Rice v. Collins

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

RICE, WARDEN, ET AL. v. COLLINS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 04–52. Argued December 5, 2005—Decided January 18, 2006

After the prosecutor struck a young, African-American woman, Juror

16, from the panel at respondent Collins’ state-court drug trial,

Collins objected that the strike was made on account of Juror 16’s

race. As race-neutral explanations for the strike, the prosecutor said

that Juror 16 had rolled her eyes in response to a question from the

court; that she was young and might be too tolerant of a drug crime;

and that she was single and lacked ties to the community. In reject-

ing Collins’ challenge, the trial court declared that it did not observe

the complained-of demeanor by Juror 16, but noted that she was

youthful, as was a white male juror also dismissed by peremptory

challenge, and stated it would give the prosecutor “the benefit of the

doubt.” The prosecutor had also referred to Juror 16’s gender in ex-

plaining the strike, but the trial court disallowed any reliance on that

ground. The California Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and

the trial court’s ruling on the peremptory challenge, finding that the

prosecutor permissibly excluded Juror 16 based on her youth. Even if

youth was not a legitimate reason to exercise a peremptory challenge,

said the court, Juror 16’s demeanor supported the strike; nothing in

the record suggested the trial court failed to conduct a searching in-

quiry of the prosecutor’s reasons for striking her. The California Su-

preme Court denied review. The Federal District Court dismissed

Collins’ habeas petition with prejudice, but the Ninth Circuit re-

versed and remanded, concluding that, under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the State Court of Ap-

peal’s affirmance was based on an unreasonable factual determina-

tion in light of the evidence presented at trial.

Held: The Ninth Circuit’s attempt to use a set of debatable inferences to

set aside the state court’s conclusion does not satisfy AEDPA’s re-

2 RICE v. COLLINS

Syllabus

quirements for granting habeas relief. Pp. 3–8.

(a) Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 98, a defendant’s chal-

lenge to a peremptory strike allegedly based on race requires, inter

alia, that the trial court determine whether the defendant has car-

ried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This involves

evaluating “the persuasiveness of the [prosecutor’s proffered] justifi-

cation” for the strike, but “the ultimate burden of persuasion regard-

ing racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent

of the strike.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765, 768. Because, under

AEDPA, a federal habeas court must find the state-court conclusion

“an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2), a

federal court can only grant Collins’ petition if it was unreasonable to

credit the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the Batson chal-

lenge. Pp. 3–4.

(b) Though the Ninth Circuit recited the proper standard of review,

it improperly substituted its evaluation of the record for that of the

state trial court, which, under §2254(d)(2), did not make an unrea-

sonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.

Noting that the trial court had not witnessed Juror 16’s purported

eye rolling, the Ninth Circuit concluded that no reasonable factfinder

could have accepted the prosecutor’s rendition of the alleged incident

because the prosecutor had completely undermined her own credibil-

ity based on three considerations: her erroneous statement that an-

other prospective African-American juror, Juror 19, was “young”

when, in fact, she was a grandmother; the prosecutor’s improper at-

tempt to use gender as a basis for exclusion; and the Court of Ap-

peals’ skepticism toward the prosecutor’s explanation that she struck

Juror 16 in part because of her youth and lack of ties to the commu-

nity. As to the first reason, because the prosecutor’s reference to Ju-

ror 19’s youth occurred during a discussion of three prospective ju-

rors, two of whom were, indeed, young, it is quite plausible that the

prosecutor simply misspoke. It is a tenuous inference to say that an

accidental reference with respect to one juror undermines the prose-

cutor’s credibility with respect to another. Second, the Ninth Circuit

assigned the prosecutor’s reference to Juror 16’s gender more weight

than it can bear, given that the prosecutor provided a number of

other permissible and plausible race-neutral reasons for excluding

her. Collins provides no argument why this matter demonstrates

that a reasonable factfinder must conclude the prosecutor lied about

the eye rolling and struck Juror 16 based on her race. Finally, even if

the prosecutor’s concerns about Juror 16’s youth and lack of commu-

nity ties were overly cautious, her wariness could be seen as race

neutral, for she used a peremptory strike on a white male juror, Ju-

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Syllabus

ror 6, with the same characteristics. Viewing the foregoing concerns

together, the most generous reading would suggest only that the trial

court had reason to question the prosecutor’s credibility regarding

Juror 16’s alleged improper demeanor. That does not, however, com-

pel the conclusion that the trial court had no permissible alternative

but to reject the prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications and conclude

Collins had shown a Batson violation. Reasonable minds reviewing

the record might disagree about the prosecutor’s credibility, but on

habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s

credibility determination. Pp. 4–8.

365 F. 3d 667, reversed and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. BREYER,

J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOUTER, J., joined.

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–52

_________________

BERTRAM RICE, WARDEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

STEVEN MARTELL COLLINS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[January 18, 2006]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court

Concerned that, in this habeas corpus case, a federal

court set aside reasonable state-court determinations of

fact in favor of its own debatable interpretation of the

record, we granted certiorari. Our review confirms that

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred, misap-

plying settled rules that limit its role and authority.

I

After a 4-day trial in the Superior Court of California for

the County of Los Angeles, a jury convicted Steven Martell

Collins on one count of possessing cocaine with intent to

distribute. The conviction was all the more serious be-

cause it subjected him to California’s three strikes rule for

sentencing. The question at issue in this federal habeas

corpus action, however, is the California courts’ rejection

of Collins’ argument that the prosecutor struck a young,

African-American woman, Juror 16, from the panel on

account of her race. A second African-American juror was

also the subject of a peremptory strike, and although

Collins challenged that strike in the trial court, on appeal

he objected only to the excusal of Juror 16.

2 RICE v. COLLINS

Opinion of the Court

Even prior to this Court’s decision in Batson v. Ken-

tucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), California courts barred per-

emptory challenges to jurors based on race. People v.

Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978). Although

our recent decision in Johnson v. California, 545 U. S. ___

(2005), disapproved of the manner in which Wheeler and

Batson were implemented in some California cases, the

state courts in this case used the correct analytical frame-

work in considering and ruling upon the objection to the

prosecutorial strike.

As race-neutral explanations for striking Juror 16, the

prosecutor said that Juror 16 had rolled her eyes in re-

sponse to a question from the court; that Juror 16 was

young and might be too tolerant of a drug crime; and that

Juror 16 was single and lacked ties to the community. A

further, more troubling part of the prosecutor’s unorgan-

ized explanation was her reference to Juror 16’s gender.

The trial court, correctly, disallowed any reliance on that

ground. The trial court, furthermore, which had the bene-

fit of observing the prosecutor firsthand over the course of

the proceedings, rejected Collins’ challenge.

“With regard to 016, the court, frankly, did not ob-

serve the demeanor of Ms. 016 that was complained of

by the District Attorney; however, Ms. 016 was a

youthful person, as was [a white male juror the prose-

cutor also dismissed by peremptory challenge]. And

one or more prospective jurors also. The Court is pre-

pared to give the District Attorney the benefit of the

doubt as to Ms. 016.” 2 App. 14–15.

The California Court of Appeal upheld the conviction

and the trial court’s ruling on the peremptory challenge.

People v. Collins, No. B106939 (Dec. 12, 1997), App. to Pet.

for Cert. 112–117. In its view, youth was a legitimate

reason to exercise a peremptory challenge; and, even if it

were not, Juror 16’s demeanor also supported the strike.

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of the Court

Id., at 116. According to its review of the record, nothing

suggested the trial court failed to conduct a searching

inquiry of the prosecutor’s reasons for striking Juror 16.

Id., at 116–117. The appeals court thus upheld the trial

court’s ultimate conclusion to credit the prosecutor. Ibid.

Without comment, the Supreme Court of California denied

Collins’ petition for review. Id., at 96.

Collins sought collateral relief on this claim in federal

court. The United States District Court for the Central

District of California dismissed with prejudice Collins’

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id., at 91. A divided

panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-

versed and remanded with instructions to grant the peti-

tion. 348 F. 3d 1082 (2003), amended and superseded by

365 F. 3d 667 (2004). Noting that the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governed

Collins’ petition, the panel majority concluded that it was

an unreasonable factual determination to credit the prose-

cutor’s race-neutral reasons for striking Juror 16. Id., at

679. Judge Hall dissented, id., at 687–691; and later, over

the dissent of five judges, the Court of Appeals declined to

rehear the case en banc, id., at 670–673. Though it recited

the proper standard of review, the panel majority improp-

erly substituted its evaluation of the record for that of the

state trial court. We granted the petition for certiorari,

545 U. S. ___ (2005), and now reverse.

II

A defendant’s Batson challenge to a peremptory strike

requires a three-step inquiry. First, the trial court must

determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie

showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory chal-

lenge on the basis of race. 476 U. S., at 96–97. Second, if

the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to

present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in

question. Id., at 97–98. Although the prosecutor must

4 RICE v. COLLINS

Opinion of the Court

present a comprehensible reason, “[t]he second step of this

process does not demand an explanation that is persua-

sive, or even plausible”; so long as the reason is not inher-

ently discriminatory, it suffices. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S.

765, 767–768 (1995) (per curiam). Third, the court must

then determine whether the defendant has carried his

burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Batson,

supra, at 98; Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. ___, ___ (2005)

(slip op., at 18). This final step involves evaluating “the

persuasiveness of the justification” proffered by the prose-

cutor, but “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding

racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the

opponent of the strike.” Purkett, supra, at 768.

On direct appeal in federal court, the credibility findings

a trial court makes in a Batson inquiry are reviewed for

clear error. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U. S. 352, 364–

366 (1991) (plurality opinion) (holding that evaluation of a

prosecutor’s credibility “lies ‘peculiarly within a trial

judge’s province’ ”). Under AEDPA, however, a federal

habeas court must find the state-court conclusion “an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28

U. S. C. §2254(d)(2). Thus, a federal habeas court can only

grant Collins’ petition if it was unreasonable to credit the

prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the Batson

challenge. State-court factual findings, moreover, are

presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden of rebut-

ting the presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.”

§2254(e)(1). See Miller-El, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6).

Although the Ninth Circuit assumed §2254(e)(1)’s pre-

sumption applied in this case, 365 F. 3d, at 677, the par-

ties disagree about whether and when it does. We need

not address that question. Even assuming, arguendo, that

only §2254(d)(2) applied in this proceeding, the state-court

decision was not an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court.

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of the Court

Because the California Court of Appeal accepted the

trial court’s credibility finding, the panel majority inquired

whether the appellate court made an unreasonable factual

determination. See id., at 682. The panel majority’s

analysis and conclusions, however, depended entirely on

its view of the trial court’s credibility holding. The panel

majority found no error in the trial court’s proceedings or

rulings in the first two steps of the Batson inquiry. 365

F. 3d, at 677–678. It disagreed, however, with the trial

court’s conclusions on the third step, holding that it was

unreasonable to accept the prosecutor’s explanation that

Juror 16 was excused on account of her youth and her

demeanor. Id., at 678–687. We conclude the Ninth Cir-

cuit erred, for the trial court’s credibility determination

was not unreasonable.

Noting that the trial court had not witnessed Juror 16’s

purported eye rolling, the panel majority concluded that

no reasonable factfinder could have accepted the prosecu-

tor’s rendition of the alleged incident because the prosecu-

tor’s conduct completely undermined her credibility. Id.,

at 683. Having before it only the trial court record, the

Court of Appeals majority drew this conclusion based on

three considerations: first, the prosecutor’s erroneous

statement concerning another prospective African-

American juror’s age; second, the prosecutor’s improper

attempt to use gender as a basis for exclusion; and third,

the majority’s skepticism toward the prosecutor’s explana-

tion that she struck Juror 16 in part because of her youth

and lack of ties to the community. Id., at 683–684.

The first reason the panel majority noted for rejecting

the trial court’s credibility finding pertained not to Juror

16, the subject of Collins’ claim on appeal, but to another

prospective African-American juror, Juror 19. The prose-

cutor referred to Juror 19 as “young” even though she was

a grandmother. This reference to youth took place during

a discussion about three prospective jurors, Jurors 6, 16,

6 RICE v. COLLINS

Opinion of the Court

and 19. Jurors 6 and 16 were both young. As Judge Hall

observed, it is quite plausible that the prosecutor simply

misspoke with respect to a juror’s numerical designation,

an error defense counsel may also have committed. Id., at

688; 2 App. 9. It is a tenuous inference to say that an

accidental reference with respect to one juror, Juror 19,

undermines the prosecutor’s credibility with respect to

Juror 16. Seizing on what can plausibly be viewed as an

innocent transposition makes little headway toward the

conclusion that the prosecutor’s explanation was clearly

not credible.

Second, the panel majority concluded that the trial court

should have questioned the prosecutor’s credibility be-

cause of her “attempt to use gender as a race-neutral basis

for excluding Jurors 016 and 019.” 365 F. 3d, at 684.

Respondent’s trial occurred in August 1996, over two years

after our decision in J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511

U. S. 127 (1994), made clear that discrimination in jury

selection on the basis of gender violates the Equal Protec-

tion Clause. Although the record contains a somewhat

confusing colloquy on this point, it can be read as indicat-

ing that one of the prosecutor’s aims in striking Juror 16

was achieving gender balance on the jury. Concerned

about the constitutionality of such a strike, the trial court

made clear that it would not accept gender as a race-

neutral explanation. The panel majority assigned the

gender justification more weight than it can bear. The

prosecutor provided a number of other permissible and

plausible race-neutral reasons, and Collins provides no

argument why this portion of the colloquy demonstrates

that a reasonable factfinder must conclude the prosecutor

lied about the eye rolling and struck Juror 16 based on her

race.

Finally, the panel majority believed to be unsupportable

the prosecutor’s stated concern that Juror 16 might, as a

young and single citizen with no ties to the community, be

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of the Court

too tolerant of the crime with which respondent was

charged. 365 F. 3d, at 680–682, 684. This was so, the

majority concluded, because during voir dire Juror 16

replied affirmatively when asked if she believed the crime

with which respondent was charged should be illegal and

disclaimed any other reason she could not be impartial.

Id., at 680. That the prosecutor claimed to hold such

concerns despite Juror 16’s voir dire averments does not

establish that she offered a pretext. It is not unreasonable

to believe the prosecutor remained worried that a young

person with few ties to the community might be less will-

ing than an older, more permanent resident to impose a

lengthy sentence for possessing a small amount of a con-

trolled substance. Accord, id., at 690 (Hall, J., dissenting).

Even if the prosecutor was overly cautious in this regard,

her wariness of the young and the rootless could be seen

as race neutral, for she used a peremptory strike on a

white male juror, Juror 6, with the same characteristics.

2 App. 5, 14.

Viewing the panel majority’s concerns together, the

most generous reading would suggest only that the trial

court had reason to question the prosecutor’s credibility

regarding Juror 16’s alleged improper demeanor. That

does not, however, compel the conclusion that the trial

court had no permissible alternative but to reject the

prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications and conclude

Collins had shown a Batson violation. Reasonable minds

reviewing the record might disagree about the prosecutor’s

credibility, but on habeas review that does not suffice to

supersede the trial court’s credibility determination.

The panel majority did not stop at the conclusion that

the trial court rendered an unreasonable factual determi-

nation in light of the evidence presented. It further con-

cluded that the state courts had unreasonably applied

clearly established federal law as determined by this

Court. 365 F. 3d, at 679; 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). The

8 RICE v. COLLINS

Opinion of the Court

question whether a state court errs in determining the

facts is a different question from whether it errs in apply-

ing the law. In this case there is no demonstration that

either the trial court or the California Court of Appeal

acted contrary to clearly established federal law in recog-

nizing and applying Batson’s burden-framework. See

2 App. 14–15; App. to Pet. for Cert. 114–116. The only

question, as we have noted, is whether the trial court’s

factual determination at Batson’s third step was unrea-

sonable. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude it

was not.

III

The panel majority’s attempt to use a set of debatable

inferences to set aside the conclusion reached by the state

court does not satisfy AEDPA’s requirements for granting

a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the Court of

Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

BREYER, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–52

_________________

BERTRAM RICE, WARDEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

STEVEN MARTELL COLLINS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[January 18, 2006]

JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins,

concurring.

Twenty years ago Justice Thurgood Marshall warned

that the test of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986),

would fail to ferret out unconstitutional discrimination in

the selection of jurors. Id., at 102–103 (concurring opin-

ion) (“The decision today will not end the racial discrimi-

nation that peremptories inject into the jury-selection

process”). In my view, history has proved Justice Mar-

shall right. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. ___, ___

(2005) (slip op., at 1) (BREYER, J., concurring). And today’s

case, like Miller-El, helps to illustrate Batson’s fundamen-

tal failings.

For one thing, the prosecutor’s inability in this case to

provide a clear explanation of why she exercised her per-

emptory challenges may well reflect the more general fact

that the exercise of a peremptory challenge can rest upon

instinct not reason. Insofar as Batson asks prosecutors to

explain the unexplainable, how can it succeed? Miller-El,

545 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2–3) (BREYER, J., concurring).

For another thing, the trial judge’s uncertainty about

the legal validity of the exercise of peremptory challenges

in this case may reflect the more general fact that, some-

times, no one, not even the lawyer herself, can be certain

whether a decision to exercise a peremptory challenge

2 RICE v. COLLINS

BREYER, J., concurring

rests upon an impermissible racial, religious, gender-

based, or ethnic stereotype. Ibid. See also Batson, supra,

at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting unconscious

internalization of racial stereotypes). How can trial judges

second-guess an instinctive judgment the underlying basis

for which may be a form of stereotyping invisible even to

the prosecutor? Miller-El, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 2)

(BREYER, J., concurring).

Finally, the case before us makes clear that ordinary

mechanisms of judicial review cannot assure Batson’s

effectiveness. The reasons are structural. The trial judge

is best placed to consider the factors that underlie credibil-

ity: demeanor, context, and atmosphere. And the trial

judge is best placed to determine whether, in a borderline

case, a prosecutor’s hesitation or contradiction reflect (a)

deception, or (b) the difficulty of providing a rational rea-

son for an instinctive decision. Appellate judges cannot on

the basis of a cold record easily second-guess a trial judge’s

decision about likely motivation. These circumstances

mean that appellate courts will, and must, grant the trial

courts considerable leeway in applying Batson. See Her-

nandez v. New York, 500 U. S. 352 (1991). As the present

case illustrates, considerations of federalism require fed-

eral habeas courts to show yet further deference to state-

court judgments. See 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2) (state-court

factual determination must stand unless “unreasonable”).

The upshot is an unresolvable tension between, on the

one hand, what Blackstone called an inherently “ ‘arbi-

trary and capricious’ ” peremptory challenge system,

Miller-El, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7) (BREYER, J., concur-

ring) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the

Laws of England 346 (1769)), and, on the other hand, the

Constitution’s nondiscrimination command. Given this

constitutional tension, we may have to choose. Miller-El,

supra, at ___ (slip op., at 8) (BREYER, J., concurring);

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

BREYER, J., concurring

dissenting) (“Were it necessary to make an absolute choice

between the right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in

conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth

Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the

Constitution compels a choice of the former”); Batson, su-

pra, at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (same).

I have argued that legal life without peremptories is no

longer unthinkable. Miller-El, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6–

7) (concurring opinion) (citing, inter alia, the experience of

England). I continue to believe that we should reconsider

Batson’s test and the peremptory challenge system as a

whole. Nonetheless, because the Court correctly applies

the present legal framework, I concur in its opinion.