade after his conviction.

We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. __ (2007), and we re

verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

When considering the controlling precedents,

Witherspoon is not the final word, but it is a necessary

starting point. During the voir dire that preceded William

Witherspoon’s capital trial, the prosecution succeeded in

removing a substantial number of jurors based on their

general scruples against inflicting the death penalty. The

State challenged, and the trial court excused for cause, 47

members of the 96-person venire, without significant

examination of the individual prospective jurors. 391

U. S., at 514–515; see also Brief for Petitioner in

Witherspoon v. Illinois, O. T. 1967, No. 1015, p. 4. The

Court held that the systematic removal of those in the

venire opposed to the death penalty had led to a jury

“uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die,” 391 U. S.,

at 521, and thus “woefully short of that impartiality to

which the petitioner was entitled under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments,” id., at 518. Because “[a] man

who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Opinion of the Court

favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted

to him by the State,” id., at 519, the Court held that “a

sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that

imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding

veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general

objections to the death penalty,” id., at 522. The Court

also set forth, in dicta in a footnote, a strict standard for

when an individual member of the venire may be removed

for cause on account of his or her views on the death pen

alty. Id., at 522–523, n. 21.

In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412 (1985), the Court

explained that “Witherspoon is best understood in the

context of its facts.” Id., at 418. The Court noted that in

Witherspoon the trial court had excused half the venire—

every juror with conscientious objections to capital pun

ishments. 469 U. S., at 416. Furthermore, the state sen

tencing scheme under which Witherspoon’s sentence was

imposed permitted the jury “unlimited discretion in choice

of sentence.” Id., at 421. When a juror is given unlimited

discretion, the Court explained, all he or she must do to

follow instructions is consider the death penalty, even if in

the end he or she would not be able to impose it. Ibid.

Rejecting the strict standard found in Witherspoon’s foot

note 21, the Court recognized that the diminished discre

tion now given to capital jurors and the State’s interest in

administering its capital punishment scheme called for a

different standard. The Court relied on Adams v. Texas,

448 U. S. 38, 45 (1980), which provided the following

standard: “[W]hether the juror’s views would prevent or

substantially impair the performance of his duties as a

juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”

Witt, 469 U. S., at 424 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court in Witt instructed that, in applying this

standard, reviewing courts are to accord deference to the

trial court. Deference is owed regardless of whether the

trial court engages in explicit analysis regarding substan

4 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

tial impairment; even the granting of a motion to excuse

for cause constitutes an implicit finding of bias. Id., at

430. The judgment as to “whether a veniremen is biased

. . . is based upon determinations of demeanor and credi

bility that are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.

Such determinations [are] entitled to deference even on

direct review; the respect paid such findings in a habeas

proceeding certainly should be no less.” Id., at 428 (inter

nal quotation marks, footnote, and brackets omitted). And

the finding may be upheld even in the absence of clear

statements from the juror that he or she is impaired be

cause “many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough

questions to reach the point where their bias has been

made ‘unmistakably clear’; these veniremen may not know

how they will react when faced with imposing the death

sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to

hide their true feelings.” Id., at 424–425. Thus, when

there is ambiguity in the prospective juror’s statements,

“the trial court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assess

ment of [the venireman’s] demeanor, [is] entitled to re

solve it in favor of the State.” Id., at 434.

The rule of deference was reinforced in Darden v.

Wainwright, 477 U. S. 168 (1986). There, the State had

challenged a potential juror, and the defense had not

objected to his removal. Without further questioning from

the trial court, the juror was excused. Id., at 178. The

petitioner argued to this Court that the transcript of voir

dire did not show that the removed juror was substantially

impaired because the critical answer he had given was

ambiguous. The Court rejected this argument. “[O]ur

inquiry does not end with a mechanical recitation of a

single question and answer.” Id., at 176. Even when

“[t]he precise wording of the question asked of [the veni

reman], and the answer he gave, do not by themselves

compel the conclusion that he could not under any circum

stance recommend the death penalty,” the need to defer to

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

Opinion of the Court

the trial court remains because so much may turn on a

potential juror’s demeanor. Id., at 178. The absence of an

objection, and the trial court’s decision not to engage in

further questioning as it had prior to excusing other ju

rors, supported the conclusion that the juror was im

paired. Ibid.

In Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U. S. 648 (1987), the Court

addressed once more a case involving not the excusal of a

single juror but rather systematic exclusion. The State

had lodged for-cause or peremptory challenges against

every juror who “expressed any degree of uncertainty in

the ability to cast . . . a vote” for the death penalty, id., at

652, and quickly exhausted all 12 of its peremptory chal

lenges, id., at 653. The prosecution then challenged a

juror who had expressed no opposition to the death pen

alty and had said many times that she could return a

death sentence. The trial court denied the challenge. Id.,

at 654–655. Arguing that the trial court had erroneously

denied certain earlier challenges for cause, and thus had

forced the State to waste peremptory challenges, the

prosecution sought to reopen those previous challenges.

The trial court refused to do so, but removed the current

juror, over objection from the defense. Id., at 655. On

appeal all of the state judges agreed the juror could not be

excused for cause under either the Witherspoon or the Witt

standard, but the majority held it was appropriate, under

the circumstances, to treat the challenge in question as a

peremptory strike. 481 U. S., at 656–657.

This Court reversed, holding that the juror had been

removed for cause and that she was not substantially

impaired under the controlling Witt standard. 481 U. S.,

at 659. The error was not subject to harmlessness review,

and thus the sentence could not stand. Ibid. Gray repre

sents a rare case, however, because in the typical situation

there will be a state-court finding of substantial impair

ment; in Gray, the state courts had found the opposite,

6 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

which makes that precedent of limited significance to the

instant case.

These precedents establish at least four principles of

relevance here. First, a criminal defendant has the right

to an impartial jury drawn from a venire that has not been

tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective prosecu

torial challenges for cause. Witherspoon, 391 U. S., at 521.

Second, the State has a strong interest in having jurors

who are able to apply capital punishment within the

framework state law prescribes. Witt, 469 U. S., at 416.

Third, to balance these interests, a juror who is substan

tially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death

penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for

cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, re

moval for cause is impermissible. Id., at 424. Fourth, in

determining whether the removal of a potential juror

would vindicate the State’s interest without violating the

defendant’s right, the trial court makes a judgment based

in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed

deference by reviewing courts. Id., at 424–434.

Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is

in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of

the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical impor

tance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of poten

tial jurors. Id., at 428; Darden, supra, at 178. Leading

treatises in the area make much of nonverbal communica

tion. See, e.g., V. Starr & M. McCormick, Jury Selection

389–523 (3d ed. 2001); J. Frederick, Mastering Voir Dire

and Jury Selection 39–56 (2d ed. 2005).

The requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, of

course, provide additional, and binding, directions to

accord deference. The provisions of that statute create an

independent, high standard to be met before a federal

court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to set aside state-

court rulings. See 28 U. S. C. §§2254(d)(1)–(2); Williams v.

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

Opinion of the Court

Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 413 (2000).

By not according the required deference, the Court of

Appeals failed to respect the limited role of federal habeas

relief in this area prescribed by Congress and by our cases.

II

A

In applying the principles of Witherspoon and Witt, it is

instructive to consider the entire voir dire in Brown’s case.

Spanning more than two weeks, the process entailed an

examination of numerous prospective jurors. After the

third day of the voir dire, during which few jurors were

questioned, the trial court explained the process would

“have to go a little bit faster.” Tr. 1398. The next day, the

court reiterated this concern, for it had told the jury the

trial would take no more than six weeks in order not to

conflict with the Christmas holidays. Id., at 1426.

Eleven days of the voir dire were devoted to determining

whether the potential jurors were death qualified. During

that phase alone, the defense challenged 18 members of

the venire for cause. Despite objections from the State, 11

of those prospective jurors were excused. As for the State,

it made 12 challenges for cause; defense counsel objected

seven times; and only twice was the juror excused follow

ing an objection from the defense. Before deciding a con

tested challenge, the trial court gave each side a chance to

explain its position and recall the potential juror for addi

tional questioning. When issuing its decisions the court

gave careful and measured explanations. See, e.g., id., at

2601–2604 (denying the State’s motion to excuse a juror

following an objection for defense); App. 97–100 (granting

the State’s motion to excuse Juror X despite an objection

from defense).

Before the State challenged Juror Z, the defense moved

to excuse a potential juror who had demonstrated some

confusion. After argument from both counsel, the trial

8 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

court explained that it would be open to further question

ing if one of the parties felt the juror’s position could be

clarified: “I thought at first the both of you were wanting

to excuse [this juror] since he seemed kind of confused to

both sides, but if there really is a question, let me know

and I don’t have any hesitation about bringing the juror

out here and following up.” Id., at 26. Consistent with the

need for an efficient voir dire, the court also told counsel:

“Let me point something out to both sides. If you are

going to agree on a challenge, . . . we can shortcut some of

what happens out here.” Ibid.

Setting aside the disputed circumstances of Juror Z’s

removal, the defense refrained from objecting to the

State’s challenges for cause only when the challenged

juror was explicit that he or she would not impose the

death penalty or could not understand the burden of proof.

See Tr. 1457, 1912, 2261, 2940. For other jurors, the

defense objections were vigorous and, it seems, persuasive.

The defense argued that the jurors’ equivocal statements

reflected careful thinking and responsibility, not substan

tial impairment. See, e.g., id., at 1791, 2111, 2815. The

tenacity of Brown’s counsel was demonstrated when, long

after the trial court had overruled the defense objection

and excused Juror Y, the defense moved in writing to have

her returned for further questioning and rehabilitation.

Id., at 3151–3154. The trial court denied this motion after

argument from both parties. Id., at 3154.

The defense also lodged its own challenges for cause. In

defending them against the State’s objections, defense

counsel argued, contrary to the position Brown takes in

this Court, that a trial court cannot rely upon a potential

juror’s bare promises to follow instructions and obey the

law. See, e.g., id., at 1713–1714, 1960–1961, 2772–2773,

3014–3016. With regard to one juror, defense counsel

argued:

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

Opinion of the Court

“Any time this individual was asked any questions

about following the law, he will always indicate that

he will. But when we look to see . . . his view[s] on the

death penalty, . . . they [are] so strong that they would

substantially impair his ability to follow the law and

to follow his oath as a juror.” Id., at 1960–1961.

In at least two instances this argument appears to have

prevailed when the trial court overruled the State’s objec

tion to Brown’s challenge for cause.

A final, necessary part of this history is the instruction

the venire received from the court concerning the sentenc

ing options in the case. Before individual oral examina

tion, the trial court distributed a questionnaire asking

jurors to explain their attitudes toward the death penalty.

When distributing the questionnaire, the court explained

the general structure of the trial and the burden of proof.

It described how the penalty phase would function:

“[I]f you found Mr. Brown guilty of the crime of first

degree murder with one or more aggravating circum

stances, then you would be reconvened for a second

phase called a sentencing phase. During that sen

tencing phase proceeding you could hear additional

evidence [and] arguments concerning the penalty to

be imposed. You would then be asked to retire to de

termine whether the death penalty should be imposed

or whether the punishment should be life imprison

ment without the possibility of parole.

“In making this determination you would be asked

the following question: Having in mind the crime

with which the defendant has been found guilty, are

you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there

are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit

leniency? If you unanimously answered yes to this

question, the sentence would be death. . . . [Other

wise] the sentence would be life imprisonment with

10 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

out the possibility of release or parole.” Id., at. 1089–

1090.

After the questionnaires were filled out, the jurors were

provided with handbooks that explained the trial process

and the sentencing phase in greater depth. Small groups

of potential jurors were then brought in to be questioned.

Before Juror Z’s group began, the court explained once

more that if Brown were convicted, “there are only two

penalties that a jury could return, one is life in prison

without possibility of release or parole. And that literally

means exactly that, a true life in prison without release or

parole.” Id., at 2016.

With this background, we turn to Juror Z’s examination.

B

Juror Z was examined on the seventh day of the voir

dire and the fifth day of the death-qualification phase.

The State argues that Juror Z was impaired not by his

general outlook on the death penalty, but rather by his

position regarding the specific circumstances in which the

death penalty would be appropriate. The transcript of

Juror Z’s questioning reveals that, despite the preceding

instructions and information, he had both serious misun

derstandings about his responsibility as a juror and an

attitude toward capital punishment that could have pre

vented him from returning a death sentence under the

facts of this case.

Under the voir dire procedures, the prosecution and

defense alternated in commencing the examination. For

Juror Z, the defense went first. When questioned, Juror Z

demonstrated no general opposition to the death penalty

or scruples against its infliction. In fact, he soon ex

plained that he “believe[d] in the death penalty in severe

situations.” App. 58. He elaborated, “I don’t think it

should never happen, and I don’t think it should happen

10 times a week either.” Id., at 63. “[T]here [are] times

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 11

Opinion of the Court

when it would be appropriate.” Ibid.

The questioning soon turned to when that would be so.

Juror Z’s first example was one in which “the defendant

actually came out and said that he actually wanted to die.”

Id., at 59. Defense set this aside and sought another

example. Despite having been told at least twice by the

trial court that if convicted of first-degree murder, Brown

could not be released from prison, the only example Juror

Z could provide was when “a person is . . . incorrigible and

would reviolate if released.” Id., at 62. The defense coun

sel replied that there would be no possibility of Brown’s

release and asked whether the lack of arguments about

recidivism during the penalty phase would frustrate Juror

Z. He answered, “I’m not sure.” Id., at 63.

The State began its examination of Juror Z by noting

that his questionnaire indicated he was “in favor of the

death penalty if it is proved beyond a shadow of a doubt if

a person has killed and would kill again.” Id., at 69. The

State explained that the burden of proof was beyond a

reasonable doubt, not beyond a shadow of a doubt, and

asked whether Juror Z understood. He answered, “[I]t

would have to be in my mind very obvious that the person

would reoffend.” Id., at 70. In response the State once

more explained to Juror Z, now for at least the fourth

time, that there was no possibility of Brown’s being re

leased to reoffend. Juror Z explained, “[I]t wasn’t until

today that I became aware that we had a life without

parole in the state of Washington,” id., at 71, although in

fact a week earlier the trial judge had explained to Juror

Z’s group that there was no possibility of parole when a

defendant was convicted of aggravated first-degree mur

der. The prosecution then asked, “And now that you know

there is such a thing . . . can you think of a time when you

would be willing to impose a death penalty . . . ?” Id., at

71–72. Juror Z answered, “I would have to give that some

thought.” Id., at 72. He supplied no further answer to the

12 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

question.

The State sought to probe Juror Z’s position further by

asking whether he could “consider” the death penalty;

Juror Z said he could, including under the general facts of

Brown’s crimes. Ibid. When asked whether he no longer

felt it was necessary for the State to show that Brown

would reoffend, Juror Z gave this confusing answer: “I do

feel that way if parole is an option, without parole as an

option. I believe in the death penalty.” Id., at 72–73.

Finally, when asked whether he could impose the death

penalty when there was no possibility of parole, Juror Z

answered, “[I]f I was convinced that was the appropriate

measure.” Id., at 73. Over the course of his questioning,

he stated six times that he could consider the death

penalty or follow the law, see id., at 62, 70, 72, 73, but

these responses were interspersed with more equivocal

statements.

The State challenged Juror Z, explaining that he was

confused about the conditions under which death could be

imposed and seemed to believe it only appropriate when

there was a risk of release and recidivism. Id., at 75.

Before the trial court could ask Brown for a response, the

defense volunteered, “We have no objection.” Ibid. The

court then excused Juror Z. Ibid.

III

On federal habeas review, years after the conclusion of

the voir dire, the Court of Appeals granted Brown relief

and overturned his sentence. The court held that both the

state trial court’s excusal of Juror Z and the State Su

preme Court’s affirmance of that ruling were contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law. 451 F. 3d, at 953. The Court of Appeals held

that the Supreme Court of Washington had failed to find

that Juror Z was substantially impaired; it further held

that the State Supreme Court could not have made that

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 13

Opinion of the Court

finding in any event because the transcript unambigu

ously proved Juror Z was not substantially impaired. For

these reasons, explained the Court of Appeals, the trial

court’s decision to excuse Juror Z was contrary to the

Witherspoon-Witt rule despite Brown’s failure to object.

Each of the holdings of the Court of Appeals is wrong.

A

As part of its exposition and analysis, the Court of Ap

peals found fault with the opinion of the Supreme Court of

Washington. It stated that although the State Supreme

Court had held that Jurors X and Y were substantially

impaired, the same “finding is missing from the state

court’s discussion” of Juror Z’s excusal. 451 F. 3d, at 950.

The Court of Appeals therefore held “[t]he Washington

Supreme Court in this case applied the wrong standard

with respect to Juror Z.” Id., at 953, n. 10. This is an

erroneous summary of the State Supreme Court’s opinion.

The state court did make an explicit ruling that Juror Z

was impaired. In a portion of the opinion entitled “Sum

mary and Conclusions,” the court held: “The trial court

properly exercised its discretion in excusing for cause

prospective jurors [X, Y, and Z] during voir dire. Their

views would have prevented or substantially impaired

their ability to follow the court’s instructions and abide by

their oaths as jurors.” Brown, 132 Wash. 2d, at 630, 940

P. 2d, at 598, 599. It is unclear why the Court of Appeals

overlooked or disregarded this finding, and it was mis

taken in faulting the completeness of the Supreme Court

of Washington’s opinion.

Even absent this explicit finding, the Supreme Court of

Washington’s opinion was not contrary to our cases. The

court identified the Witherspoon-Witt rule, recognized that

our precedents required deference to the trial court, and

applied an abuse-of-discretion standard. 132 Wash. 2d, at

601, 940 P. 2d, at 584. Having set forth that framework, it

14 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

explained:

“[Brown] did not object at trial to the State’s challenge

of [Juror Z] for cause. At any rate, [Juror Z] was

properly excused. On voir dire he indicated he would

impose the death penalty where the defendant ‘would

reviolate if released,’ which is not a correct statement

of the law. He also misunderstood the State’s burden

of proof . . . although he was corrected later. The trial

court did not abuse its discretion in excusing [Juror Z]

for cause.” Id., at 604, 940 P. 2d, at 585.

The only fair reading of the quoted language is that the

state court applied the Witt standard in assessing the

excusal of Juror Z. Regardless, there is no requirement in

a case involving the Witherspoon-Witt rule that a state

appellate court make particular reference to the excusal of

each juror. See Early v. Packer, 537 U. S. 3, 9 (2002) (per

curiam). It is the trial court’s ruling that counts.

B

From our own review of the state trial court’s ruling, we

conclude the trial court acted well within its discretion in

granting the State’s motion to excuse Juror Z.

Juror Z’s answers, on their face, could have led the trial

court to believe that Juror Z would be substantially im

paired in his ability to impose the death penalty in the

absence of the possibility that Brown would be released

and would reoffend. And the trial court, furthermore, is

entitled to deference because it had an opportunity to

observe the demeanor of Juror Z. We do not know any

thing about his demeanor, in part because a transcript

cannot fully reflect that information but also because the

defense did not object to Juror Z’s removal. Nevertheless,

the State’s challenge, Brown’s waiver of an objection, and

the trial court’s excusal of Juror Z support the conclusion

that the interested parties present in the courtroom all felt

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 15

Opinion of the Court

that removing Juror Z was appropriate under the

Witherspoon-Witt rule. See Darden, 477 U. S., at 178

(emphasizing the defendant’s failure to object and the

judge’s decision not to engage in further questioning as

evidence of impairment).

Juror Z’s assurances that he would consider imposing

the death penalty and would follow the law do not over

come the reasonable inference from his other statements

that in fact he would be substantially impaired in this case

because there was no possibility of release. His assur

ances did not require the trial court to deny the State’s

motion to excuse Juror Z. The defense itself had told the

trial court that any juror would make similar guarantees

and that they were worth little; instead, defense counsel

explained, the court should listen to arguments concerning

the substance of the juror’s answers. The trial court in

part relied, as diligent judges often must, upon both par

ties’ counsel to explain why a challenged juror’s problem

atic beliefs about the death penalty would not rise to the

level of substantial impairment. Brown’s counsel offered

no defense of Juror Z. In light of the deference owed to

the trial court the position Brown now maintains does

not convince us the decision to excuse Juror Z was

unreasonable.

It is true that in order to preserve a Witherspoon claim

for federal habeas review there is no independent federal

requirement that a defendant in state court object to the

prosecution’s challenge; state procedural rules govern. We

nevertheless take into account voluntary acquiescence to,

or confirmation of, a juror’s removal. By failing to object,

the defense did not just deny the conscientious trial judge

an opportunity to explain his judgment or correct any

error. It also deprived reviewing courts of further factual

findings that would have helped to explain the trial court’s

decision. The harm caused by a defendant’s failure to

object to a juror’s excusal was described well by a Wash

16 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

ington appellate court in a different case:

“When a challenge for cause is made, opposing counsel

can object either on the grounds that it is facially in

sufficient or that the facts needed to support it are not

true. [Defendant] did neither. Had [defendant] ob

jected immediately to the State’s challenge for cause,

the court could have tried the issue and determined

the law and facts. Because [defendant] did not timely

object to the excusal of Juror 30, the court had no op

portunity to remedy whatever factual questions were

in the mind of [defendant’s] counsel.” State v. Taylor,

No. 16057–2–III etc., 1998 WL 75648, *5 (Wash.

App., Feb. 24, 1998) (unpublished opinion; citations

omitted).

The defense may have chosen not to object because

Juror Z seemed substantially impaired. See 451 F. 3d, at

959 (Tallman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en

banc). Or defense counsel may have felt that Juror Z, a

basketball referee whose stepbrother was a police officer,

would have been favorable to the State. See App. 68, 74;

451 F. 3d, at 953, n. 9 (reasoning that “defense counsel

declined to object because he was glad to get rid of juror Z.

After all, Z had described himself as pro-death penalty

. . . . Defense counsel must have thanked his lucky stars

when the prosecutor bumped Z”). Or the failure to object

may have been an attempt to introduce an error into the

trial because the defense realized Brown’s crimes were

horrific and the mitigating evidence was weak. Although

we do not hold that, because the defense may have wanted

Juror Z on the jury, any error was harmless, neither must

we treat the defense’s acquiescence in Juror Z’s removal as

inconsequential.

The defense’s volunteered comment that there was no

objection is especially significant because of frequent

defense objections to the excusal of other jurors and the

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 17

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trial court’s request that if both parties wanted a juror

removed, saying so would expedite the process. In that

context the statement was not only a failure to object but

also an invitation to remove Juror Z.

We reject the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the

excusal of Juror Z entitles Brown to federal habeas relief.

The need to defer to the trial court’s ability to perceive

jurors’ demeanor does not foreclose the possibility that a

reviewing court may reverse the trial court’s decision

where the record discloses no basis for a finding of sub

stantial impairment. But where, as here, there is lengthy

questioning of a prospective juror and the trial court has

supervised a diligent and thoughtful voir dire, the trial

court has broad discretion. The record does not show the

trial court exceeded this discretion in excusing Juror Z;

indeed the transcript shows considerable confusion on the

part of the juror, amounting to substantial impairment.

The Supreme Court of Washington recognized the defer

ence owed to the trial court and, contrary to the Court of

Appeals’ misreading of the state court’s opinion, identified

the correct standard required by federal law and found it

satisfied. That decision, like the trial court’s, was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law.

IV

Brown raises two additional arguments that rely upon

Washington state law. He first contends we should not

consider his failure to object because Washington state

law does not require a defendant to object to a challenge to

a potential juror. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35 (“As to the . . .

failure to object . . . we have admitted that what [defense

counsel] said was I have no objection. . . . But [they] all

knew that this issue could be raised for the first time on

appeal”). In addition he asserts that even if Juror Z’s

statements indicated that he would base his decision upon

18 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

the risk of Brown reoffending, that requirement was con

sistent with the state sentencing scheme.

For the reasons explained above the defense’s failure to

object in this case has significance to our analysis even on

the assumption that state law did not require an objection

to preserve an error for review in the circumstances of this

case. The Supreme Court of Washington, however, noted

Brown’s failure to object, suggesting it had significance for

its own analysis. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d, at 604, 940 P. 2d,

at 585. This is consistent with Washington law, which

permits a party to “except” to the opposing party’s chal

lenge of a juror for cause, Wash. Rev. Code 4.44.230

(2006), and gives appellate courts discretion to bar “any

claim of error which was not raised in the trial court”

unless that error is a “manifest error affecting a constitu

tional right,” Wash. Rule App. Proc. 2.5(a) (2006). See also

13 R. Ferguson, Washington Practice: Criminal Practice

and Procedure §4908, p. 432 (3d ed. 2004) (“In general,

issues not raised in the trial court will not be considered

for the first time on appeal. It is the purpose of this gen

eral rule to give the trial court an opportunity to correct

the alleged error. Accordingly, it is the duty of counsel to

call the trial court’s attention to the alleged error . . .”

(footnotes omitted)).

The Supreme Court of Washington also held that Juror

Z misstated Washington’s sentencing law. Brown, supra,

at 604, 940 P. 2d, at 585. It is not for us to second-guess

that determination, and our conclusion is, in any event,

the same as that court’s. Juror Z did not say that the

likelihood of Brown’s harming someone while in prison

would be among his sentencing considerations. Rather,

the sole reason Juror Z expressed for imposing the death

penalty, in a case where the accused opposed it, was

whether the defendant could be released and would revio

late. That is equivalent to treating the risk of recidivism

as the sole aggravating factor, rather than treating lack of

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 19

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future dangerousness as a possible mitigating considera

tion. See Wash. Rev. Code §10.95.020 (2006) (setting forth

aggravating factors); §10.95.070 (setting forth future

dangerousness as one of eight mitigating factors).

For these reasons, we are not persuaded to depart from

the Supreme Court of Washington’s determination of the

state law at issue or to ignore Brown’s failure to object.

* * *

Capital defendants have the right to be sentenced by an

impartial jury. The State may not infringe this right by

eliminating from the venire those whose scruples against

the death penalty would not substantially impair the

performance of their duties. Courts reviewing claims of

Witherspoon-Witt error, however, especially federal courts

considering habeas petitions, owe deference to the trial

court, which is in a superior position to determine the

demeanor and qualifications of a potential juror. The

Court of Appeals neglected to accord this deference. And

on this record it was error to find that Juror Z was not

substantially impaired. The judgment of the Court of

Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

20 UTTECHT v. BROWN

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Appendix to opinion of the Court

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT

Excerpts of Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Voir Dire)

(Nov. 3, 1993) in State v. Brown, Cause No. 91–1–03233–1

(Super. Ct. King Cty., Wash.), App. 57–75:

THE COURT: All right. [Juror Z]. (Prospective Juror,

[Juror Z], entered the courtroom.)

THE COURT: That’s fine, [Juror Z]. Good afternoon.

[JUROR Z]: Good afternoon.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions at all about

any of the preliminary instructions that you got this after

noon and the format that we were talking about or the

reasons why the attorneys have to discuss the penalty

phase when there may never really be a penalty phase.

[JUROR Z]: No, I think I understand the situation.

THE COURT: Did you answer or nod your head about

remembering something about having heard this crime

before?

[JUROR Z]: No, I did not.

THE COURT: Okay. We’ll start with the defense.

MS. HUPP: Thank you, your Honor.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

BY MS. HUPP:

Q Good afternoon. My name is Lin-Marie Hupp, and

I’m one of Cal Brown’s attorneys.

I would like to start off asking you some questions about

your feelings about the death penalty. I want to reinforce

what the Judge has already told you, which is there are no

right or wrong answers. We just need to get information

about your feelings so we can do our job.

A Okay.

Q Can you tell me when it was you first realized this

was a potential death penalty case?

A Not until last Monday when I was here in the initial

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 21

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Appendix to opinion of the Court

jury information session.

Q Okay. Can you tell me when the Judge read that

long thing to you and basically told you that this was a

potential in the case, can you tell me what you were think

ing when you heard that?

A I guess I wasn’t surprised when I got the announce

ment for jury duty. And it was more than the standard

two weeks that most everybody else goes to. I thought it

must be a pretty substantial case. In my mind I tried to

guess what it might be, so this is one of the things that

entered into it.

Q Can you give me an idea of what your general feel

ings about the death penalty are?

A I do believe in the death penalty in severe situations.

A good example might be the young man from, I believe he

was from Renton that killed a couple of boys down in the

Vancouver area and was sentenced to the death penalty,

and wanted the death penalty. And I think it is appropri

ate in severe cases.

Q And that case you’re talking about, that is the one

where he actually came out, the defendant actually came

out and said that he actually wanted to die?

A I believe that was the case.

Q Does that have any kind of bearing on your idea that

the death penalty was appropriate in his case?

A I believe that it was in that case.

Q If you removed that factor completely from it, is that

again the type of case that you think the death penalty

would be appropriate?

A It would have to be a severe case. I guess I can’t put

a real line where that might be, but there are a lot of cases

that I don’t think it’s where people would—

Q Okay. And let me kind of fill in the blanks for myself

here by just asking you a couple of questions about that.

I’m assuming that there would not be any case other than

murder that you would think the death penalty would be

22 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

Appendix to opinion of the Court

appropriate?

A I think that is correct.

Q Okay. And the way the law is in Washington any

way, in order to get to the point where you would even

consider the death penalty, the State would first have to

prove that you had committed a premeditate murder and

one that had been thought about beforehand.

Do you have any kind of feeling that something other

than a premeditated murder, in other words, one that

would have been planned that would be appropriate for

the death penalty?

A No. I think it would have to be premeditated.

Q In addition to that in Washington even premeditated

murders are not eligible for a potential death penalty

unless the State also proves aggravating circumstances.

In this case the State is alleging or is going to try and

prove a number of aggravating circumstances, four of

them. Okay. And the ones that they are going to try and

prove are that the murder was committed, a premeditated

murder was committed during a rape, a robbery, a kid

napping and that it was done in order to conceal a witness

or eliminate a witness.

Does that fall within the class of cases that you think

the death penalty is appropriate?

A I think that would be.

Q Okay. Now, how about other sentencing options in a

case like that, do you think that something other than the

death penalty might be an appropriate sentence?

A I think that if a person is temporarily insane or

things of that that lead a person to do things that they

would not normally do, I think that would enter into it.

Q All right. Other than—well, maybe what we should

do—the way that the law is in Washington, if the jury

finds beyond a reasonable doubt that somebody has com

mitted a premeditated murder with at least one aggravat

ing circumstance, and in this case you have a potential for

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 23

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Appendix to opinion of the Court

the four, then the jury reconvenes to consider whether or

not the death penalty should be imposed or whether or not

a life sentence without parole should be imposed.

One sort of aside here, life without parole is exactly

what it sounds like. It is a life sentence. You’re not ever

eligible for parole. You hear about it in the papers some

times where somebody has got a life sentence and they’re

going to be eligible for parole in 10 years or 20 years.

A I understand.

Q Were you aware before that Washington has got this

kind of sentence where it’s life without parole where you

are not ever eligible for parole?

A I did not until this afternoon.

Q That is the two options that the jury has if they found

the person guilty of premeditated murder beyond a rea

sonable doubt plus aggravating circumstances beyond a

reasonable doubt.

Do you think that you could consider both options?

A Yes, I could.

Q Could you give me an idea sort of have you thought

about sort of the underlying reason why you think the

death penalty is appropriate, what purpose it serves, that

kind of thing?

A I think if a person is, would be incorrigible and would

reviolate if released, I think that’s the type of situation

that would be appropriate.

Q Okay. Now, knowing that you didn’t know before

when you were coming to those opinions about the two

options that we have here obviously somebody who is not

going to get out of jail no matter which sentence you give

them if you got to that point of making a decision about

the sentence, does that mean what I’m hearing you say is

that you could consider either alternative?

A I believe so, yes.

Q Now, in your, I think in your questionnaire you sort

of referred to that also, what you kind of thought about

24 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

Appendix to opinion of the Court

was if somebody had been killed and it had been proven to

you that they would kill again. Understanding that the

two options there are life without parole or the death

penalty, there is not a lot of likelihood that people are

going to spend a lot of time talking about whether or not

they’re going to kill again in the sentencing phase of this

case. Is that going to make you frustrated? Are you going

to want to hear about things like that, about people’s

opinions in the penalty phase?

A I’m not sure.

Q Okay. That’s very fair. Do you have any kind of

feelings about the frequency of the use of the death pen

alty in the United States today? Do you think it’s used too

frequently or not often enough?

A It seemed like there were several years when it

wasn’t used at all and just recently it has become more

prevalent in the news anyway. I don’t think it should

never happen, and I don’t think it should happen 10 times

a week either. I’m not sure what the appropriate number

is but I think in severe situations, it is appropriate.

Q It sounds like you’re a little more confortable that it

is being used some of the time?

A Yes.

Q You weren’t happy with the time when it wasn’t

being used at all?

A I can’t say I was happy or unhappy, I just felt that

there were times when it would be appropriate.

Q Let me ask you, and we may have covered this al

ready, but let me ask you just to make sure I understand.

If the State were to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant had committed a premeditated murder with

aggravating circumstances that I have laid out for you,

rape, robbery, kidnapping, to conceal or eliminate a wit

ness, at least one of those, in addition another thing you

might hear in this trial is some evidence that the defen

dant deliberately inflicted pain upon the victim before she

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 25

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Appendix to opinion of the Court

died for some period of time.

If that was the crime that you heard about and came to

a decision about guilty about, do you think you consider a

life sentence?

A I could consider it but I don’t know if I really have

enough information to make a determination.

Q Right. And it’s real tough to be asking you these

questions and even tougher for you to have to answer

them without any evidence before you. But you under

stand that this is our only time to do that before you have

heard all the evidence?

A I understand, yes.

Q As a matter of fact, the law in this state after, even

after you have found somebody guilty of really hideous

crime like that presumes that the sentence, the appropri

ate sentence is life without parole. The State has the

burden of proof, again, in the penalty phase. And they

would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there

are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit a life

sentence.

Are you comfortable with that idea that you start off

presuming that, as a matter of fact, even for a hideous

crime that a life sentence is the appropriate sentence?

A It is or is not?

Q That it is an appropriate sentence.

A I guess I’m a little confused by the question. So, you

go into it with a life sentence is the appropriate sentence?

Q Right. If you look at the chart here, there’s almost a

mirror image to start off a trial presuming that somebody

is innocent and you start off a sentencing presuming that

a life sentence is appropriate?

A I see.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q Okay. Now, as far as mitigating circumstances, you

had mentioned the idea that maybe somebody was tempo

26 UTTECHT v. BROWN

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Appendix to opinion of the Court

rarily insane. The Judge is going to give you an instruc

tion on mitigating circumstances, and I will defines it for

you, but the definition is real broad. The definition basi

cally is, any reason, not a justification, not an excuse for

the crime and not a defense to the crime, but a reason for

imposing something other than death. That’s pretty broad.

MR. MATTHEWS: I object to that question. I don’t

believe that is a question. I believe that’s a statement.

THE COURT: The objection will be sustained.

Q (BY MS. HUPP) The judge will instruct you about

what a mitigating circumstance is.

But what I want to be real clear about is that it’s not a

defense to the crime. Okay. In other words, if you believe

that somebody was really temporarily insane at the time

he committed the offense, well, then it wouldn’t be pre

meditated. It would be an insanity defense, and that

would all get dealt with—

MR. MATTHEWS: Your Honor, again, I am going to

object to the nature of the question.

THE COURT: [Juror Z], you were the one that actually

brought it up in terms of the mental status of the person.

You are the one who said temporarily insane when they

committed this kind of crime. You realize that there are

particular defenses that may be available in the actual

criminal case itself, the guilt phase.

But once you get to the penalty phase, we’re not talking

about the crime in any way, and you’re simply trying to

determine what the appropriate punishment or sanction

should be for a crime that a person has been found guilty

of. At that point in time, something like all sorts of miti

gating circumstances come into it, and mental status can

come into it. But it would only be evaluated in the light of

the mitigating circumstances, not a defense. Do you un

derstand that?

A Understand.

Q (BY MS. HUPP) To just sort of follow up on that, if

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Appendix to opinion of the Court

mental status came into play and you were presented with

some sort of evidence about mental status, is that the sort

of evidence you would consider?

A Yes, I could.

Q How about things like somebody’s childhood or their

emotional development?

A I could consider it. I don’t have strong feelings one

way or the other.

Q Okay. All right. And, also, when we talk about miti

gating circumstances, what might be mitigating to you

might not matter much to the person sitting next to you in

juror’s box. Do you think you could discuss your feelings

about those things?

A Yes.

Q Could you, say the person next to you says something

is mitigating and you don’t think it’s very mitigating at

all, could you also discuss it in this situation?

A (Nodding head).

Q Could you respect that other person’s opinion?

A Everybody is entitled to an opinion, yes.

Q Another thing that happens at the sentencing phase

of the trial is that the jury would have to be unanimous, in

other words, everybody would have to agree if they were

going to impose a death sentence. If one person, four

people, five people, how ever many people don’t agree with

that, then the sentence is life. Okay. So, it kind of strips

away that sort of comfort in numbers that some people get

from the idea of having a unanimous decision.

Do you think you can accept the responsibility for such

an important decision for yourself?

A I do.

Q Okay. Thank you.

MS. HUPP: I have no further questions.

THE COURT: The State.

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Appendix to opinion of the Court

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

BY MR. MATTHEWS:

Q [Juror Z], I’m Al Matthews. I’m one of two prosecu

tors in the case. I have got some very specific questions,

and perhaps we can clear them up real rapidly.

I see your step-brother is a policeman and you see him

about four times a year.

A (Nodding head).

Q Do you ever have any discussions about the death

penalty, is this a subject that ever comes up?

A No.

Q Have you ever had occasion to discuss it at all within

the family circle?

A I don’t believe so.

Q You mentioned on your questionnaire, and we do

read them, that you’re in favor of the death penalty if it is

proved beyond a shadow of a doubt if a person has killed

and would kill again. Do you remember making that

statement?

A Yes.

Q First of all, have you ever been on a jury trial before?

A I have not.

Q Now, you made this statement before you read your

juror’s handbook I imagine?

A Yes.

Q So, I want to ask you, the thing that bothers me, of

course, is the idea beyond a shadow of a doubt. The law

says beyond a reasonable doubt, and it will be explained to

you what it actually means. But I want to assure you it

doesn’t mean, I don’t believe the Court would instruct

would you it means beyond all doubt or beyond any

shadow of a doubt. Knowing that, would you still require

the State to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that the

crime occurred knowing that the law doesn’t require that

much of us?

A I would have to know the, I’m at a loss for the words

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 29

Opinion of the Court

Appendix to opinion of the Court

here.

Q You can ask me any questions, too, if you need some

clarification.

A I guess it would have to be in my mind very obvious

that the person would reoffend.

Q Well, we’re not talking about that, sir.

A Or was guilty, yes.

Q So, we’re talking about that?

A Yes.

Q So, you would be satisfied with a reasonable doubt

standard? You would be willing to follow the law?

A Yes.

Q In other words, nothing, there is very few things in

life absolutely certain?

A I understand.

Q And that is basically what we’re saying to you, and

that is what the term reasonable doubt means—

A (Nodding head).

Q —that we don’t have to prove it beyond all doubt.

Now, we get to the penalty phase and the question

becomes slightly different. It presumes life as a person is

presumed innocent in the guilt phase, it is presumed that

the proper penalty for the beginning point in the penalty

phase is life in prison without parole.

Now, you mentioned that you would have to be satisfied

that the person would not kill again. Now, you know that

the possible, that the only two penalties are life in prison

without parole or death. The person, if he is committed, if

he is convicted of aggravated murder, is not going to be

out on the streets again, not going to come in contact with

the people that he had a chance to run into before. So, the

likelihood of him killing someone out in the street is nil or

practically nil at that point.

I guess the reverse side of what you’re saying is, if you

could be convinced that he wouldn’t kill again, would you

find it difficult to vote for the death penalty given a situa

30 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

Appendix to opinion of the Court

tion where he couldn’t kill again?

A I think I made that statement more under assump

tion that a person could be paroled. And it wasn’t until

today that I became aware that we had a life without

parole in the state of Washington.

Q And now that you know there is such a thing and

they do mean what they say, can you think of a time when

you would be willing to impose a death penalty since the

person would be locked up for the rest of his life?

A I would have to give that some thought. I really, like

I said, up until an hour ago did not realize that there was

an option of life without parole.

Q And I realize this is put on you rather suddenly, but

you also recognize as someone who is representing the

State in this case, we have made the election to ask that

the jury if he is found guilty, ask that the jury vote for the

death penalty.

And I’m asking you a very important thing and to

everyone in here, whether you, knowing that the person

would never get out for the rest of his life, two things. And

they’re slightly different. One, whether you could consider

the death penalty and the second thing I would ask you is

whether you could impose the death penalty. I’m not

asking a promise or anything.

But I’m asking you, first, could you consider it, and if

you could consider it, do you think under the conditions

where the man would never get out again you could im

pose it?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, this idea of him having to kill again to deserve

the death penalty is something that you are not firm on,

you don’t feel that now?

A I do feel that way if parole is an option, without

parole as an option. I believe in the death penalty. Like I

said, I’m not sure that there should be a waiting line of

people happening every day or every week even, but I

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 31

Opinion of the Court

Appendix to opinion of the Court

think in severe situations it’s an appropriate measure.

Q But in the situation where a person is locked up for

the rest of his life and there is no chance of him ever get

ting out again, which would be the situation in this case,

do you think you could also consider and vote for the death

penalty under those circumstances?

A I could consider it, yes.

Q Then could you impose it?

A I could if I was convinced that was the appropriate

measure.

MR. MATTHEWS: I have no further questions.

THE COURT: All right. [Juror Z], there is something

that I want to clarify in response to some of the questions

that were asked of you.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

BY THE COURT:

Q In your questionnaire it talks about beyond a shadow

of a doubt, and the prosecutor here went into that a little

further. You realize that that is the standard that the law

imposes on the State to prove a case beyond a reasonable

doubt. And, obviously, that is a question of interpretation.

You officiate basketball games. That’s in your question

naire. You, even at the college level, knowing how fast

that game is, you have to make a call on some of those

calls and you have to decide whether to blow that whistle

and make that particular call. Do you think you under

stand the difference between a reasonable call and beyond

a shadow of a doubt type call?

A I guess I do. The terminology beyond a shadow of a

doubt, when I wrote that I wasn’t even sure whether, I

mean, it’s just terminology that I have heard probably

watching Perry Mason or something over the years. But I

guess the point I was making that it has to be—

Q You would have to be positive?

A I would have to be positive, that’s correct.

32 UTTECHT v. BROWN

Opinion of the Court

Appendix to opinion of the Court

Q The State has to convince you?

A Yes.

Q As they would have to convince any reasonable per

son?

A Yes.

THE COURT: [Juror Z], let me have you step back into

the juryroom. The bailiff will excuse you from there in

just a few minutes. Thank you.

Counsel, any challenge to this particular juror?

MR. MATTHEWS: I would, your Honor, not on the term

beyond a shadow of a doubt, I think he would certainly

stick with the reasonable doubt standard. But I think he

is very confused about the statements where he said that

if a person can’t kill again, in other words, he’s locked up

for the rest of his life, he said, basically, he could vote for

the death penalty if it was proved beyond a shadow of.

And I am certainly going to concede that he means beyond

a reasonable doubt. And if a person kills and will kill

again. And I think he has some real problems with that.

He said he hadn’t really thought about it. And I don’t

think at this period of time he’s had an opportunity to

think about it, and I don’t think he said anything that

overcame this idea of he must kill again before he imposed

the death penalty or be in a position to kill again. So, that

is my only challenge.

MR. MULLIGAN: We have no objection.

THE COURT: Counsel, the request of the prosecutor’s

office, we will go ahead and excuse [Juror Z].

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

STEVENS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–413

_________________

JEFFREY UTTECHT, SUPERINTENDENT, WASH-

INGTON STATE PENITENTIARY, PETITIONER v.

CAL COBURN BROWN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 4, 2007]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE

GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.

Millions of Americans oppose the death penalty. A cross

section of virtually every community in the country in

cludes citizens who firmly believe the death penalty is

unjust but who nevertheless are qualified to serve as

jurors in capital cases. An individual’s opinion that a life

sentence without the possibility of parole is the severest

sentence that should be imposed in all but the most hei

nous cases does not even arguably “ ‘prevent or substan

tially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in

accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” Wain

wright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412, 420 (1985) (emphasis de

leted). Moreover, an individual who maintains such a

position, or even one who opposes the death penalty as a

general matter, “ ‘may not be challenged for cause based

on his views about capital punishment.’ ” Ibid. Today the

Court ignores these well-established principles, choosing

instead to defer blindly to a state court’s erroneous charac

terization of a juror’s voir dire testimony.1 Although this

——————

1 The Court opens its opinion with a graphic description of the under

lying facts of respondent’s crime, perhaps in an attempt to startle the

reader or muster moral support for its decision. Given the legal ques

tion at issue, and the procedural posture of this case, the inclusion of

2 UTTECHT v. BROWN

STEVENS, J., dissenting

case comes to us under the standard of review imposed by

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, the level of deference given by

the Court to the state courts in this case is completely

unwarranted based on the record before us. Because I

find no justification in the record or elsewhere for the

decision to strike Juror Z for cause, I must dissent.

I

When the State challenged Juror Z, it argued that he

was “confused about the conditions under which [the

death penalty] could be imposed and seemed to believe it

only appropriate when there was a risk of release and

recidivism.” Ante, at 12. A more accurate characteriza

tion of Juror Z’s testimony is that although he harbored

some general reservations about the death penalty, he

stated that he could consider and would vote to impose the

death penalty where appropriate.2 When asked for “an

——————

such a description is, in my view, both irrelevant and unnecessary. Cf.

Witt, 469 U. S., at 440, n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“However heinous

Witt’s crime, the majority’s vivid portrait of its gruesome details has no

bearing on the issue before us. It is not for this Court to decide whether

Witt deserves to die. That decision must first be made by a jury of his

peers, so long as the jury is impartial and drawn from a fair cross

section of the community in conformity with the requirements of the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments”).

2 In contrast to Juror Z’s statements, those jurors who have been

properly struck under the Witherspoon-Witt rule have made much

stronger statements with regard to their inability to follow the law or to

impose the death penalty. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412,

416 (1985) (juror confirming that her personal beliefs would interfere

with her ability to judge the guilt or innocence of the defendant); id., at

438, n. 7 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (discussing the two

other jurors who were properly dismissed for cause, one of whom stated

that he would not be able to “ ‘follow the law as instructed by the

Court’ ” when the death penalty was in issue, and the other of whom

stated that he could not “keep an open mind as to whether to vote for

the death penalty or life”). Cf. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U. S. 648, 653–

654, and n. 5, 659 (1987) (holding that a juror who seemed “somewhat

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

STEVENS, J., dissenting

idea . . . of the underlying reason why you think the death

penalty is appropriate [or] what purpose it serves,” Juror

Z responded that “the type of situation” in which the death

penalty would be appropriate was “if a person was incorri

gible and would reviolate if released.” App. 62 (emphasis

added). After it was explained to Juror Z that the only two

sentencing alternatives available under Washington law

would be life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole and a death sentence, Juror Z repeatedly confirmed

that even if he knew the defendant would never be re

leased, he would still be able to consider and vote for the

death penalty. Id., at 62, 72, 73. As for any general reser

vations Juror Z may have had about the imposition of the

death penalty, it is clear from his testimony that he was in

no way categorically opposed to it. When asked whether

he was “a little more comfortable that it is being used

some of the time,” Juror Z responded in the affirmative.

Id., at 63.

While such testimony might justify a prosecutor’s per

emptory challenge, until today not one of the many cases

decided in the wake of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S.

510 (1968), has suggested that such a view would support

a challenge for cause. The distinction that our cases re

quire trial judges to draw is not between jurors who are in

favor of the death penalty and those who oppose it, but

rather between two sub-classes within the latter class—

those who will conscientiously apply the law and those

whose conscientious scruples necessarily prevent them

from doing so.3 As then-Justice Rehnquist explained in

——————

confused” but who stated that she “could” vote for the death penalty

“ ‘was clearly qualified to be seated as a juror under the Adams [v.

Texas, 448 U. S. 38 (1980)] and Witt criteria’ ”).

3 “The state of this case law leaves trial courts with the difficult task

of distinguishing between prospective jurors whose opposition to capital

punishment will not allow them to apply the law or view the facts

impartially and jurors who, though opposed to capital punishment, will

4 UTTECHT v. BROWN

STEVENS, J., dissenting

his opinion for the Court in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U. S.

162, 176 (1986):

“It is important to remember that not all who oppose

the death penalty are subject to removal for cause in

capital cases; those who firmly believe that the death

penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in

capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are

willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in

deference to the rule of law.”

Today’s opinion simply ignores the justification for this

strict rule. As we explained 20 years ago:

“The State’s power to exclude for cause jurors from

capital juries does not extend beyond its interest in

removing those jurors who would ‘frustrate the State’s

legitimate interest in administering constitutional

capital sentencing schemes by not following their

oaths.’ Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S., at 423. To

permit the exclusion for cause of other prospective ju

rors based on their views of the death penalty unnec

essarily narrows the cross section of venire members.

It ‘stack[s] the deck against the petitioner. To execute

[such a] death sentence would deprive him of his life

without due process of law.’ Witherspoon v. Illinois,

391 U. S., at 523.” Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U. S. 648,

658–659 (1987).

In its opinion, the Court blindly accepts the state court’s

conclusory statement that Juror Z’s views would have

“substantially impaired” his ability to follow the court’s

instructions without examining what that term means in

practice and under our precedents. Ante, at 13. Even

AEDPA does not permit us to abdicate our judicial role in

——————

nevertheless conscientiously apply the law to the facts adduced at

trial.” Witt, 469 U. S., at 421.

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

STEVENS, J., dissenting

this fashion.

The high threshold that must be crossed to establish the

kind of impairment that would justify the exclusion of a

juror under the rule of Wainwright v. Witt is illustrated by

Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court in Darden v. Wain

wright, 477 U. S. 168 (1986). In that case, we assumed

that a prospective juror’s affirmative answer to the follow

ing question would not suffice to support his exclusion for

cause: “ ‘Do you have any moral or religious, conscientious

moral or religious principles in opposition to the death

penalty so strong that you would be unable without violat

ing your own principles to vote to recommend a death

penalty regardless of the facts?’ ” Id., at 178. We recog

nized that the juror’s answer by itself did not compel the

conclusion that he could not under any circumstances

recommend the death penalty. See ibid. (“The precise

wording of the question asked of [the juror], and the an

swer he gave, do not by themselves compel the conclusion

that he could not under any circumstance recommend the

death penalty”). We nevertheless upheld his exclusion

because the trial judge had previously explained that he

wanted to know if “ ‘you have such strong religious, moral

or conscientious principles in opposition to the death

penalty that you would be unwilling to vote to return an

advisory sentence recommending the death sentence even

though the facts presented to you should be such as under

the law would require that recommendation?’ ” Id., at 176

(emphasis added). Our holding in Darden rested squarely

on the distinction between mere opposition to the death

penalty—even when based on religious or moral princi

ples—and an inability to perform the legally required

duties of a juror.

In contrast, in Gray, 481 U. S. 648, we reversed a death

sentence where a juror had been impermissibly struck for

cause. In that case, the trial court struck a juror who

appeared confused and who at times seemed to equivocate,

6 UTTECHT v. BROWN

STEVENS, J., dissenting

but who eventually acknowledged that “she could consider

the death penalty in an appropriate case.” Id., at 653; cf.

voir dire testimony of Juror Z, App. 73 (“I could [impose

the death penalty] if I was convinced that it was the ap

propriate measure”). The Court distinguishes Gray from

the case now before us solely on the basis that in Gray

there was no state-court finding of substantial impair

ment. Ante, at 5–6. In the Court’s view, this distinction is

grounded in the fact that, here, there was “an explicit

ruling that Juror Z was impaired.” Ante, at 13. That

“ruling” consists of a one-sentence conclusion included in

the final summary section of the Washington Supreme

Court’s opinion. That conclusion is based on an earlier

part of the court’s opinion, in which it found that during

voir dire, Juror Z “indicated that he would impose the

death penalty where the defendant ‘would reviolate if

released,’ which is not a correct statement of the law.”

State v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529, 604, 940 P. 2d 546, 585

(1997) (en banc). Under our precedents, a juror’s state

ment that he would vote to impose a death sentence where

there is a possibility that the defendant may reoffend,

provided merely as an example of when that penalty

might be appropriate, does not constitute a basis for strik

ing a juror for cause.4

In the alternative, and perhaps recognizing the tenuous

nature of the state court’s “ruling,” the Court relies on the

fact that the trial court’s judgment is entitled to deference

——————

4 To the extent the Washington Supreme Court deemed Juror Z “sub

stantially impaired” because he initially demonstrated a misunder

standing of or confusion about the relevant law, that would also be an

insufficient basis to support his exclusion for cause, given that by the

end of the voir dire questioning, his confusion on that point had abated

and he had made clear that even if the defendant were never to be

released, he could still consider the death penalty. He also initially

“misunderstood the State’s burden of proof in a criminal case” but, as

the Washington Supreme Court itself explained, “he was corrected

later.” 132 Wash. 2d, at 604, 940 P. 2d, at 585.

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

STEVENS, J., dissenting

because it had the unique opportunity to observe Juror Z’s

demeanor during voir dire. A ruling cannot be taken at

face value when it is clear that the reasoning behind that

ruling is erroneous in light of our prior precedents.5 There

is absolutely nothing in the record to suggest—even in

light of the trial court’s tendency to provide “careful and

measured explanations” for its decisions, ante, at 7—that

anything about Juror Z’s demeanor would dull the impact

of his numerous affirmative statements about his ability

to impose the death penalty in any situation. In effect, the

Court reads something into nothing and defers to a finding

that the trial court never made, instead of relying on the

finding on which the Washington Supreme Court clearly

based its own ruling and which finds no support in our

decisions.

In its analysis, the Court places great emphasis on

defense counsel’s failure to object to Juror Z’s exclusion for

cause, characterizing it as “voluntary acquiescence to, or

confirmation of” his removal. Ante, at 15. A closer look at

the voir dire transcript, which the Court has included as

an appendix to its opinion, reveals that the Court’s inter

pretation of defense counsel’s statement is not necessarily

accurate. Upon being asked by the judge if either party

had any challenge to Juror Z, the State provided that it

did and the defense responded to the judge that it had “no

objection.” App. 75. Although the Court reads defense

counsel’s statement to mean that defense counsel had no

objection to Juror Z’s exclusion, it is more clearly read to

——————

5 Although pre-AEDPA, we recognized in Gray that the deference

traditionally given to a trial court’s findings may not be due when those

findings are based on a misapplication of federal law. See 481 U. S., at

661, n. 10 (“The State has devoted a significant portion of its brief to an

argument based on the deference this Court owes to findings of fact

made by a trial court. Such deference is inappropriate where, as here,

the trial court’s findings are dependent on an apparent misapplication

of federal law”).

8 UTTECHT v. BROWN

STEVENS, J., dissenting

mean that the defense had no objection to Juror Z serving

on the jury and therefore no reason to challenge him.6

Even if we were to interpret defense counsel’s statement

as the failure to provide an affirmative “defense of Juror

Z,” ante, at 15, it is important to recognize that Washing

ton law does not require an objection to preserve an error

for review.7 Ante, at 17; see also State v. Levy, 156 Wash.

2d 709, 719, 132 P. 3d 1076, 1081 (2006) (“We have long

held that even if the defendant fails to object at trial, error

may be raised on appeal if it ‘invades a fundamental right

of the accused’ ” (quoting State v. Becker, 132 Wash. 2d 54,

64, 935 P. 2d 1321, 1326 (1997)).

In any event, whether defense counsel’s statement is

taken as a failure to provide a defense of Juror Z or as

acquiescence in his recusal, it is irrelevant to the ultimate

disposition of this case. We said in Witt that the failure to

object “in a situation later claimed to be so rife with ambi

guity as to constitute constitutional error” is a factor that

should be considered when assessing a defendant’s claims,

469 U. S., at 431, n. 11, but in this case there was abso

lutely no basis for striking Juror Z. Thus, counsel’s failure

to provide an affirmative response to the State’s motion,

——————

6 As the Court of Appeals recognized in its opinion, it could also cer

tainly be the case that “defense counsel declined to object because he

was glad to get rid of juror Z[, given that] Z had described himself as

pro-death penalty, and reiterated numerous times, under oath, that he

would be willing and able to impose the death penalty.” Brown v.

Lambert, 451 F. 3d 946, 953, n. 9 (CA9 2005); cf. Witt, 469 U. S., at 437

(STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that in the case of one

juror who stated unequivocally that she “ ‘could not bring back a death

penalty,’ ” the defense’s objection to the prosecutor’s motion to excuse

her for cause served to demonstrate that defense counsel wanted the

juror to remain on the jury).

7 In contrast, in Witt, we found it significant enough to note that since

it had decided the case, the Florida Supreme Court had “enforced a

contemporaneous-objection rule when dealing with Witherspoon chal

lenges.” Id., at 431, n. 11.

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

STEVENS, J., dissenting

though perhaps not strategically sound, does not doom

respondent’s constitutional claim. Unlike Witt, in which

there was arguably some ambiguity in the juror’s voir dire

responses, here Juror Z had unambiguously asserted his

full capability to follow the law. See, e.g., App. 58 (“I do

believe in the death penalty in severe situations”); id., at

62 (responding to whether he could consider both available

sentencing options, “Yes, I could”); id., at 63 (“I just felt

that there were times when [the death penalty] would be

appropriate”); id., at 72 (responding to whether he could

consider and impose the death penalty where the defen

dant would otherwise never be released from prison, “Yes,

sir”); id., at 73 (responding to whether he could consider

and vote for the death penalty where the alternative is a

life sentence without the possibility of parole, “I could

[impose it] if I was convinced that was the appropriate

measure”); cf. Witt, 469 U. S., at 438 (STEVENS, J., concur

ring in judgment) (“Given . . . [the juror’s] somewhat tim

orous responses, it is entirely possible that her appearance

and demeanor persuaded trial counsel that he would

prefer a vigorous or more reluctant juror”).

II

Even a juror who is generally opposed to the death

penalty cannot permissibly be excused for cause so long as

he can still follow the law as properly instructed. The

Court recognizes this principle, see ante, at 2–3, and yet

the perverse result of its opinion is that a juror who is

clearly willing to impose the death penalty, but considers

the severity of that decision carefully enough to recognize

that there are certain circumstances under which it is not

appropriate (e.g., that it would only be appropriate in

“severe situations,” App. 63), is “substantially impaired.”

It is difficult to imagine, under such a standard, a juror

who would not be considered so impaired, unless he deliv

ered only perfectly unequivocal answers during the unfa

10 UTTECHT v. BROWN

STEVENS, J., dissenting

miliar and often confusing legal process of voir dire and

was willing to state without hesitation that he would be

able to vote for a death sentence under any imaginable

circumstance. Cf. Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S. 38, 50–51

(1980) (“We repeat that the State may bar from jury ser

vice those whose beliefs about capital punishment would

lead them to violate the law or violate their oaths. But

[the Constitution does not allow the exclusion of] jurors

whose only fault was to take their responsibilities with

special seriousness or to acknowledge honestly that they

might or might not be affected”).

Today, the Court has fundamentally redefined—or

maybe just misunderstood—the meaning of “substantially

impaired,” and, in doing so, has gotten it horribly back

wards. It appears to be under the impression that trial

courts should be encouraging the inclusion of jurors who

will impose the death penalty rather than only ensuring

the exclusion of those who say that, in all circumstances,

they cannot. The Court emphasizes that “the State has a

strong interest in having jurors who are able to apply

capital punishment within the framework state law pre

scribes.” Ante, at 6. But that does not and cannot mean

that jurors must be willing to impose a death sentence in

every situation in which a defendant is eligible for that

sanction. That is exactly the outcome we aimed to protect

against in developing the standard that, contrary to the

Court’s apparent temporary lapse, still governs today. See

Gray, 481 U. S., at 658 (explaining that to permit the

exclusion of jurors other than those who will not follow

their oaths “unnecessarily narrows the cross section of

venire members” and “ ‘stack[s] the deck against the peti

tioner’ ” (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U. S., at 523)).

Judge Kozinski’s opinion for the Court of Appeals in this

case is solidly grounded on the entire line of our cases

recognizing the basic distinction dramatically illustrated

by Justice Powell’s opinion in Darden and by Justice

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 11

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Rehnquist’s statement in Lockhart. He surely was enti

tled to assume that the law had not changed so dramati

cally in the years following his service as a law clerk to

Chief Justice Burger that a majority of the present Court

would not even mention that basic distinction, and would

uphold the disqualification of a juror whose only failing

was to harbor some slight reservation in imposing the

most severe of sanctions.

I respectfully dissent.

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–413

_________________

JEFFREY UTTECHT, SUPERINTENDENT, WASH-

INGTON STATE PENITENTIARY, PETITIONER v.

CAL COBURN BROWN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 4, 2007]

JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins,

dissenting.

I join JUSTICE STEVENS’ dissent. I write separately to

emphasize that, in my opinion, the majority’s strongest

piece of evidence—defense counsel’s words “no objection”

(uttered in response to the court’s excusing Juror Z)—

should play no role in our analysis. App. 75. The words

“no objection” meant in context at most what they say,

namely that defense counsel did not object to the judge’s

excusing Juror Z for cause. Often States treat such a

failure to object as waiving a point. But that is not so here.

That is because the Washington Supreme Court has told

us that, under state law, counsel’s failure to object is

without significant legal effect. Ante, at 18–19 (opinion of

the Court); ante, at 8 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); State v.

Levy, 156 Wash. 2d 709, 719–720, 132 P. 3d 1076, 1080–

1081 (2006) (en banc). And that means we must treat this

case as if a proper objection had been made.

The majority continues to rely upon the statement,

however, not as proving an objection, but as helping to

demonstrate courtroom “atmospherics,” such as facial

expressions or vocal hesitations or tones of voice sufficient

to warrant excusing Juror Z for cause. Ante, at 15–18, 19.

But in my view the majority reads too much into too little.

2 UTTECHT v. BROWN

BREYER, J., dissenting

What the words “no objection” suggest is simply that

defense counsel did not have any objection. And to find

more in those few words treats them like a Rorschach blot,

permitting a reviewing judge to affirm (or to reverse) the

trial judge on no more than the subjective view of the

written record that the appellate judge may take. Or, it

simply offers a backdoor way to avoid the effect of Wash

ington’s procedural rule. The latter would wrongly ignore

Washington law. The former would too often make it

impossible to obtain meaningful review of silent records.

There is no need, after all, to stretch the significance of

ordinary statements and thereby to assume special atmos

pherics that support (or undercut) a trial judge’s decision.

Where special courtroom atmospherics matter, a lawyer

(or the judge) can always make appropriate remarks for

the record.

Basing my conclusions, then, on the written record

itself, and in particular upon what Juror Z said in re

sponse to questions, I believe, for the reasons JUSTICE

STEVENS sets forth (and applying AEDPA’s strict stan

dard), that the trial judge’s decision to excuse Juror Z was

constitutionally erroneous and a new trial is necessary.

For these reasons, I dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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