House v. Bell

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HOUSE v. BELL, WARDEN

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 04–8990. Argued January 11, 2006—Decided June 12, 2006

A Tennessee jury convicted petitioner House of Carolyn Muncey’s mur

der and sentenced him to death. The State’s case included evidence

that FBI testing showing semen consistent (or so it seemed) with

House’s on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing and small bloodstains consistent

with her blood but not House’s on his jeans. In the sentencing phase,

the jury found, inter alia, the aggravating factor that the murder was

committed while House was committing, attempting to commit, or

fleeing from the commission of rape or kidnaping. In affirming, the

State Supreme Court described the evidence as circumstantial but

strong. House was denied state postconviction relief. Subsequently,

the Federal District Court denied habeas relief, deeming House’s

claims procedurally defaulted and granting the State summary

judgment on most of his claims. It also found, after an evidentiary

hearing at which House attacked the blood and semen evidence and

presented other evidence, including a putative confession, suggesting

that Mr. Muncey committed the crime, that House did not fall within

the “actual innocence” exception to procedural default recognized in

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, and Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333.

The Sixth Circuit ultimately affirmed.

Held:

1. Because House has made the stringent showing required by the

actual-innocence exception, his federal habeas action may proceed.

Pp. 16–34.

(a) To implement the general principle that “comity and finality

‘must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust in

carceration,’ ” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 495, this Court has

ruled that prisoners asserting innocence as a gateway to defaulted

claims must establish that, in light of new evidence, “it is more likely

2 HOUSE v. BELL

Syllabus

than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U. S, at 327. Several fea

tures of Schlup’s standard bear emphasis here. First, while the

gateway claim requires “new reliable evidence . . . not presented at

trial,” id., at 324, the habeas court must assess the likely impact of

“ ‘all the evidence’ ” on reasonable jurors, id., at 329. Second, rather

than requiring absolute certainty about guilt or innocence, a peti

tioner’s burden at the gateway stage is to demonstrate that more

likely than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror

would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, this stan

dard is “by no means equivalent to the standard of Jackson v. Vir

ginia, 443 U. S. 307,” which governs insufficient evidence claims, id.,

at 330. Rather, because a Schlup claim involves evidence the trial

jury did not have before it, the inquiry requires the federal court to

assess how reasonable jurors would react to the overall, newly sup

plemented record. See ibid. Contrary to the State’s arguments, the

standard of review in two provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effec

tive Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U. S. C. §§2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) and

2254(e)(2), is inapplicable here. In addition, because the standard

does not address a “district court’s independent judgment as to

whether reasonable doubt exists,” Schlup, supra, at 329, a ruling in

House’s favor does not require the showing of clear error as to the

District Court’s specific findings. It is with these principles in mind

that the evidence developed in House’s federal habeas proceedings

should be evaluated. Pp. 16–20.

(b) In direct contradiction of evidence presented at trial, DNA

testing has established that semen on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing came

from her husband, not House. While the State claims that the evi

dence is immaterial since neither sexual contact nor motive were

elements of the offense at the guilt phase, this Court considers the

new disclosure of central importance. This case is about who com

mitted the crime, so motive is key, and the prosecution at the guilt

phase referred to evidence at the scene suggesting that House com

mitted, or attempted to commit, an indignity on Mrs. Muncey. Apart

from proving motive, this was the only forensic evidence at the scene

that would link House to the murder. Law and society demand ac

countability for a sexual offense, so the evidence was also likely a fac

tor in persuading the jury not to let him go free. At sentencing,

moreover, the jury concluded that the murder was committed in the

course of a rape or kidnaping. A jury acting without the assumption

that the semen could have come from House would have found it nec

essary to establish some different motive, or, if the same motive, an

intent far more speculative. Pp. 20–22.

(c) The evidentiary disarray surrounding the other forensic evi

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Syllabus

dence, the bloodstains on House’s pants, taken together with the tes

timony of an Assistant Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Ten

nessee, would prevent reasonable jurors from placing significant reli

ance on the blood evidence. The medical examiner who testified

believes the blood on the jeans must have come from the autopsy

samples. In addition, a vial and a quarter of autopsy blood is unac

counted for; the blood was transported to the FBI together with the

pants in conditions that could have caused the vials to spill; some

blood did spill at least once during the blood’s journey from Tennes

see authorities through FBI hands to a defense expert; the pants

were stored in a plastic bag bearing a large bloodstain and a label

from a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation agent; and the box contain

ing the blood samples may have been opened before arriving at the

FBI lab. None of this evidence was presented to the trial jury.

Whereas the bloodstains seemed strong evidence of House’s guilt at

trial, the record now raises substantial questions about the blood’s

origin. Pp. 22–28.

(d) In the post-trial proceedings, House presented troubling evi

dence that Mr. Muncey could have been the murderer. Two wit

nesses described a confession by Mr. Muncey; two others described

suspicious behavior (a fight between the couple and Mr. Muncey’s at

tempt to construct a false alibi) around the time of the crime; and

others described a history of spousal abuse. Considered in isolation,

a reasonable jury might well disregard this evidence, but in combina

tion with the challenges to the blood evidence and lack of motive with

respect to House, evidence pointing to Mr. Muncey likely would rein

force other doubts as to House’s guilt. Pp. 28–33.

(e) The Assistant Chief Medical Examiner further testified that

certain injuries discovered on House after the crime likely did not re

sult from involvement in the murder. Certain other evidence—Mrs.

Muncey’s daughter’s recollection of the night of the murder, and the

District Court’s finding at the habeas proceeding that House was not

a credible witness—may favor the State. Pp. 33–34.

(f) While this is not a case of conclusive exoneration, and the is

sue is close, this is the rare case where—had the jury heard all the

conflicting testimony—it is more likely than not that no reasonable

juror viewing the record as a whole would lack reasonable doubt. P.

34.

2. House has not shown freestanding innocence that would render

his imprisonment and planned execution unconstitutional under

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, in which the Court assumed with

out deciding that “in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration

of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a

defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there

4 HOUSE v. BELL

Syllabus

were no state avenue open to process such a claim,” id., at 417. The

threshold showing for such a right would be extraordinarily high, and

House has not satisfied whatever burden a hypothetical freestanding

innocence claim would require. He has cast doubt on his guilt suffi

cient to satisfy Schlup’s gateway standard for obtaining federal re

view, but given the closeness of the Schlup question here, his show

ing falls short of the threshold implied in Herrera. Pp. 34–36.

386 F. 3d 668, reversed and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,

SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., filed an

opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in

which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., took no part in the

consideration or decision of the case.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–8990

_________________

PAUL GREGORY HOUSE, PETITIONER v. RICKY

BELL, WARDEN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 12, 2006]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Some 20 years ago in rural Tennessee, Carolyn Muncey

was murdered. A jury convicted petitioner Paul Gregory

House of the crime and sentenced him to death, but new

revelations cast doubt on the jury’s verdict. House, pro

testing his innocence, seeks access to federal court to

pursue habeas corpus relief based on constitutional claims

that are procedurally barred under state law. Out of

respect for the finality of state-court judgments federal

habeas courts, as a general rule, are closed to claims that

state courts would consider defaulted. In certain excep

tional cases involving a compelling claim of actual inno

cence, however, the state procedural default rule is not a

bar to a federal habeas corpus petition. See Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 319–322 (1995). After careful review

of the full record, we conclude that House has made the

stringent showing required by this exception; and we hold

that his federal habeas action may proceed.

I

We begin with the facts surrounding Mrs. Muncey’s

disappearance, the discovery of her body, and House’s

2 HOUSE v. BELL

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arrest. Around 3 p.m. on Sunday, July 14, 1985, two local

residents found her body concealed amid brush and tree

branches on an embankment roughly 100 yards up the

road from her driveway. Mrs. Muncey had been seen last

on the evening before, when, around 8 p.m., she and her

two children—Lora Muncey, age 10, and Matthew

Muncey, age 8—visited their neighbor, Pam Luttrell.

According to Luttrell, Mrs. Muncey mentioned her hus

band, William Hubert Muncey, Jr., known in the commu

nity as “Little Hube” and to his family as “Bubbie.” As

Luttrell recounted Mrs. Muncey’s comment, Mr. Muncey

“had gone to dig a grave, and he hadn’t come back, but

that was all right, because [Mrs. Muncey] was going to

make him take her fishing the next day,” App. 11–12.

Mrs. Muncey returned home, and some time later, before

11:00 p.m. at the latest, Luttrell “heard a car rev its motor

as it went down the road,” something Mr. Muncey custom

arily did when he drove by on his way home. Record,

Addendum 4, 5 Tr. of Evidence in No. 378 (Crim. Ct. Un

ion County, Tenn.) 641–642 (hereinafter Tr.). Luttrell

then went to bed.

Around 1 a.m., Lora and Matthew returned to Luttrell’s

home, this time with their father, Mr. Muncey, who said

his wife was missing. Muncey asked Luttrell to watch the

children while he searched for his wife. After he left,

Luttrell talked with Lora. According to Luttrell:

“[Lora] said she heard a horn blow, she thought she

heard a horn blow, and somebody asked if Bubbie was

home, and her mama, you know, told them—no. And

then she said she didn’t know if she went back to

sleep or not, but then she heard her mama going down

the steps crying and I am not sure if that is when she

told me that she heard her mama say—oh God, no,

not me, or if she told me that the next day, but I do

know that she said she heard her mother going down

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of the Court

the steps crying.” App. 14–15.

While Lora was talking, Luttrell recalled, “Matt kept

butting in, you know, on us talking, and he said—sister

they said daddy had a wreck, they said daddy had a

wreck.” Id., at 13.

At House’s trial, Lora repeated her account of the

night’s events, this time referring to the “wreck” her

brother had mentioned. To assist in understanding Lora’s

account, it should be noted that Mrs. Muncey’s father-in

law—Little Hube’s father—was sometimes called “Big

Hube.” Lora and her brother called him “Paw Paw.” We

refer to him as Mr. Muncey, Sr. According to Lora, Mr.

Muncey, Sr. had a deep voice, as does petitioner House.

Lora testified that after leaving Luttrell’s house with

her mother, she and her brother “went to bed.” Id., at 18.

Later, she heard someone, or perhaps two different people,

ask for her mother. Lora’s account of the events after she

went to bed was as follows:

“Q Laura [sic], at some point after you got back home

and you went to bed, did anything happen that caused

your mother to be upset or did you hear anything?

“A Well, it sounded like PawPaw said—where’s

daddy at, and she said digging a grave.

“Q Okay. Do you know if it was PawPaw or not, or

did it sound like PawPaw?

“A It just sounded like PawPaw.

“Q And your mother told him what?

“A That he was digging a grave.

“Q Had you ever heard that voice before that said

that?

“A I don’t remember.

“Q After that, at some point later, did you hear any

thing else that caused your mother to be upset?

“A Well, they said that daddy had a wreck down the

road and she started crying—next to the creek.

4 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

“Q Your mother started crying. What was it that

they said?

“A That daddy had a wreck.

“Q Did they say where?

“A Down there next to the creek.” Id., at 18–19.

Lora did not describe hearing any struggle. Some time

later, Lora and her brother left the house to look for their

mother, but no one answered when they knocked at the

Luttrells’ home, and another neighbor, Mike Clinton, said

he had not seen her. After the children returned home,

according to Lora, her father came home and “fixed him a

bologna sandwich and he took a bit of it and he says—

sissy, where is mommy at, and I said—she ain’t been here

for a little while.” Id., at 20. Lora recalled that Mr.

Muncey went outside and, not seeing his wife, returned to

take Lora and Matthew to the Luttrells’ so that he could

look further.

The next afternoon Billy Ray Hensley, the victim’s first

cousin, heard of Mrs. Muncey’s disappearance and went to

look for Mr. Muncey. As he approached the Munceys’

street, Hensley allegedly “saw Mr. House come out from

under a bank, wiping his hands on a black rag.” Id., at 32.

Just when and where Hensley saw House, and how well

he could have observed him, were disputed at House’s

trial. Hensley admitted on cross-examination that he

could not have seen House “walking up or climbing up” the

embankment, id., at 39; rather, he saw House, in “[j]ust a

glance,” id., at 40, “appear out of nowhere,” “next to the

embankment,” id., at 39. On the Munceys’ street, opposite

the area where Hensley said he saw House, a white Ply

mouth was parked near a sawmill. Another witness, Billy

Hankins, whom the defense called, claimed that around

the same time he saw a “boy” walking down the street

away from the parked Plymouth and toward the Munceys’

home. This witness, however, put the “boy” on the side of

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of the Court

the street with the parked car and the Munceys’ driveway,

not the side with the embankment.

Hensley, after turning onto the Munceys’ street, contin

ued down the road and turned into their driveway. “I

pulled up in the driveway where I could see up toward

Little Hube’s house,” Hensley testified, “and I seen Little

Hube’s car wasn’t there, and I backed out in the road, and

come back [the other way].” Id., at 32. As he traveled up

the road, Hensley saw House traveling in the opposite

direction in the white Plymouth. House “flagged [Hensley]

down” through his windshield, ibid., and the two cars met

about 300 feet up the road from the Munceys’ driveway.

According to Hensley, House said he had heard Mrs.

Muncey was missing and was looking for her husband.

Id., at 33. Though House had only recently moved to the

area, he was acquainted with the Munceys, had attended a

dance with them, and had visited their home. He later

told law enforcement officials he considered both of the

Munceys his friends. According to Hensley, House said he

had heard that Mrs. Muncey’s husband, who was an alco

holic, was elsewhere “getting drunk.” Ibid.

As Hensley drove off, he “got to thinking to [him]self—

he’s hunting Little Hube, and Little Hube drunk—what

would he be doing off that bank . . . .” Ibid. His suspicion

aroused, Hensley later returned to the Munceys’ street

with a friend named Jack Adkins. The two checked differ

ent spots on the embankment, and though Hensley saw

nothing where he looked, Adkins found Mrs. Muncey. Her

body lay across from the sawmill near the corner where

House’s car had been parked, dumped in the woods a short

way down the bank leading toward a creek.

Around midnight, Dr. Alex Carabia, a practicing pa

thologist and county medical examiner, performed an

autopsy. Dr. Carabia put the time of death between 9 and

11 p.m. Mrs. Muncey had a black eye, both her hands

were bloodstained up to the wrists, and she had bruises on

6 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

her legs and neck. Dr. Carabia described the bruises as

consistent with a “traumatic origin,” i.e., a fight or a fall

on hard objects. 7 id., at 985–986. Based on the neck

bruises and other injuries, he concluded Mrs. Muncey had

been choked, but he ruled this out as the cause of death.

The cause of death, in Dr. Carabia’s view, was a severe

blow to the left forehead that inflicted both a laceration

penetrating to the bone and, inside the skull, a severe

right-side hemorrhage, likely caused by Mrs. Muncey’s

brain slamming into the skull opposite the impact. Dr.

Carabia described this head injury as consistent either

with receiving a blow from a fist or other instrument or

with striking some object.

The county sheriff, informed about Hensley’s earlier

encounter with House, questioned House shortly after the

body was found. That evening, House answered further

questions during a voluntary interview at the local jail.

Special Agent Ray Presnell of the Tennessee Bureau of

Investigation (TBI) prepared a statement of House’s an

swers, which House signed. Asked to describe his where

abouts on the previous evening, House claimed—falsely,

as it turned out—that he spent the entire evening with his

girlfriend, Donna Turner, at her trailer. Asked whether

he was wearing the same pants he had worn the night

before, House replied—again, falsely—that he was. House

was on probation at the time, having recently been re

leased on parole following a sentence of five years to life

for aggravated sexual assault in Utah. House had

scratches on his arms and hands, and a knuckle on his

right ring finger was bruised. He attributed the scratches

to Turner’s cats and the finger injury to recent construc

tion work tearing down a shed. The next day House gave

a similar statement to a different TBI agent, Charles

Scott.

In fact House had not been at Turner’s home. After

initially supporting House’s alibi, Turner informed au

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of the Court

thorities that House left her trailer around 10:30 or 10:45

p.m. to go for a walk. According to Turner’s trial testi

mony, House returned later—she was not sure when—hot

and panting, missing his shirt and his shoes. House,

Turner testified, told her that while he was walking on the

road near her home, a vehicle pulled up beside him, and

somebody inside “called him some names and then they

told him he didn’t belong here anymore.” App. 89. House

said he tried to ignore the taunts and keep walking, but

the vehicle pulled in behind him, and “one of them got out

and grabbed him by the shoulder . . . and [House] swung

around with his right hand” and “hit something.” Ibid.

According to Turner, House said “he took off down the

bank and started running and he said that he—he said it

seemed forever where he was running. And he said they

fired two shots at him while he took off down the bank

. . . .” Ibid. House claimed the assailants “grabbed ahold

of his shirt,” which Turner remembered as “a blue tank

top, trimmed in yellow,” and “they tore it to where it

wouldn’t stay on him and he said—I just throwed it off

when I was running.” Id., at 91. Turner, noticing House’s

bruised knuckle, asked how he hurt it, and House told her

“that’s where he hit.” Id., at 90. Turner testified that she

“thought maybe my ex-husband had something to do with

it.” Ibid.

Although the white Plymouth House drove the next day

belonged to Turner, Turner insisted House had not used

the car that night. No forensic evidence connected the car

to the crime; law enforcement officials inspected a white

towel covering the driver seat and concluded it was clean.

Turner’s trailer was located just under two miles by road,

through hilly terrain, from the Muncey residence.

Law enforcement officers also questioned the victim’s

husband. Though Mrs. Muncey’s comments to Luttrell

gave no indication she knew this, Mr. Muncey had spent

the evening at a weekly dance at a recreation center

8 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

roughly a mile and a half from his home. In his statement

to law enforcement—a statement House’s trial counsel

claims he never saw—Mr. Muncey admitted leaving the

dance early, but said it was only for a brief trip to the

package store to buy beer. He also stated that he and his

wife had had sexual relations Saturday morning.

Late in the evening on Monday, July 15—two days after

the murder—law enforcement officers visited Turner’s

trailer. With Turner’s consent, Agent Scott seized the

pants House was wearing the night Mrs. Muncey disap

peared. The heavily soiled pants were sitting in a laundry

hamper; years later, Agent Scott recalled noticing “reddish

brown stains” he “suspected” were blood. Id., at 274–275.

Around 4 p.m. the next day, two local law enforcement

officers set out for the Federal Bureau of Investigation in

Washington, D. C., with House’s pants, blood samples

from the autopsy, and other evidence packed together in a

box. They arrived at 2:00 a.m. the next morning. On July

17, after initial FBI testing revealed human blood on the

pants, House was arrested.

II

The State of Tennessee charged House with capital

murder. At House’s trial, the State presented testimony

by Luttrell, Hensley, Adkins, Lora Muncey, Dr. Carabia,

the sheriff, and other law enforcement officials. Through

TBI Agents Presnell and Scott, the jury learned of House’s

false statements. Central to the State’s case, however,

was what the FBI testing showed—that semen consistent

(or so it seemed) with House’s was present on Mrs.

Muncey’s nightgown and panties, and that small blood

stains consistent with Mrs. Muncey’s blood but not

House’s appeared on the jeans belonging to House.

Regarding the semen, FBI Special Agent Paul Bigbee, a

serologist, testified that the source was a “secretor,” mean

ing someone who “secrete[s] the ABO blood group sub

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

Opinion of the Court

stances in other body fluids, such as semen and saliva”—a

characteristic shared by 80 percent of the population,

including House. Id., at 55. Agent Bigbee further testified

that the source of semen on the gown was blood-type A,

House’s own blood type. As to the semen on the panties,

Agent Bigbee found only the H blood-group substance,

which A and B blood-type secretors secrete along with

substances A and B, and which O-type secretors secrete

exclusively. Agent Bigbee explained, however—using

science an amicus here sharply disputes, see Brief for

Innocence Project, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 24–26—that

House’s A antigens could have “degraded” into H, App. 57–

58. Agent Bigbee thus concluded that both semen deposits

could have come from House, though he acknowledged

that that the H antigen could have come from Mrs.

Muncey herself if she was a secretor—something he “was

not able to determine,” id., at 58—and that, while Mr.

Muncey was himself blood-type A (as was his wife), Agent

Bigbee was again “not able to determine his secretor

status,” id., at 57. Agent Bigbee acknowledged on cross-

examination that “a saliva sample” would have sufficed to

determine whether Mr. Muncey was a secretor; the State

did not provide such a sample, though it did provide sam

ples of Mr. Muncey’s blood. Id., at 62.

As for the blood, Agent Bigbee explained that “spots of

blood” appeared “on the left outside leg, the right bottom

cuff, on the left thigh and in the right inside pocket and on

the lower pocket on the outside.” Id., at 48. Agent Bigbee

determined that the blood’s source was type A (the type

shared by House, the victim, and Mr. Muncey). He also

successfully tested for the enzyme phosphoglucomutase

and the blood serum haptoglobin, both of which “are found

in all humans” and carry “slight chemical differences” that

vary genetically and “can be grouped to differentiate

between two individuals if those types are different.” Id.,

at 49–50. Based on these chemical traces and on the A

10 HOUSE v. BELL

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blood type, Agent Bigbee determined that only some 6.75

percent of the population carry similar blood, that the

blood was “consistent” with Mrs. Muncey’s (as determined

by testing autopsy samples), and that it was “impossible”

that the blood came from House. Id., at 48–52.

A different FBI expert, Special Agent Chester Blythe,

testified about fiber analysis performed on Mrs. Muncey’s

clothes and on House’s pants. Although Agent Blythe

found blue jean fibers on Mrs. Muncey’s nightgown, brass

ier, housecoat, and panties, and in fingernail scrapings

taken from her body (scrapings that also contained trace,

unidentifiable amounts of blood), he acknowledged that, as

the prosecutor put it in questioning the witness, “blue jean

material is common material,” so “this doesn’t mean that

the fibers that were all over the victim’s clothing were

necessarily from [House’s] pair of blue jeans.” 6 Tr. 864–865.

On House’s pants, though cotton garments both transfer

and retain fibers readily, Agent Blythe found neither hair

nor fiber consistent with the victim’s hair or clothing.

In the defense case House called Hankins, Clinton, and

Turner, as well as House’s mother, who testified that

House had talked to her by telephone around 9:30 p.m. on

the night of the murder and that he had not used her car

that evening. House also called the victim’s brother, Ricky

Green, as a witness. Green testified that on July 2, roughly

two weeks before the murder, Mrs. Muncey called him and

“said her and Little Hube had been into it and she said she

was wanting to leave Little Hube, she said she was want

ing to get out—out of it, and she was scared.” 7 id., at

1088. Green recalled that at Christmastime in 1982 he

had seen Mr. Muncey strike Mrs. Muncey after returning

home drunk.

As Turner informed the jury, House’s shoes were found

several months after the crime in a field near her home.

Turner delivered them to authorities. Though the jury did

not learn of this fact (and House’s counsel claims he did

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 11

Opinion of the Court

not either), the State tested the shoes for blood and found

none. House’s shirt was not found.

The State’s closing argument suggested that on the

night of her murder, Mrs. Muncey “was deceived . . . . She

had been told [her husband] had had an accident.” 9 id.,

at 1226. The prosecutor emphasized the FBI’s blood

analysis, noting that “after running many, many, many

tests,” Agent Bigbee:

“was able to tell you that the blood on the defendant’s

blue jeans was not his own blood, could not be his own

blood. He told you that the blood on the blue jeans

was consistent with every characteristic in every re

spect of the deceased’s, Carolyn Muncey’s, and that

ninety-three (93%) percent of the white population

would not have that blood type. . . . He can’t tell you

one hundred (100%) percent for certain that it was her

blood. But folks, he can sure give you a pretty good—

a pretty good indication.” Id., at 1235–1236.

In the State’s rebuttal, after defense counsel questioned

House’s motive “to go over and kill a woman that he barely

knew[,] [w]ho was still dressed, still clad in her clothes,”

Id., at 1274, the prosecutor referred obliquely to the semen

stains. While explaining that legally “it does not make

any difference under God’s heaven, what the motive was,”

App. 106, the prosecutor told the jury, “you may have an

idea why he did it,” ibid.:

“The evidence at the scene which seemed to suggest

that he was subjecting this lady to some kind of in

dignity, why would you get a lady out of her house,

late at night, in her night clothes, under the trick that

her husband has had a wreck down by the creek? . . .

Well, it is because either you don’t want her to tell

what indignities you have subjected her to, or she is

unwilling and fights against you, against being sub

jected to those indignities. In other words, it is either

12 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

to keep her from telling what you have done to her, or

it is that you are trying to get her to do something

that she nor any mother on that road would want to

do with Mr. House, under those conditions, and you

kill her because of her resistance. That is what the

evidence at the scene suggests about motive.” Id., at

106–107.

In addition the government suggested the black rag

Hensley said he saw in House’s hands was in fact the

missing blue tank top, retrieved by House from the crime

scene. And the prosecution reiterated the importance of

the blood. “[D]efense counsel,” he said, “does not start out

discussing the fact that his client had blood on his jeans on

the night that Carolyn Muncey was killed. . . . He doesn’t

start with the fact that nothing that the defense has in

troduced in this case explains what blood is doing on his

jeans, all over his jeans, that is scientifically, completely

different from his blood.” Id., at 104–105. The jury found

House guilty of murder in the first degree.

The trial advanced to the sentencing phase. As aggra

vating factors to support a capital sentence, the State

sought to prove: (1) that House had previously been con

victed of a felony involving the use or threat of violence;

(2) that the homicide was especially heinous, atrocious, or

cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind; and

(3) that the murder was committed while House was

committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing from the

commission of, rape or kidnaping. See Tenn. Code Ann.

§§39–2–203(i)(2), (5), (7) (1982) (repealed 1989); compare

§§39–13–204(i)(2), (5), (7) (2003). After presenting evi

dence of House’s parole status and aggravated sexual

assault conviction, the State rested. As mitigation, the

defense offered testimony from House’s father and mother,

as well as evidence, presented through House’s mother,

that House attempted suicide after the guilt-phase verdict.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 13

Opinion of the Court

Before the attempt House wrote his mother a letter pro

fessing his innocence.

In closing the State urged the jury to find all three

aggravating factors and impose death. As to the kidnap

ing or rape factor, the prosecution suggested Mrs. Muncey

was “decoy[ed] or entic[ed] . . . away from her family, and

confin[ed] her against her will because you know that as

she was being beaten to death.” 10 Tr. 1410. “We also

think,” the prosecutor added, “the proof shows strong

evidence of attempted sexual molestation of the victim to

accompany the taking away and murdering her.” Id., at

1410–1411. Later the prosecutor argued, “I think the

proof shows in the record that it is more likely than not

that having been through the process before and having

been convicted of a crime involving the threat of violence,

or violence to another person, aggravated sexual assault,

that the defendant cannot benefit from the type of reha

bilitation that correction departments can provide.” Id., at

1413. The jury unanimously found all three aggravating

factors and concluded “there are no mitigating circum

stances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the statutory

aggravating circumstance or circumstances.” Id., at1454.

The jury recommended a death sentence, which the trial

judge imposed.

III

The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed House’s convic

tion and sentence, describing the evidence against House

as “circumstantial” but “quite strong.” State v. House, 743

S. W. 2d 141, 143, 144 (1987). Two months later, in a state

trial court, House filed a pro se petition for postconviction

relief, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel

at trial. The court appointed counsel, who amended the

petition to raise other issues, including a challenge to

certain jury instructions. At a hearing before the same

judge who conducted the trial, House’s counsel offered no

14 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

proof beyond the trial transcript. The trial court dis

missed the petition, deeming House’s trial counsel ade

quate and overruling House’s other objections. On appeal

House’s attorney renewed only the jury-instructions ar

gument. In an unpublished opinion the Tennessee Court

of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and both the Tennessee

Supreme Court and this Court, House v. Tennessee, 498

U. S. 912 (1990), denied review.

House filed a second postconviction petition in state court

reasserting his ineffective-assistance claim and seeking

investigative and/or expert assistance. After extensive

litigation regarding whether House’s claims were proce

durally defaulted the Tennessee Supreme Court held that

House’s claims were barred under a state statute provid

ing that claims not raised in prior postconviction proceed

ings are presumptively waived, Tenn. Code Ann. §40–30–

112 (1990) (repealed 1995), and that courts may not con

sider grounds for relief “which the court finds should be

excluded because they have been waived or previously

determined,” §40–30–111 (repealed 1995). See House v.

State, 911 S. W. 2d 705 (Tenn. 1995). This Court denied

certiorari. House v. Tennessee, 517 U. S. 1193 (1996).

House next sought federal habeas relief, asserting nu

merous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and

prosecutorial misconduct. The United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, though deem

ing House’s claims procedurally defaulted and granting

summary judgment to the State on the majority of House’s

claims, held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether

House fell within the “actual innocence” exception to

procedural default that this Court recognized as to sub

stantive offenses in Schlup and as to death sentences in

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333 (1992). Presenting evi

dence we describe in greater detail below, House attacked

the semen and blood evidence used at his trial and pre

sented other evidence, including a putative confession,

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 15

Opinion of the Court

suggesting that Mr. Muncey, not House, committed the

murder. The District Court nevertheless denied relief,

holding that House had neither demonstrated actual

innocence of the murder under Schlup nor established

that he was ineligible for the death penalty under Sawyer.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted a

certificate of appealability under 28 U. S. C. §2253(c) as to

all claims in the habeas petition. On the merits a divided

panel affirmed, but its opinion was withdrawn and the

case taken en banc. A divided en banc court certified

state-law questions to the Tennessee Supreme Court.

House v. Bell, 311 F. 3d 767 (CA6 2002). Concluding that

House had made a compelling showing of actual inno

cence, and recognizing that in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S.

390 (1993), this Court assumed without deciding that “in a

capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual

innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a

defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas

relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a

claim,” id., at 417, the six-judge majority certified ques

tions to the State Supreme Court, 311 F. 3d, at 777–778.

The questions sought “to ascertain whether there remains

a ‘state avenue open to process such a claim’ in this case.”

Id., at 768. Four dissenting judges argued the court

should have reached the merits, rather than certifying

questions to the state court; these judges asserted that

House could not obtain relief under Schlup, let alone

Sawyer and Herrera. 311 F. 3d, at 780–781 (Boggs, J., dis

senting). A fifth dissenter explained that while he agreed

with the majority that House “presents a strong claim for

habeas relief, at least at the sentencing phase of the case,”

he objected to the certification of questions to the Tennes

see high court. Id., at 787 (opinion of Gilman, J.). This

Court denied certiorari. Bell v. House, 539 U. S. 937

(2003).

The State urged the Tennessee Supreme Court not to

16 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

answer the Court of Appeals’ certified questions, and the

state court did not do so. The case returned to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. This time

an eight-judge majority affirmed the District Court’s

denial of habeas relief. 386 F. 3d 668 (2004). Six dissent

ers argued that House not only had met the actual inno

cence standard for overcoming procedural default but also

was entitled to immediate release under Herrera. 386

F. 3d, at 708 (Merritt, J., dissenting). A seventh dissenter

(the same judge who wrote separately in the previous en

banc decision) described the case as “a real-life murder

mystery, an authentic ‘who-done-it’ where the wrong man

may be executed.” Id., at 709 (opinion of Gilman, J.). He

concluded such grave uncertainty necessitated relief in the

form of a new trial for House. Id., at 710.

We granted certiorari, 545 U. S. ___ (2005), and now

reverse.

IV

As a general rule, claims forfeited under state law may

support federal habeas relief only if the prisoner demon

strates cause for the default and prejudice from the as

serted error. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 485

(1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 129 (1982); Wain

wright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 87 (1977). The rule is based

on the comity and respect that must be accorded to state-

court judgments. See, e.g., Engle, supra, at 126–129;

Wainwright, supra, at 89–90. The bar is not, however,

unqualified. In an effort to “balance the societal interests

in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial

resources with the individual interest in justice that arises

in the extraordinary case,” Schlup, 513 U. S., at 324, the

Court has recognized a miscarriage-of-justice exception.

“ ‘[I]n appropriate cases,’ ” the Court has said, “the princi

ples of comity and finality that inform the concepts of

cause and prejudice ‘must yield to the imperative of cor

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 17

Opinion of the Court

recting a fundamentally unjust incarceration,’ ” Carrier,

supra, at 495 (quoting Engle, supra, at 135).

In Schlup, the Court adopted a specific rule to imple

ment this general principle. It held that prisoners assert

ing innocence as a gateway to defaulted claims must

establish that, in light of new evidence, “it is more likely

than not that no reasonable juror would have found peti

tioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 513 U. S., at

327. This formulation, Schlup explains, “ensures that

petitioner’s case is truly ‘extraordinary,’ while still provid

ing petitioner a meaningful avenue by which to avoid a

manifest injustice.” Ibid. (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499

U. S. 467, 494 (1991)). In the usual case the presumed

guilt of a prisoner convicted in state court counsels against

federal review of defaulted claims. Yet a petition sup

ported by a convincing Schlup gateway showing “raise[s]

sufficient doubt about [the petitioner’s] guilt to undermine

confidence in the result of the trial without the assurance

that that trial was untainted by constitutional error”;

hence, “a review of the merits of the constitutional claims”

is justified. 513 U. S., at 317.

For purposes of this case several features of the Schlup

standard bear emphasis. First, although “[t]o be credible”

a gateway claim requires “new reliable evidence—whether

it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewit

ness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not

presented at trial,” id., at 324, the habeas court’s analysis

is not limited to such evidence. There is no dispute in this

case that House has presented some new reliable evidence;

the State has conceded as much, see infra, at 20–21. In

addition, because the District Court held an evidentiary

hearing in this case, and because the State does not chal

lenge the court’s decision to do so, we have no occasion to

elaborate on Schlup’s observation that when considering

an actual-innocence claim in the context of a request for

an evidentiary hearing, the District Court need not “test

18 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

the new evidence by a standard appropriate for deciding a

motion for summary judgment,” but rather may “consider

how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility

of the affiants bear on the probable reliability of that

evidence.” 513 U. S., at 331–332. Our review in this case

addresses the merits of the Schlup inquiry, based on a

fully developed record, and with respect to that inquiry

Schlup makes plain that the habeas court must consider

“ ‘all the evidence,’ ” old and new, incriminating and excul

patory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be

admitted under “rules of admissibility that would govern

at trial.” See id., at 327–328 (quoting Friendly, Is Inno

cence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg

ments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 160 (1970)). Based on this

total record, the court must make “a probabilistic deter

mination about what reasonable, properly instructed

jurors would do.” 513 U. S., at 329. The court’s function is

not to make an independent factual determination about

what likely occurred, but rather to assess the likely impact

of the evidence on reasonable jurors. Ibid.

Second, it bears repeating that the Schlup standard is

demanding and permits review only in the “ ‘extraordi

nary’ ” case. Id., at 327 (quoting Zant, supra, at 494); see

also 513 U. S., at 324 (emphasizing that “in the vast ma

jority of cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely suc

cessful”). At the same time, though, the Schlup standard

does not require absolute certainty about the petitioner’s

guilt or innocence. A petitioner’s burden at the gateway

stage is to demonstrate that more likely than not, in light

of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find him

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—or, to remove the dou

ble negative, that more likely than not any reasonable

juror would have reasonable doubt.

Finally, as the Schlup decision explains, the gateway

actual-innocence standard is “by no means equivalent to

the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979),”

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 19

Opinion of the Court

which governs claims of insufficient evidence. Id., at 330.

When confronted with a challenge based on trial evidence,

courts presume the jury resolved evidentiary disputes

reasonably so long as sufficient evidence supports the

verdict. Because a Schlup claim involves evidence the

trial jury did not have before it, the inquiry requires the

federal court to assess how reasonable jurors would react

to the overall, newly supplemented record. See ibid. If

new evidence so requires, this may include consideration

of “the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial.”

Ibid.; see also ibid. (noting that “[i]n such a case,

the habeas court may have to make some credibility

assessments”).

As an initial matter, the State argues that the Antiter

rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),

110 Stat. 1214, has replaced the Schlup standard with a

stricter test based on Sawyer, which permits consideration

of successive, abusive, or defaulted sentencing-related

claims only if the petitioner “show[s] by clear and convinc

ing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reason

able juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the

death penalty under the applicable state law,” 505 U. S., at

336. One AEDPA provision establishes a similar standard

for second or successive petitions involving no retroactively

applicable new law, 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(B)(ii); another

sets it as a threshold for obtaining an evidentiary hearing

on claims the petitioner failed to develop in state court,

§2254(e)(2). Neither provision addresses the type of peti

tion at issue here—a first federal habeas petition seeking

consideration of defaulted claims based on a showing of

actual innocence. Thus, the standard of review in these

provisions is inapplicable. Cf. Lonchar v. Thomas, 517

U. S. 314, 324 (1996) (“[D]ismissal of a first federal habeas

petition is a particularly serious matter”).

The State also argues that the District Court’s findings

in this case tie our hands, precluding a ruling in House’s

20 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

favor absent a showing of clear error as to the District

Court’s specific determinations. This view overstates the

effect of the District Court’s ruling. Deference is given to a

trial court’s assessment of evidence presented to it in the

first instance. Yet the Schlup inquiry, we repeat, requires

a holistic judgment about “ ‘all the evidence,’ ” 513 U. S., at

328 (quoting Friendly, supra, at 160), and its likely effect

on reasonable jurors applying the reasonable-doubt stan

dard. As a general rule, the inquiry does not turn on

discrete findings regarding disputed points of fact, and

“[i]t is not the district court’s independent judgment as to

whether reasonable doubt exists that the standard ad

dresses,” 513 U. S., at 329. Here, although the District

Court attentively managed complex proceedings, carefully

reviewed the extensive record, and drew certain conclu

sions about the evidence, the court did not clearly apply

Schlup’s predictive standard regarding whether reason

able jurors would have reasonable doubt. As we shall

explain, moreover, we are uncertain about the basis for

some of the District Court’s conclusions—a consideration

that weakens our reliance on its determinations.

With this background in mind we turn to the evidence

developed in House’s federal habeas proceedings.

DNA Evidence

First, in direct contradiction of evidence presented at

trial, DNA testing has established that the semen on Mrs.

Muncey’s nightgown and panties came from her husband,

Mr. Muncey, not from House. The State, though conced

ing this point, insists this new evidence is immaterial. At

the guilt phase at least, neither sexual contact nor motive

were elements of the offense, so in the State’s view the

evidence, or lack of evidence, of sexual assault or sexual

advance is of no consequence. We disagree. In fact we

consider the new disclosure of central importance.

From beginning to end the case is about who committed

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 21

Opinion of the Court

the crime. When identity is in question, motive is key.

The point, indeed, was not lost on the prosecution, for it

introduced the evidence and relied on it in the final guilt-

phase closing argument. Referring to “evidence at the

scene,” the prosecutor suggested that House committed, or

attempted to commit, some “indignity” on Mrs. Muncey

that neither she “nor any mother on that road would want

to do with Mr. House.” 9 Tr. 1302–1303. Particularly in a

case like this where the proof was, as the State Supreme

Court observed, circumstantial, State v. House, 743 S. W.

2d, at 143, 144, we think a jury would have given this

evidence great weight. Quite apart from providing proof of

motive, it was the only forensic evidence at the scene that

would link House to the murder.

Law and society, as they ought to do, demand account

ability when a sexual offense has been committed, so not

only did this evidence link House to the crime; it likely

was a factor in persuading the jury not to let him go free.

At sentencing, moreover, the jury came to the unanimous

conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murder

was committed in the course of a rape or kidnaping. The

alleged sexual motivation relates to both those determina

tions. This is particularly so given that, at the sentencing

phase, the jury was advised that House had a previous

conviction for sexual assault.

A jury informed that fluids on Mrs. Muncey’s garments

could have come from House might have found that House

trekked the nearly two miles to the victim’s home and

lured her away in order to commit a sexual offense. By

contrast a jury acting without the assumption that the

semen could have come from House would have found it

necessary to establish some different motive, or, if the

same motive, an intent far more speculative. When the

only direct evidence of sexual assault drops out of the case,

so, too, does a central theme in the State’s narrative link

ing House to the crime. In that light, furthermore,

22 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

House’s odd evening walk and his false statements to

authorities, while still potentially incriminating, might

appear less suspicious.

Bloodstains

The other relevant forensic evidence is the blood on

House’s pants, which appears in small, even minute,

stains in scattered places. As the prosecutor told the jury,

they were stains that, due to their small size, “you or I

might not detect[,] [m]ight not see, but which the FBI lab

was able to find on [House’s] jeans.” App. 11. The stains

appear inside the right pocket, outside that pocket, near

the inside button, on the left thigh and outside leg, on the

seat of the pants, and on the right bottom cuff, including

inside the pants. Due to testing by the FBI, cuttings now

appear on the pants in several places where stains evi

dently were found. (The cuttings were destroyed in the

testing process, and defense experts were unable to repli

cate the tests.) At trial, the government argued “nothing

that the defense has introduced in this case explains what

blood is doing on his jeans, all over [House’s] jeans, that is

scientifically, completely different from his blood.” Id., at

105. House, though not disputing at this point that the

blood is Mrs. Muncey’s, now presents an alternative ex

planation that, if credited, would undermine the probative

value of the blood evidence.

During House’s habeas proceedings, Dr. Cleland Blake,

an Assistant Chief Medical Examiner for the State of

Tennessee and a consultant in forensic pathology to the

TBI for 22 years, testified that the blood on House’s pants

was chemically too degraded, and too similar to blood

collected during the autopsy, to have come from Mrs.

Muncey’s body on the night of the crime. The blood sam

ples collected during the autopsy were placed in test tubes

without preservative. Under such conditions, according to

Dr. Blake, “you will have enzyme degradation. You will

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 23

Opinion of the Court

have different blood group degradation, blood marker deg

radation.” Record, Doc. 275, p. 80 (hereinafter R275:80).

The problem of decay, moreover, would have been com

pounded by the body’s long exposure to the elements,

sitting outside for the better part of a summer day. In

contrast, if blood is preserved on cloth, “it will stay there

for years,” ibid.; indeed, Dr. Blake said he deliberately

places blood drops on gauze during autopsies to preserve it

for later testing. The blood on House’s pants, judging by

Agent Bigbee’s tests, showed “similar deterioration,

breakdown of certain of the named numbered enzymes” as

in the autopsy samples. Id., at 110. “[I]f the victim’s blood

had spilled on the jeans while the victim was alive and

this blood had dried,” Dr. Blake stated, “the deterioration

would not have occurred,” ibid., and “you would expect

[the blood on the jeans] to be different than what was in

the tube,” id., at 113. Dr. Blake thus concluded the blood

on the jeans came from the autopsy samples, not from

Mrs. Muncey’s live (or recently killed) body.

Other evidence confirms that blood did in fact spill from

the vials. It appears the vials passed from Dr. Carabia,

who performed the autopsy, into the hands of two local

law enforcement officers, who transported it to the FBI,

where Agent Bigbee performed the enzyme tests. The

blood was contained in four vials, evidently with neither

preservative nor a proper seal. The vials, in turn, were

stored in a styrofoam box, but nothing indicates the box

was kept cool. Rather, in what an evidence protocol expert

at the habeas hearing described as a violation of proper

procedure, the styrofoam box was packed in the same

cardboard box as other evidence including House’s pants

(apparently in a paper bag) and other clothing (in separate

bags). The cardboard box was then carried in the officers’

car while they made the 10-hour journey from Tennessee

to the FBI lab. Dr. Blake stated that blood vials in hot

conditions (such as a car trunk in the summer) could blow

24 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

open; and in fact, by the time the blood reached the FBI it

had hemolyzed, or spoiled, due to heat exposure. By the

time the blood passed from the FBI to a defense expert,

roughly a vial and a half were empty, though Agent Big-

bee testified he used at most a quarter of one vial. Blood,

moreover, had seeped onto one corner of the styrofoam box

and onto packing gauze inside the box below the vials.

In addition, although the pants apparently were pack

aged initially in a paper bag and FBI records suggest they

arrived at the FBI in one, the record does not contain the

paper bag but does contain a plastic bag with a label

listing the pants and Agent Scott’s name—and the plastic

bag has blood on it. The blood appears in a forked streak

roughly five inches long and two inches wide running

down the bag’s outside front. Though testing by House’s

expert confirmed the stain was blood, the expert could not

determine the blood’s source. Speculations about when

and how the blood got there add to the confusion regarding

the origins of the stains on House’s pants.

Faced with these indications of, at best, poor evidence

control, the State attempted to establish at the habeas

hearing that all blood spillage occurred after Agent Bigbee

examined the pants. Were that the case, of course, then

blood would have been detected on the pants before any

spill—which would tend to undermine Dr. Blake’s analysis

and support using the bloodstains to infer House’s guilt.

In support of this theory the State put on testimony by a

blood spatter expert who believed the “majority” of the

stains were “transfer stains,” that is, stains resulting from

“wip[ing] across the surface of the pants” rather than

seeping or spillage. App. 293–294. Regarding the spillage

in the styrofoam box, the expert noted that yellow “Tennes

see Crime Laboratory” tape running around the box and

down all four sides did not line up when the bloodstains on

the box’s corner were aligned. The inference was that the

FBI received the box from Tennessee authorities, opened it,

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 25

Opinion of the Court

and resealed it before the spillage occurred. Reinforcing

this theory, Agent Bigbee testified that he observed no

blood spillage in the styrofoam box and that had he de

tected such signs of evidence contamination, FBI policy

would have required immediate return of the evidence.

In response House argued that even assuming the tape

alignment showed spillage occurring after FBI testing,

spillage on one or more earlier occasions was likely. In

fact even the State’s spatter expert declined to suggest the

blood in the box and on the packing gauze accounted for

the full vial and a quarter missing. And when the defense

expert opened the box and discovered the spills, the bulk

of the blood-caked gauze was located around and under

neath the half-full vial, which was also located near the

stained corner. No gauze immediately surrounding the

completely empty vial was stained. The tape, moreover,

circled the box in two layers, one underneath the other,

and in one spot the underlying layer stops cleanly at the

lid’s edge, as if cut with a razor, and does not continue

onto the body of the box below. In House’s view this clean

cut suggests the double layers could not have resulted

simply from wrapping the tape around twice, as the spat

ter expert claimed; rather, someone possessing Tennessee

Crime Lab tape—perhaps the officers transporting the

blood and pants—must have cut the box open and resealed

it, possibly creating an opportunity for spillage. Support

ing the same inference, a label on the box’s lid lists both

blood and vaginal secretions as the box’s contents, though

Agent Bigbee’s records show the vaginal fluids arrived at

the FBI in a separate envelope. Finally, cross-

examination revealed that Agent Bigbee’s practice did not

always match the letter of FBI policy. Although Mrs.

Muncey’s bra and housecoat were packed together in a

single bag, creating, according to Agent Bigbee, a risk of

“cross contamination,” id., at 286, he did not return them;

nor did he note the discrepancy between the “[b]lood and

26 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

[v]aginal secretions” label and the styrofoam box’s actual

contents, though he insisted his customary practice was to

match labels with contents immediately upon opening an

evidence box. Id., at 287.

The State challenged Dr. Blake’s scientific conclusions,

and to do so it called Agent Bigbee as a witness. Agent

Bigbee defended the testimony he had given at the trial.

To begin with, he suggested Dr. Blake had misconstrued

the term “inc” in Agent Bigbee’s trial report, interpreting

it to mean “incomplete” when it in fact meant “inconclu

sive.” Id., at 254–256, 282. Dr. Blake, however, replied

“[s]ame difference” when asked whether his opinion would

change if “inc” meant “inconclusive.” Id., at 256; see also

6 Tr. 906 (Bigbee trial testimony) (“You will notice I have

INC written under the transparent, that is the symbol

that I use to mean the test was incomplete”). Agent Big-

bee further asserted that, whereas Dr. Blake (in Bigbee’s

view) construed the results to mean the enzyme was not

present at all, in fact the results indicated only that Big-

bee could not identify the marker type on whatever en

zymes were present. App. 282. Yet the State did not

cross-examine Dr. Blake on this point, nor did the District

Court resolve the dispute one way or the other, so on this

record it seems possible that Dr. Blake meant only to

suggest the blood was too degraded to permit conclusive

typing. The State, moreover, does not ask us to question

Dr. Blake’s basic premise about the durability of blood

chemicals deposited on cotton—a premise Agent Bigbee

appeared to accept as a general matter. Given the record

as it stands, then, we cannot say Dr. Blake’s conclusions

have been discredited; if other objections might be ad

duced, they must await further proceedings. At the least,

the record before us contains credible testimony suggest

ing that the missing enzyme markers are generally better

preserved on cloth than in poorly kept test tubes, and that

principle could support House’s spillage theory for the

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 27

Opinion of the Court

blood’s origin.

In this Court, as a further attack on House’s showing,

the State suggests that, given the spatter expert’s testi

mony, House’s theory would require a jury to surmise that

Tennessee officials donned the pants and deliberately

spread blood over them. We disagree. This should be a

matter for the trier of fact to consider in the first instance,

but we can note a line of argument that could refute the

State’s position. It is correct that the State’s spatter ex

pert opined that the stains resulted from wiping or smear

ing rather than direct spillage; and she further stated that

the distribution of stains in some spots suggests the pants

were “folded in some manner or creased in some manner”

when the transfers occurred, id., at 296. While the expert

described this pattern, at least with respect to stains on

the lap of the pants, as “consistent” with the pants being

worn at the time of the staining, ibid., her testimony, as

we understand it, does not refute the hypothesis that the

packaging of the pants for transport was what caused

them to be folded or creased. It seems permissible, more

over, to conclude that the small size and wide distribution

of stains—inside the right pocket, outside that pocket,

near the inside button, on the left thigh and outside leg, on

the seat of the pants, and on the right bottom cuff, includ

ing inside the pants—fits as well with spillage in transport

as with wiping and smearing from bloody objects at the

crime scene, as the State proposes. (As has been noted, no

blood was found on House’s shoes.)

The District Court discounted Dr. Blake’s opinion, not

on account of Blake’s substantive approach, but based on

testimony from Agent Scott indicating he saw, as the

District Court put it, “what appeared to be bloodstains on

Mr. House’s blue jeans when the jeans were removed from

the laundry hamper at Ms. Turner’s trailer.” Id., at 348.

This inference seems at least open to question, however.

Agent Scott stated only that he “saw reddish brownish

28 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

stains [he] suspected to be blood”; he admitted that he

“didn’t thoroughly examine the blue jeans at that time.”

R276:113–114. The pants were in fact extensively soiled

with mud and reddish stains, only small portions of which

are blood.

In sum, considering “ ‘all the evidence,’ ” Schlup, 513

U. S., at 328 (quoting Friendly, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 160),

on this issue, we think the evidentiary disarray surround

ing the blood, taken together with Dr. Blake’s testimony

and the limited rebuttal of it in the present record, would

prevent reasonable jurors from placing significant reliance

on the blood evidence. We now know, though the trial jury

did not, that an Assistant Chief Medical Examiner be

lieves the blood on House’s jeans must have come from

autopsy samples; that a vial and a quarter of autopsy

blood is unaccounted for; that the blood was transported to

the FBI together with the pants in conditions that could

have caused vials to spill; that the blood did indeed spill at

least once during its journey from Tennessee authorities

through FBI hands to a defense expert; that the pants

were stored in a plastic bag bearing both a large blood

stain and a label with TBI Agent Scott’s name; and that

the styrofoam box containing the blood samples may well

have been opened before it arrived at the FBI lab. Thus,

whereas the bloodstains, emphasized by the prosecution,

seemed strong evidence of House’s guilt at trial, the record

now raises substantial questions about the blood’s origin.

A Different Suspect

Were House’s challenge to the State’s case limited to the

questions he has raised about the blood and semen, the

other evidence favoring the prosecution might well suffice

to bar relief. There is, however, more; for in the post-trial

proceedings House presented troubling evidence that Mr.

Muncey, the victim’s husband, himself could have been the

murderer.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 29

Opinion of the Court

At trial, as has been noted, the jury heard that roughly

two weeks before the murder Mrs. Muncey’s brother re

ceived a frightened phone call from his sister indicating

that she and Mr. Muncey had been fighting, that she was

scared, and that she wanted to leave him. The jury also

learned that the brother once saw Mr. Muncey “smac[k]”

the victim. 7 Tr. 1087–1088. House now has produced

evidence from multiple sources suggesting that Mr. Muncey

regularly abused his wife. For example, one witness—

Kathy Parker, a lifelong area resident who denied any

animosity towards Mr. Muncey—recalled that Mrs. Muncey

“was constantly with black eyes and busted mouth.” App.

235. In addition Hazel Miller, who is Kathy Parker’s

mother and a lifelong acquaintance of Mr. Muncey, testi

fied at the habeas hearing that two or three months before

the victim’s death Mr. Muncey came to Miller’s home and

“tried to get my daughter [Parker] to go out with him,”

R274:47. (Parker had dated Mr. Muncey at age 14.) Ac

cording to Miller, Muncey said “[h]e was upset with his

wife, that they had had an argument and he said he was

going to get rid of that woman one way or the other.” App.

236.

Another witness—Mary Atkins, also an area native who

“grew up” with Mr. Muncey and professed no hard feel

ings, R274:10, 16—claims she saw Mr. Muncey “back

han[d]” Mrs. Muncey on the very night of the murder.

App. 226, 228. Atkins recalled that during a break in the

recreation center dance, she saw Mr. Muncey and his wife

arguing in the parking lot. Mr. Muncey “grabbed her and

he just backhanded her.” Id., at 228. After that, Mrs.

Muncey “left walking.” Id., at 229. There was also testi

mony from Atkins’ mother, named Artie Lawson. A self-

described “good friend” of Mr. Muncey, id., at 231, Lawson

said Mr. Muncey visited her the morning after the mur

der, before the body was found. According to Lawson, Mr.

Muncey asked her to tell anyone who inquired not only

30 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

that she had been at the dance the evening before and had

seen him, but also that he had breakfasted at her home at

6 o’clock that morning. Lawson had not in fact been at the

dance, nor had Mr. Muncey been with her so early.

Of most importance is the testimony of Kathy Parker

and her sister Penny Letner. They testified at the habeas

hearing that, around the time of House’s trial, Mr. Muncey

had confessed to the crime. Parker recalled that she and

“some family members and some friends [were] sitting

around drinking” at Parker’s trailer when Mr. Muncey

“just walked in and sit down.” R274:37. Muncey, who had

evidently been drinking heavily, began “rambling off . . .

[t]alking about what happened to his wife and how it

happened and he didn’t mean to do it.” Ibid. According to

Parker, Mr. Muncey “said they had been into [an] argu

ment and he slapped her and she fell and hit her head and

it killed her and he didn’t mean for it to happen.” Id., at

38. Parker said she “freaked out and run him off.” Ibid.

Letner similarly recalled that at some point either “dur

ing [House’s] trial or just before,” id., at 30, Mr. Muncey

intruded on a gathering at Parker’s home. Appearing

“pretty well blistered,” Muncey “went to crying and was

talking about his wife and her death and he was saying

that he didn’t mean to do it.” App. 232. “[D]idn’t mean to

do what[?],” Letner asked, R274:33, at which point Mr.

Muncey explained:

“[S]he was ‘bitching him out’ because he didn’t take

her fishing that night, that he went to the dance in

stead. He said when he come home that she was still

on him pretty heavily ‘bitching him out’ again and

that he smacked her and that she fell and hit her

head. He said I didn’t mean to do it, but I had to get

rid of her, because I didn’t want to be charged with

murder.” App. 232–233.

Letner, who was then 19 years old with a small child,

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 31

Opinion of the Court

said Mr. Muncey’s statement “scared [her] quite badly,” so

she “got out of there immediately.” Id., at 233. Asked

whether she reported the incident to the authorities,

Letner stated, “I was frightened, you know. . . . I figured

me being 19 year old they wouldn’t listen to anything I

had to say.” R274:31. Parker, on the other hand, claimed

she (Parker) in fact went to the Sherriff’s Department, but

no one would listen:

“I tried to speak to the Sheriff but he was real busy.

He sent me to a deputy. The deputy told me to go up

stairs to the courtroom and talk to this guy, I can’t

remember his name. I never did really get to talk to

anybody.” App. 234.

Parker said she did not discuss the matter further because

“[t]hey had it all signed, sealed and delivered. We didn’t

know anything to do until we heard that they reopened

[House’s] trial.” R274:45. Parker’s mother, Hazel Miller,

confirmed she had driven Parker to the courthouse, where

Parker “went to talk to some of the people about this case.”

App. 237.

Other testimony suggests Mr. Muncey had the opportu

nity to commit the crime. According to Dennis Wallace, a

local law enforcement official who provided security at the

dance on the night of the murder, Mr. Muncey left the

dance “around 10:00, 10:30, 9:30 to 10:30.” R274:56–57.

Although Mr. Muncey told law enforcement officials just

after the murder that he left the dance only briefly and

returned, Wallace could not recall seeing him back there

again. Later that evening, Wallace responded to Mr.

Muncey’s report that his wife was missing. Muncey de

nied he and his wife had been “a fussing or a fighting”; he

claimed his wife had been “kidnapped.” Id., at 58. Wal

lace did not recall seeing any blood, disarray, or knocked-

over furniture, although he admitted he “didn’t pay too

much attention” to whether the floor appeared especially

32 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

clean. According to Wallace, Mr. Muncey said “let’s search

for her” and then led Wallace out to search “in the weeds”

around the home and the driveway (not out on the road

where the body was found). Id., at 58, 60, 63.

In the habeas proceedings, then, two different witnesses

(Parker and Letner) described a confession by Mr.

Muncey; two more (Atkins and Lawson) described suspi

cious behavior (a fight and an attempt to construct a false

alibi) around the time of the crime; and still other wit

nesses described a history of abuse.

As to Parker and Letner, the District Court noted that it

was “not impressed with the allegations of individuals who

wait over ten years to come forward with their evidence,”

especially considering that “there was no physical evi

dence in the Munceys’ kitchen to corroborate [Mr.

Muncey’s] alleged confession that he killed [his wife]

there.” App. 348. Parker and Letner, however, did at

tempt to explain their delay coming forward, and the

record indicates no reason why these two women, both

lifelong acquaintances of Mr. Muncey, would have wanted

either to frame him or to help House. Furthermore, the

record includes at least some independent support for the

statements Parker and Letner attributed to Mr. Muncey.

The supposed explanation for the fatal fight—that his wife

was complaining about going fishing—fits with Mrs.

Muncey’s statement to Luttrell earlier that evening that

her husband’s absence was “all right, because she was

going to make him take her fishing the next day,” id., at

11–12. And Dr. Blake testified, in only partial contradic

tion of Dr. Carabia, that Mrs. Muncey’s head injury re

sulted from “a surface with an edge” or “a hard surface

with a corner,” not from a fist. R275:72. (Dr. Carabia had

said either a fist or some other object could have been the

cause.)

Mr. Muncey testified at the habeas hearing, and the

District Court did not question his credibility. Though Mr.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 33

Opinion of the Court

Muncey said he seemed to remember visiting Lawson the

day after the murder, he denied either killing his wife or

confessing to doing so. Yet Mr. Muncey also claimed,

contrary to Constable Wallace’s testimony and to his own

prior statement, that he left the dance on the night of the

crime only when it ended at midnight. Mr. Muncey, more

over, denied ever hitting Mrs. Muncey; the State itself had

to impeach him with a prior statement on this point.

It bears emphasis, finally, that Parker’s and Letner’s

testimony is not comparable to the sort of eleventh-hour

affidavit vouching for a defendant and incriminating a

conveniently absent suspect that Justice O’Connor de

scribed in her concurring opinion in Herrera as “unfortu

nate” and “not uncommon” in capital cases, 506 U. S., at

423; nor was the confession Parker and Letner described

induced under pressure of interrogation. The confession

evidence here involves an alleged spontaneous statement

recounted by two eyewitnesses with no evident motive to

lie. For this reason it has more probative value than, for

example, incriminating testimony from inmates, suspects,

or friends or relations of the accused.

The evidence pointing to Mr. Muncey is by no means

conclusive. If considered in isolation, a reasonable jury

might well disregard it. In combination, however, with the

challenges to the blood evidence and the lack of motive with

respect to House, the evidence pointing to Mr. Muncey

likely would reinforce other doubts as to House’s guilt.

Other Evidence

Certain other details were presented at the habeas

hearing. First, Dr. Blake, in addition to testifying about

the blood evidence and the victim’s head injury, examined

photographs of House’s bruises and scratches and con

cluded, based on 35 years’ experience monitoring the

development and healing of bruises, that they were too old

to have resulted from the crime. In addition Dr. Blake

34 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

claimed that the injury on House’s right knuckle was

indicative of “[g]etting mashed”; it was not consistent with

striking someone. R275:63. (That of course would also

eliminate the explanation that the injury came from the

blow House supposedly told Turner he gave to his uniden

tified assailant.)

The victim’s daughter, Lora Muncey (now Lora Tharp),

also testified at the habeas hearing. She repeated her

recollection of hearing a man with a deep voice like her

grandfather’s and a statement that her father had had a

wreck down by the creek. She also denied seeing any

signs of struggle or hearing a fight between her parents,

though she also said she could not recall her parents ever

fighting physically. The District Court found her credible,

and this testimony certainly cuts in favor of the State.

Finally, House himself testified at the habeas proceed

ings. He essentially repeated the story he allegedly told

Turner about getting attacked on the road. The District

Court found, however, based on House’s demeanor, that he

“was not a credible witness.” App. 329.

Conclusion

This is not a case of conclusive exoneration. Some as

pects of the State’s evidence—Lora Muncey’s memory of a

deep voice, House’s bizarre evening walk, his lie to law

enforcement, his appearance near the body, and the blood

on his pants—still support an inference of guilt. Yet the

central forensic proof connecting House to the crime—the

blood and the semen—has been called into question, and

House has put forward substantial evidence pointing to a

different suspect. Accordingly, and although the issue is

close, we conclude that this is the rare case where—had

the jury heard all the conflicting testimony—it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror viewing the record

as a whole would lack reasonable doubt.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006)

35

Opinion of the Court

V

In addition to his gateway claim under Schlup, House

argues that he has shown freestanding innocence and that

as a result his imprisonment and planned execution are

unconstitutional. In Herrera, decided three years before

Schlup, the Court assumed without deciding that “in a

capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual

innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a

defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas

relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a

claim.” 506 U. S., at 417; see also id., at 419 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring) (“I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal

principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with

the Constitution”). “[T]he threshold showing for such an

assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high,”

the Court explained, and petitioner’s evidence there fell

“far short of that which would have to be made in order to

trigger the sort of constitutional claim which we have

assumed, arguendo, to exist.” Id., at 417, 418–419; see

also id., at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that

because “[p]etitioner has failed to make a persuasive

showing of actual innocence,” “the Court has no reason to

pass on, and appropriately reserves, the question whether

federal courts may entertain convincing claims of actual

innocence”). House urges the Court to answer the ques

tion left open in Herrera and hold not only that freestand

ing innocence claims are possible but also that he has

established one.

We decline to resolve this issue. We conclude here,

much as in Herrera, that whatever burden a hypothetical

freestanding innocence claim would require, this peti

tioner has not satisfied it. To be sure, House has cast

considerable doubt on his guilt—doubt sufficient to satisfy

Schlup’s gateway standard for obtaining federal review

despite a state procedural default. In Herrera, however,

the Court described the threshold for any hypothetical

36 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of the Court

freestanding innocence claim as “extraordinarily high.”

506 U. S., at 417. The sequence of the Court’s decisions in

Herrera and Schlup—first leaving unresolved the status of

freestanding claims and then establishing the gateway

standard—implies at the least that Herrera requires more

convincing proof of innocence than Schlup. It follows,

given the closeness of the Schlup question here, that

House’s showing falls short of the threshold implied in

Herrera.

* * *

House has satisfied the gateway standard set forth in

Schlup and may proceed on remand with procedurally

defaulted constitutional claims. The judgment of the

Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–8990

_________________

PAUL GREGORY HOUSE, PETITIONER v. RICKY

BELL, WARDEN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 12, 2006]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA

and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in the judgment in

part and dissenting in part.

To overcome the procedural hurdle that Paul House

created by failing to properly present his constitutional

claims to a Tennessee court, he must demonstrate that the

constitutional violations he alleges “ha[ve] probably re

sulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,”

such that a federal court’s refusal to hear the defaulted

claims would be a “miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo,

513 U. S. 298, 326, 327 (1995) (internal quotation marks

omitted). To make the requisite showing of actual inno

cence, House must produce “new reliable evidence” and

“must show that it is more likely than not that no reason

able juror would have convicted him in the light of the new

evidence.” Id., at 324, 327 (emphasis added). The question

is not whether House was prejudiced at his trial because the

jurors were not aware of the new evidence, but whether all

the evidence, considered together, proves that House was

actually innocent, so that no reasonable juror would vote to

convict him. Considering all the evidence, and giving due

regard to the District Court’s findings on whether House’s

new evidence was reliable, I do not find it probable that no

reasonable juror would vote to convict him, and accordingly

I dissent.

2 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

Because I do not think that House has satisfied the actual

innocence standard set forth in Schlup, I do not believe that

he has met the higher threshold for a freestanding inno

cence claim, assuming such a claim exists. See Herrera v.

Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 417 (1993). I therefore concur in the

judgment with respect to the Court’s disposition of that

separate claim.

I

In Schlup, we stated that a habeas petitioner attempt

ing to present a defaulted claim to a federal court must

present “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or

critical physical evidence—that was not presented at

trial.” 513 U. S., at 324 (emphasis added). Implicit in the

requirement that a habeas petitioner present reliable

evidence is the expectation that a factfinder will assess

reliability. The new evidence at issue in Schlup had not

been subjected to such an assessment—the claim in

Schlup was for an evidentiary hearing—and this Court

specifically recognized that the “new statements may, of

course, be unreliable.” Id., at 331. The Court stated that

the District Court, as the “reviewing tribunal,” was tasked

with assessing the “probative force” of the petitioner’s new

evidence of innocence, and “may have to make some credi

bility assessments.” Id., at 327–328, 330. Indeed, the

Supreme Court took the unusual step of remanding the

case to the Court of Appeals “with instructions to remand

to the District Court,” so that the District Court could

consider how the “likely credibility of the affiants” bears

upon the “probable reliability” of the new evidence. Id., at

332. In short, the new evidence is not simply taken at face

value; its reliability has to be tested.

Critical to the Court’s conclusion here that House has

sufficiently demonstrated his innocence are three pieces of

new evidence presented to the District Court: DNA evi

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

dence showing that the semen on Carolyn Muncey’s cloth

ing was from her husband, Hubert Muncey, not from

House; testimony from new witnesses implicating Mr.

Muncey in the murder; and evidence indicating that Mrs.

Muncey’s blood spilled from test tubes containing autopsy

samples in an evidence container. To determine whether

it should open its door to House’s defaulted constitutional

claims, the District Court considered this evidence in a

comprehensive evidentiary hearing. As House presented

his new evidence, and as the State rebutted it, the District

Court observed the witnesses’ demeanor, examined physi

cal evidence, and made findings about whether House’s

new evidence was in fact reliable. This factfinding role is

familiar to a district court. “The trial judge’s major role is

the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling

that role comes expertise.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470

U. S. 564, 574 (1985).

The State did not contest House’s new DNA evidence

excluding him as the source of the semen on Mrs.

Muncey’s clothing, but it strongly contested the new tes

timony implicating Mr. Muncey, and it insisted that the

blood spillage occurred after the FBI tested House’s jeans

and determined that they were stained with Mrs.

Muncey’s blood.

At the evidentiary hearing, sisters Kathy Parker and

Penny Letner testified that 14 years earlier, either during

or around the time of House’s trial, they heard Mr.

Muncey drunkenly confess to having accidentally killed

his wife when he struck her in their home during an ar

gument, causing her to fall and hit her head. Record, Doc.

274, pp. 28–29, 30, 37–38. Schlup provided guidance on

how a district court should assess this type of new evi

dence: The court “may consider how the timing of the

submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear

on the probable reliability of that evidence,” and it “must

assess the probative force of the newly presented evidence

4 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

in connection with the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.”

513 U. S., at 332. Consistent with this guidance, the

District Court concluded that the sisters’ testimony was

not credible. The court noted that it was “not impressed

with the allegations of individuals who wait over ten years

to come forward.” App. 348. It also considered how the

new testimony fit within the larger web of evidence, ob

serving that Mr. Muncey’s alleged confession contradicted

the testimony of the Munceys’ “very credible” daughter,

Lora Tharp, who consistently testified that she did not

hear a fight in the house that night, but instead heard a

man with a deep voice who lured her mother from the

house by saying that Mr. Muncey had been in a wreck

near the creek. Id., at 323, 348.

The District Court engaged in a similar reliability in

quiry with regard to House’s new evidence of blood spill

age. At the evidentiary hearing, House conceded that FBI

testing showed that his jeans were stained with Mrs.

Muncey’s blood, but he set out to prove that the blood

spilled from test tubes containing autopsy samples, and

that it did so before the jeans were tested by the FBI. The

District Court summarized the testimony of the various

witnesses who handled the evidence and their recollec

tions about bloodstains and spillage; it acknowledged that

House’s expert, Dr. Cleland Blake, disagreed with FBI

Agent Paul Bigbee about how to interpret the results of

Agent Bigbee’s genetic marker analysis summary; and it

summarized the testimony of the State’s blood spatter

expert, Paulette Sutton. Id., at 339–347. After reviewing

all the evidence, the District Court stated: “Based upon

the evidence introduced during the evidentiary hearing . . .

the court concludes that the spillage occurred after the

FBI crime laboratory received and tested the evidence.”

Id., at 348 (emphasis added).

Normally, an appellate court reviews a district court’s

factual findings only for clear error. See Fed. Rule Civ.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

Proc. 52(a) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or

documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly

erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportu

nity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the

witnesses”); Bessemer City, supra, at 574 (clearly erroneous

standard applies “even when the district court’s findings do

not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead

on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from

other facts”). The Sixth Circuit deferred to the District

Court’s factual findings, 386 F. 3d 668, 684 (2004), and

Schlup did not purport to alter—but instead reaffirmed

and highlighted—the district court’s critical role as fact-

finder. Yet the majority asserts that the clear error stan

dard “overstates the effect of the District Court’s ruling,”

and then dismisses the District Court’s reliability findings

because it is “uncertain about” them, while stopping short

of identifying clear error. Ante, at 20. This is a sharp

departure from the guidance in Schlup.

In Schlup, we contrasted a district court’s role in assess

ing the reliability of new evidence of innocence with a

district court’s role in deciding a summary judgment

motion. 513 U. S., at 332. We explained that, in the latter

situation, the district court does not assess credibility or

weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether there

is a genuine factual issue for trial. Ibid. Assessing the

reliability of new evidence, on the other hand, is a typical

factfinding role, requiring credibility determinations and a

weighing of the “probative force” of the new evidence in

light of “the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.” Ibid. We

found it “obviou[s]” that a habeas court conducting an

actual innocence inquiry must do more than simply check

whether there are genuine factual issues for trial. Ibid.

The point of the actual innocence inquiry is for the federal

habeas court to satisfy itself that it should suspend the

normal procedural default rule, disregard the important

judicial interests of finality and comity, and allow a state

6 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

prisoner to present his defaulted constitutional claims to a

federal court. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 490–

491 (1991).

The majority surprisingly states that this guidance is

inapplicable here because this case involves a “fully devel

oped record,” while the district court in Schlup had de

clined to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Ante, at 17–18.

But the guidance is clearly applicable: The point in Schlup

was not simply that a hearing was required, but why—

because the district court had to assess the probative force

of the petitioner’s newly presented evidence, by engaging

in factfinding rather than performing a summary judg

ment-type inquiry. 513 U. S., at 331–332. That is pre

cisely what the District Court did here. In addition to a

“fully developed record,” we have the District Court’s

factual findings about the reliability of the new evidence

in that record, factual findings which the majority disre

gards without finding clear error.

The majority essentially disregards the District Court’s

role in assessing the reliability of House’s new evidence.

With regard to the sisters’ testimony, the majority casts

aside the District Court’s determination that their state

ments came too late and were too inconsistent with credi

ble record evidence to be reliable, instead observing that

the women had no obvious reason to lie, that a few aspects

of their testimony have record support, and that they

recounted an uncoerced confession. Ante, at 32–33. As for

the District Court’s express finding that the autopsy blood

spilled after the FBI tested House’s jeans, the majority

points to Dr. Blake’s testimony that blood enzymes “are

generally better preserved on cloth,” and even conjures up

its own theory in an attempt to refute Ms. Sutton’s expert

testimony that the pattern of some bloodstains was consis

tent with blood being transferred while the pants were

being worn. Ante, at 27 (“This should be a matter for the

trier of fact to consider in the first instance, but we can

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

note a line of argument that could refute the State’s posi

tion . . . [Ms. Sutton’s] testimony . . . does not refute the

hypothesis that the packaging of the pants for transport

was what caused them to be folded or creased”); see App.

296.

The majority’s assessment of House’s new evidence is

precisely the summary judgment-type inquiry Schlup said

was inappropriate. 513 U. S., at 332. By casting aside the

District Court’s factual determinations made after a com

prehensive evidentiary hearing, the majority has done

little more than reiterate the factual disputes presented

below. Witnesses do not testify in our courtroom, and it is

not our role to make credibility findings and construct

theories of the possible ways in which Mrs. Muncey’s blood

could have been spattered and wiped on House’s jeans.

The District Court did not painstakingly conduct an evi

dentiary hearing to compile a record for us to sort through

transcript by transcript and photograph by photograph,

assessing for ourselves the reliability of what we see.

Schlup made abundantly clear that reliability determina

tions were essential, but were for the district court to

make. 513 U. S., at 331–332. We are to defer to the better

situated District Court on reliability, unless we determine

that its findings are clearly erroneous. We are not con

cerned with “the district court’s independent judgment as

to whether reasonable doubt exists,” id., at 329, but the

District Court here made basic factual findings about the

reliability of House’s new evidence; it did not offer its

personal opinion about whether it doubted House’s guilt.

Schlup makes clear that those findings are controlling

unless clearly erroneous.

I have found no clear error in the District Court’s reli

ability findings. Not having observed Ms. Parker and Ms.

Letner testify, I would defer to the District Court’s deter

mination that they are not credible, and the evidence in

the record undermining the tale of an accidental killing

8 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

during a fight in the Muncey home convinces me that this

credibility finding is not clearly erroneous. Dr. Alex Cara

bia, who performed the autopsy, testified to injuries far

more severe than a bump on the head: Mrs. Muncey had

bruises on the front and back of her neck, on both thighs,

on her lower right leg and left knee, and her hands were

bloodstained up to the wrists; her injuries were consistent

with a struggle and traumatic strangulation. Record,

Addendum 4, 7 Tr. of Evidence in No. 378 (Crim. Ct. Un

ion County, Tenn.) 984–987 (hereinafter Tr.) And, of

course, Lora Tharp has consistently recalled a deep-voiced

visitor arriving late at night to tell Mrs. Muncey that her

husband was in a wreck near the creek. App. 19, 270.

I also find abundant evidence in the record to support

the District Court’s finding that blood spilled within the

evidence container after the FBI received and tested

House’s jeans. Agent Bigbee testified that there was no

leakage in the items submitted to him for testing. Id., at

277. The majority’s entire analysis on this point assumes

the agent flatly lied, though there was no attack on his

credibility below. Moreover, Ms. Sutton determined, in

her expert opinion, that the wide distribution of stains

“front and back, top to bottom,” the fact that some blood

stains were mixed with mud, and the presence of blood

stains inside the pocket and inside the fly, showed that the

blood was spattered and wiped—not spilled—on House’s

jeans. Id., at 291–293, 295; id., at 293 (“[I]f a tube of blood

had spilled on these pants, the stain should have been in a

localized area”); id., at 294 (“The stains also . . . either

originate on the inside and don’t soak out or on the outside

and are not soaking to the inside. That, of course, would

be what you would see with a spill”).

It is also worth noting that the blood evidently spilled

inside the evidence container when the jeans were pro

tected inside a plastic zip lock bag, as shown by the pres

ence of a bloodstain on the outside of that bag. See Re

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

cord, Plt. Exh. 10–6. House’s expert tested the exterior

and interior of that plastic bag for bloodstains using an

“extremely sensitive” test, and only the exterior of the bag

tested positive for blood. Id., Doc. 274, at 95–96. The

evidence in the record indicates that the jeans were placed

in the plastic bag after they arrived at the FBI: FBI re

cords show that the jeans arrived there in a paper bag,

and the plastic bag has FBI markings on it. Id., Adden

dum 2, Trial Exh. 31, p. 36; id., Plt. Exh. 10–6. The blood

stain on the outside of the plastic bag therefore further

supports the District Court’s conclusion that the blood

spilled after the evidence was received and tested by the

FBI, and not en route when the jeans were in a paper bag.

I suppose it is theoretically possible that the jeans were

contaminated by spillage before arriving at the FBI, that

Agent Bigbee either failed to note or lied about such spill

age, and that the FBI then transferred the jeans into a

plastic bag and put them back inside the evidence con

tainer with the spilled blood still sloshing around suffi

ciently to contaminate the outside of the plastic bag as

extensively as it did. This sort of unbridled speculation

can theoretically defeat any inconvenient fact, but does

not suffice to convince me that the District Court’s factual

finding—that the blood spilled after FBI testing—was

clearly erroneous.

Moreover, the yellow “Tennessee Crime Lab” tape

placed around the container on all four sides does not line

up when the bloodstained corners of the container and its

lid are aligned, showing that the blood did not spill until

sometime after the container was received and opened at

its first destination—the FBI. See id., Respondent’s Exh.

24; id., Doc. 276, pp. 190–191 (testimony of Paulette Sut

ton). The majority points out that on one side of the con

tainer, the first of two layers of tape appears to begin

cleanly at the lid’s edge, and from this concludes that the

container must have been cut open and resealed by Ten

10 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

nessee authorities en route to the FBI. Ante, at 25; see

Record, Respondent’s Exh. 23d. Even if the majority’s

deduction from a photograph of the container were true, it

would show only that Tennessee authorities had reason to

open the container once it was sealed to take something

out or put something in, perhaps back at the crime lab in

Union County. But even if the container had been opened

before its arrival at the FBI, the majority recognizes that

it was resealed with “Tennessee Crime Lab” tape, and the

second layer of tape aligns only when the bloodstains on

the container and its lid do not. Ante, at 24–25. Of course,

the District Court—which concluded that the blood was

spilled after testing at the FBI laboratory—had before it

the box itself with the tape as the witnesses testified on

the point, and not—like this Court—simply a photograph.

See Bessemer City, 470 U. S., at 574 (district court’s find

ings about physical evidence are reviewed for clear error).

House’s theory that the blood on his jeans was trans

ferred there from the autopsy samples is based on Dr.

Blake’s reading of Agent Bigbee’s enzyme marker analysis

summary. After reading the summary, Dr. Blake con

cluded that the enzymes in the bloodstains on House’s

jeans and the enzymes in the autopsy samples had dete

riorated to the same extent. Record, Doc. 275, p. 110. In

particular, he noted that the GLO1 enzyme showed “in

complete penetration” on both the autopsy blood and the

jeans, and because enzymes are better preserved on cloth,

the enzyme should have been present on the jeans. Id., at

116. But Agent Bigbee disputed Dr. Blake’s reading of

what was, after all, Agent Bigbee’s own study. He testi

fied that “ ‘inc’ ” on his chart meant “inconclusive,” not

“incomplete penetration,” and that the term “inconclusive”

meant that the enzyme was present, but could not be

grouped into an ABO bloodtype. Id., Doc. 276, at 140.

While pointing out that his summary showed different

levels of enzymes in the two samples, Agent Bigbee also

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 11

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

noted that many different factors—such as heat, dirt, or

bacteria in a clothes hamper—could cause enzymes to

degrade on cloth. Id., at 139, 167–170. Considering how

House’s new blood spillage evidence fits within the record

as a whole, I can see no clear error in the District Court’s

express finding that the blood spilled in the evidence

container after the FBI found Mrs. Muncey’s blood on

House’s jeans.

The District Court attentively presided over a complex

evidentiary hearing, often questioning witnesses exten

sively during the presentation of critical evidence. See,

e.g., id., Doc. 275, at 110–115. The court concisely sum

marized the evidence presented, then dutifully made

findings about the reliability of the testimony it heard and

the evidence it observed. We are poorly equipped to sec

ond-guess the District Court’s reliability findings and

should defer to them, consistent with the guidance we

provided in Schlup.

II

With due regard to the District Court’s reliability find

ings, this case invites a straightforward application of the

legal standard adopted in Schlup. A petitioner does not

pass through the Schlup gateway if it is “more likely than

not that there is any juror who, acting reasonably, would

have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

513 U. S., at 333 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis

added).

The majority states that if House had presented just one

of his three key pieces of evidence—or even two of the

three—he would not pass through the Schlup gateway.

See ante, at 28 (“Were House’s challenge to the State’s

case limited to the questions he has raised about the blood

and semen, the other evidence favoring the prosecution

might well suffice to bar relief”); ante, at 33 (“If considered

in isolation, a reasonable jury might well disregard [the

12 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

evidence pointing to Mr. Muncey]. In combination, how

ever, with the challenges to the blood evidence and the

lack of motive with respect to House, the evidence pointing

to Mr. Muncey likely would reinforce other doubts as to

House’s guilt”). According to the majority, House has

picked the trifecta of evidence that places conviction out

side the realm of choices any juror, acting reasonably,

would make. Because the case against House remains

substantially unaltered from the case presented to the

jury, I disagree.

At trial, the State presented its story about what hap

pened on the night of Mrs. Muncey’s murder. The

Munceys’ daughter heard a deep-voiced perpetrator arrive

at the Muncey home late at night and tell Mrs. Muncey

that her husband had been in a wreck near the creek.

App. 19. Ms. Tharp relayed her testimony again at the

evidentiary hearing, and the District Court determined

that she was a “very credible witness.” Id., at 270, 323.

When police questioned House after witnesses reported

seeing him emerge from the embankment near Mrs.

Muncey’s body shortly before it was discovered, he told

two different officers that he never left Donna Turner’s

trailer the previous evening, even recounting the series of

television programs he watched before going to bed. 7 Tr.

963–965, 1031–1032. He had worked to concoct an alibi

we now know was a lie. On the day Mrs. Muncey’s body

was found, Bill Breeding, a criminal investigator at the

Union County Sheriff’s Office, observed House at the local

jail and noticed that he had abrasions “across his knuckles

and about his hands,” two or three bruises on his right

arm, scratches on his chest, and his right ring finger was

red and swollen. 6 id., at 801–802. The interviewing

officers noticed similar injuries. App. 78–80; 7 Tr. 974–

975. House told them that his finger was swollen because

he fell off a porch, and the scratches and bruises were

from tearing down a building, and from a cat. Ibid. Ms.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 13

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

Turner initially confirmed House’s alibi, but she changed

her story when police warned her that covering up a homi

cide was a serious offense. Id., at 1063. Ms. Turner then

told police that House had in fact left her house that night

between 10:30 and 10:45 p.m. Id., at 1062–1063. He came

back some time later panting and sweating, shirtless and

shoeless, and with various injuries. App. 88–91; 8 Tr.

1154–1155.

Also on the day the body was found, Sheriff Earl Loy

asked House if he was wearing the same clothes he wore

the night before. 6 id., at 845. House “hesitated,” then

stated that he had changed his shirt, but not his jeans.

Ibid. In other words, he specifically tried to conceal from

the police that he had worn other jeans the night before,

for reasons that were to become clear. Ms. Turner re

vealed that House’s statement that he had not changed his

jeans was a lie, and police retrieved House’s dirty jeans

from Ms. Turner’s hamper. Ibid. Of course, FBI testing

revealed that House’s jeans were stained with Mrs.

Muncey’s blood, and the District Court determined that

House’s new evidence of blood spillage did not undermine

those test results. App. 348. If in fact Mrs. Muncey’s

blood only got on House’s jeans from later evidentiary

spillage, House would have had no reason to lie to try to

keep the existence of the concealed jeans from the police.

Through Ms. Turner’s testimony at trial, the jury also

heard House’s story about what happened that night. He

left Ms. Turner’s trailer late at night to go for a walk. Id.,

at 86. When he returned some time later—panting,

sweating, and missing his shirt and shoes—he told her

that some men in a truck tried to kill him. Id., at 88–91.

When Ms. Turner asked House about his injuries, he

attributed them to fighting with his assailants. Id., at 90;

8 Tr. 1154–1155. House retold this story to the District

Court, saying that he initially lied to police because he

was on parole and did not want to draw attention to him

14 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

self. Record, Doc. 276, at 99, 108–109. In other words,

having nothing to hide and facing a murder charge, House

lied—and when he was caught in the lie, he said he lied

not to escape the murder charge, but solely to avoid unex

plained difficulties with his parole officer. The jury re

jected House’s story about the night’s events, and the

District Court “considered Mr. House’s demeanor and

found that he was not a credible witness.” App. 329.

The jury also heard House’s attempt to implicate Mr.

Muncey in his wife’s murder by calling Mrs. Muncey’s

brother, Ricky Green, as a witness. Mr. Green testified

that two weeks before the murder, his sister called him to

say that she and Mr. Muncey had been fighting, that she

wanted to leave him, and that she was scared. 7 Tr. 1088.

Mr. Green also testified that the Munceys had marital

problems, and that he had previously seen Mr. Muncey hit

his wife. Id., at 1087. The jury rejected House’s attempt

to implicate Mr. Muncey, and the District Court was not

persuaded by House’s attempt to supplement this evidence

at the evidentiary hearing, finding that his new witnesses

were not credible. App. 348.

Noticeably absent from the State’s story about what

happened to Mrs. Muncey on the night of her death was

much mention of the semen found on Mrs. Muncey’s cloth

ing. House’s single victory at the evidentiary hearing was

new DNA evidence proving that the semen was deposited

by Mr. Muncey. The majority identifies the semen evi

dence as “[c]entral to the State’s case” against House, ante,

at 8, but House’s jury would probably be quite surprised

by this characterization. At trial, Agent Bigbee testified

that from the semen stains on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing, he

could determine that the man who deposited the semen

had type A blood, and was a secretor. App. 54–56. Agent

Bigbee also testified that House and Mr. Muncey both

have type A blood, that House is a secretor, and that

“[t]here is an eighty (80%) percent chance that [Mr.

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 15

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

Muncey] is a secretor.” Id., at 55–56; 6 Tr. 952 (emphasis

added). Moreover, Agent Bigbee informed the jury that

because 40 percent of people have type A blood, and 80

percent of those people are secretors, the semen on Mrs.

Muncey’s clothing could have been deposited by roughly

one out of every three males. Id., at 957. The jury was

also informed several times by the defense that Mrs.

Muncey’s body was found fully clothed. See, e.g., 4 id., at

628; 9 id., at 1274.

The majority describes House’s sexual motive as “a

central theme in the State’s narrative linking House to the

crime,” and states that without the semen evidence, “a

jury . . . would have found it necessary to establish some

different motive, or, if the same motive, an intent far more

speculative.” Ante, at 21. The State, however, consis

tently directed the jury’s attention away from motive, and

sexual motive was far from a “central theme” of the State’s

case—presumably because of the highly ambiguous nature

of the semen evidence recounted above. The Tennessee

Supreme Court did not mention that evidence in catalog

ing the “[p]articularly incriminating” or “[d]amaging”

evidence against House. App. 135. The State did not

mention the semen evidence in its opening statement to

the jury, instead focusing on premeditation. 4 Tr. 613–

615. The defense used its opening statement to expose

lack of motive as a weakness in the State’s case. Id., at

628. After the State’s equivocal presentation of the semen

evidence through Agent Bigbee’s testimony at trial, the

State again made no reference to the semen evidence or to

a motive in its closing argument, prompting the defense to

again highlight this omission. 9 id., at 1274 (“[W]hy was

Carolyn Muncey killed? We don’t know. Is it important to

have some motive? In your minds? What motive did Paul

Gregory House have to go over and kill a woman that he

barely knew? Who was still dressed, still clad in her

clothes”).

16 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

In rebuttal, the State disclaimed any responsibility

to prove motive, again shifting the jury’s focus to

premeditation:

“The law says that if you take another person’s life,

you beat them, you strangle them, and then you don’t

succeed, and then you kill them by giving them multi

ple blows to the head, and one massive blow to the

head, and that that causes their brains to crash

against the other side of their skull, and caused such

severe bleeding inside the skull itself, that you die—

that it does not make any difference under God’s

heaven, what the motive was. That is what the law

is. The law is that if motive is shown, it can be con

sidered by the jury as evidence of guilt. But the law is

that if you prove that a killing was done, beyond a

reasonable doubt, by a person, and that he premedi

tated it, he planned it, it is not necessary for the jury

to conclude why he did it.” App. 106.

As a follow-up to this explanation, when the trial was

almost over and only in response to the defense’s consis

tent prodding, the State made its first and only reference

to a possible motive, followed immediately by another

disclaimer:

“Now, you may have an idea why he did it. The evi

dence at the scene which seemed to suggest that he

was subjecting this lady to some kind of indignity,

why would you get a lady out of her house, late at

night, in her night clothes, under the trick that her

husband has had a wreck down by the creek? . . . Why

is it that you choke her? Why is it that you repeatedly

beat her? Why is it that she has scrapes all over her

body? Well, it is because either you don’t want her to

tell what indignities you have subjected her to, or she

is unwilling and fights against you, against being sub

jected to those indignities. . . . That is what the evi

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 17

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

dence at the scene suggests about motive. But motive

is not an element of the crime. It is something that

you can consider, or ignore. Whatever you prefer.

The issue is not motive. The issue is premeditation.”

Id., at 106–107.

It is on this “obliqu[e]” reference to the semen evidence

during the State’s closing argument that the majority

bases its assertion that House’s sexual motive was a “cen

tral theme in the State’s narrative.” Ante, at 11, 21.

Although it is possible that one or even some jurors might

have entertained doubt about House’s guilt absent the

clearest evidence of motive, I do not find it more likely

than not that every juror would have done so, and that is

the legal standard under Schlup. The majority aphoristi

cally states that “[w]hen identity is in question, motive is

key.” Ante, at 21. Not at all. Sometimes, when identity is

in question, alibi is key. Here, House came up with one—

and it fell apart, later admitted to be fabricated when his

girlfriend would not lie to protect him. Scratches from a

cat, indeed. Surely a reasonable juror would give the fact

that an alibi had been made up and discredited significant

weight. People facing a murder charge, who are innocent,

do not make up a story out of concern that the truth might

somehow disturb their parole officer. And people do not

lie to the police about which jeans they were wearing the

night of a murder, if they have no reason to believe the

jeans would be stained with the blood shed by the victim

in her last desperate struggle to live.

In Schlup, we made clear that the standard we adopted

requires a “stronger showing than that needed to establish

prejudice.” 513 U. S., at 327. In other words, House must

show more than just a “reasonable probability that . . . the

factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting

guilt.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695 (1984).

House must present such compelling evidence of innocence

18 HOUSE v. BELL

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

that it becomes more likely than not that no single juror,

acting reasonably, would vote to convict him. Schlup,

supra, at 329. The majority’s conclusion is that given the

sisters’ testimony (if believed), and Dr. Blake’s rebutted

testimony about how to interpret Agent Bigbee’s enzyme

marker analysis summary (if accepted), combined with the

revelation that the semen on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing was

deposited by her husband (which the jurors knew was just

as likely as the semen having been deposited by House),

no reasonable juror would vote to convict House. Ante, at

34. Given the District Court’s reliability findings about

the first two pieces of evidence, the evidence before us now

is not substantially different from that considered by

House’s jury. I therefore find it more likely than not that

in light of this new evidence, at least one juror, acting

reasonably, would vote to convict House. The evidence as

a whole certainly does not establish that House is actually

innocent of the crime of murdering Carolyn Muncey, and

accordingly I dissent.