The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 97-50282
Summary Calendar
_____________________
ARTHUR B. CHAUSMER, M.D., Ph.D.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY HEALTH
SCIENCE CENTER, ET AL.,
Defendants,
PAT CAMPBELL, Individually and in His
Official Capacity,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas
USDC No. MO-96-CV-132
_________________________________________________________________
December 4, 1997
Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Pat Campbell, in his individual capacity, appeals the denial
of his summary judgment motion.
To the extent that the denial of summary judgment, based on a
defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity, turns on an issue of
law, we have jurisdiction despite the absence of a final judgment.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Southard v. Texas Bd. of Crim. Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 548 (5th Cir.
1997). Campbell argues that Chausmer does not have a
constitutionally cognizable property or liberty interest in the
settlement agreement; Chausmer’s due process contentions merely
present a breach of contract claim; even if Chausmer had a
constitutionally viable interest, the constitutional right
allegedly violated was not clearly established; and Campbell’s
actions were objectively reasonable. We have carefully reviewed
the arguments and the appellate record. We conclude that Chausmer
failed to allege the violation of a cognizable interest under the
Due Process Clause, let alone alleging the violation of clearly
established constitutional law. See Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d
1365, 1368-71 (5th Cir. 1996). Thus, the district court erred in
denying Campbell judgment on the federal law claims in the light of
Campbell being qualifiedly immune.
Campbell also argues that the district court erred in denying
summary judgment on the state law claim of fraud in the light of
his defense of official immunity. Although asserted in his answer,
Campbell did not raise the defense of official immunity in his
motion for summary judgment, and the district court’s order denying
summary judgment did not refer to it. Therefore, we lack
jurisdiction to consider Campbell’s argument. See Cantu v. Rocha,
77 F.3d 795, 804 (5th Cir. 1996).
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For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s
order to the extent that summary judgment was denied to Campbell,
in his individual capacity, on the federal law claims. We REMAND
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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