Dolan v. United States Postal Service

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DOLAN v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 04–848. Argued November 7, 2005—Decided February 22, 2006

Under the Postal Reorganization Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act

(FTCA) applies to “tort claims arising out of [Postal Service] activi-

ties.” 39 U. S. C. §409(c). The FTCA, in turn, waives sovereign im-

munity in certain cases involving negligence committed by federal

employees in the course of their employment, 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1),

making the United States liable “in the same manner and to the

same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” §2674.

However, the sovereign immunity bar remains as to, inter alia, “[a]ny

claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of

letters or postal matter.” §2680(b). Consequently, the United States

may be liable if postal workers commit torts under local law, but not

for claims defined by the exception. Petitioner Dolan filed an FTCA

suit against the Postal Service for injuries she suffered when she

tripped and fell over mail left on her porch by postal employees. The

District Court dismissed the suit, and the Third Circuit affirmed,

both concluding that, although the FTCA generally waives sovereign

immunity as to federal employees’ torts, Dolan’s claims were barred

by §2680(b)’s exception.

Held: Because the postal exception is inapplicable in this case, Dolan’s

claim may go forward. This Court assumes that under the applicable

state law a person injured by tripping over a package or bundle neg-

ligently left by a private party would have a cause of action for dam-

ages. The question is whether §2860(b)’s exception preserves sover-

eign immunity in such a case. Considered in isolation, “negligent

transmission” could embrace a wide range of acts. However, inter-

pretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statu-

tory text, considering the statute’s purpose and context. Here, both

context and precedent require reading the phrase so that it does not

2 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE

Syllabus

go beyond negligence causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, in dam-

aged condition, or at the wrong address. Starting with context, “neg-

ligent transmission” follows the terms “loss” and “miscarriage,” which

limit the reach of transmission. Mail is “lost” if it is destroyed or

misplaced and “miscarried” if it goes to the wrong address. Since

both terms refer to failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in

a timely manner to the right address, it would be odd if “negligent

transmission” swept far more broadly to include injuries caused by

postal employees but involving neither failure to transmit mail nor

damage to its contents. This interpretation is supported by Kosak v.

United States, 465 U. S. 848, where this Court noted that one of the

FTCA’s purposes was to waive the Government’s immunity from li-

ability for injuries resulting from auto accidents involving postal

trucks delivering—and thus “transmitting”—the mail. Nothing in

the statutory text supports a distinction between negligent driving,

which the Government claims relates only circumstantially to the

mail, and Dolan’s accident, which was caused by the mail itself. In

both cases the postal employee acts negligently while transmitting

mail. In addition, focusing on whether the mail itself caused the in-

jury would yield anomalies, perhaps making liability turn on, e.g.,

whether a mail sack was empty or full. It is more likely that Con-

gress intended to retain immunity only for injuries arising because

mail either fails to arrive or arrives late, in damaged condition, or at

the wrong address, since such harms are primarily identified with

the Postal Service’s function of transporting mail. The Government

claims that, given the Postal Service’s vast operations, Congress

must have intended to insulate delivery-related torts from liability,

but §2680(b)’s specificity indicates otherwise. Had Congress intended

to preserve immunity for all delivery-related torts, it could have used

sweeping language similar to that used in other FTCA exceptions,

e.g., §2860(i). Furthermore, losses of the type for which immunity is

retained under §2680(b) are at least to some degree avoidable or

compensable through postal registration and insurance. The Gov-

ernment raises the specter of frivolous slip-and-fall claims inundating

the Postal Service, but that is a risk shared by any business making

home deliveries. Finally, the general rule that a sovereign immunity

waiver “will be strictly construed . . . in favor of the sovereign,” Lane

v. Peña, 518 U. S. 187, 192, is “unhelpful” in the FTCA context,

where “unduly generous interpretations of the exceptions run the

risk of defeating” the central purpose of the statute, Kosak, supra, at

853, n. 9, which “waives the Government’s immunity from suit in

sweeping language,” United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543,

547. Pp. 4–11.

377 F. 3d 285, reversed and remanded.

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Syllabus

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined.

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. ALITO, J., took no part in the

consideration or decision of the case.

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–848

_________________

BARBARA DOLAN, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

POSTAL SERVICE ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[February 22, 2006]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Each day, according to the Government’s submissions

here, the United States Postal Service delivers some 660

million pieces of mail to as many as 142 million delivery

points. This case involves one such delivery point—

petitioner Barbara Dolan’s porch—where mail left by

postal employees allegedly caused her to trip and fall.

Claiming injuries as a result, Dolan filed a claim for ad-

ministrative relief from the Postal Service. When her

claim was denied, she and her husband (whose claim for

loss of consortium the Dolans later conceded was barred

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies) filed suit

in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-

trict of Pennsylvania, asserting that the Postal Service’s

negligent placement of mail at their home subjected the

Government to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act

(FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§1346(b)(1), 2674. The District Court

dismissed Dolan’s suit, and the Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit affirmed, 377 F. 3d 285 (2004). Both courts

concluded that, although the FTCA generally waives

sovereign immunity as to federal employees’ torts, Dolan’s

2 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE

Opinion of the Court

claims were barred by an exception to that waiver, 28

U. S. C. §2680(b). We disagree and hold that Dolan’s suit

may proceed.

I

Under the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U. S. C. §101 et

seq., the Postal Service is “an independent establishment

of the executive branch of the Government of the United

States,” §201. Holding a monopoly over carriage of letters,

the Postal Service has “significant governmental powers,”

including the power of eminent domain, the authority to

make searches and seizures in the enforcement of laws

protecting the mails, the authority to promulgate postal

regulations, and, subject to the Secretary of State’s super-

vision, the power to enter international postal agreements.

See Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd., 540

U. S. 736, 741 (2004) (discussing 39 U. S. C. §§101, 401, 407,

601–606). Consistent with this status, the Postal Service

enjoys federal sovereign immunity absent a waiver. See

ibid.; cf. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a

waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Govern-

ment and its agencies from suit”).

Although the Postal Reorganization Act generally

“waives the immunity of the Postal Service from suit by

giving it the power ‘to sue and be sued in its official

name,’ ” Flamingo Industries, supra, at 741 (quoting 39

U. S. C. §401(1)), the statute also provides that the FTCA

“shall apply to tort claims arising out of activities of the

Postal Service,” §409(c).

The FTCA, in turn, waives sovereign immunity in two

different sections of the United States Code. The first

confers federal-court jurisdiction in a defined category of

cases involving negligence committed by federal employees

in the course of their employment. This jurisdictional

grant covers:

“claims against the United States, for money dam-

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of the Court

ages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury

or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused

by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any

employee of the Government while acting within the

scope of his office or employment, under circum-

stances where the United States, if a private person,

would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the

law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”

28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1).

As to claims falling within this jurisdictional grant, the

FTCA, in a second provision, makes the United States liable

“in the same manner and to the same extent as a private

individual under like circumstances,” though not “for

interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.”

§2674; see generally United States v. Olson, 546 U. S. ___ ,

___ (2005) (slip op., at 1).

The FTCA qualifies its waiver of sovereign immunity for

certain categories of claims (13 in all). If one of the excep-

tions applies, the bar of sovereign immunity remains. The

13 categories of exempted claims are set forth in 28

U. S. C. §2680, and the relevant subsection for our pur-

poses, pertaining to postal operations, is §2680(b). It

states:

“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of

this title shall not apply to . . . [a]ny claim arising out

of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of

letters or postal matter.”

As a consequence, the United States may be liable if postal

employees commit torts under local law, but not for claims

defined by this exception.

This was the provision relied upon by the District Court

and Court of Appeals to dismiss Dolan’s suit. The Court of

Appeals’ decision created a conflict with a decision of the

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Raila v.

United States, 355 F. 3d 118, 121 (CA2 2004). We granted

4 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE

Opinion of the Court

certiorari. 544 U. S. ___ (2005).

II

We assume that under the applicable state law a person

injured by tripping over a package or bundle of papers

negligently left on the porch of a residence by a private

party would have a cause of action for damages. See 28

U. S. C. §§1346(b)(1), 2674. The question is whether,

when mail left by the Postal Service causes the slip and

fall, the §2680(b) exception for “loss, miscarriage, or negli-

gent transmission of letters or postal matter” preserves

sovereign immunity despite the FTCA’s more general

statements of waiver.

If considered in isolation, the phrase “negligent trans-

mission” could embrace a wide range of negligent acts

committed by the Postal Service in the course of delivering

mail, including creation of slip-and-fall hazards from

leaving packets and parcels on the porch of a residence.

After all, in ordinary meaning and usage, transmission of

the mail is not complete until it arrives at the destination.

See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

2429 (1971) (defining “transmission” as “an act, process, or

instance of transmitting” and “transmit” as “to cause to go

or be conveyed to another person or place”). In large part

this inference—transmission includes delivery—led the

District Court and Court of Appeals to rule for the Gov-

ernment. See 377 F. 3d, at 288; App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a–

6a. The definition of words in isolation, however, is not

necessarily controlling in statutory construction. A word

in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of

its definitional possibilities. Interpretation of a word or

phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text,

considering the purpose and context of the statute, and

consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the

analysis. Here, we conclude both context and precedent

require a narrower reading, so that “negligent transmis-

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of the Court

sion” does not go beyond negligence causing mail to be lost

or to arrive late, in damaged condition, or at the wrong

address. See Raila, supra, at 121 (holding the postal

exception covers “damages and delay of the postal mate-

rial itself and consequential damages therefrom”). The

phrase does not comprehend all negligence occurring in

the course of mail delivery.

Starting with context, the words “negligent transmis-

sion” in §2680(b) follow two other terms, “loss” and “mis-

carriage.” Those terms, we think, limit the reach of

“transmission.” “[A] word is known by the company it

keeps”—a rule that “is often wisely applied where a word

is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of

unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Jarecki v.

G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961); see also Dole

v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S. 26, 36 (1990) (“[W]ords grouped in

a list should be given related meaning” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Here, as both parties acknowledge, mail

is “lost” if it is destroyed or misplaced and “miscarried” if

it goes to the wrong address. Since both those terms refer

to failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in a

timely manner to the right address, it would be odd if

“negligent transmission” swept far more broadly to include

injuries like those alleged here—injuries that happen to be

caused by postal employees but involve neither failure to

transmit mail nor damage to its contents.

Our interpretation would be less secure were it not for a

precedent we deem to have decisive weight here. We refer

to Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848 (1984). In Kosak,

an art collector alleged in an FTCA suit that artworks he

owned were damaged when the United States Customs

Service seized and detained them. Id., at 849–850. The

question was whether the Government retained immunity

based on §2680(c), a provision that has since been

amended but at the time covered:

6 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE

Opinion of the Court

“[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or

collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention

of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs

or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.” Id., at

852, n. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In its opinion concluding the exception did apply and thus

that the United States retained sovereign immunity, the

Court gave specific consideration to the postal exception.

In a part of the opinion central to its holding, the Court

contrasted what it called the “generality of §2680(c)” with

the “specificity of §2680(b),” id., at 855. The Court ob-

served:

“One of the principal purposes of the Federal Tort

Claims Act was to waive the Government’s immunity

from liability for injuries resulting from auto acci-

dents in which employees of the Postal System were

at fault. In order to ensure that §2680(b), which gov-

erns torts committed by mailmen, did not have the ef-

fect of barring precisely the sort of suit that Congress

was most concerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the

provision carefully delineated the types of misconduct

for which the Government was not assuming financial

responsibility—namely, ‘the loss, miscarriage, or neg-

ligent transmission of letters or postal matter’—

thereby excluding, by implication, negligent handling

of motor vehicles.” Ibid.

In the present case neither party suggests Kosak’s con-

clusion regarding negligent operation of postal motor

vehicles should be ignored as dictum. In light of Kosak’s

discussion, we cannot interpret the phrase “negligent

transmission” in §2680(b) to cover all negligence in the

course of mail delivery. Although postal trucks may well

be delivering—and thus transmitting—mail when they

collide with other vehicles, Kosak indicates the United

States, nonetheless, retains no immunity.

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of the Court

Seeking to distinguish postal auto accidents from Do-

lan’s fall, the Government argues that negligent driving

relates only circumstantially to the mail, whereas Dolan’s

accident was caused by the mail itself. Nothing in the

statutory text supports this distinction. Quite the con-

trary, if placing mail so as to create a slip-and-fall risk

constitutes “negligent transmission,” the same should be

true of driving postal trucks in a manner that endangers

others on the road. In both cases the postal employee acts

negligently while transmitting mail. In addition, as the

Second Circuit recognized and as the Government ac-

knowledged at oral argument, focusing on whether the

mail itself caused the injury would yield anomalies, per-

haps making liability turn on whether a mail sack causing

a slip-and-fall was empty or full, or whether a pedestrian

sideswiped by a passing truck was hit by the side-view

mirror or a dangling parcel. See Raila, 355 F. 3d, at 122–

123.

We think it more likely that Congress intended to retain

immunity, as a general rule, only for injuries arising,

directly or consequentially, because mail either fails to

arrive at all or arrives late, in damaged condition, or at

the wrong address. Illustrative instances of the excep-

tion’s operation, then, would be personal or financial

harms arising from nondelivery or late delivery of sensi-

tive materials or information (e.g., medicines or a mort-

gage foreclosure notice) or from negligent handling of a

mailed parcel (e.g., shattering of shipped china). Such

harms, after all, are the sort primarily identified with the

Postal Service’s function of transporting mail throughout

the United States.

Resisting this conclusion, the Government emphasizes

the Postal Service’s vast operations—the 660 million daily

mailings and 142 million delivery points mentioned at the

outset. See Brief for Respondents 36. As delivery to

mailboxes and doorsteps is essential to this nationwide

8 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE

Opinion of the Court

undertaking, Congress must have intended, the Govern-

ment asserts, to insulate delivery-related torts from liabil-

ity. If, however, doorstep delivery is essential to the postal

enterprise, then driving postal trucks is no less so. And in

any event, while it is true “[t]he §2680 exceptions are

designed to protect certain important governmental func-

tions and prerogatives from disruption,” Molzof v. United

States, 502 U. S. 301, 311 (1992), the specificity of §2680(b),

see Kosak, 465 U. S., at 855, indicates that Congress did

not intend to immunize all postal activities.

Other FTCA exceptions paint with a far broader brush.

They cover, for example: “[a]ny claim for damages caused

by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regula-

tion of the monetary system,” 28 U. S. C. §2680(i); “[a]ny

claim arising out of the combatant activities of the mili-

tary or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of

war,” §2680(j); “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,”

§2680(k); “[a]ny claim arising from the activities of the

Tennessee Valley Authority,” §2680(l), or “the Panama

Canal Company,” §2680(m); and “[a]ny claim arising from

the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermedi-

ate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives,” §2680(n). Had

Congress intended to preserve immunity for all torts

related to postal delivery—torts including hazardous mail

placement at customer homes—it could have used simi-

larly sweeping language in §2680(b). By instead “carefully

delineat[ing]” just three types of harm (loss, miscarriage,

and negligent transmission), see Kosak, supra, at 855,

Congress expressed the intent to immunize only a subset

of postal wrongdoing, not all torts committed in the course

of mail delivery.

Further supporting our interpretation, losses of the type

for which immunity is retained under §2680(b) are at least

to some degree avoidable or compensable through postal

registration and insurance. See United States Postal

Service, Domestic Mail Manual pt. 609.1.1 (Nov. 10, 2005),

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

Opinion of the Court

available at http://pe.usps.gov/text/dmm300/609.htm (as

visited Jan. 9, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s case

file) (allowing indemnity claims for loss or damage of

“insured, collect on delivery (COD), registered with postal

insurance, or Express Mail”); 39 CFR §111.1 (2005) (incor-

porating by reference the Domestic Mail Manual). The

same was true when Congress enacted the FTCA in 1946.

See 39 U. S. C. §245 (1940 ed. and Supp. V) (setting rates

and conditions for mail insurance); 39 U. S. C. §381 (1946

ed.) (“For the greater security of valuable mail matter the

Postmaster General may establish a uniform system of

registration, and as a part of such system he may provide

rules under which the senders or owners of any registered

matter shall be indemnified for loss, rifling, or damage

thereof in the mails . . .”). As Kosak explains, one purpose

of the FTCA exceptions was to avoid “extending the cover-

age of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were

already available,” 465 U. S., at 858—an objective consis-

tent with retaining immunity as to claims of mail damage

or delay covered by postal registration and insurance.

While the Government suggests other injuries falling

outside the FTCA are also subject to administrative relief,

even assuming that is true the provision the Government

cites permits only discretionary relief, not an automatic

remedy like postal insurance. See 39 U. S. C. §2603 (indi-

cating the Postal Service “may adjust and settle” personal-

injury and property-damage claims “not cognizable” under

the FTCA’s administrative relief provision); see also 31

U. S. C. §224c (1940 ed.) (indicating that “[w]hen any

damage is done to person or property by or through the

operation of the Post Office Department . . . the Postmas-

ter General is invested with power to adjust and settle any

claim for such damage when his award for such damage in

any case does not exceed $500”); Legislative Reorganiza-

tion Act of 1946, §424(a), 60 Stat. 846–847 (repealing

§224c as to negligence claims cognizable under the FTCA).

10 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE

Opinion of the Court

The Government raises the specter of frivolous slip-and-

fall claims inundating the Postal Service. It is true that,

in addition to other considerations we have identified,

Kosak describes “avoiding exposure of the United States to

liability for excessive or fraudulent claims” as a principal

aim of the FTCA exceptions, 465 U. S., at 858. Slip-and-

fall liability, however, to the extent state tort law imposes

it, is a risk shared by any business that makes home

deliveries. Given that “negligent transmission,” viewed in

context and in light of Kosak, cannot sweep as broadly as

the Government claims, ordinary protections against

frivolous litigation must suffice here, just as they do in the

case of motor vehicle collisions.

Finally, it should be noted that this case does not impli-

cate the general rule that “a waiver of the Government’s

sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of

its scope, in favor of the sovereign,” Lane v. Peña, 518 U. S.

187, 192 (1996). As Kosak explains, this principle is “un-

helpful” in the FTCA context, where “unduly generous

interpretations of the exceptions run the risk of defeating

the central purpose of the statute,” 465 U. S., at 853, n. 9,

which “waives the Government’s immunity from suit in

sweeping language,” United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340

U. S. 543, 547 (1951); see also United States v. Nordic Vil-

lage, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 34 (1992) (observing “[w]e have on

occasion narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of sover-

eign immunity where that was consistent with Congress’

clear intent, as in the context of the ‘sweeping language’ of

the [FTCA]” (quoting Yellow Cab Co., supra, at 547)).

Hence, “the proper objective of a court attempting to con-

strue one of the subsections of 28 U. S. C. §2680 is to

identify ‘those circumstances which are within the words

and reason of the exception’—no less and no more.” Ko-

sak, supra, at 853, n. 9 (quoting Dalehite v. United States,

346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953)). Having made that inquiry here,

we conclude Dolan’s claims fall outside §2680(b).

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 11

Opinion of the Court

* * *

The postal exception is inapplicable, and Dolan’s claim

falls within the FTCA’s general waiver of federal sovereign

immunity. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is re-

versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–848

_________________

BARBARA DOLAN, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

POSTAL SERVICE ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[February 22, 2006]

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the Gov-

ernment’s sovereign immunity for civil suits seeking

money damages

“for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or

death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-

sion of any employee of the Government while acting

within the scope of his office or employment, under

circumstances where the United States, if a private

person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance

with the law of the place where the act or omission oc-

curred,” 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1),

save several exceptions found in §2680. As relevant here,

Congress reserved to the Government its sovereign immu-

nity respecting “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscar-

riage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal mat-

ter.” §2680(b) (postal exception).

Petitioner Barbara Dolan claims to have suffered per-

sonal injuries when she tripped over letters, packages, and

periodicals that an employee of the United States Postal

Service (Postal Service) negligently left on her porch.

Today, the Court concludes that Dolan’s lawsuit may

proceed because her claim does not fall within the excep-

tion. I disagree. Dolan’s claim arises out of the Postal

2 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Service’s “negligent transmission” of mail and is thus

covered by the terms of the postal exception. Even if the

exception is ambiguous, this Court’s cases require that

ambiguities as to the scope of the Government’s waiver of

immunity be resolved in its favor. Accordingly, I respect-

fully dissent.

I

The text of the postal exception, and every term therein,

should be ascribed its ordinary meaning. See FDIC v.

Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 477 (1994) (noting that we interpret

a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary meaning

when that term is not defined in the statute). The term in

controversy here is “negligent transmission.” The crux of

my disagreement with the majority is its failure to assign

the term “transmission” its plain meaning. That term is

defined as the “[a]ct, operation, or process, of transmit-

ting.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2692 (2d

ed. 1934, as republished 1945). “Transmit” is defined as,

inter alia, “[t]o send or transfer from one person or place

to another; to forward by rail, post, wire, etc., . . . [t]o

cause . . . to pass or be conveyed.” Id., at 2692–2693.

There is no cause to conclude that Congress was unaware

of the ordinary definition of the terms “transmission” and

“transmit” when it enacted the FTCA and the postal ex-

ception in 1946. Nor is there textual indication that Con-

gress intended to deviate from the ordinary meaning of

these terms.1 Accordingly, I would interpret the term

——————

1 In fact, this reading is supported by Congress’ routine definitional

use of the terms “transmission” and “transmit” in both criminal and

civil postal statutes to refer to the handling, processing, and delivery of

mail to a final destination. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 43, §6, 5

Stat. 734 (respecting deputy postmasters authorized “to transmit to any

person or place” official letters or packages free of charge); 18 U. S. C.

§§1696(b) and (c) (referring to unlawful “transmission” of letters);

§§1716(b), (c), (d), and (e) (regulating and proscribing “transmission in

the mails” of dangerous items (e.g., medicines) except when the “trans-

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

“transmission” consistent, with its ordinary meaning, see

ante, at 4, and conclude that the postal exception exempts

the Government from liability for any claim arising out of

the negligent delivery of the mail to a Postal Service pa-

tron, including Dolan’s slip-and-fall claim.

Rejecting the “ordinary meaning and usage” of “negli-

gent transmission,” the majority concludes that the term

covers only injury arising “directly or consequentially”

from “negligence causing mail to be lost or to arrive late,

in damaged condition, or at the wrong address.” Ante, at

5, 7. Thus, in the majority’s view, “negligent transmis-

sion” covers direct injury to the mail as well as personal

injury arising from injury to the mail, but does not cover

personal injury that does not arise from damage to the

mail. For example, in the majority’s view, if a mail carrier

negligently drops a mailbox containing glassware on a

patron’s doorstep, causing the contents to shatter, and the

patron later injures himself while attempting to handle

the shards of glass, the postal exception would bar a claim

for damages for the destroyed item as well as a related

claim for personal injury. That view is correct, as far as it

goes. However, under the majority’s view, if the mail

carrier negligently places a heap of mail on a patron’s

front porch and the patron trips and falls over the mail as

he walks out of his front door, his personal injury claim

may go forward. There is no basis in the text for the line

drawn by the majority. Indeed, the majority’s view is at

odds with the broad language of the postal exception,

which expressly applies to “[a]ny claim arising out of . . .

negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.”

§2680(b) (emphasis added).

The majority rationalizes its view by concluding that the

terms “loss” and “miscarriage” necessarily limit the term

“transmission.” Ante, at 5. Applying the rule of noscitur a

——————

mission” is “to,” “from,” or “between” specified individuals or entities).

4 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

sociis—that a word is known by the company it keeps—the

majority reasons that because both “loss” and “miscar-

riage” refer to “failings in the postal obligation to deliver

mail in a timely manner to the right address, it would be

odd if ‘negligent transmission’ swept more broadly.” Ibid.

But there is nothing “odd” about interpreting the term

“negligent transmission” to encompass more ground than

the decidedly narrower terms “loss” and “miscarriage.”

The rule of noscitur a sociis is intended to prevent as-

cribing to one word a meaning so expansive that it con-

flicts with other terms of the provision in a manner that

gives “ ‘unintended breadth to an Act of Congress.’ ”

Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995) (quoting

Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961)).

That rule, however, “does not require [the Court] to con-

strue every term in a series narrowly because of the mean-

ing given to just one of the terms,” where, as here, nothing

in the text demands a more limited construction. Gustaf-

son, supra, at 586 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (emphasis

deleted). Indeed, to read Congress’ use of narrow terms in a

list as limiting the meaning of broad terms in the same list

“would defy common sense; doing so would prevent Con-

gress from giving effect to expansive words in a list when-

ever they are combined with one word with a more re-

stricted meaning.” Id., at 587.

Nor does this Court’s opinion in Kosak v. United States,

465 U. S. 848 (1984), support the majority’s narrow con-

struction of the postal exception. In Kosak, this Court

suggested that the postal exception does not apply to suits

arising from the negligent handling of motor vehicles by

Postal Service employees. Specifically, the Court stated

that:

“One of the principal purposes of the [FTCA] was to

waive the Government’s immunity from liability for

injuries resulting from auto accidents . . . . In order to

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

THOMAS, J., dissenting

ensure that §2680(b) . . . did not have the effect of bar-

ring precisely the sort of suit that Congress was most

concerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the provision

carefully delineated the types of misconduct for which

the Government was not assuming financial responsi-

bility—namely, ‘the loss, miscarriage, or negligent

transmission of letters or postal matter’. . . Id., at 855

(emphasis added).

That observation has no import beyond the recognition

that the postal exception—whatever its scope may be—

was carefully crafted so as not to undermine an undis-

puted principal purpose of the FTCA—to waive the Gov-

ernment’s immunity for injuries arising from auto acci-

dents. It says nothing further about the acts Congress

intended to capture when enacting the postal exception,

and, thus, is unremarkable for purposes of construing the

exception. 2

——————

2 In an attempt to reconcile Kosak with this case, the majority argues

that “one purpose of the FTCA exceptions was to avoid ‘extending

coverage of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were already

available,’ . . . an objective consistent with retaining immunity as to

some claims of mail damage or delay covered by postal registration and

insurance.” Ante, at 9 (quoting Kosak, 465 U. S., at 858). The majority,

however, ignores the fact that, in most cases, such insurance covers

only the sender, not the recipient, in which case recipients have no

means of obtaining compensation for loss or damage to money, gifts,

heirlooms, valuable papers, delayed medicine, or time-sensitive docu-

ments. See United States Postal Service, Mailing Standards of the

United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual, §§609.4.3(f) and

(ae), pp. 1129, 1130 (rev. Jan. 6, 2005). The majority’s justification also

fails to take into account the fact that postal patrons cannot insure

against the loss of items of sentimental value. See id., §609.4.3, gener-

ally. With a more accurate depiction of registration and insurance

coverage in hand, the Government’s claim that, like injuries arising

from negligent transmission of mail, other injuries outside the reach of

the FTCA are also amenable to administrative relief is not so easily

dismissed. Ante, at 9. Specifically, 39 U. S. C. §2603, as the Govern-

ment argues, provides for the settlement of claims, within the discre-

6 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Even if Kosak does inform the outcome in this case, it

does not support the majority’s interpretation of “negligent

transmission.” As discussed above, the majority does not

purport to limit the type of negligent act that may fall

under the postal exception; rather it limits the scope of the

exception based on the type of consequence that the negli-

gent act causes (damage to the mail, late delivery, etc.)

But Kosak’s exclusion of the act of negligent driving—

regardless of whether the consequence of that act is dam-

age to the mail or injury to a person—from the scope of the

postal exception implies, if anything, that the Kosak Court

envisioned discrete acts as being covered, independently of

the nature of their consequences. See 465 U. S., at 855

(excluding “negligent handling of motor vehicles” from the

“types of misconduct” for which liability is barred by the

postal exception). As such, Kosak does not support an

interpretation of “negligent transmission” based upon the

type of injury that is caused by the Postal Service’s negli-

gent handling of the mail.

II

Assuming that the postal exception is ambiguous, as the

majority suggests, see ante, at 4–5, settled principles

governing the interpretation of waivers of sovereign im-

munity require us to rule in favor of the Government.

A court may only exercise jurisdiction over the Gov-

ernment pursuant to “a clear statement from the United

States waiving sovereign immunity . . . together with a

claim falling within the terms of the waiver.” United

States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U. S. 465, 472

——————

tion of the United States, for injuries caused by the Postal Service that

are not otherwise cognizable, which would include claims like Dolan’s.

The discretionary nature of such settlements does not alter the fact

that §2603 undermines the Court’s position that the purported un-

availability of administrative recovery for claims such as Dolan’s

supports its proposed interpretation.

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

THOMAS, J., dissenting

(2003). “[A] waiver of the Government’s sovereign immu-

nity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in

favor of the sovereign.” Lane v. Peña, 518 U. S. 187, 192

(1996). These settled legal principles apply not only to the

interpretation of the scope of the Government’s waiver of

immunity, but also to the interpretation of the scope of

any exceptions to that waiver. See ibid. (explaining that,

consistent with rules of construction respecting waivers of

sovereign immunity, ambiguities created by conditions on

and qualifications of the waiver must be strictly construed

in favor of sovereign immunity).

Thus, the majority is incorrect to conclude that “this

case does not implicate the general rule that ‘a waiver of

the Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly

construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.’ ”

Ante, at 10. As this case clearly illustrates, the Govern-

ment’s amenability to suit can only be ascertained after

construing both the waiver of immunity and its excep-

tions. The well-established rationale for construing a

waiver in favor of the sovereign’s immunity, thus, applies

with equal force to the construction of an exception to that

waiver. Accordingly, even if I were to conclude that the

majority’s interpretation of “negligent transmission” were

as plausible as my own, I would still resolve this case in

favor of the Government’s sovereign immunity as man-

dated by our canons of construction.3

——————

3 There is no canon of construction that counsels in favor of constru-

ing the ambiguity against the Government. Although we have “on

occasion narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of sovereign immu-

nity,” we have done so in cases where Congress plainly waived the

Government’s immunity for the particular claim at issue, and the only

question before the Court was the permissibility of the form of the suit.

United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 34 (1992) (citing

United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543 (1951), and United

States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366 (1949)). In cases

where, as here, the question whether a particular claim is subject to an

exception is disputed, we have construed FTCA exceptions broadly to

8 DOLAN v. POSTAL SERVICE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

* * *

For these reasons, I would hold that a tort claim for

personal injury arising out of negligent delivery of mail to

a postal patron is barred by 28 U. S. C. §2680(b), the

postal exception. Accordingly, I would affirm the judg-

ment of the Court of Appeals.

——————

preclude claims for actions Congress intended to except from the

FTCA’s general waiver of immunity. See Dalehite v. United States, 346

U. S. 15, 31 (1953); United States v. Orleans, 425 U. S. 807 (1976);

Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848 (1984).