Opinion

Berry v. Peterman

  • 604 F.3d 435
  • 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 9195
  • 2010 WL 1780152
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
May 5, 2010
Status
Published
On the bench
Manion, Posner, Hamilton
Cited by
886 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.1%

explaining, when analyzing deliberate-indifference claim against nurse, that “a nurse confronted with an inappropriate or questionable practice, should not simply defer to that practice, but rather has a professional *565 obligation to the patient to take appropriate action, whether by discussing the nurse’s concerns with the treating physician or by contacting a responsible administrator or higher authority” (internal quotation marks omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • explaining, when analyzing deliberate-indifference claim against nurse, that “a nurse confronted with an inappropriate or questionable practice, should not simply defer to that practice, but rather has a professional *565 obligation to the patient to take appropriate action, whether by discussing the nurse’s concerns with the treating physician or by contacting a responsible administrator or higher authority” (internal quotation marks omitted)
  • explaining, when analyzing deliberate-indiffer- ence claim against nurse, that “a nurse confronted with an inappropriate or questionable practice should not simply defer to that practice, but rather has a professional obligation to the patient to take appropriate action, whether by discussing the nurse’s concerns with the treating physician or by contacting a responsible administrator or higher authority” (internal quotation marks omitted)
  • finding that although nurses generally defer to instructions given by physicians, “that deference may not be blind or unthinking, particularly if it is apparent that the physician’s order will likely harm the patient,” and thus the prison nurses’ conduct raised issues of fact that barred summary judgment in their favor
  • explaining that an official who is working in an administrative capacity and consults with medical staff, forwards concerns, and timely responds to complaints does not violate the Constitution because officials may defer to the judgment of the providers who are treating a patient without fear of liability

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-3557

A KIDA B ERRY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

L T. G EORGE P ETERMAN, R.N. D AVE R EICH, AND

K AREN B UTLER, M.D.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 08-CV-0421—J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge.

S UBMITTED M ARCH 17, 2010—D ECIDED M AY 5, 2010

Before P OSNER, M ANION, and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.

H AMILTON, Circuit Judge. In the spring of 2008, plaintiff

Akida Berry, an inmate in the Wisconsin Department

of Corrections, was transferred temporarily to the

Waushara County Jail because of overcrowding. Berry

developed a serious toothache. The nurse and the doctor

at the jail told him to take over-the-counter pain

relievers, but they refused to refer him to a dentist. After

2 No. 09-3557

about two months of serious pain, Berry was returned to

a state facility where he promptly saw a dentist who

performed a root canal the same day.

Berry, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the nurse, the

doctor, and the jail administrator under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violating his Eighth Amendment right not to be sub-

jected to cruel and unusual punishment. The defendants

moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) that Berry

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as re-

quired by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); (2) that Berry did not

suffer a serious medical condition; and (3) that even if

Berry did suffer a serious medical condition, he could

not prove that any defendant acted with deliberate indif-

ference toward that condition. The district court disagreed

with the defendants on the first two points but agreed

on the third and thus granted summary judgment to all

three defendants. Berry v. Peterman, 2009 WL 3061977

(E.D. Wis. Sept. 23, 2009).

We affirm in part and reverse in part. We agree with the

district court that Berry has raised a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether he exhausted his administra-

tive remedies. We also agree that Berry suffered a

serious medical condition and that the jail administrator

is entitled to summary judgment because he was not

deliberately indifferent to Berry’s situation. As a lay-

person, the administrator was entitled to rely on the

doctor’s and nurse’s advice regarding Berry’s dental

pain. But we conclude that Berry has offered sufficient

evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that

the doctor and nurse acted with deliberate indifference

No. 09-3557 3

toward his condition by persisting in an easy but inef-

fective course of treatment that subjected him to two

months of serious but avoidable pain. We remand

those claims for trial.

The Facts for Summary Judgment

This case comes before us on review of a grant of sum-

mary judgment, so we must give plaintiff Berry the benefit

of all conflicts in the evidence and all reasonable and

favorable inferences that might be drawn from the evi-

dence. See Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir.

2006); Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 32 F.3d 1126, 1132

(7th Cir. 1994). We do not vouch for the objective truth

of every detail of the following account or take any posi-

tion as to Berry’s ultimate chance of success on the merits.

Berry was confined at the Waushara County Jail for

approximately ten weeks—from March 28, 2008, through

June 6, 2008—due to overcrowding at Wisconsin’s De-

partment of Corrections (“DOC”) facilities. Approxi-

mately one month before his transfer to Waushara, Berry

had a DOC dental exam and was classified as ” level 20,”

meaning that he had routine or chronic dental needs

and appeared unlikely to suffer an acute dental episode

in the next six months.

During his detention at the Waushara County Jail,

Berry filed numerous complaints concerning a steadily-

worsening toothache. As early as April 3rd, Berry asked to

see a dentist about an ailing tooth, claiming that air, water,

and food all caused him pain. On April 11th, Berry filed a

4 No. 09-3557

complaint stating that he did not believe he could wait

until his transfer back to a DOC facility to see a dentist.

He wrote that nothing was helping his tooth and that

he was “having constant pains [and] headaches.” On

April 13th, Berry again asked to see a dentist and com-

plained that his tooth caused him continuous pain, head-

aches, and problems eating and sleeping. Again on

April 18th, Berry complained that his tooth was

causing him “a great deal of pain, and the worst head-

ache I’ve ever had,” and that he was “unable to drink

water at times, or brush my teeth due to the [pain].” On

April 21st, Berry asked his nurse whether he could be

sent to an off-site dentist to address his increasing

pain, and he complained that his pain medication was

ineffective. Berry complained again on April 24th that

he was in such pain that he had to chew food on only

one side of his mouth, and he noted that the pain had

affected his sleeping and eating. On April 29th, Berry

complained that he had not been able to brush his teeth

because cold water caused him intolerable pain. A few

days later, on May 1st, Berry complained to the jail ad-

ministrator that he needed to see a dentist. Berry filed

this lawsuit on May 14th. He complained to the jail ad-

ministrator again on May 18th, stating that he needed

to see a dentist and that his requests had been ignored.

Defendant Dave Reich—a registered nurse working

for Health Professionals, Ltd., which contracted to pro-

vide medical and nursing services at the Waushara

County Jail—received and replied to most of Berry’s

complaints. In response to Berry’s numerous requests

to see a dentist, Nurse Reich regularly responded that

No. 09-3557 5

Waushara did not have a dentist on staff, that the

Waushara County Jail’s medical staff could treat only

pain or infections, and that any dental work would be

performed when Berry was transferred back to a DOC

facility. At times Nurse Reich changed Berry’s treatment

or made suggestions to alleviate his pain, but he often

merely reminded Berry that he had upcoming doctor

appointments and that he was already receiving pain

treatment (over-the-counter pain relievers). Other times,

Nurse Reich simply replied that Berry’s complaints

had already been addressed.

Defendant Karen Butler, a physician also working for

Health Professionals, examined Berry twice during his

time at the Waushara County Jail. The record contains

no evidence that Dr. Butler x-rayed Berry’s teeth nor

any details as to the methods used to examine Berry’s

teeth on either visit. On the limited record, it appears

that Dr. Butler examined Berry only for infections

or “dental emergencies.” During her examination on

April 17, 2008, Dr. Butler noted no such infections or

emergencies. On April 24th, Dr. Butler examined Berry

again, this time noting a filling in tooth No. 19 but nothing

that would cause pain. On this second visit, Berry

insisted on seeing a dentist. Dr. Butler refused to make

a referral, apparently because Berry presented with

nothing more urgent than unexplained severe pain.

Instead, she recommended a different pain medication.

Dr. Butler persisted in this course of treatment even

after Berry complained that those medications were

ineffective. She never contacted a dentist to examine

Berry’s teeth.

6 No. 09-3557

Defendant George Peterman, Waushara County’s jail

administrator, had limited contact with Berry, who ad-

dressed only three complaints to him. Peterman replied

to the second complaint and told Berry that he had

raised his concerns with the medical staff. At Berry’s

request, Peterman later looked at Berry’s teeth himself.

Not surprisingly, he told Berry that he was not qualified

to diagnose or treat dental problems. In response to the

third complaint, in which Berry requested to see a

dentist, Peterman forwarded Berry’s request to the

medical staff and notified the DOC of Berry’s complaints.

Berry was transferred from the Waushara County Jail to

a DOC facility on June 6th and had a “priority” appoint-

ment with a dentist on June 12th. According to his chart,

Berry complained of pain in tooth No. 19 when he ate,

when he brushed his teeth with cold water, and at night.

The dentist’s exam revealed that the pulp in tooth

No. 19 was “clearly necrotic,” and the dentist performed

a root canal or pulpotomy—surgical removal of a

portion of the tooth’s pulp (the connective tissue

within, containing blood vessels and nerve tissue)—to

salvage the remaining pulp. The dentist’s notes

indicate that if Berry’s pain had not subsided after the

root canal, the tooth would have to have been removed.

The district court granted summary judgment for all

three defendants, concluding that Berry’s dental pain

was objectively serious but that none of the defendants

had been deliberately indifferent to his condition. The

court explained that Peterman and Nurse Reich

properly deferred to the medical assessments made by

No. 09-3557 7

Dr. Butler, who treated Berry’s pain and examined him

twice but saw no indication of infection or other

dental emergency.

Analysis

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitu-

tion protects prisoners from being subjected to cruel

and unusual punishment. This amendment, incorporated

to apply to the states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-

ment, includes a right to adequate medical care. Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); Johnson v. Doughty,

433 F.3d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 2006). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, a prisoner may bring suit against any person

who caused a violation of the prisoner’s Eighth Amend-

ment rights while acting under color of state law.

Berry asserts that his Eighth Amendment rights were

violated because the defendants showed deliberate indif-

ference to his repeated complaints of severe dental pain.

To succeed on this claim, Berry must show (1) that he

suffered from an objectively serious medical condition;

and (2) that the individual defendant was deliberately

indifferent to that condition. Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d

579, 584 (7th Cir. 2006), citing Zentmyer v. Kendall County,

220 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000).

On the first element, the district court correctly con-

cluded that Berry had come forward with sufficient

evidence of an objectively serious medical condition.

Berry offered ample evidence that he suffered from tooth

decay and serious pain while at the Waushara Jail—his

8 No. 09-3557

tooth’s pulp was “clearly necrotic,” according to the

dental records, requiring an immediate root canal when

Berry was finally seen by a dentist shortly after leaving

Waushara and returning to a DOC facility. Tooth decay

can constitute an objectively serious medical condition

because of pain and the risk of infection. Board v.

Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 480-81 & n.4, 482-83 (7th Cir. 2005);

Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2000) (tooth

cavity presented serious medical condition).1

Though the district court agreed that Berry suffered

from an objectively serious medical condition, it con-

cluded that none of the defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to that condition. Deliberate indifference

occurs when a defendant realizes that a substantial risk

of serious harm to the prisoner exists, but the defendant

disregards that risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837 (1994); Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir.

2010), citing Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir.

2006). Deliberate indifference is intentional or reckless

conduct, not mere negligence. Gayton, 593 F.3d at 620.

Because each defendant played a different role in regard

to Berry’s treatment at the Waushara Jail, we address

each defendant in turn.

1

The defendants argue that Berry’s purchases of candy and

other sticky, sugary foods show that he did not actually suffer

from an objectively serious condition. We agree with the

district judge that this evidence only raises an issue of material

fact to be resolved by a jury, not by the court on summary

judgment. See Berry, 2009 WL 3061977, at *5-*6.

No. 09-3557 9

I. The Jail Administrator

Berry failed to present sufficient evidence to support

a reasonable jury finding that jail administrator

Peterman acted with deliberate indifference. As a non-

medical administrator, Peterman was entitled to defer to

the judgment of jail health professionals so long as he did

not ignore Berry. See Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527-28

(7th Cir. 2008); Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010-11

(7th Cir. 2006); Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655-56 (7th

Cir. 2005); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).

The undisputed facts show that Peterman met this stan-

dard. He consulted with the medical staff, forwarded

Berry’s concerns to the DOC, and timely responded to

Berry’s complaints. That he took no further action

cannot be seen as deliberate indifference. As a practical

matter, it would be unwise to require more of a non-

medical staff member like Peterman. As Hayes, Johnson,

Greeno, Spruill, and a host of other cases make clear, the

law encourages non-medical security and administra-

tive personnel at jails and prisons to defer to the profes-

sional medical judgments of the physicians and nurses

treating the prisoners in their care without fear of

liability for doing so. The district court properly granted

summary judgment as to defendant Peterman.

II. The Jail Doctor

Dr. Butler is not entitled to summary judgment. Neither

medical malpractice nor mere disagreement with a doc-

tor’s medical judgment is enough to prove deliberate

10 No. 09-3557

indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d

254, 261 (7th Cir. 1996). But a prisoner also is not required

to show that he was literally ignored. Sherrod v. Lingle,

223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000). Although the doctor

did not completely ignore plaintiff’s pain, a doctor’s

choice of the “easier and less efficacious treatment” for

an objectively serious medical condition can still amount

to deliberate indifference for purposes of the Eighth

Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 & n.10, citing Williams

v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Doughty,

433 F.3d at 1013 (stating that “medical personnel cannot

simply resort to an easier course of treatment that they

know is ineffective”); Greeno, 414 F.3d at 655 (noting

that persistence in a course of treatment “known to be

ineffective” violates the Eighth Amendment). A sig-

nificant delay in effective medical treatment also may

support a claim of deliberate indifference, especially

where the result is prolonged and unnecessary pain.

Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 779 (7th Cir. 2008)

(reversing summary judgment for defendants where

plaintiff did not receive treatment for painful broken

nose for nearly two days), citing Gutierrez v. Peters, 111

F.3d 1364, 1371-72 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).

Also, as we explained in Grieveson, a non-trivial delay

in treating serious pain can be actionable even without

expert medical testimony showing that the delay aggra-

vated the underlying condition. 538 F.3d at 779, distin-

guishing Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir.

1996) (one-hour delay in responding to claim of injury

by rape in prison did not rise to level of constitutional

No. 09-3557 11

violation). In this context, courts may consider the “cost

of treatment alternatives [when] determining what con-

stitutes adequate, minimum-level medical care,” Johnson,

433 F.3d at 1013, citing Ralston v. McGovern, 167 F.3d

1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 1999), “but medical personnel cannot

simply resort to an easier course of treatment that they

know is ineffective.” Johnson, 433 F.3d at 1013, citing

Kelley v. McGinnis, 899 F.2d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 1990).

On the summary judgment record, a jury could reason-

ably conclude that Dr. Butler knowingly adhered to an

easier method to treat Berry’s pain that she knew

was not effective. She had not identified an effective

pain medication, nor could she explain Berry’s pain, yet

she rejected the obvious alternative of referring Berry to

a dentist. A jury could find that she simply concluded

that Berry could endure his pain until his transfer back

to the DOC several weeks later, when Berry would be

the DOC dentist’s problem, not hers. It is hard to

imagine that a doctor seeing a civilian patient, or a

doctor in a prison having on-site dental staff, would

respond in this way to persistent complaints of severe

dental pain over a period of weeks, even in the absence

of a “dental emergency.” A basic dental examination

is not “an expensive or unconventional treatment,” nor

is it esoteric or experimental. See Ralston, 167 F.3d at 1162.

Such examinations are inexpensive and commonly

sought immediately to address severe dental pain. Thus,

Dr. Butler’s refusal to permit Berry such a basic treat-

ment option could be characterized as a “gratuitous

cruelty” forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. See id.

12 No. 09-3557

Where Berry made a modest request for treatment by a

dentist, Dr. Butler’s “obdurate refusal to alter [Berry’s]

course of treatment despite his repeated reports that the

medication was not working and his condition was

getting worse”, see Greeno, 414 F.3d at 654, is sufficient

to defeat her motion for summary judgment.2

We are troubled by the evidence that Dr. Butler would

not refer Berry to a dentist unless and until he presented

either a “dental emergency” or infection. For a physician

to wait to treat a patient until an infection occurs

seems counterintuitive. Medical science has long tried to

prevent infections from occurring in the first place. The

record does not explain just what is included in the

term “dental emergency,” but such emergencies are

certainly not the only serious dental conditions that

demand reasonably prompt professional attention.

Berry could have required emergency treatment if an

infection had spread from his afflicted tooth into his

bloodstream, but a doctor could not conscionably wait

until that late point to finally provide effective treatment,

2

The defendants make much of Berry’s purchase of candy and

junk food during his stay at the Waushara County Jail. This

evidence might support an argument that Dr. Butler believed

Berry was exaggerating his pain, but again, that argument

presents at most a factual issue that must be addressed to a

jury. See Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1040 (7th Cir. 2002)

(holding that doctor’s and nurse’s belief that prisoner was

malingering presented jury issue, not grounds for summary

judgment, where they refused to dispense prescribed pain

medication).

No. 09-3557 13

particularly when confronted with persistent complaints

of severe dental pain that was not responding to med-

ication.

Dr. Butler’s refusal to refer Berry to a dentist resulted

in a substantial and unnecessary delay in the treatment

of his decaying tooth. The medical records and Berry’s

steady complaints of escalating pain indicate that the

delay unreasonably prolonged Berry’s suffering, making

summary judgment inappropriate. See, e.g., Grieveson,

538 F.3d at 779-80 (evidence of one-and-a-half day delay

before treating painful broken nose was sufficient to

survive summary judgment); Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d

710, 716 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of judgment as

a matter of law; jury could conclude that the delay

in treatment “unnecessarily prolonged and exacerbated”

prisoner’s pain). Of course, we do not suggest that a

minor delay in treatment constitutes deliberate indif-

ference. See, e.g., Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 466 (7th

Cir. 2009) (noting that two-and-a-half hour delay in

treatment of plaintiff’s shoulder injury “was minimal and

had no adverse consequences”). Anyone who has ever

visited a doctor’s office knows that some delays in treat-

ment are inevitable, particularly absent a life-threatening

emergency. Such delays are even more likely in the

prison environment. See, e.g., id. at 467 (noting that

delay was result of guards’ inability to leave prison work

gang unattended). The delay in this case, however, was

neither minimal nor justified by Berry’s status as a pris-

oner. Berry was forced to endure nearly two months of

serious pain despite the availability of an obvious treat-

ment—a simple dentist visit—that Berry had specifically

14 No. 09-3557

requested numerous times. The only apparent reason

for that delay was that he had the misfortune of being

transferred to a jail without an on-site dentist.

III. The Jail Nurse

We also conclude that Nurse Reich was not entitled to

summary judgment. The district court concluded that

Reich was entitled to defer to Dr. Butler regarding

Berry’s treatment. Here, however, the record shows that

Dr. Butler last saw Berry on April 24th, six weeks before

he was transferred to the DOC facility where he finally

received the needed root canal. During much of that

time, Nurse Reich was aware of Berry’s ongoing pain

and the ineffectiveness of the recommended pain med-

ications, yet he apparently never consulted Dr. Butler

again regarding whether a dentist’s examination was

necessary. Rather, Nurse Reich continued to respond

personally to Berry’s complaints (including one com-

plaint directed to defendant Peterman), telling Berry that

he could not see a dentist until his next DOC placement

and asking if Berry needed to see Dr. Butler about an

infection. Given the substantial passage of time after

Dr. Butler last examined Berry and Nurse Reich’s contin-

ued responses to Berry’s complaints during that time,

a jury could conclude that Reich acted independently

rather than on Dr. Butler’s instructions and was there-

fore personally responsible for delaying Berry’s dental

treatment, at least after he last saw Dr. Butler on

April 24th. A jury could conclude that the imposition of

this delay constituted deliberate indifference to Berry’s

serious pain.

No. 09-3557 15

To the extent that Nurse Reich did in fact consult with

Dr. Butler over the course of Berry’s last weeks at the

Waushara County Jail, though, a jury could question

whether he could justifiably defer to Dr. Butler’s opinions

regarding Berry’s dental complaints. Although a med-

ical care system requires nurses to defer to treating physi-

cians’ instructions and orders in most situations, that

deference may not be blind or unthinking, particularly if

it is apparent that the physician’s order will likely harm

the patient. See Frank J. & Nancy M. Cavico, The

Nursing Profession in the 1990’s: Negligence and Malpractice

Liability, 43 Clev. St. L. Rev. 557, 613-16 (1995) (discussing

cases). As an ethical matter, a nurse confronted with an

“inappropriate or questionable practice” should not

simply defer to that practice, but rather has a professional

obligation to the patient to “take appropriate action,”

whether by discussing the nurse’s concerns with the

treating physician or by contacting a responsible adminis-

trator or higher authority. American Nurses Ass’n, Code

of Ethics for Nurses With Interpretive Statements, Provi-

sion 3.5 (2001), available at http://nursingworld.org/ethics/

code/protected_ nwcoe813.htm (last visited April 9, 2010).

We do not suggest that these professional standards are

part of the Eighth Amendment, but they are relevant in

evaluating whether Nurse Reich can rely on the general

supervision by Dr. Butler to excuse his responses to

Berry’s continuing complaints of pain in a way that

otherwise could reasonably be deemed to show deliberate

indifference to his pain.

Also, a jury could find that Nurse Reich’s deference

was less justifiable than usual because this was a case

16 No. 09-3557

of dental pain rather than a medical problem clearly

within Dr. Butler’s professional expertise. Nothing in

the record indicates that Dr. Butler had any dental

training or experience to which Nurse Reich could or

should defer. As a matter of simple common sense, few

people would turn to a general practitioner physician

for the treatment of a cavity or gum disease.

We are not persuaded, at least as a matter of law, by

Nurse Reich’s argument that he cannot be held liable

because he lacked the authority to refer Berry to a

dentist without further approval. Nurse Reich always

had the ability to contact Peterman or other supervisory

personnel to voice any concerns about Dr. Butler’s treat-

ment of Berry’s condition. See American Nurses Ass’n,

Code of Ethics for Nurses With Interpretive State-

ments, Provision 3.5.

In sum, Berry has offered sufficient evidence to defeat

Nurse Reich’s motion for summary judgment. The

extent to which Nurse Reich relied on Dr. Butler’s

medical judgment and the reasonableness of any such

reliance require further exploration at trial, particularly

given the regime of individual liability under section

1983, under which the defendants might try to blame

each other for Berry’s suffering.

Accordingly, we A FFIRM the judgment of the district

court as to defendant Peterman, R EVERSE as to defendants

Reich and Butler, and R EMAND this matter for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. Thus far, Berry

has pursued this case without a lawyer, and he has pre-

sented the evidence and his legal arguments well. If this

No. 09-3557 17

matter proceeds to a trial on the merits, however, the

district court will want to consider the possibility, pursu-

ant to the standards set forth in Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d

647 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc), of requesting counsel to

represent him at trial if Berry is receptive to the idea.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).

M ANION, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part. I agree with the court (and the district court)

that Berry has raised a genuine issue of material

fact regarding the exhaustion of his administrative reme-

dies, that he suffered a serious medical condition, and

that the jail administrator is entitled to summary judg-

ment because he was not deliberately indifferent to

Berry’s situation. However, I disagree with the court

that Berry has offered sufficient evidence that would

allow a jury to infer that Dr. Butler and Nurse Reich

acted with deliberate indifference when responding to

Berry’s complaints about the painful condition of his

tooth. Therefore I would affirm the district court’s con-

clusion that given the evidence most favorable to Berry,

a reasonable jury could not find that Dr. Butler or Nurse

Reich were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.

At most, this unfortunate case amounts to negligence

on the part of Dr. Butler and Nurse Reich. I don’t believe

18 No. 09-3557

a reasonable jury could even find gross negligence,

much less deliberate indifference which would amount

to intentional cruel and unusual punishment. As the

district court noted, “Berry cannot overcome the record

showing that he was offered repeated medical examina-

tions to screen an emergency dental situation. Defendant

Butler states that she did not see any sign of infection or

other emergency dental condition when she examined

Berry twice in April of 2008.” In addition, the district

court noted that “Nurse Reich was entitled to rely on

Dr. Butler’s conclusion that Berry did not require emer-

gency dental care. In addition, Reich responded promptly

to Berry’s many complaints by offering advice on mini-

mizing pain, arranged for Berry to try a different pain

reliever approved by the doctor, and offered to schedule

a third medical examination if Berry would request

one.” This court observes that “the doctor and nurse

acted with deliberate indifference toward his condition

by persisting in an easy but ineffective course of treat-

ment that subjected him to two months of serious but

avoidable pain.” To describe the treatment as “easy but

ineffective” describes nothing more than negligence.

Dr. Butler supposedly examined Berry to determine if

he had an infection. An easy but likely effective alterna-

tive would have been to prescribe a strong enough antibi-

otic (instead of a pain pill) to attack what should have

been an obvious infection, but if not obvious at least a

precautionary alternative. If the tooth was infected (the

dentist later described it as necrotic), the infection that

was likely causing the significant pain would have been

eliminated quickly with an effective antibiotic. That

No. 09-3557 19

process would have been just as “easy,” and would have

temporarily resolved the problem until the dentist could

get at it upon Berry’s return to prison.

Therefore I would conclude that the evidence most

favorable to Berry amounted to negligence on the part of

both the doctor and the nurse. Berry turned down the

offer of a third visit by the doctor, and Nurse Reich was

in continual contact with him with various attempts,

albeit ineffective, to treat his pain. On numerous

occasions this court has held that when prison medical

personnel continue to pay attention to and to treat a

prisoner’s medical complaints, even if the treatment

is not up to par, the medical efforts on the prisoner’s

behalf are enough to overcome any presumption of de-

liberate indifference. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532

F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2008). While that could likely be found

as negligent treatment, it does not amount to a delib-

erately indifferent attitude that translates into cruel and

unusual punishment. Therefore I would affirm the dis-

trict court.

5-5-10

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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