Bowles v. Russell

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BOWLES v. RUSSELL, WARDEN

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 06–5306. Argued March 26, 2007—Decided June 14, 2007

Having failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the Federal District

Court’s denial of habeas relief, petitioner Bowles moved to reopen the

filing period pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6),

which allows a district court to grant a 14-day extension under cer

tain conditions, see 28 U. S. C. §2107(c). The District Court granted

Bowles’ motion but inexplicably gave him 17 days to file his notice of

appeal. He filed within the 17 days allowed by the District Court, but

after the 14-day period allowed by Rule 4(a)(6) and §2107(c). The

Sixth Circuit held that the notice was untimely and that it therefore

lacked jurisdiction to hear the case under this Court’s precedent.

Held: Bowles’ untimely notice of appeal—though filed in reliance upon

the District Court’s order—deprived the Sixth Circuit of jurisdiction.

Pp. 2–10.

(a) The taking of an appeal in a civil case within the time pre

scribed by statute is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Griggs v. Provi

dent Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 61 (per curiam). There is

a significant distinction between time limitations set forth in a stat

ute such as §2107, which limit a court’s jurisdiction, see, e.g., Kon

trick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 453, and those based on court rules,

which do not, see, e.g., id., at 454. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S.

500, 505, and Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 314, distin

guished. Because Congress decides, within constitutional bounds,

whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine

when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them. See

United States v. Curry, 6 How. 106, 113. And when an “appeal has

not been prosecuted in the manner directed, within the time limited

by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”

Id., at 113. The resolution of this case follows naturally from this

2 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

Syllabus

reasoning. Because Congress specifically limited the amount of time

by which district courts can extend the notice-of-appeal period in

§2107(c), Bowles’ failure to file in accordance with the statute de

prived the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction. And because Bowles’ er

ror is one of jurisdictional magnitude, he cannot rely on forfeiture or

waiver to excuse his lack of compliance. Pp. 4–8.

(b) Bowles’ reliance on the “unique circumstances” doctrine, rooted

in Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S.

215 (per curiam) and applied in Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384 (per

curiam), is rejected. Because this Court has no authority to create

equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the doc

trine is illegitimate. Harris Truck Lines and Thompson are overruled

to the extent they purport to authorize an exception to a jurisdic

tional rule. Pp. 8–9.

432 F. 3d 668, affirmed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a

dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ.,

joined.

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–5306

_________________

KEITH BOWLES, PETITIONER v. HARRY RUSSELL,

WARDEN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 14, 2007]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, a District Court purported to extend a

party’s time for filing an appeal beyond the period allowed

by statute. We must decide whether the Court of Appeals

had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed after the

statutory period but within the period allowed by the

District Court’s order. We have long and repeatedly held

that the time limits for filing a notice of appeal are juris

dictional in nature. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner’s

untimely notice—even though filed in reliance upon a

District Court’s order—deprived the Court of Appeals of

jurisdiction.

I

In 1999, an Ohio jury convicted petitioner Keith Bowles

of murder for his involvement in the beating death of Ollie

Gipson. The jury sentenced Bowles to 15 years to life

imprisonment. Bowles unsuccessfully challenged his

conviction and sentence on direct appeal.

Bowles then filed a federal habeas corpus application on

September 5, 2002. On September 9, 2003, the District

Court denied Bowles habeas relief. After the entry of final

2 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

Opinion of the Court

judgment, Bowles had 30 days to file a notice of appeal.

Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A); 28 U. S. C. §2107(a). He

failed to do so. On December 12, 2003, Bowles moved to

reopen the period during which he could file his notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(6), which allows district

courts to extend the filing period for 14 days from the day

the district court grants the order to reopen, provided

certain conditions are met. See §2107(c).

On February 10, 2004, the District Court granted

Bowles’ motion. But rather than extending the time pe

riod by 14 days, as Rule 4(a)(6) and §2107(c) allow, the

District Court inexplicably gave Bowles 17 days—until

February 27—to file his notice of appeal. Bowles filed his

notice on February 26—within the 17 days allowed by the

District Court’s order, but after the 14-day period allowed

by Rule 4(a)(6) and §2107(c).

On appeal, respondent Russell argued that Bowles’

notice was untimely and that the Court of Appeals there

fore lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court of

Appeals agreed. It first recognized that this Court has

consistently held the requirement of filing a timely notice

of appeal is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” 432 F. 3d 668,

673 (CA6 2005) (citing Browder v. Director, Dept. of Cor

rections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 264 (1978)). The court also

noted that courts of appeals have uniformly held that Rule

4(a)(6)’s 180-day period for filing a motion to reopen is also

mandatory and not susceptible to equitable modification.

432 F. 3d, at 673 (collecting cases). Concluding that “the

fourteen-day period in Rule 4(a)(6) should be treated as

strictly as the 180-day period in that same Rule,” id., at

676, the Court of Appeals held that it was without juris

diction. We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. ___ (2006), and

now affirm.

II

According to 28 U. S. C. §2107(a), parties must file

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Opinion of the Court

notices of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the judg

ment being appealed. District courts have limited author

ity to grant an extension of the 30-day time period. Rele

vant to this case, if certain conditions are met, district

courts have the statutory authority to grant motions to

reopen the time for filing an appeal for 14 additional days.

§2107(c). Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce

dure carries §2107 into practice. In accord with §2107(c),

Rule 4(a)(6) describes the district court’s authority to

reopen and extend the time for filing a notice of appeal

after the lapse of the usual 30 days:

“(6) Reopening the Time to File an Appeal.

“The district court may reopen the time to file an

appeal for a period of 14 days after the date when its

order to reopen is entered, but only if all the following

conditions are satisfied:

“(A) the motion is filed within 180 days after the

judgment or order is entered or within 7 days after

the moving party receives notice of the entry, which

ever is earlier;

“(B) the court finds that the moving party was enti

tled to notice of the entry of the judgment or order

sought to be appealed but did not receive the notice

from the district court or any party within 21 days af

ter entry; and

“(C) the court finds that no party would be preju

diced.” (Emphasis added.)1

It is undisputed that the District Court’s order in this

case purported to reopen the filing period for more than 14

days. Thus, the question before us is whether the Court of

Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed

——————

1 The Rule was amended, effective December 1, 2005, to require that

notice be pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 77(d). The substance is

otherwise unchanged.

4 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

Opinion of the Court

outside the 14-day window allowed by §2107(c) but within

the longer period granted by the District Court.

A

This Court has long held that the taking of an appeal

within the prescribed time is “mandatory and jurisdic

tional.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459

U. S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks

omitted);2 accord, Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236,

247 (1998); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S.

312, 314–315 (1988); Browder, supra, at 264. Indeed, even

prior to the creation of the circuit courts of appeals, this

Court regarded statutory limitations on the timing of

appeals as limitations on its own jurisdiction. See Scar

borough v. Pargoud, 108 U. S. 567, 568 (1883) (“[T]he writ

of error in this case was not brought within the time lim

ited by law, and we have consequently no jurisdiction”);

United States v. Curry, 6 How. 106, 113 (1848) (“[A]s this

appeal has not been prosecuted in the manner directed,

within the time limited by the acts of Congress, it must be

——————

2 Griggs and several other of this Court’s decisions ultimately rely on

United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 229 (1960), for the proposition

that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. As the

dissent notes, we have recently questioned Robinson’s use of the term

“jurisdictional.” Post, at 2 (opinion of SOUTER, J.) Even in our cases

criticizing Robinson, however, we have noted the jurisdictional signifi

cance of the fact that a time limit is set forth in a statute, see infra, at

5–6, and have even pointed to §2107 as a statute deserving of jurisdic

tional treatment. Infra, at 6. Additionally, because we rely on those

cases in reaching today’s holding, the dissent’s rhetoric claiming that

we are ignoring their reasoning is unfounded.

Regardless of this Court’s past careless use of terminology, it is

indisputable that time limits for filing a notice of appeal have been

treated as jurisdictional in American law for well over a century.

Consequently, the dissent’s approach would require the repudiation of a

century’s worth of precedent and practice in American courts. Given

the choice between calling into question some dicta in our recent

opinions and effectively overruling a century’s worth of practice, we

think the former option is the only prudent course.

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

Opinion of the Court

dismissed for want of jurisdiction”). Reflecting the consis

tency of this Court’s holdings, the courts of appeals rou

tinely and uniformly dismiss untimely appeals for lack of

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Atkins v. Medical Dept. of Augusta

Cty. Jail, No. 06–7792, 2007 WL 1048810 (CA4, Apr. 4,

2007) (per curiam) (unpublished); see also 15A C. Wright,

A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure

§3901, p. 6 (2d ed. 1992) (“The rule is well settled that

failure to file a timely notice of appeal defeats the jurisdic

tion of a court of appeals”). In fact, the author of today’s

dissent recently reiterated that “[t]he accepted fact is that

some time limits are jurisdictional even though expressed

in a separate statutory section from jurisdictional grants,

see, e.g., . . . §2107 (providing that notice of appeal in civil

cases must be filed ‘within thirty days after the entry of

such judgment’).” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S.

149, 160, n. 6 (2003) (majority opinion of SOUTER, J.,

joined by STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., inter

alios) (citation omitted).

Although several of our recent decisions have under

taken to clarify the distinction between claims-processing

rules and jurisdictional rules, none of them calls into

question our longstanding treatment of statutory time

limits for taking an appeal as jurisdictional. Indeed, those

decisions have also recognized the jurisdictional signifi

cance of the fact that a time limitation is set forth in a

statute. In Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443 (2004), we held

that failure to comply with the time requirement in Fed

eral Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004 did not affect a

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Critical to our analysis

was the fact that “[n]o statute . . . specifies a time limit for

filing a complaint objecting to the debtor’s discharge.” 540

U. S., at 448. Rather, the filing deadlines in the Bank

ruptcy Rules are “ ‘procedural rules adopted by the Court

for the orderly transaction of its business’ ” that are “ ‘not

jurisdictional.’ ” Id., at 454 (quoting Schacht v. United

6 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

Opinion of the Court

States, 398 U. S. 58, 64 (1970)). Because “[o]nly Congress

may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction,” 540 U. S., at 452 (citing U. S. Const., Art. III,

§1), it was improper for courts to use “the term ‘jurisdic

tional’ to describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of

court,” 540 U. S., at 454. See also Eberhart v. United

States, 546 U. S. 12 (2005) (per curiam). As a point of

contrast, we noted that §2107 contains the type of statu

tory time constraints that would limit a court’s jurisdic

tion. 540 U. S., at 453, and n. 8.3 Nor do Arbaugh v. Y &

H Corp., 546 U. S. 500 (2006), or Scarborough v. Principi,

541 U. S. 401 (2004), aid petitioner. In Arbaugh, the

statutory limitation was an employee-numerosity re

quirement, not a time limit. 546 U. S., at 505. Scarbor

ough, which addressed the availability of attorney’s fees

under the Equal Access to Justice Act, concerned “a mode

of relief . . . ancillary to the judgment of a court” that

already had plenary jurisdiction. 541 U. S., at 413.

This Court’s treatment of its certiorari jurisdiction also

demonstrates the jurisdictional distinction between court-

promulgated rules and limits enacted by Congress. Ac

cording to our Rules, a petition for a writ of certiorari

must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the judgment

sought to be reviewed. See this Court’s Rule 13.1. That

90-day period applies to both civil and criminal cases. But

the 90-day period for civil cases derives from both this

Court’s Rule 13.1 and 28 U. S. C. §2101(c). We have re

peatedly held that this statute-based filing period for civil

——————

3 At

least one federal court of appeals has noted that Kontrick and

Eberhart “called . . . into question” the “longstanding assumption” that

the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement.

United States v. Sadler, 480 F. 3d 932, 935 (CA9 2007). That court

nonetheless found that “[t]he distinction between jurisdictional rules

and inflexible but not jurisdictional timeliness rules drawn by Eberhart

and Kontrick turns largely on whether the timeliness requirement is or

is not grounded in a statute.” Id., at 936.

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

Opinion of the Court

cases is jurisdictional. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm’n

v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U. S. 88, 90 (1994).

Indeed, this Court’s Rule 13.2 cites §2101(c) in directing

the Clerk not to file any petition “that is jurisdictionally

out of time.” (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, we

have treated the rule-based time limit for criminal cases

differently, stating that it may be waived because “[t]he

procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly

transaction of its business are not jurisdictional and can

be relaxed by the Court in the exercise of its discre

tion . . . .” Schacht, supra, at 64.4

Jurisdictional treatment of statutory time limits makes

good sense. Within constitutional bounds, Congress de

cides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to

consider. Because Congress decides whether federal

courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when,

and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them.

See Curry, 6 How., at 113. Put another way, the notion of

“ ‘subject-matter’ ” jurisdiction obviously extends to

“ ‘classes of cases . . . falling within a court’s adjudicatory

authority,’ ” Eberhart, supra, at 16 (quoting Kontrick,

supra, at 455), but it is no less “jurisdictional” when Con

——————

4 The dissent minimizes this argument, stating that the Court under

stood §2101(c) as jurisdictional “in the days when we used the term

imprecisely.” Post, at 4, n. 4. The dissent’s apathy is surprising be

cause if our treatment of our own jurisdiction is simply a relic of the old

days, it is a relic with severe consequences. Just a few months ago, the

Clerk, pursuant to this Court’s Rule 13.2, refused to accept a petition

for certiorari submitted by Ryan Heath Dickson because it had been

filed one day late. In the letter sent to Dickson’s counsel, the Clerk

explained that “[w]hen the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari

in a civil case . . . has expired, the Court no longer has the power to

review the petition.” Letter from William K. Suter, Clerk of Court, to

Ronald T. Spriggs (Dec. 28, 2006). Dickson was executed on April 26,

2007, without any Member of this Court having even seen his petition

for certiorari. The rejected certiorari petition was Dickson’s first in this

Court, and one can only speculate as to whether denial of that petition

would have been a foregone conclusion.

8 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

Opinion of the Court

gress forbids federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise

legitimate “class of cases” after a certain period has

elapsed from final judgment.

The resolution of this case follows naturally from this

reasoning. Like the initial 30-day period for filing a notice

of appeal, the limit on how long a district court may re

open that period is set forth in a statute, 28 U. S. C.

§2107(c). Because Congress specifically limited the

amount of time by which district courts can extend the

notice-of-appeal period in §2107(c), that limitation is more

than a simple “claim-processing rule.” As we have long

held, when an “appeal has not been prosecuted in the

manner directed, within the time limited by the acts of

Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”

Curry, supra, at 113. Bowles’ failure to file his notice of

appeal in accordance with the statute therefore deprived

the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction. And because Bowles’

error is one of jurisdictional magnitude, he cannot rely on

forfeiture or waiver to excuse his lack of compliance with

the statute’s time limitations. See Arbaugh, supra, at

513–514.

B

Bowles contends that we should excuse his untimely

filing because he satisfies the “unique circumstances”

doctrine, which has its roots in Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v.

Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215 (1962) (per cu

riam). There, pursuant to then-Rule 73(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, a District Court entertained a

timely motion to extend the time for filing a notice of

appeal. The District Court found the moving party had

established a showing of “excusable neglect,” as required

by the Rule, and granted the motion. The Court of Ap

peals reversed the finding of excusable neglect and, ac

cordingly, held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction

to grant the extension. Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

Opinion of the Court

Meat Packers, Inc., 303 F. 2d 609, 611–612 (CA7 1962).

This Court reversed, noting “the obvious great hardship to

a party who relies upon the trial judge’s finding of ‘excus

able neglect.’ ” 371 U. S., at 217.

Today we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of

appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.

Because this Court has no authority to create equitable

exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the

“unique circumstances” doctrine is illegitimate. Given

that this Court has applied Harris Truck Lines only once

in the last half century, Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384

(1964) (per curiam), several courts have rightly questioned

its continuing validity. See, e.g., Panhorst v. United

States, 241 F. 3d 367, 371 (CA4 2001) (doubting “the con

tinued viability of the unique circumstances doctrine”).

See also Houston v. Lack, 487 U. S. 266, 282 (1988)

(SCALIA, J., dissenting) (“Our later cases . . . effectively

repudiate the Harris Truck Lines approach . . .”). See also

Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U. S. 169, 170 (1989)

(referring to “the so-called ‘unique circumstances’ excep

tion” to the timely appeal requirement). We see no com

pelling reason to resurrect the doctrine from its 40-year

slumber. Accordingly, we reject Bowles’ reliance on the

doctrine, and we overrule Harris Truck Lines and Thomp

son to the extent they purport to authorize an exception to

a jurisdictional rule.

C

If rigorous rules like the one applied today are thought

to be inequitable, Congress may authorize courts to prom

ulgate rules that excuse compliance with the statutory

time limits. Even narrow rules to this effect would give

rise to litigation testing their reach and would no doubt

detract from the clarity of the rule. However, congres

sionally authorized rulemaking would likely lead to less

litigation than court-created exceptions without authoriza

tion. And in all events, for the reasons discussed above,

10 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

Opinion of the Court

we lack present authority to make the exception petitioner

seeks.

III

The Court of Appeals correctly held that it lacked juris

diction to consider Bowles’ appeal. The judgment of the

Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

SOUTER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–5306

_________________

KEITH BOWLES, PETITIONER v. HARRY RUSSELL,

WARDEN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 14, 2007]

JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE

GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.

The District Court told petitioner Keith Bowles that his

notice of appeal was due on February 27, 2004. He filed a

notice of appeal on February 26, only to be told that he

was too late because his deadline had actually been Feb

ruary 24. It is intolerable for the judicial system to treat

people this way, and there is not even a technical justifica

tion for condoning this bait and switch. I respectfully

dissent.

I

“ ‘Jurisdiction,’ ” we have warned several times in the

last decade, “ ‘is a word of many, too many, meanings.’ ”

Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83,

90 (1998) (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F. 3d 661,

663, n. 2 (CADC 1996)); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443,

454 (2004) (quoting Steel Co.); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,

546 U. S. 500, 510 (2006) (quoting Steel Co.); Rockwell Int’l

Corp. v. United States, 549 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (slip op.,

at 9) (quoting Steel Co.). This variety of meaning has

insidiously tempted courts, this one included, to engage in

“less than meticulous,” Kontrick, supra, at 454, sometimes

even “profligate . . . use of the term,” Arbaugh, supra, at

510.

2 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

In recent years, however, we have tried to clean up our

language, and until today we have been avoiding the

erroneous jurisdictional conclusions that flow from indis

criminate use of the ambiguous word. Thus, although we

used to call the sort of time limit at issue here “mandatory

and jurisdictional,” United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S.

220, 229 (1960), we have recently and repeatedly corrected

that designation as a misuse of the “jurisdiction” label.

Arbaugh, supra, at 510 (citing Robinson as an example of

improper use of the term “jurisdiction”); Eberhart v.

United States, 546 U. S. 12, 17–18 (2005) (per curiam)

(same); Kontrick, supra, at 454 (same).

But one would never guess this from reading the Court’s

opinion in this case, which suddenly restores Robinson’s

indiscriminate use of the “mandatory and jurisdictional”

label to good law in the face of three unanimous repudia

tions of Robinson’s error. See ante, at 4. This is puzzling,

the more so because our recent (and, I repeat, unanimous)

efforts to confine jurisdictional rulings to jurisdiction

proper were obviously sound, and the majority makes no

attempt to show they were not.1

The stakes are high in treating time limits as jurisdic

tional. While a mandatory but nonjurisdictional limit is

enforceable at the insistence of a party claiming its benefit

or by a judge concerned with moving the docket, it may be

waived or mitigated in exercising reasonable equitable

——————

1 The

Court thinks my fellow dissenters and I are forgetful of an opin

ion I wrote and the others joined in 2003, which referred to the 30-day

rule of 28 U. S. C. §2107(a) as a jurisdictional time limit. See ante, at 5

(quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S. 149, 160, n. 6 (2003)).

But that reference in Barnhart was a perfect example of the confusion

of the mandatory and the jurisdictional that the entire Court has spent

the past four years repudiating in Arbaugh, Eberhart, and Kontrick.

My fellow dissenters and I believe that the Court was right to correct

its course; the majority, however, will not even admit that we deliber

ately changed course, let alone explain why it is now changing course

again.

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

SOUTER, J., dissenting

discretion. But if a limit is taken to be jurisdictional,

waiver becomes impossible, meritorious excuse irrelevant

(unless the statute so provides), and sua sponte considera

tion in the courts of appeals mandatory, see Arbaugh,

supra, at 514.2 As the Court recognizes, ante, at 5–6, this

is no way to regard time limits set out in a court rule

rather than a statute, see Kontrick, supra, at 452 (“Only

Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-

matter jurisdiction”). But neither is jurisdictional treat

ment automatic when a time limit is statutory, as it is in

this case. Generally speaking, limits on the reach of fed

eral statutes, even nontemporal ones, are only jurisdic

tional if Congress says so: “when Congress does not rank a

statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts

should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in charac

ter.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 516. Thus, we have held “that

time prescriptions, however emphatic, ‘are not properly

typed “jurisdictional,” ’ ” id., at 510 (quoting Scarborough

v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 414 (2004)), absent some juris

dictional designation by Congress. Congress put no juris

dictional tag on the time limit here.3

——————

2 The requirement that courts of appeals raise jurisdictional issues

sua sponte reveals further ill effects of today’s decision. Under §2107(c),

“[t]he district court may . . . extend the time for appeal upon a showing

of excusable neglect or good cause.” By the Court’s logic, if a district

court grants such an extension, the extension’s propriety is subject to

mandatory sua sponte review in the court of appeals, even if the exten

sion was unopposed throughout, and upon finding error the court of

appeals must dismiss the appeal. I see no more justification for such a

rule than reason to suspect Congress meant to create it.

3 The majority answers that a footnote of our unanimous opinion in

Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443 (2004), used §2107(a) as an illustration

of a jurisdictional time limit. Ante, at 6 (“[W]e noted that §2107 con

tains the type of statutory time constraints that would limit a court’s

jurisdiction. 540 U. S., at 453, and n. 8”). What the majority overlooks,

however, are the post-Kontrick cases showing that §2107(a) can no

longer be seen as an example of a jurisdictional time limit. The juris

dictional character of the 30- (or 60)-day time limit for filing notices of

4 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

The doctrinal underpinning of this recently repeated

view was set out in Kontrick: “the label ‘jurisdictional’ [is

appropriate] not for claim-processing rules, but only for

prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject

matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)

falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.” 540 U. S.,

at 455. A filing deadline is the paradigm of a claim-

processing rule, not of a delineation of cases that federal

courts may hear, and so it falls outside the class of limita

tions on subject matter jurisdiction unless Congress says

otherwise.4

——————

appeal under the present §2107(a) was first pronounced by this Court

in Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257 (1978).

But in that respect Browder was undercut by Eberhart v. United States,

546 U. S. 12 (2005) (per curiam), decided after Kontrick. Eberhart cited

Browder (along with several of the other cases on which the Court now

relies) as an example of the basic error of confusing mandatory time

limits with jurisdictional limitations, a confusion for which United

States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220 (1960), was responsible. Compare

ante, at 4 (citing Browder, Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.,

459 U. S. 56 (1982) (per curiam), and Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S.

236 (1998)), with Eberhart, supra, at 17–18 (citing those cases as

examples of the confusion caused by Robinson’s imprecise language).

Eberhart was followed four months later by Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,

546 U. S. 500 (2006), which summarized the body of recent decisions in

which the Court “clarified that time prescriptions, however emphatic,

are not properly typed jurisdictional,” id., at 510 (internal quotation

marks omitted). This unanimous statement of all Members of the

Court participating in the case eliminated the option of continuing to

accept §2107(a) as jurisdictional and it precludes treating the 14-day

period of §2107(c) as a limit on jurisdiction.

4 The Court points out that we have affixed a “jurisdiction” label to

the time limit contained in §2101(c) for petitions for writ of certiorari in

civil cases. Ante, at 6–7 (citing Federal Election Comm’n v. NRA

Political Victory Fund, 513 U. S. 88, 90 (1994); this Court’s Rule 13.2).

Of course, we initially did so in the days when we used the term impre

cisely. The status of §2101(c) is not before the Court in this case, so I

express no opinion on whether there are sufficient reasons to treat it as

jurisdictional. The Court’s observation that jurisdictional treatment

has had severe consequences in that context, ante, at 7, n. 4, does

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

SOUTER, J., dissenting

The time limit at issue here, far from defining the set of

cases that may be adjudicated, is much more like a statute

of limitations, which provides an affirmative defense, see

Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c), and is not jurisdictional, Day v.

McDonough, 547 U. S. 198, 205 (2006). Statutes of limita

tions may thus be waived, id., at 207–208, or excused by

rules, such as equitable tolling, that alleviate hardship

and unfairness, see Irwin v. Department of Veterans Af

fairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95–96 (1990).

Consistent with the traditional view of statutes of limi

tations, and the carefully limited concept of jurisdiction

explained in Arbaugh, Eberhart, and Kontrick, an excep

tion to the time limit in 28 U. S. C. §2107(c) should be

available when there is a good justification for one, for

reasons we recognized years ago. In Harris Truck Lines,

Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215, 217 (1962)

(per curiam), and Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384, 387

(1964) (per curiam), we found that “unique circumstances”

excused failures to comply with the time limit. In fact,

much like this case, Harris and Thompson involved dis

trict court errors that misled litigants into believing they

had more time to file notices of appeal than a statute

actually provided. Thus, even back when we thoughtlessly

called time limits jurisdictional, we did not actually treat

them as beyond exemption to the point of shrugging at the

inequity of penalizing a party for relying on what a federal

judge had said to him. Since we did not dishonor reason

able reliance on a judge’s official word back in the days

when we uncritically had a jurisdictional reason to be

unfair, it is unsupportable to dishonor it now, after re

peatedly disavowing any such jurisdictional justification

——————

nothing to support an argument that jurisdictional treatment is sound,

but instead merely shows that the certiorari rule, too, should be recon

sidered in light of our recent clarifications of what sorts of rules should

be treated as jurisdictional.

6 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

that would apply to the 14-day time limit of §2107(c).

The majority avoids clashing with Harris and Thompson

by overruling them on the ground of their “slumber,” ante,

at 9, and inconsistency with a time-limit-as-jurisdictional

rule.5 But eliminating those precedents underscores what

has become the principal question of this case: why does

today’s majority refuse to come to terms with the steady

stream of unanimous statements from this Court in the

past four years, culminating in Arbaugh’s summary a year

ago? The majority begs this question by refusing to con

front what we have said: “in recent decisions, we have

clarified that time prescriptions, however emphatic, ‘are

not properly typed “jurisdictional.” ’ ” Arbaugh, 546 U. S.,

at 510 (quoting Scarborough, 541 U. S., at 414). This

statement of the Court, and those preceding it for which it

stands as a summation, cannot be dismissed as “some

dicta,” ante, at 4, n. 2, and cannot be ignored on the

ground that some of them were made in cases where the

challenged restriction was not a time limit, see ante, at 6.

By its refusal to come to grips with our considered state

ments of law the majority leaves the Court incoherent.

In ruling that Bowles cannot depend on the word of a

District Court Judge, the Court demonstrates that no one

may depend on the recent, repeated, and unanimous

statements of all participating Justices of this Court. Yet

more incongruously, all of these pronouncements by the

Court, along with two of our cases,6 are jettisoned in a

——————

5 With no apparent sense of irony, the Court finds that “ ‘[o]ur later

cases . . . effectively repudiate the Harris Truck Lines approach.’ ” Ante,

at 9 (quoting Houston v. Lack, 487 U. S. 266, 282 (1988) (SCALIA, J.,

dissenting); omission in original). Of course, those “later cases” were

Browder and Griggs, see Houston, supra, at 282, which have them

selves been repudiated, not just “effectively” but explicitly, in Eberhart.

See n. 3, supra.

6 Three, if we include Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U. S. 203 (1964) (per

curiam).

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

SOUTER, J., dissenting

ruling for which the leading justification is stare decisis,

see ante, at 4 (“This Court has long held . . .”).

II

We have the authority to recognize an equitable excep

tion to the 14-day limit, and we should do that here, as it

certainly seems reasonable to rely on an order from a

federal judge.7 Bowles, though, does not have to convince

us as a matter of first impression that his reliance was

justified, for we only have to look as far as Thompson to

know that he ought to prevail. There, the would-be appel

lant, Thompson, had filed post-trial motions 12 days after

the District Court’s final order. Although the rules said

they should have been filed within 10, Fed. Rules Civ.

Proc. 52(b) and 59(b) (1964), the trial court nonetheless

had “specifically declared that the ‘motion for a new trial’

was made ‘in ample time.’ ” Thompson, 375 U. S., at 385.

Thompson relied on that statement in filing a notice of

appeal within 60 days of the denial of the post-trial mo

tions but not within 60 days of entry of the original judg

ment. Only timely post-trial motions affected the 60-day

time limit for filing a notice of appeal, Rule 73(a) (1964), so

the Court of Appeals held the appeal untimely. We va

cated because Thompson “relied on the statement of the

District Court and filed the appeal within the assumedly

new deadline but beyond the old deadline.” Id., at 387.

Thompson should control. In that case, and this one,

the untimely filing of a notice of appeal resulted from

reliance on an error by a district court, an error that

caused no evident prejudice to the other party. Actually,

there is one difference between Thompson and this case:

——————

7 As a member of the Federal Judiciary, I cannot help but think that

reliance on our orders is reasonable. See O. Holmes, Natural Law, in

Collected Legal Papers 311 (1920). I would also rest better knowing

that my innocent errors will not jeopardize anyone’s rights unless

absolutely necessary.

8 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

Thompson filed his post-trial motions late and the District

Court was mistaken when it said they were timely; here,

the District Court made the error out of the blue, not on

top of any mistake by Bowles, who then filed his notice of

appeal by the specific date the District Court had declared

timely. If anything, this distinction ought to work in

Bowles’s favor. Why should we have rewarded Thompson,

who introduced the error, but now punish Bowles, who

merely trusted the District Court’s statement?8

Under Thompson, it would be no answer to say that

Bowles’s trust was unreasonable because the 14-day limit

was clear and counsel should have checked the judge’s

arithmetic. The 10-day limit on post-trial motions was no

less pellucid in Thompson, which came out the other way.

And what is more, counsel here could not have uncovered

the court’s error simply by counting off the days on a

calendar. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6)

allows a party to file a notice of appeal within 14 days of

“the date when [the district court’s] order to reopen is

entered.” See also 28 U. S. C. §2107(c)(2) (allowing re

opening for “14 days from the date of entry”). The District

Court’s order was dated February 10, 2004, which reveals

——————

8 Nothing in Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U. S. 169 (1989),

requires such a strange rule. In Osterneck, we described the “unique

circumstances” doctrine as applicable “only where a party has per

formed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline for

filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer

that this act has been properly done.” Id., at 179. But the point we

were making was that Thompson could not excuse a lawyer’s original

mistake in a case in which a judge had not assured him that his act had

been timely; the Court of Appeals in Osterneck had found that no court

provided a specific assurance, and we agreed. I see no reason to take

Osterneck’s language out of context to buttress a fundamentally unfair

resolution of an issue the Osterneck Court did not have in front of it.

Cf. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 515 (1993) (“[W]e

think it generally undesirable, where holdings of the Court are not at

issue, to dissect the sentences of the United States Reports as though

they were the United States Code”).

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

SOUTER, J., dissenting

the date the judge signed it but not necessarily the date on

which the order was entered. Bowles’s lawyer therefore

could not tell from reading the order, which he received by

mail, whether it was entered the day it was signed. Nor is

the possibility of delayed entry merely theoretical: the

District Court’s original judgment in this case, dated July

10, 2003, was not entered until July 28. See App. 11

(District Court docket). According to Bowles’s lawyer,

electronic access to the docket was unavailable at the

time, so to learn when the order was actually entered he

would have had to call or go to the courthouse and check.

See Tr. of Oral Arg. 56–57. Surely this is more than eq

uity demands, and unless every statement by a federal

court is to be tagged with the warning “Beware of the

Judge,” Bowles’s lawyer had no obligation to go behind the

terms of the order he received.

I have to admit that Bowles’s counsel probably did not

think the order might have been entered on a different day

from the day it was signed. He probably just trusted that

the date given was correct, and there was nothing unrea

sonable in so trusting. The other side let the order pass

without objection, either not caring enough to make a fuss

or not even noticing the discrepancy; the mistake of a few

days was probably not enough to ring the alarm bell to

send either lawyer to his copy of the federal rules and then

off to the courthouse to check the docket.9 This would be a

different case if the year were wrong on the District

——————

9 At first glance it may seem unreasonable for counsel to wait until

the penultimate day under the judge’s order, filing a notice of appeal

being so easy that counsel should not have needed the extra time. But

as Bowles’s lawyer pointed out at oral argument, filing the notice of

appeal starts the clock for filing the record, see Fed. Rule App.

Proc. 6(b)(2)(B), which in turn starts the clock for filing a brief, see Rule

31(a)(1), for which counsel might reasonably want as much time as

possible. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. A good lawyer plans ahead, and

Bowles had a good lawyer.

10 BOWLES v. RUSSELL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

Court’s order, or if opposing counsel had flagged the error.

But on the actual facts, it was reasonable to rely on a

facially plausible date provided by a federal judge.

I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and

remand for consideration of the merits.