Marshall v. Marshall

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 04–1544. Argued February 28, 2006—Decided May 1, 2006

Among longstanding limitations on federal-court jurisdiction otherwise

properly exercised are the so-called “domestic relations” and “pro

bate” exceptions. Neither is compelled by the text of the Constitution

or federal statute. Both are judicially created doctrines stemming in

large measure from misty understandings of English legal history.

In view of lower federal-court decisions expansively interpreting the

two exceptions, this Court reined in the domestic relations exception

in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689, and endeavored similarly

to curtail the probate exception in Markham v. Allen, 326 U. S. 490.

Petitioner, Vickie Lynn Marshall (Vickie), a.k.a. Anna Nicole

Smith, is the surviving widow of J. Howard Marshall II (J. Howard),

who died without providing for Vickie in his will. According to

Vickie, J. Howard intended to provide for her through a gift in the

form of a “catch-all” trust. Respondent, E. Pierce Marshall (Pierce),

J. Howard’s son, was the ultimate beneficiary of J. Howard’s estate

plan. While the estate was subject to ongoing Texas Probate Court

proceedings, Vickie filed for bankruptcy in California. Pierce filed a

proof of claim in the federal bankruptcy court, alleging that Vickie

had defamed him when, shortly after J. Howard’s death, her lawyers

told the press that Pierce had engaged in forgery, fraud, and over

reaching to gain control of his father’s assets. Pierce sought a decla

ration that his claim was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Vickie

answered, asserting truth as a defense. She also filed counterclaims,

among them a claim that Pierce had tortiously interfered with a gift

she expected from J. Howard. Vickie’s tortious interference counter

claim turned her objection to Pierce’s claim into an adversary pro

ceeding, see Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3007, in which the Bankruptcy

Court granted summary judgment for Vickie on Pierce’s claim and,

2 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Syllabus

after a trial on the merits, entered judgment for Vickie on her coun

terclaim. The court also held that both Vickie’s objection to Pierce’s

claim and her counterclaim qualified as “core proceedings” under 28

U. S. C. §157, which meant that the court had authority to enter a fi

nal judgment disposing of those claims. It awarded Vickie substan

tial compensatory and punitive damages. Pierce then filed a post

trial motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, assert

ing that Vickie’s tortious interference claim could be tried only in the

Texas probate proceedings. The Bankruptcy Court denied the mo

tion. Relying on Markham, the Bankruptcy Court observed that a

federal court has jurisdiction to adjudicate rights in probate property,

so long as its final judgment does not interfere with the state court’s

possession of the property. Subsequently, the Texas Probate Court

declared that J. Howard’s estate plan was valid.

Back in the federal forum, Pierce sought district-court review of the

Bankruptcy Court’s judgment. Among other things, the District

Court held that the probate exception did not reach Vickie’s counter

claim. Citing Markham, 326 U. S., at 494, the court said that the ex

ception would bar federal jurisdiction only if such jurisdiction would

“interfere” with the probate proceedings. It would not do so, the court

concluded, because: (1) success on Vickie’s counterclaim did not ne

cessitate any declaration that J. Howard’s will was invalid, and (2)

under Texas law, probate courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction to

entertain claims of the kind Vickie’s counterclaim asserted. The

court also held that Vickie’s claim did not qualify as a “core pro

ceedin[g]” over which a bankruptcy court may exercise plenary

power, see 28 U. S. C. §157(b)–(c). Accordingly, the District Court

treated the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment as proposed, rather than

final, and undertook de novo review. Adopting and supplementing

the Bankruptcy Court’s findings, the District Court determined that

Pierce had tortiously interfered with Vickie’s expectancy by, inter

alia, conspiring to suppress or destroy the inter vivos trust instru

ment J. Howard had directed his lawyers to prepare for Vickie, and to

strip J. Howard of his assets by backdating, altering, and otherwise

falsifying documents and presenting them to J. Howard under false

pretenses. The District Court awarded Vickie some $44.3 million in

compensatory damages and, based on “overwhelming” evidence of

Pierce’s willfulness, maliciousness, and fraud, an equal amount in

punitive damages.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. Although the Court of Appeals recog

nized that Vickie’s claim does not involve the administration of an es

tate, the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter, it

nonetheless held that the probate exception bars federal jurisdiction

in this case. It read the exception broadly to exclude from the federal

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Syllabus

courts’ adjudicatory authority not only direct challenges to a will or

trust, but also questions which would ordinarily be decided by a pro

bate court in determining the validity of the decedent’s estate plan

ning instrument, whether those questions involve fraud, undue influ

ence, or tortious interference with the testator’s intent. The court

also held that a State’s vesting of exclusive jurisdiction over probate

matters in a special court strips federal courts of jurisdiction to enter

tain any probate related matter, including claims respecting tax li

ability, debt, gift, and tort. Noting that the Probate Court had ruled

it had exclusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie’s claims, the Ninth Cir

cuit held that ruling binding on the Federal District Court.

Held: The Ninth Circuit had no warrant from Congress, or from this

Court’s decisions, for its sweeping extension of the probate exception

recognized in those decisions. Because this case does not fall within

the exception’s scope, the District Court properly asserted jurisdiction

over Vickie’s counterclaim against Pierce. Pp. 8–18.

(a) Ankenbrandt addressed the domestic relations exception’s deri

vation and limits. Among other things, the Court, 504 U. S., at 693–

695, traced the current exception to Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582,

584–589, in which the Court had announced in dicta—without cita

tion or discussion—that federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits for

divorce or alimony. Finding no Article III impediment to federal-

court jurisdiction in domestic relations cases, 504 U. S., at 695–697,

the Ankenbrandt Court, id., at 698–701, anchored the exception in

the Judiciary Act of 1789, which, until 1948, provided circuit court

diversity jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature at common law

or in equity.” The Barber majority, the Ankenbrandt Court acknowl

edged, 504 U. S., at 698, did not expressly tie its announcement of a

domestic relations exception to the text of the diversity statute, but

the Barber dissenters made the connection. Because English chan

cery courts lacked authority to issue divorce and alimony decrees, the

dissenters stated, United States courts similarly lacked authority to

decree divorces or award alimony, 21 How., at 605. The Ankenbrandt

Court was “content” “to rest [its] conclusion that a domestic relations

exception exists as a matter of statutory construction not on the accu

racy of [Barber’s] historical justifications, but, “rather,” on “Congress’

apparent acceptance of this construction of the diversity jurisdiction

provisions in the years prior to 1948,” 504 U. S., at 700. Ankenbrandt

further determined that Congress did not intend to terminate the ex

ception in 1948 when it “replace[d] the law/equity distinction with

the phrase ‘all civil actions.’ ” Id., at 700. The Ankenbrandt Court

nevertheless emphasized that the exception covers only “a narrow

range of domestic relations issues.” Id., at 701. Noting that some

lower federal courts had applied the exception “well beyond the cir

4 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Syllabus

cumscribed situations posed by Barber and its progeny,” ibid., the

Court clarified that only “divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees”

remain outside federal jurisdictional bounds, id., at 703, 704. While

recognizing state tribunals’ “special proficiency” in handling issues

arising in the granting of such decrees, id., at 704, the Court viewed

federal courts as equally equipped to deal with complaints alleging

torts, ibid. Pp. 8–11.

(b) This Court has recognized a probate exception, kin to the do

mestic relations exception, to otherwise proper federal jurisdiction.

See, e.g., Markham, the Court’s most recent and pathmarking pro

nouncement on the subject. Among other things, the Markham Court

first stated that, although “a federal court has no jurisdiction to pro

bate a will or administer an estate[,] it has [long] been established

. . . that federal courts of equity have jurisdiction to entertain suits ‘in

favor of creditors, legatees and heirs’ and other claimants against a

decedent’s estate ‘to establish their claims’ so long as the federal

court does not interfere with the probate proceedings or assume gen

eral jurisdiction of the probate or control of the property in the cus

tody of the state court.” 326 U. S., at 494. The Court next described a

probate exception of distinctly limited scope: “[W]hile a federal court

may not exercise its jurisdiction to disturb or affect the possession of

property in the custody of a state court, . . . it may exercise its juris

diction to adjudicate rights in such property where the final judgment

does not undertake to interfere with the state court’s possession save

to the extent that the state court is bound by the judgment to recog

nize the right adjudicated by the federal court.” Ibid. The first of

these quoted passages is not a model of clear statement, and some

lower federal courts have read the words “interfere with the probate

proceedings” to block federal jurisdiction over a range of matters well

beyond probate of a will or administration of a decedent’s estate, in

cluding an executor’s breach of fiduciary duty. This Court reads

Markham’s enigmatic words, in sync with the second above-quoted

passage, to proscribe “disturb[ing] or affect[ing] the possession of

property in the custody of a state court.” Ibid. Though that reading

renders the first-quoted passage in part redundant, redundancy in

this context is preferable to incoherence. This Court therefore com

prehends Markham’s “interference” language as essentially a reitera

tion of the general principle that, when one court is exercising in rem

jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume in rem jurisdic

tion over the same res. See, e.g., Penn General Casualty Co. v. Penn

sylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U. S. 189, 195–196. Thus, the probate

exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or annulment

of a will and the administration of a decedent’s estate; it also pre

cludes federal courts from disposing of property that is in the custody

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Syllabus

of a state probate court. But it does not bar federal courts from adju

dicating matters outside those confines and otherwise within federal

jurisdiction. Pp. 11–15.

(c) Vickie’s claim does not involve the administration of an estate,

the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter. Provoked

by Pierce’s claim in the bankruptcy proceedings, Vickie’s claim al

leges the widely recognized tort of interference with a gift or inheri

tance. She seeks an in personam judgment against Pierce, not the

probate or annulment of a will. Cf. Sutton v. English, 246 U. S. 199,

208. Nor does she seek to reach a res in a state court’s custody. See

Markham, 326 U. S., at 494. Furthermore, no “sound policy consid

erations” militate in favor of extending the probate exception to cover

this case. Cf. Ankenbrandt, 504 U. S., at 703. Trial courts, both fed

eral and state, often address conduct of the kind Vickie alleges. State

probate courts possess no “special proficiency” in handling such is

sues. Cf. id., at 704. P. 15.

(d) This Court rejects the Ninth Circuit’s alternate rationale that

the Texas Probate Court’s jurisdictional ruling bound the Federal

District Court. Texas courts have recognized a state-law tort action

for interference with an expected gift or inheritance. It is clear, un

der Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, that Texas law governs the

substantive elements of Vickie’s tortious interference claim. But it is

also clear that Texas may not reserve to its probate courts the exclu

sive right to adjudicate a transitory tort. See Tennessee Coal, Iron &

R. Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 360. Jurisdiction is determined “by

the law of the court’s creation and cannot be defeated by the extrater

ritorial operation of a [state] statute . . . , even though it created the

right of action.” Ibid. Directly on point, the Court has held that fed

eral-court jurisdiction, “having existed from the beginning of the Fed

eral government, [can] not be impaired by subsequent state legisla

tion creating courts of probate.” McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268,

281. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U. S. 106, on which the Ninth Circuit relied,

is not to the contrary. Durfee stands only for the proposition that a

state court’s final judgment determining its own jurisdiction ordinar

ily qualifies for full faith and credit, so long as the jurisdictional issue

was fully and fairly litigated in the court that rendered the judgment.

See id., at 111, 115. At issue here, however, is not the Texas Probate

Court’s jurisdiction, but the federal courts’ jurisdiction to entertain

Vickie’s tortious interference claim. Under our federal system, Texas

cannot render its probate courts exclusively competent to entertain a

claim of that genre. Pp. 15–17.

(e) The Ninth Circuit may address on remand the questions

whether Vickie’s claim was “core” and Pierce’s arguments concerning

claim and issue preclusion. P. 17–18.

6 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

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392 F. 3d 1118, reversed and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ.,

joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–1544

_________________

VICKIE LYNN MARSHALL, PETITIONER v. E. PIERCE

MARSHALL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[May 1, 2006]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Cohens v. Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall famously

cautioned: “It is most true that this Court will not take

jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it

must take jurisdiction, if it should . . . . We have no more

right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,

than to usurp that which is not given.” 6 Wheat. 264, 404

(1821). Among longstanding limitations on federal juris

diction otherwise properly exercised are the so-called

“domestic relations” and “probate” exceptions. Neither is

compelled by the text of the Constitution or federal stat

ute. Both are judicially created doctrines stemming in

large measure from misty understandings of English legal

history. See, e.g., Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in

Federal Court: Toward a Principled Exercise of Jurisdic

tion, 35 Hastings L. J. 571, 584–588 (1984); Spindel v.

Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 802 (EDNY 1968) (collecting

cases and commentary revealing vulnerability of historical

explanation for domestic relations exception); Winkler,

The Probate Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 14 Probate

L. J. 77, 125–126, and n. 256 (1997) (describing historical

2 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

explanation for probate exception as “an exercise in my

thography”). In the years following Marshall’s 1821 pro

nouncement, courts have sometimes lost sight of his ad

monition and have rendered decisions expansively

interpreting the two exceptions. In Ankenbrandt v. Rich

ards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992), this Court reined in the “do

mestic relations exception.” Earlier, in Markham v. Allen,

326 U. S. 490 (1946), the Court endeavored similarly to

curtail the “probate exception.”

Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit in the instant case read

the probate exception broadly to exclude from the federal

courts’ adjudicatory authority “not only direct challenges

to a will or trust, but also questions which would ordinar

ily be decided by a probate court in determining the valid

ity of the decedent’s estate planning instrument.” 392

F. 3d 1118, 1133 (2004). The Court of Appeals further

held that a State’s vesting of exclusive jurisdiction over

probate matters in a special court strips federal courts of

jurisdiction to entertain any “probate related matter,”

including claims respecting “tax liability, debt, gift, [or]

tort.” Id., at 1136. We hold that the Ninth Circuit had no

warrant from Congress, or from decisions of this Court, for

its sweeping extension of the probate exception.

I

Petitioner, Vickie Lynn Marshall (Vickie), also known as

Anna Nicole Smith, is the surviving widow of J. Howard

Marshall II (J. Howard). Vickie and J. Howard met in

October 1991. After a courtship lasting more than two

years, they were married on June 27, 1994. J. Howard

died on August 4, 1995. Although he lavished gifts and

significant sums of money on Vickie during their courtship

and marriage, J. Howard did not include anything for

Vickie in his will. According to Vickie, J. Howard intended

to provide for her financial security through a gift in the

form of a “catch-all” trust.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of the Court

Respondent, E. Pierce Marshall (Pierce), one of J. How

ard’s sons, was the ultimate beneficiary of J. Howard’s

estate plan, which consisted of a living trust and a

“pourover” will. Under the terms of the will, all of J.

Howard’s assets not already included in the trust were to

be transferred to the trust upon his death.

Competing claims regarding J. Howard’s fortune ignited

proceedings in both state and federal courts. In January

1996, while J. Howard’s estate was subject to ongoing

proceedings in Probate Court in Harris County, Texas,

Vickie filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bank

ruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. §1101 et seq., in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.

See 275 B. R. 5, 8 (CD Cal. 2002). In June 1996, Pierce

filed a proof of claim in the federal bankruptcy proceeding,

id., at 9; see 11 U. S. C. §501, alleging that Vickie had

defamed him when, shortly after J. Howard’s death, law

yers representing Vickie told members of the press that

Pierce had engaged in forgery, fraud, and overreaching to

gain control of his father’s assets. 275 B. R., at 9. Pierce

sought a declaration that the debt he asserted in that

claim was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Ibid.1 Vickie

answered, asserting truth as a defense. She also filed

counterclaims, among them a claim that Pierce had tor

tiously interfered with a gift she expected. Ibid.; see App.

23–25. Vickie alleged that Pierce prevented the transfer

of his father’s intended gift to her by, among other things:

effectively imprisoning J. Howard against his wishes;

surrounding him with hired guards for the purpose of

preventing personal contact between him and Vickie;

making misrepresentations to J. Howard; and transferring

property against J. Howard’s expressed wishes. Id., at 24.

——————

1 Among debts not dischargeable in bankruptcy, see 11 U. S. C.

§523(a), are those arising from “willful and malicious injury by the

debtor,” §523(a)(6).

4 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

Vickie’s tortious interference counterclaim turned her

objection to Pierce’s claim into an adversary proceeding.

Id., at 39; see Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3007. In that pro

ceeding, the Bankruptcy Court granted summary judg

ment in favor of Vickie on Pierce’s claim and, after a trial

on the merits, entered judgment for Vickie on her tortious

interference counterclaim. See 253 B. R. 550, 558–559

(2000). The Bankruptcy Court also held that both Vickie’s

objection to Pierce’s claim and Vickie’s counterclaim quali

fied as “core proceedings” under 28 U. S. C. §157, which

meant that the court had authority to enter a final judg

ment disposing of those claims. See 257 B. R. 35, 39–40

(2000). The court awarded Vickie compensatory damages

of more than $449 million—less whatever she recovered in

the ongoing probate action in Texas—as well as $25 mil

lion in punitive damages. Id., at 40.

Pierce filed a post-trial motion to dismiss for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting that Vickie’s tortious

interference claim could be tried only in the Texas probate

proceedings. Id., at 36. The Bankruptcy Court held that

“the ‘probate exception’ argument was waived” because it

was not timely raised. Id., at 39. Relying on this Court’s

decision in Markham, the court observed that a federal

court has jurisdiction to “adjudicate rights in probate

property, so long as its final judgment does not undertake

to interfere with the state court’s possession of the prop

erty.” 257 B. R., at 38 (citing Markham, 326 U. S., at 494).

Meanwhile, in the Texas Probate Court, Pierce sought a

declaration that the living trust and his father’s will were

valid. 392 F. 3d, at 1124–1125. Vickie, in turn, chal

lenged the validity of the will and filed a tortious interfer

ence claim against Pierce, ibid., but voluntarily dismissed

both claims once the Bankruptcy Court entered its judg

ment, id., at 1128. Following a jury trial, the Probate

Court declared the living trust and J. Howard’s will valid.

Id., at 1129.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of the Court

Back in the federal forum, Pierce sought district-court

review of the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment. While reject

ing the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that Pierce had

forfeited any argument based on the probate exception,

the District Court held that the exception did not reach

Vickie’s claim. 264 B. R. 609, 619–625 (CD Cal. 2001).

The Bankruptcy Court “did not assert jurisdiction gener

ally over the probate proceedings . . . or take control over

[the] estate’s assets,” the District Court observed, id., at

621, “[t]hus, the probate exception would bar federal

jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim only if such juris

diction would ‘interfere’ with the probate proceedings,”

ibid. (quoting Markham, 326 U. S., at 494). Federal juris

diction would not “interfere” with the probate proceedings,

the District Court concluded, because: (1) success on

Vickie’s counterclaim did not necessitate any declaration

that J. Howard’s will was invalid, 264 B. R., at 621; and

(2) under Texas law, probate courts do not have exclusive

jurisdiction to entertain claims of the kind asserted in

Vickie’s counterclaim, id., at 622–625.

The District Court also held that Vickie’s claim did not

qualify as a “core proceedin[g] arising under title 11, or

arising in a case under title 11.” 28 U. S. C. §157(b)(1); see

264 B. R., at 625–632. A bankruptcy court may exercise

plenary power only over “core proceedings.” See §157(b)–

(c).2 In non-core matters, a bankruptcy court may not

——————

2 “Core proceedings include, but are not limited to—

“(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;

“(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemp

tions from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests

for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title

11 but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated

personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for

purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;

“(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against

the estate;

“(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;

6 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

enter final judgment; it has authority to issue only pro

posed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are

reviewed de novo by the district court. See §157(c)(1).

Accordingly, the District Court treated the Bankruptcy

Court’s judgment as “proposed[,] rather than final,” and

undertook a “comprehensive, complete, and independent

review of” the Bankruptcy Court’s determinations. 264

B. R., at 633.

Adopting and supplementing the Bankruptcy Court’s

findings, the District Court determined that Pierce had

tortiously interfered with Vickie’s expectancy. Specifi

cally, the District Court found that J. Howard directed his

lawyers to prepare an inter vivos trust for Vickie consist

ing of half the appreciation of his assets from the date of

their marriage. See 275 B. R., at 25–30, 51–53. It further

found that Pierce conspired to suppress or destroy the

trust instrument and to strip J. Howard of his assets by

——————

“(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;

“(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;

“(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;

“(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent convey

ances;

“(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;

“(J) objections to discharges;

“(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;

“(L) confirmations of plans;

“(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use

of cash collateral;

“(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property result

ing from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not

filed claims against the estate;

“(O) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the

estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security

holder relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death

claims; and

“(P) recognition of foreign proceedings and other matters under chap

ter 15 of title 11.” 28 U. S. C. A. §157(b)(2) (1993 ed. and July 2005

Supp.).

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of the Court

backdating, altering, and otherwise falsifying documents,

arranging for surveillance of J. Howard and Vickie, and

presenting documents to J. Howard under false pretenses.

See id., at 36–50, 57–58; see also 253 B. R., at 554–556,

559–560. Based on these findings, the District Court

awarded Vickie some $44.3 million in compensatory dam

ages. 275 B. R., at 53–57. In addition, finding “over

whelming” evidence of Pierce’s “willfulness, maliciousness,

and fraud,” the District Court awarded an equal amount

in punitive damages. Id., at 57–58.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.

The appeals court recognized that Vickie’s claim “does not

involve the administration of an estate, the probate of a

will, or any other purely probate matter.” 392 F. 3d, at

1133. Nevertheless, the court held that the probate excep

tion bars federal jurisdiction in this case. In the Ninth

Circuit’s view, a claim falls within the probate exception if

it raises “questions which would ordinarily be decided by a

probate court in determining the validity of the decedent’s

estate planning instrument,” whether those questions

involve “fraud, undue influence[, or] tortious interference

with the testator’s intent.” Ibid.

The Ninth Circuit was also of the view that state-court

delineation of a probate court’s exclusive adjudicatory

authority could control federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

In this regard, the Court of Appeals stated: “Where a state

has relegated jurisdiction over probate matters to a special

court and [the] state’s trial courts of general jurisdiction

do not have jurisdiction to hear probate matters, then

federal courts also lack jurisdiction over probate matters.”

Id., at 1136. Noting that “[t]he [P]robate [C]ourt ruled it

had exclusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie[’s] claims,” the

Ninth Circuit held that “ruling . . . binding on the United

States [D]istrict [C]ourt.” Ibid. (citing Durfee v. Duke, 375

U. S. 106, 115–116 (1963)).

8 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

We granted certiorari, 545 U. S. ___ (2005), to resolve

the apparent confusion among federal courts concerning

the scope of the probate exception. Satisfied that the

instant case does not fall within the ambit of the narrow

exception recognized by our decisions, we reverse the

Ninth Circuit’s judgment.

II

In Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992), we

addressed both the derivation and the limits of the “do

mestic relations exception” to the exercise of federal juris

diction. Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of Missouri, brought

suit in Federal District Court on behalf of her daughters,

naming as defendants their father (Ankenbrandt’s former

husband) and his female companion, both citizens of Lou

isiana. Id., at 691. Ankenbrandt’s complaint sought

damages for the defendants’ alleged sexual and physical

abuse of the children. Ibid. Federal jurisdiction was

predicated on diversity of citizenship. Ibid. (citing 28

U. S. C. §1332). The District Court dismissed the case for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that Anken

brandt’s suit fell within “the ‘domestic relations’ exception

to diversity jurisdiction.” 504 U. S., at 692. The Court of

Appeals agreed and affirmed. Ibid. We reversed the

Court of Appeals’ judgment. Id., at 706–707.

Holding that the District Court improperly refrained

from exercising jurisdiction over Ankenbrandt’s tort claim,

id., at 704, we traced explanation of the current domestic

relations exception to Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582

(1859). See Ankenbrandt, 504 U. S., at 693–695. In Bar

ber, the Court upheld federal-court authority, in a diver

sity case, to enforce an alimony award decreed by a state

court. In dicta, however, the Barber Court announced—

without citation or discussion—that federal courts lack

jurisdiction over suits for divorce or the allowance of ali

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

Opinion of the Court

mony. 21 How., at 584–589; see Ankenbrandt, 504 U. S.,

at 693–695.

Finding no Article III impediment to federal-court juris

diction in domestic relations cases, id., at 695–697, the

Court in Ankenbrandt anchored the exception in Congress’

original provision for diversity jurisdiction, id., at 698–

701. Beginning at the beginning, the Court recalled:

“The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that ‘the circuit

courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with

the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil

nature at common law or in equity, where the matter

in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value

of five hundred dollars, and . . . an alien is a party, or

the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit

is brought, and a citizen of another State.’ ” Id., at 698

(quoting Act of Sept. 24, 1789, §11, 1 Stat. 78; empha

sis added in Ankenbrandt).

The defining phrase, “all suits of a civil nature at common

law or in equity,” the Court stressed, remained in succes

sive statutory provisions for diversity jurisdiction until

1948, when Congress adopted the more economical phrase,

“all civil actions.” 504 U. S., at 698; 1948 Judicial Code

and Judiciary Act, 62 Stat. 930, 28 U. S. C. §1332.

The Barber majority, we acknowledged in Ankenbrandt,

did not expressly tie its announcement of a domestic rela

tions exception to the text of the diversity statute. 504

U. S., at 698. But the dissenters in that case made the

connection. They stated that English courts of chancery

lacked authority to issue divorce and alimony decrees.

Because “the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States

in chancery is bounded by that of the chancery in Eng

land,” Barber, 21 How., at 605 (opinion of Daniel, J.), the

dissenters reasoned, our federal courts similarly lack

authority to decree divorces or award alimony, ibid. Such

relief, in other words, would not fall within the diversity

10 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

statute’s original grant of jurisdiction over “all suits of a

civil nature at common law or in equity.” We concluded in

Ankenbrandt that “it may be inferred fairly that the juris

dictional limitation recognized by the [Barber] Court

rested on th[e] statutory basis” indicated by the dissenters

in that case. 504 U. S., at 699.

We were “content” in Ankenbrandt “to rest our conclu

sion that a domestic relations exception exists as a matter

of statutory construction not on the accuracy of the his

torical justifications on which [the exception] was seem

ingly based.” Id., at 700. “[R]ather,” we relied on “Con

gress’ apparent acceptance of this construction of the

diversity jurisdiction provisions in the years prior to 1948,

when the statute limited jurisdiction to ‘suits of a civil

nature at common law or in equity.’” Ibid. (quoting 1 Stat.

78). We further determined that Congress did not intend

to terminate the exception in 1948 when it “replace[d] the

law/equity distinction with the phrase ‘all civil actions.’ ”

504 U. S., at 700. Absent contrary indications, we pre

sumed that Congress meant to leave undisturbed “the

Court’s nearly century-long interpretation” of the diversity

statute “to contain an exception for certain domestic rela

tions matters.” Ibid.

We nevertheless emphasized in Ankenbrandt that the

exception covers only “a narrow range of domestic rela

tions issues.” Id., at 701. The Barber Court itself, we

reminded, “sanctioned the exercise of federal jurisdiction

over the enforcement of an alimony decree that had been

properly obtained in a state court of competent jurisdic

tion.” 504 U. S., at 702. Noting that some lower federal

courts had applied the domestic relations exception “well

beyond the circumscribed situations posed by Barber and

its progeny,” id., at 701, we clarified that only “divorce,

alimony, and child custody decrees” remain outside federal

jurisdictional bounds, id., at 703, 704. While recognizing

the “special proficiency developed by state tribunals . . . in

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 11

Opinion of the Court

handling issues that arise in the granting of [divorce,

alimony, and child custody] decrees,” id., at 704, we

viewed federal courts as equally equipped to deal with

complaints alleging the commission of torts, ibid.

III

Federal jurisdiction in this case is premised on 28

U. S. C. §1334, the statute vesting in federal district

courts jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases and related pro

ceedings. Decisions of this Court have recognized a “pro

bate exception,” kin to the domestic relations exception, to

otherwise proper federal jurisdiction. See Markham v.

Allen, 326 U. S., at 494; see also Sutton v. English, 246

U. S. 199 (1918); Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank &

Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33 (1909). Like the domestic relations

exception, the probate exception has been linked to lan

guage contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789.

Markham, the Court’s most recent and pathmarking

pronouncement on the probate exception, stated that “the

equity jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789

. . . , which is that of the English Court of Chancery in

1789, did not extend to probate matters.” 326 U. S., at

494. See generally Nicolas, Fighting the Probate Mafia: A

Dissection of the Probate Exception to Federal Jurisdic

tion, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1479 (2001). As in Ankenbrandt, so

in this case, “[w]e have no occasion . . . to join the histori

cal debate” over the scope of English chancery jurisdiction

in 1789, 504 U. S., at 699, for Vickie Marshall’s claim falls

far outside the bounds of the probate exception described

in Markham. We therefore need not consider in this case

whether there exists any uncodified probate exception to

federal bankruptcy jurisdiction under §1334.3

——————

3 We note that the broad grant of jurisdiction conferred by §1334(b) is

subject to a mandatory abstention provision applicable to certain state-

law claims. Section 1334(c)(2) provides:

12 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

In Markham, the plaintiff Alien Property Custodian4

commenced suit in Federal District Court against an

executor and resident heirs to determine the Custodian’s

asserted rights regarding a decedent’s estate. 326 U. S., at

491–492. Jurisdiction was predicated on §24(1) of the

Judicial Code, now 28 U. S. C. §1345, which provides for

federal jurisdiction over suits brought by an officer of the

United States. At the time the federal suit commenced,

the estate was undergoing probate administration in a

state court. The Custodian had issued an order vesting in

himself all right, title, and interest of German legatees.

He sought and gained in the District Court a judgment

——————

“Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State

law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11

but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, with

respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court of

the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district

court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is com

menced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate

jurisdiction.”

That provision is, in turn, qualified: “Non-core proceedings under

section 157(b)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code, shall not be subject

to the mandatory abstention provisions of section 1334(c)(2).”

§157(b)(4). Because the Bankruptcy Court rejected Pierce’s motion for

mandatory abstention as untimely, 257 B. R. 35, 39 (CD Cal. 2000), we

need not consider whether these provisions might have required ab

stention upon a timely motion.

4 Section 6 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 415, 50

U. S. C. App., authorizes the President to appoint an official known as

the “alien property custodian,” who is responsible for “receiv[ing,] . . .

hold[ing], administer[ing], and account[ing] for” “all money and prop

erty in the United States due or belonging to an enemy, or ally of

enemy . . . .” The Act was originally enacted during World War I “to

permit, under careful safeguards and restrictions, certain kinds of

business to be carried on” among warring nations, and to “provid[e] for

the care and administration of the property and property rights of

enemies and their allies in this country pending the war.” Markham v.

Cabell, 326 U. S. 404, 414, n. 1 (1945) (Burton, J., concurring) (quoting

S. Rep. No. 113, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1 (1917)).

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 13

Opinion of the Court

determining that the resident heirs had no interest in the

estate, and that the Custodian, substituting himself for

the German legatees, was entitled to the entire net estate,

including specified real estate passing under the will.

Reversing the Ninth Circuit, which had ordered the case

dismissed for want of federal subject-matter jurisdiction,

this Court held that federal jurisdiction was properly

invoked. The Court first stated:

“It is true that a federal court has no jurisdiction

to probate a will or administer an estate . . . . But it

has been established by a long series of decisions of

this Court that federal courts of equity have jurisdic

tion to entertain suits ‘in favor of creditors, legatees

and heirs’ and other claimants against a decedent’s

estate ‘to establish their claims’ so long as the federal

court does not interfere with the probate proceedings

or assume general jurisdiction of the probate or con

trol of the property in the custody of the state court.”

326 U. S., at 494 (quoting Waterman, 215 U. S., at 43).

Next, the Court described a probate exception of distinctly

limited scope:

“[W]hile a federal court may not exercise its jurisdic

tion to disturb or affect the possession of property in

the custody of a state court, . . . it may exercise its ju

risdiction to adjudicate rights in such property where

the final judgment does not undertake to interfere

with the state court’s possession save to the extent

that the state court is bound by the judgment to rec

ognize the right adjudicated by the federal court.” 326

U. S., at 494.

The first of the above-quoted passages from Markham is

not a model of clear statement. The Court observed that

federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits to de

termine the rights of creditors, legatees, heirs, and other

14 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

claimants against a decedent’s estate, “so long as the

federal court does not interfere with the probate proceed

ings.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Lower federal courts have

puzzled over the meaning of the words “interfere with the

probate proceedings,” and some have read those words to

block federal jurisdiction over a range of matters well

beyond probate of a will or administration of a decedent’s

estate. See, e.g., Mangieri v. Mangieri, 226 F. 3d 1, 2–3

(CA1 2000) (breach of fiduciary duty by executor); Golden

ex rel. Golden v. Golden, 382 F. 3d 348, 360–362 (CA3

2004) (same); Lepard v. NBD Bank, 384 F. 3d 232–237

(CA6 2004) (breach of fiduciary duty by trustee); Storm v.

Storm, 328 F. 3d 941, 943–945 (CA7 2003) (probate excep

tion bars claim that plaintiff’s father tortiously interfered

with plaintiff’s inheritance by persuading trust grantor to

amend irrevocable inter vivos trust); Rienhardt v. Kelly,

164 F. 3d 1296, 1300–1301 (CA10 1999) (probate exception

bars claim that defendants exerted undue influence on

testator and thereby tortiously interfered with plaintiff’s

expected inheritance).

We read Markham’s enigmatic words, in sync with the

second above-quoted passage, to proscribe “disturb[ing] or

affect[ing] the possession of property in the custody of a

state court.” 326 U. S., at 494. True, that reading renders

the first-quoted passage in part redundant, but redun

dancy in this context, we do not doubt, is preferable to

incoherence. In short, we comprehend the “interference”

language in Markham as essentially a reiteration of the

general principle that, when one court is exercising in rem

jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume in

rem jurisdiction over the same res. See, e.g., Penn General

Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U. S.

189, 195–196 (1935); Waterman, 215 U. S., at 45–46.

Thus, the probate exception reserves to state probate

courts the probate or annulment of a will and the admini

stration of a decedent’s estate; it also precludes federal

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 15

Opinion of the Court

courts from endeavoring to dispose of property that is in

the custody of a state probate court. But it does not bar

federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those

confines and otherwise within federal jurisdiction.

A

As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, Vickie’s

claim does not “involve the administration of an estate,

the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter.”

392 F. 3d, at 1133. Provoked by Pierce’s claim in the

bankruptcy proceedings, Vickie’s claim, like Carol Anken

brandt’s, alleges a widely recognized tort. See King v.

Acker, 725 S. W. 2d 750, 754 (Tex. App. 1987); Restate

ment (Second) of Torts §774B (1977) (“One who by fraud,

duress or other tortious means intentionally prevents

another from receiving from a third person an inheritance

or gift that [s]he would otherwise have received is subject

to liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift.”).

Vickie seeks an in personam judgment against Pierce, not

the probate or annulment of a will. Cf. Sutton, 246 U. S.,

at 208 (suit to annul a will found “supplemental to the

proceedings for probate of the will” and therefore not

cognizable in federal court). Nor does she seek to reach a

res in the custody of a state court. See Markham, 326

U. S., at 494.

Furthermore, no “sound policy considerations” militate

in favor of extending the probate exception to cover the

case at hand. Cf. Ankenbrandt, 504 U. S., at 703. Trial

courts, both federal and state, often address conduct of the

kind Vickie alleges. State probate courts possess no “spe

cial proficiency . . . in handling [such] issues.” Cf. id., at

704.

B

The Court of Appeals advanced an alternate basis for its

conclusion that the federal courts lack jurisdiction over

16 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

Vickie’s claim. Noting that the Texas Probate Court

“ruled it had exclusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie Lynn

Marshall’s claims against E. Pierce Marshall,” the Ninth

Circuit held that “ruling . . . binding on the United States

[D]istrict [C]ourt.” 392 F. 3d, at 1136. We reject that

determination.

Texas courts have recognized a state-law tort action for

interference with an expected inheritance or gift, modeled

on the Restatement formulation. See King, 725 S. W. 2d,

at 754; Brandes v. Rice Trust, Inc., 966 S. W. 2d 144, 146–

147 (Tex. App. 1998).5 It is clear, under Erie R. Co. v.

——————

5 Texas appellate courts have on occasion held claims of tortious in

terference with an expected inheritance “barred” by a prior probate

court judgment, apparently applying ordinary principles of preclusion.

See, e.g., Thompson v. Deloitte & Touche, 902 S. W. 2d 13, 16 (Tex. App.

1995) (final probate court judgment bars claim of tortious interference

with inheritance expectancy because probate court “necessarily found

that [the decedent] signed the will with testamentary capacity, and

that it reflected his intent, was not the result of coercion or undue

influence, and was valid”); Neill v. Yett, 746 S. W. 2d 32, 35–36 (Tex.

App. 1988) (complaint alleging fraud and tortious interference with

inheritance expectancy, filed more than two years after will was admit

ted to probate, was barred by both the statute of limitations and the

final probate judgment, and failed to state the elements of the claim).

Neither Thompson nor Neill questions the Texas trial courts’ subject-

matter jurisdiction over the claims in question.

Pierce maintains that Thompson, Neill, and other Texas decisions

support his contention that preclusion principles bar Vickie’s claim.

See Brief for Respondent 36–38. Vickie argues to the contrary. See

Brief for Petitioner 42 n. 30 (urging that preclusion does not apply

because (1) Vickie’s claim was not litigated to final judgment in the

Texas probate proceedings; (2) having presented her claim in the

Bankruptcy Court years before she joined the Texas will contest, Vickie

was not obliged to present her claim in the Texas proceedings; (3) the

Bankruptcy Court’s judgment preceded the Probate Court judgment;

and (4) the Texas Probate Court did not have before it important

evidence). See also Tex. Rule Civ. Proc. 97; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.

Valero Energy Corp., 997 S. W. 2d 203, 206–207 (Tex. 1999). The

matter of preclusion remains open for consideration on remand. See

infra, at 18.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 17

Opinion of the Court

Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), that Texas law governs the

substantive elements of Vickie’s tortious interference

claim. It is also clear, however, that Texas may not re

serve to its probate courts the exclusive right to adjudicate

a transitory tort. We have long recognized that “a State

cannot create a transitory cause of action and at the same

time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of

action in any court having jurisdiction.” Tennessee Coal,

Iron & R. Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 360 (1914). Juris

diction is determined “by the law of the court’s creation

and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation of

a [state] statute . . . , even though it created the right of

action.” Ibid. Directly on point, we have held that the

jurisdiction of the federal courts, “having existed from the

beginning of the Federal government, [can] not be im

paired by subsequent state legislation creating courts of

probate.” McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 281 (1910)

(upholding federal jurisdiction over action by heirs of

decedent, who died intestate, to determine their rights in

the estate (citing Waterman, 215 U. S. 33)).

Our decision in Durfee v. Duke, 375 U. S. 106 (1963),

relied upon by the Ninth Circuit, 392 F. 3d, at 1136, is not

to the contrary. Durfee stands only for the proposition

that a state court’s final judgment determining its own

jurisdiction ordinarily qualifies for full faith and credit, so

long as the jurisdictional issue was fully and fairly liti

gated in the court that rendered the judgment. See 375

U. S., at 111, 115. At issue here, however, is not the Texas

Probate Court’s jurisdiction, but the federal courts’ juris

diction to entertain Vickie’s tortious interference claim.

Under our federal system, Texas cannot render its probate

courts exclusively competent to entertain a claim of that

genre. We therefore hold that the District Court properly

18 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of the Court

asserted jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim against

Pierce.

IV

After determining that Vickie’s claim was not a “core

proceeding,” the District Court reviewed the case de novo

and entered its final judgment on March 7, 2002. 275

B. R., at 5–8. The Texas Probate Court’s judgment be

came final on February 11, 2002, nearly one month ear

lier. App. to Pet. for Cert. 41. The Court of Appeals con

sidered only the issue of federal subject-matter

jurisdiction. It did not address the question whether

Vickie’s claim was “core”; nor did it address Pierce’s argu

ments concerning claim and issue preclusion. 392 F. 3d,

at 1137. These issues remain open for consideration on

remand.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–1544

_________________

VICKIE LYNN MARSHALL, PETITIONER v. E. PIERCE

MARSHALL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[May 1, 2006]

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment.

The administration of decedents’ estates typically is

governed by rules of state law and conducted by state

probate courts. Occasionally, however, disputes between

interested parties arise, either in the probate proceeding

itself or elsewhere, that qualify as cases or controversies

that federal courts have jurisdiction to decide. See, e.g.,

Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971). In her opinion for the

Court, JUSTICE GINSBURG has cogently explained why this

is such a case. I write separately to explain why I do not

believe there is any “probate exception” that ousts a federal

court of jurisdiction it otherwise possesses.

The familiar aphorism that hard cases make bad law

should extend to easy cases as well. Markham v. Allen,

326 U. S. 490 (1946), like this case, was an easy case. In

Markham, as here, it was unnecessary to question the

historical or logical underpinnings of the probate exception

to federal jurisdiction because, whatever the scope of the

supposed exception, it did not extend to the case at hand.

But Markham’s obiter dicta—dicta that the Court now

describes as redundant if not incoherent, ante, at 14—

generated both confusion and abdication of the obligation

Chief Justice Marshall so famously articulated, see

Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821); see also

2 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

ante, at 1. While the Court today rightly abandons much

of that dicta, I would go further.

The Court is content to adopt the approach it followed in

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992), and to

accept as foundation for the probate exception Markham’s

bald assertion that the English High Court of Chancery’s

jurisdiction did not “extend to probate matters” in 1789.

326 U. S., at 495; see ante, at 11. I would not accept that

premise. Not only had the theory Markham espoused

been only sporadically and tentatively cited as justification

for the exception,1 but the most comprehensive article on

the subject has persuasively demonstrated that Mark

ham’s assertion is “an exercise in mythography.”2

Markham’s theory apparently is the source of the

Court’s reformulated exception, which “reserves to state

probate courts the probate or annulment of a will and the

administration of a decedent’s estate.” Ante, at 14. Al

though undoubtedly narrower in scope than Markham’s

ill-considered description of the probate carve-out, this

description also sweeps too broadly. For the Court has

correctly upheld the exercise of federal jurisdiction over

actions involving the annulment of wills and the admini

——————

1 Notably, Justice Joseph Bradley, a strong proponent of the theory

that federal courts sitting in equity cannot exercise jurisdiction over

probate matters because in England in 1789 such jurisdiction belonged

to the ecclesiastical courts, see Case of Broderick’s Will, 21 Wall. 503

(1875), Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 24-25 (1876) (dissenting opinion),

urged that “even in matters savoring of [e]cclesiastical process, after an

issue has been formed between definite parties,” the controversy should be

heard by a federal court. See Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 120 U. S. 450, 460-461

(1887) (dissenting opinion) (citing Gaines, 92 U. S., at 17, and Hess v.

Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73 (1885)).

2 Winkler, The Probate Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 14 Probate

L. J. 77, 126 (1997); see ante, at 1–2 (acknowledging Winkler’s analy

sis). Winkler also observes, citing Charles Dickens’ Bleak House

(1853), that Markham’s “suggestion that the High Court of Chancery

had lacked jurisdiction to ‘administer an estate’ was preposterous.” 14

Probate L. J., at 125, and n. 256.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

stration of decedents’ estates. In Gaines v. Fuentes, 92

U. S. 10 (1876), for example, the Court held that a defen

dant in an action to annul a will should be permitted to

remove the case to federal court. In so doing, it explained:

“[W]henever a controversy in a suit . . . arises respect

ing the validity or construction of a will, or the en

forcement of a decree admitting it to probate, there is

no more reason why the Federal courts should not

take jurisdiction of the case than there is that they

should not take jurisdiction of any other controversy

between the parties.” Id., at 22.

Likewise, in Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425 (1869), the Court

explained that it was “well settled that a court of chan

cery, as an incident to its power to enforce trusts, and

make those holding a fiduciary relation account, has juris

diction to compel executors and administrators to account

and distribute the assets in their hands.” Id., at 431. (In

that same case, a federal court later appointed a Special

Master to administer the estate. This Court upheld some

of the Master’s determinations and rejected others. See

Hook v. Payne, 14 Wall. 252, 255 (1872).)

To be sure, there are cases that support limitations on

federal courts’ jurisdiction over the probate and annul

ment of wills and the administration of decedents’ estates.

But careful examination reveals that at least most of the

limitations so recognized stem not from some sui generis

exception, but rather from generally applicable jurisdic

tional rules. Cf. Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 497 (1883)

(“Jurisdiction as to wills, and their probate as such, is

neither included in nor excepted out of the grant of judicial

power to the courts of the United States”). Some of those

rules, like the rule that diversity jurisdiction will not

attach absent an inter partes controversy, plainly are still

relevant today. See, e.g., Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana

Bank & Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33, 44–45 (1909); see also id.,

4 MARSHALL v. MARSHALL

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

at 46 (reaffirming the in gremio legis principle). Others,

like the rule that a bill in equity will lie only where there

is no adequate remedy elsewhere, have less straightfor

ward application in the wake of 20th-century jurisdic

tional developments. See, e.g., Case of Broderick’s Will, 21

Wall. 503, 510–512 (1875); Ellis, 109 U. S., at 503 (deny

ing relief where plaintiff had “a plain, adequate, and

complete remedy at law”); see also Winkler, supra, n.2, at

112–113. Whatever the continuing viability of these indi

vidual rules, together they are more than adequate to the

task of cabining federal courts’ jurisdiction. They require

no helping hand from the so-called probate exception.

Rather than preserving whatever vitality that the “ex

ception” has retained as a result of the Markham dicta, I

would provide the creature with a decent burial in a grave

adjacent to the resting place of the Rooker-Feldman doc

trine. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U. S. ___, ___ (2006)

(STEVENS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2–3).