State v. Atwood

171 Ariz. 576 (1992)

832 P.2d 593

STATE of Arizona, Appellee,

v.

Frank Jarvis ATWOOD, Appellant.

No. CR-87-0135-AP.

Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.

April 9, 1992.

As Modified on Denial of Motions for Reconsideration and Rehearing July 10, 1992.

*588 Grant Woods, Atty. Gen. by Bruce M. Ferg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tucson, for appellee.

Carla G. Ryan, Tucson, for appellant.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISPOSITION ........................................................... 591

ISSUES PRESENTED ON DIRECT APPEAL ..................................... 591

ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL ...................................... 592

THE LENGTH OF THIS OPINION ............................................ 592

FACTS ................................................................. 592

I. The Disappearance .................................................. 592

II. The Preliminary Investigation ..................................... 592

III. The Suspect ...................................................... 593

IV. The Arrest ........................................................ 593

*589 V. The Charges Against Defendant ...................................... 594

VI. The Case Against Defendant ........................................ 594

A. The Sightings ...................................................... 595

B. The Scientific Evidence ............................................ 595

C. The Defendant's Actions and Statements ............................. 595

D. The Evidence of Motive ............................................. 596

DISCUSSION OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON DIRECT APPEAL

1. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support the Convictions ................. 596

A. The Kidnapping ..................................................... 597

B. The Murder ......................................................... 598

2. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel .......................... 599

3. Eyewitness Identifications ......................................... 602

A. Media Exposure ..................................................... 602

B. Other Pretrial Viewings ............................................ 603

4. Denial of Exhumation ............................................... 604

5. Alleged Prosecutorial and Police Misconduct ........................ 605

A. Alleged Investigative Misconduct

1. Burial of Victim's Remains ......................................... 605

2. Police Investigation ............................................... 605

3. The "Cuckoo File" .................................................. 606

B. Alleged Misconduct Before the Grant Jury ........................... 607

C. Alleged Prosecutorial Contact with the Media ....................... 607

D. Alleged Trial Misconduct ........................................... 608

1. Witness's Reference to Polygraph ................................... 608

2. Emotional Witness .................................................. 609

3. Testimony of Victim's Mother ....................................... 609

4. Testimony Concerning Underpants Found Near Victim's Remains ........ 609

5. Comments Made by Prosecutor ........................................ 610

6. Consolidation and Severance ........................................ 611

7. Defendant's Arrest, Detention and Interrogation, and the Searches of

Defendant's Car

A. The Arrest ......................................................... 613

B. The Detention and Interrogation .................................... 615

C. The Searches ....................................................... 616

1. The First Search ................................................... 616

2. The Second Search .................................................. 618

D. Defendant's Statements to the FBI .................................. 618

8. Defendant's Motion for Continuance ................................. 620

9. Jury Selection ..................................................... 621

10. "Death Qualification" of Jury ..................................... 624

11. Jury Instructions ................................................. 624

A. Kidnapping Instruction ............................................. 624

B. Felony Murder Instruction .......................................... 625

C. Unanimous Verdict Instruction ...................................... 625

D. Denial of Willits Instructions ..................................... 626

E. Denial of Unlawful Imprisonment Instruction ........................ 628

F. Denial of Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses of First Degree

Murder ................................................................ 629

12, 13 and 14. Publicity and the Jury ................................. 630

15. Publicity and Fair Trial .......................................... 630

16. Courtroom Decorum ................................................. 633

17. Evidentiary Rulings ............................................... 634

A. Defendant's Statements

1. Defendant's Story .................................................. 635

2. Defendant's Statement on the Telephone ............................. 636

B. Defendant's Letter and Statements to Ernest Bernsienne ............. 637

C. Testimony of Paul Larmour .......................................... 639

D. Testimony of Sam Hall .............................................. 640

E. Limitation on Cross-Examination of James Corby ..................... 640

F. Admission of Defendant's Knives .................................... 641

G. Admission of Underpants ............................................ 642

*590 H. Videotapes of Defendant in Custody ................................. 643

18. The Death Sentence ................................................ 645

A. Constitutionality of Arizona's Death Penalty Statute ............... 646

B. Defendant's 1975 Conviction for Lewd and Lascivious Conduct as an

Aggravating Circumstance .............................................. 646

C. The Trial Court's Finding of No Mitigating Circumstances under

A.R.S. § 13-703(G) ................................................ 648

1. The Trial Court's Felony Murder Instruction ........................ 648

a. The Felony Murder Instruction ...................................... 648

b. The Trial Judge's Failure to Make Specific Enmund/McDaniel

Findings .............................................................. 649

2. Defendant's Heavy Drug Use ......................................... 650

3. Defendant's Demeanor During Trial .................................. 651

4. Defendant's Parents' Support ....................................... 652

5. The Cause of the Victim's Death Was Not Established ................ 652

6. Defendant's Age .................................................... 652

7. Lingering Doubt of Guilt ........................................... 653

8. Defendant's Cooperation at the Time of His Arrest .................. 653

9. Defendant's Sympathy for the Victim's Family ....................... 653

10. Defendant's I.Q. .................................................. 653

11. Defendant's Concern or His Parents ................................ 654

12. Defendant's Lack of a Violent Prior Record ........................ 654

13. Defendant's Not Causing His Prior Felonies ........................ 655

14. Defendant's Adjustment to Incarceration and His Adoption of

New Goals ............................................................. 655

D. Victim Impact Evidence ............................................. 655

E. Conclusion ......................................................... 657

19. The Kidnapping Sentence ........................................... 657

20. Computerization of the Record ..................................... 657

21. Limitation on Length of Defendant's Opening Brief ................. 658

DISCUSSION OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL ........................ 659

22. The Informant's Testimony ......................................... 659

23. The Especially Henious, Cruel, or Depraved Aggravating

Circumstance .......................................................... 660

24. The Rule in Gillies ............................................... 660

CONCLUSION ............................................................ 660

SPECIAL CONCURRENCE by Chief Justice Feldman .......................... 660

SPECIAL CONCURRENCE by Justice Corcoran ............................... 660

I. The Enmund/McDaniel Finding ........................................ 660

II. The Kidnapping Sentence ........................................... 661

III. The Informant's Testimony ........................................ 663

A. The Facts Surrounding Defendant's Incarceration, the Dates on Which

the State Charged Defendant with Kidnapping and Murder, and the

Trial Court's Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Informant's

Testimony

1. The Facts and the Dates ............................................ 663

2. The Trial Court's Ruling ........................................... 665

B. The Scope of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and the Remedy

for its Violation

1. The Right to Counsel ............................................... 666

2. The Exclusionary Rule .............................................. 667

C. Did the Trial Court Err in Excluding The Informant's Testimony During

1. The Informant as a State Agent ..................................... 667

2. Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel ....................... 668

3. The Exclusionary Rule .............................................. 668

D. Did the Trial Court Err in Excluding the Informant's Testimony During

the Sentencing Proceedings Against Defendant as to the Murder

Charge? ............................................................... 669

IV. Double Jeopardy Issues in the Event of Resentencing ............... 672

V. CONCLUSION ......................................................... 672

*591 OPINION

CORCORAN, Justice.

Appellant Frank Jarvis Atwood (defendant) was convicted by a jury of kidnapping and first degree felony murder. The court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years for the kidnapping conviction and death for the murder conviction. He now appeals his convictions and sentences. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3), and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, -4033, and -4035.

DISPOSITION

Based on our analysis below, we affirm defendant's kidnapping conviction and sentence. We also affirm defendant's first degree murder conviction and death sentence.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON DIRECT APPEAL

Defendant has raised 21 issues on appeal. Several of these issues are comprised of subordinate issues that are not listed below, but are discussed in relevant portions of this opinion. The principal issues on appeal are:

Evidence Supporting Conviction

1. Were the murder and kidnapping convictions supported by sufficient evidence?

Pretrial Issues

2. Was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel during the pretrial stage of his prosecution by actions or omissions of his first attorney?

3. Were pretrial identifications of defendant so tainted and unreliable that their admission at trial violated due process?

4. Was defendant denied a fair trial by the court's refusal to order exhumation of the victim's bones?

5. Did the police and prosecutor engage in misconduct that denied defendant a fair trial?

6. Did the trial court err by consolidating the kidnapping and murder charges and by denying defendant's motion for severance?

7. Were defendant's constitutional rights violated by his arrest, detention, interrogation, or the search of his car?

8. Did the trial court deny defendant's right to a fair trial by refusing to continue the trial date?

Jury Process

9. Was defendant improperly denied a jury selected from a representative cross-section of the community?

10. Was the jury improperly "death qualified" during voir dire?

11. Was the jury properly instructed?

12, 13 and 14. Was the jury biased by the publicity surrounding defendant's case? Should the trial court have sequestered the jury during voir dire and trial? Did the trial court improperly deny defendant's motion to change venue?

Publicity and Community Interference

15. Was defendant denied a fair trial because of the publicity surrounding the case?

16. Was defendant's trial disrupted by spectators, and, if so, was defendant prejudiced by these disruptions?

Evidentiary Rulings

17. Did the trial court improperly rule on any evidentiary issues, and, if so, was defendant prejudiced by these rulings?

Sentencing

18. Was defendant properly sentenced to death?

19. Was defendant properly sentenced for his kidnapping conviction?

Issues Regarding Defendant's Brief

20. Were defendant's right to an appeal and his due process and equal protection *592 rights violated by this court's refusal to order that the record be computerized?

21. Were defendant's due process rights violated by this court's placement of page limitations on defendant's opening brief?

ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL

The state has raised 3 issues on cross-appeal:

22. Did the trial court err in suppressing the testimony of an informant to whom defendant made incriminating statements?

23. Did the trial court err in finding that the state did not establish that defendant killed the victim in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner?

24. Should this court overrule State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 511 , 662 P.2d 1007, 1018 (1983)?

THE LENGTH OF THIS OPINION

This court has not adopted a partial publication rule. See rule 976.1, California Rules of Court; 9 B.E. Witkin, California Procedure §§ 585-89 at 577-80 (3d ed. 1985). Therefore, although many of the issues resolved in this opinion do not meet the criteria for publication under rule 111, Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court, see also rule 28, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, there is no vehicle for including these issues in a separate memorandum decision or order.

FACTS

The facts of this case are lengthy and intricate. The crime was committed in September 1984, and defendant was not put on trial until January 1987. Defendant's trial lasted approximately two months and was preceded by extensive discovery and numerous motions. More than 75 witnesses testified at trial, and the record exceeds 20,000 pages. Defendant did not testify on his own behalf. This summary attempts to merge disparate sources of circumstantial evidence gleaned from the record — eyewitness accounts, scientific testimony, and evidence of defendant's motive — into a cohesive, if not exhaustive, reconstruction of the evidence presented in this case.

I. THE DISAPPEARANCE

On the afternoon of September 17, 1984, the victim, an 8-year-old girl we will call Mary, left her home in Tucson to mail a birthday card at a nearby mailbox. When she did not return, her mother sent another daughter to locate her. That daughter returned within minutes and informed her mother that she had found the pink bicycle that Mary had been riding, but that she was unable to locate Mary. Mary's mother drove to the intersection of Root Lane and Pocito Place — a few blocks from their home and on the route Mary had taken to the mailbox. Mary's bike was laying in the street on Pocito near the intersection. Mary's mother put the bike in her car, drove home, and called the Pima County Sheriff's Department to report her daughter's disappearance.

II. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

An extensive search for Mary ensued, accompanied by significant media coverage of the event in both Tucson and Phoenix. As the investigation progressed, the authorities began to piece together the events surrounding Mary's disappearance and crucial evidence began to emerge. At this early stage of the investigation, the most significant information came from Sam Hall, a physical education teacher at a nearby elementary school, and from two teenagers from Mary's neighborhood.

Homer Davis Elementary, Mary's school, is only a few hundred feet from the spot where Mary's bike was found. Sam Hall had been outside the school on the afternoon of September 17 when he noticed a "dark Z car" in a nearby alley. Hall, who stood approximately 20 feet from the car, described the driver as a man with a medium frame, shoulder-length hair, and a dark beard and mustache. Hall noticed the driver *593 making strange gestures and shaking his head. Because he was somewhat unnerved by the driver's appearance and behavior, he wrote down the car's license plate number, but later convinced himself that he had overreacted. The next day, however, upon learning that Mary had disappeared, Hall informed authorities of what he had witnessed and gave them the license plate number.

The license plate number corresponded to a 1975 Black Datsun 280Z registered in California and belonging to defendant. Defendant, 28 years old at the time, had recently been paroled from prison after a 1981 California conviction for kidnapping an 8-year-old boy. Defendant also had been convicted in 1975 of lewd and lascivious conduct with a 14-year-old girl.

The information obtained from two teenage boys from Mary's neighborhood provided authorities with the linchpin linking defendant to Mary's disappearance. The two boys told Pima County Sheriff's Department officials that, while riding their bikes, they had seen a dark "Datsun Z car" driving very slowly at the intersection of Root and Pocito. The driver of the car had long dark hair, a mustache, and the beginnings of a beard. The boys passed the car and headed north on Pocito, where they saw Mary riding her bike south toward the intersection. Neither boy saw or heard Mary come in contact with the Datsun or its driver.

III. THE SUSPECT

After he was released on parole in May 1984 from a California State Penitentiary (where defendant had been incarcerated pursuant to his 1981 kidnapping conviction), defendant officially resided with his parents in Los Angeles. His life-style, however, was more that of a transient's, and in reality, he lived out of his car while he traveled across the country. Defendant met Jack McDonald — who would become his traveling companion — in California in August 1984 and drove with him first to Tucson and then to Enid, Oklahoma. In Oklahoma, the two men visited Ernest Bernsienne, a man with whom defendant had corresponded while he was in prison for his 1981 kidnapping conviction. The correspondence with Bernsienne and Bernsienne's testimony at trial later would provide crucial evidence concerning defendant's motive for committing the kidnapping and the murder.

Defendant and McDonald returned to California two weeks later. In mid-September, however, they again traveled to Tucson. Apparently, on both trips to Tucson, the two men spent considerable time at De Anza Park, a popular congregating spot for Tucson's transient population. The acquaintances defendant made through his contact with the park would also become important witnesses at his trial.

Defendant spent the first part of September 17 at De Anza Park. He left the park, however, in the mid-afternoon and did not return until approximately one hour before sunset. As defendant's acquaintances at the park would later testify, he returned with blood on his hands.

That evening, defendant and McDonald visited Thomas Parisien and went with him to a local tavern to play pool. They also returned a tire iron to Armour Watts' home. The defendant and McDonald left Tucson later that evening.

IV. THE ARREST

The information received from Sam Hall and the teenagers, coupled with the investigation into defendant's prior felony history, led authorities to believe that probable cause existed to arrest defendant for Mary's kidnapping. Acting pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by a United States magistrate in Tucson, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents arrested defendant in Kerrville, Texas, after learning from defendant's parents that he and McDonald had encountered car trouble in Kerrville en route to New Orleans. The arrest warrant charged defendant with kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201 .

The agents arrested defendant at the auto dealership where his car was being repaired. Defendant was read his Miranda warnings and was transferred to *594 the Kerrville Police Station where the agents again advised him of his rights and he signed Waiver of Rights and Consent to Search forms. The Consent to Search form provides a means through which a suspect can permit agents to search his or her "premises," and the form provides a blank space for agents to supply the location of the premises to be searched. On the form defendant signed, a line had been drawn through the word "premises." The agents added the word "vehicle" and a description of defendant's automobile in its place.

The FBI agents interviewed defendant for approximately two hours on the evening of his arrest. During the interview, defendant recounted his trip with Jack McDonald from California, through Tucson, to Texas. He also apprised the agents of his activities in Tucson on September 17. In brief, defendant told the agents that he and McDonald spent the evening of September 16 on Mount Lemmon outside Tucson and that they returned to the city in the late morning of September 17. The two men arrived at De Anza Park around noon. Some time later, however, defendant and McDonald argued and defendant left the park. He returned around 5:00 p.m. Defendant told the agents that, while he was away from the park, he met with Gary Cisco in the area of Wetmore and Romero Roads — near the victim's neighborhood — to discuss buying marijuana, and that he visited Watts at his home. Later, both men would deny meeting with defendant that afternoon.

The next day, defendant was transported to San Antonio, Texas, for his initial appearance. Prior to departing, he was again given his Miranda warnings. En route to San Antonio, defendant made additional statements to the agents concerning his activities on September 17. Particularly, he told the agents that, rather than returning to the park around 5:00 p.m., he had returned at 3:30 p.m.

After agents conducted an initial search of defendant's car in Kerrville, it was transported to San Antonio. FBI agents in San Antonio obtained a search warrant and proceeded to conduct a more thorough search of the vehicle.

Defendant was held in federal custody until he was extradited to this state pursuant to an Arizona arrest warrant for kidnapping. On October 1, 1984, federal charges against defendant were dismissed.

V. THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT

On September 27, 1984, defendant was charged with kidnapping "with the intent to inflict death, physical injury or a sexual offense on the victim, or to otherwise aid in the commission of a felony." See A.R.S. § 13-1304(A)(3) and (B).

At the time defendant was charged with Mary's kidnapping, authorities were uncertain of the child's fate. On April 11, 1985, however — almost 7 months after Mary disappeared — a child's skeletal remains were found in the desert of northwest Tucson. Although medical examiners were unable to determine the cause of death, they were able positively to identify the child as Mary through the use of dental records. On May 15, 1985, the Pima County Grand Jury indicted defendant for first degree felony murder pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1105. The kidnapping and murder charges were consolidated for trial.

VI. THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT

The state's theory of the crime can be briefly stated. Defendant, a convicted pedophile, was cruising Mary's neighborhood in search of a child. He saw Mary riding her bike near the mailbox and followed her on the street as she cut through a field on her way home. The field led to a short street — Pocito — that intersected with Root Lane. Defendant proceeded to Root Lane (where he was seen by the teenagers), intending to abduct Mary as she traveled down Pocito. Mary stopped briefly to talk with a friend who lived on Pocito, and then continued down the street. Defendant's car struck Mary's bike, leaving a pink paint smear on the car bumper, and he grabbed the child. He then proceeded toward northwest Tucson. En route, his car was sighted by three people, all of whom later *595 identified defendant and testified that they saw a young child in the passenger's seat. Defendant took the child to the desert, where he molested and murdered her. He then returned to De Anza Park in central Tucson, where he had been earlier in the day.

The state's substantiating evidence, however, was not as succinct. Because no witness saw defendant take Mary, and because experts were unable to determine the cause of her death, the state attempted to prove defendant's guilt through extensive circumstantial evidence. Specifically, the prosecution's case consisted of four discrete areas of evidence: (1) sightings of defendant, alone and with a young child, on the afternoon of September 17; (2) scientific evidence linking defendant's automobile with the victim's bicycle; (3) testimony concerning defendant's actions and statements after the victim's disappearance; and (4) defendant's prior statements concerning his sexual attraction to children.

A. The Sightings

At trial, the state presented 9 witnesses who testified that they saw defendant and/or his automobile on the afternoon of September 17. Some of these witnesses claimed to have seen defendant driving slowly through the victim's neighborhood, one witness testified that he saw defendant leaving the neighborhood with a young child in his car, and others placed defendant north of the neighborhood in an area where the child's remains were later found.

The specific events that occurred between the time that Mary was last seen and the time that defendant returned to De Anza Park cannot be known with certainty. What is known with relative certainty, however, is that Mary left her home at approximately 3:30 in the afternoon and that defendant returned to the park at least one hour before sunset. Therefore, two crucial aspects common to all of these sightings were the times at which they occurred and the sequence in which they transpired. To support the state's interpretation, the sightings must have occurred within the finite time period during which defendant could have abducted the child, driven to northwest Tucson, and returned to the park. The credibility of each of these witnesses, therefore, was dependent to a considerable degree on when the sightings occurred both in time and in relation to the other sightings. Indeed, the defense made considerable efforts to stress apparent inconsistencies in the sequence and times of the sightings.

B. The Scientific Evidence

An additional element of the state's case consisted of scientific evidence concerning the pink paint smear found on the front bumper of defendant's car. The state presented two expert witnesses who both concluded that defendant's vehicle had come in contact with Mary's bicycle.

Paul Larmour, an accident reconstructionist, testified that he found a "nearly perfect match heightwise between the contact area on the backside of the bicycle and the [paint] transfer on the bumper." He also testified that the paint on the bumper appeared to match the paint on the bike exactly. Larmour further testified that marks on the car's gravel pan were consistent with the theory that it struck the bicycle at a low speed and caused the bike to lodge beneath the car.

James Corby, an FBI examiner, performed microscopic, microchemical, and instrumental analyses on the paint removed from the bumper. He concluded from his tests that the paint on the bumper either came from the victim's bike or from another source exactly like the bike. Corby also examined the bicycle and found nickel particles on it. This finding was significant because the pink paint on the bumper was located in an area where the chrome had flaked off and nickel was exposed. The combined results of his tests led Corby to conclude that the likelihood was "remote" that the cross-transfer of materials could have occurred other than by forcible contact between the bike and the bumper.

C. The Defendant's Actions and Statements

Defendant's actions and statements after the victim's disappearance comprised another *596 significant element of the state's case against him. McDonald, Gary Cisco, and Thomas Parisien all testified that defendant claimed to have stabbed a man in a drug transaction on the afternoon of September 17. McDonald and Parisien also testified that they had seen blood on defendant's hands, clothes, and knife, and that defendant had discussed with them whether he should dispose of his clothes. Defendant also told them that, after killing the man, he took the body to the desert near the mountains. He told McDonald and Parisien that, while in the desert, he was stuck by cactus. Both men observed cactus needles in defendant's arms and legs. McDonald also observed defendant sandpapering the blade of his knife. In addition, while defendant and McDonald were en route to Kerrville, McDonald overheard defendant say to his mother on the phone: "Even if I did do it, you have to help me." Regarding this statement, McDonald testified that defendant later told him that "they were trying to stick something on him about a little girl." Apparently, defendant's conversation with his mother occurred after FBI agents had contacted his parents about defendant's implication in Mary's disappearance.

Defendant later repudiated the story of the stabbing, claiming that he had fabricated it in an attempt to make himself look tough to his companions. The state argued at trial that defendant's story bore too many similarities to the events surrounding Mary's disappearance and the discovery of her remains in the desert of northwest Tucson to be entirely fictitious.

D. The Evidence of Motive

The final element in the state's case against defendant consisted of evidence of his sexual attraction to children and his fear of returning to prison. Portions of defendant's correspondence with Ernest Bernsienne revealed his predilections toward children. Particularly damaging were the following comments redacted from a letter written to Bernsienne two years before Mary was kidnapped:

Ya see, it's time for "true confessions." What I mean is, there is a fact about me that I am ashamed of. I believe it is considered so wrong that I have kept this part of me hidden from you.

Rather than saying that I am attracted to people between the ages of seven and twelve, I felt a more complete explanation is necessary.

Another fear is that I am still attracted to kids but I can't handle another arrest!

The state also introduced, through Bernsienne, the following oral statements defendant made concerning children:

BERNSIENNE: He told me that he was upset because he had had a serious argument with his parents about his personal appearance, and I advised him at the time rather than stick around home and be angry, to go out for a ride and cool off, let his parents cool off, then go back and talk about it.

He told me that he had, and that he had also, in the course of doing so, he had considered going out and picking up a child.

....

I told him that if he did that the child would certainly go and tell someone, and he said this time he would make sure the child wouldn't talk.

DISCUSSION OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON DIRECT APPEAL

1. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support the Convictions

Defendant argues that neither the kidnapping nor the murder charge is supported by sufficient evidence to justify the guilty verdicts. In reviewing this claim, we do not sit as a 5-justice jury, reevaluating the evidence to determine whether we would have convicted defendant on the evidence presented at trial. Such an approach would nullify the jury's function in this case. Rather, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and we must resolve all reasonable inferences against defendant. State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 , 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989).

*597 If "substantial evidence" exists to support the verdict, we will not disturb the jury's decision. By "substantial evidence" we mean evidence that would convince an unprejudiced thinking mind of the truth of the fact to which the evidence is presented. See State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 553 , 633 P.2d 355, 362 (1981). As we stated in Tison , "If reasonable [persons] may fairly differ as to whether certain evidence establishes a fact in issue, then such evidence must be considered as substantial." Tison, 129 Ariz. at 553 , 633 P.2d at 362 . We therefore review the record to determine whether, from the evidence presented, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes of kidnapping and felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432 , 687 P.2d 1180, 1187 (1984). Applying this standard, we hold that substantial evidence exists to support both the kidnapping and murder convictions.

A. The Kidnapping

In his brief, defendant contrasts evidence presented by the prosecution with conflicting evidence presented by the defense. For example, defendant stresses that the victim's mother testified that the victim would not have gone with a stranger voluntarily, yet no one near the scene heard a child scream or heard sounds suggesting that an accident had occurred between the victim's bike and defendant's automobile. Defendant also emphasizes that some witnesses claimed to have seen the victim at a local mall several hours after she disappeared. In addition, defendant notes that no evidence was found in his car to suggest that the victim had ever been inside it.

This court has held that "[r]eversible error based on insufficiency of the evidence occurs only where there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conviction." State v. Scott, 113 Ariz. 423, 424-25 , 555 P.2d 1117, 1118-19 (1976). Viewed in this light, our review of the record convinces us that the state presented ample evidence to permit the jury rationally to conclude that defendant kidnapped the victim. The following evidence is particularly damning:

— Defendant was in the neighborhood on the afternoon the victim disappeared, a fact made virtually unquestionable by Sam Hall's sighting of a 280Z with license plates registered to defendant and his identification of defendant as the driver.

— Testimony from one of the teenage boys placed defendant at the intersection where the victim's bike was found.

— Prosecution experts testified, albeit not without disagreement from defendant's own experts, that paint and nickel transfers between the vehicle and the bike indicated that the two had come in contact, and that damage to defendant's car was consistent with striking a bicycle.

— Three witnesses identified defendant and testified that they had seen a young child riding with him in his car.

— Defendant's letters revealed his sexual attraction to young children.

Defendant contends that, under the doctrine of corpus delicti, the state should have been precluded from introducing his letters to Bernsienne until it had established a reasonable inference of the corpus delicti of kidnapping through independent evidence. We disagree.

Two elements comprise the corpus delicti of a crime: (1) the basic injury, which in this instance is the disappearance of a young girl, and (2) the fact that the basic injury was the result of a criminal, rather than a natural or accidental, cause. State v. Thomas, 78 Ariz. 52, 59 , 275 P.2d 408, 413 (1954). In Arizona, the prosecution must establish a reasonable inference of the corpus delicti before it may introduce defendant's extrajudicial confession or admission as additional evidence of the crime. See State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 506 , 662 P.2d 1007, 1013 (1983); State v. Janise, 116 Ariz. 557, 559 , 570 P.2d 499, 501 (1977).

*598 We note initially that even if defendant's letters to Bernsienne were admissions requiring corroboration under the corpus delicti doctrine, see Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 179 (1960), the evidence presented to the jury, independent of the statements in the letters, established — at the very least — a "reasonable inference" of the corpus delicti. When viewed as a whole, the circumstances of the child's disappearance, the expert testimony concerning the paint and nickel transfers, and the eyewitness testimony placing defendant in the neighborhood and in a 280Z with a young child would easily satisfy the requirement of proof independent of an extrajudicial confession or admission to create an inference that the victim's disappearance was the result of kidnapping.

We do not believe, however, that the state was required to satisfy the corroboration rule in this case. Defendant's letters to Bernsienne were written before the victim was kidnapped, and the law is well-established that pre-offense statements do not require corroboration because they contain none of the inherent weaknesses of admissions made after the fact. See Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 347 , 61 S.Ct. 603, 606 , 85 L.Ed. 876 (1941); United States v. Soulard, 730 F.2d 1292, 1298 (9th Cir.1984); Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 742 (9th Cir.1962). Because defendant's written statements to Bernsienne were written before Mary was kidnapped, and because they tended to establish the corpus delicti of kidnapping and were relevant as tending to show motive, defendant's letters to Bernsienne were properly admitted at the time they were admitted.

Of course, establishing the corpus delicti of the crime does not satisfy the requirement of proving defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on our review of the record, however, we find that the evidence presented also was sufficient to justify the jury's guilty verdict on the kidnapping charge. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, certainly a juror presented with this evidence would not be unreasonable in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant kidnapped the victim.

B. The Murder

Defendant further argues that, even if sufficient evidence exists to support the kidnapping conviction, the state cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he murdered the victim. The jury convicted defendant of felony murder pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1105, which, in this case, requires proof that defendant kidnapped the victim and that, in the course of and in furtherance of the kidnapping, he caused the victim's death. Defendant contends, however, that the state failed to establish the corpus delicti of murder and that his murder conviction is therefore invalid.

Under the corpus delicti doctrine, the state must prove that (1) the victim died and (2) the death was caused by criminal agency rather than suicide or accident. See Perkins, The Corpus Delicti of Murder, 48 Va.L.Rev. 173, 181-82 (1962). The state has satisfied the first corpus delicti requirement — Mary's remains were discovered in April 1985. Dr. Walter Birkby, a forensic anthropologist who positively identified the remains, confirmed this tragic fact.

Because only a skull, mandible, and various other scattered bone fragments were recovered, Dr. Birkby and Dr. Richard Froede, the Pima County Medical Examiner, were unable to determine the cause of death. Defendant therefore argues that, even if he did kidnap Mary, no proof exists that he murdered her. He asserts that the state failed to establish that she did not die by accident or fall victim to foul play from an unknown superseding party.

Defendant cites passages from several cases stating, in essence, that the presence of a dead body does not necessarily equate with murder. We fully agree. History is replete with macabre cases in which human remains are discovered and no evidence exists to suggest how the victim met his or her demise. This, however, is not such a case. Although authorities were unable to determine exactly how the victim died, proving the cause of death is not a necessary *599 element of corpus delicti. See People v. Bolinski, 260 Cal. App.2d 705, 715 , 67 Cal. Rptr. 347, 353 (1968). The record reveals extensive circumstantial evidence satisfying the corpus delicti requirement. See State v. Lantz, 72 Ariz. 115, 119 , 231 P.2d 454, 456-57 (1951) (corpus delicti may be shown by circumstantial evidence); McCormick on Evidence § 145, at 368 (3d ed. 1984) (same).

A young girl disappears from her neighborhood and later is found dead in the desert. This fact alone suggests the presence of criminal activity, for, given the facts of this case, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine that the child left a residential area, crossed a freeway, traversed a river bed, and went voluntarily to a sparsely populated desert location several miles from her home. Although we cannot know from the facts presented at trial exactly what happened to the victim when she was taken to the desert, we do know that (1) defendant, a convicted pedophile, was seen within yards of the girl literally seconds before she vanished; (2) witnesses identified defendant as the man they saw driving with a young child in his car; (3) defendant was seen later that afternoon with blood on his hands and clothing; and (4) defendant was also seen with cactus needles in his arms and legs.

To demonstrate criminal agency, the state must establish that the victim's death was not caused by suicide or accident. In this case, of course, the latter possibility is the only legitimate alternative to murder. We conclude that the evidence presented, although circumstantial, plainly negated the possibility that the victim died as the result of an accident. We therefore hold that the state's evidence created a reasonable inference of the corpus delicti of murder. Janise, 116 Ariz. at 559 , 570 P.2d at 501 .

With this requirement satisfied, the jury properly could consider defendant's admissions. These statements further substantiated the state's theory in this case and, coupled with the evidence already discussed, satisfied the final element in establishing murder — proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant killed the victim. After defendant's friends at De Anza Park noticed the blood on his hands, he told them that he had stabbed a man in a drug transaction and that he had taken the victim's body to the desert. He repeated this story several times during the next few days as he and McDonald traveled to Texas. Defendant also told McDonald and Parisien that he had gotten cactus needles in his arms and legs when he returned to the location where he left the body to retrieve keys he had dropped. Defendant also discussed the idea of disposing of his blood-stained clothes and, during his trip to Texas, he repeatedly sandpapered the blade of his knife.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's finding, we conclude that the jury was presented with substantial evidence from which it could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant murdered the victim. We therefore find the evidence sufficient to support defendant's first degree felony murder conviction.

2. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because of inadequate pretrial representation by his first trial attorney, Lamar Couser. Couser served as defendant's court-appointed counsel for the first 7 months of his prosecution.

As a general rule, ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be raised in post-conviction relief proceedings pursuant to rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Valdez, 160 Ariz. 9 , 770 P.2d 313 (1989). If the record clearly indicates that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is meritless, however, this court may consider the issue on direct appeal. State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167 , 771 P.2d 1382 (1989). We address the merits of defendant's claim in this direct appeal because, viewing the record in its entirety, we conclude that defendant's claim is meritless.

*600 This court applies a two-pronged test to determine whether a conviction should be reversed on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant must affirmatively show that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, as defined by prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 , 694 P.2d 222, 227 (1985); State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 214 , 689 P.2d 153, 157 (1984). If an ineffectiveness claim can be rejected for lack of prejudice, the court need not inquire into counsel's performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 , 104 S.Ct. at 2069 . We will find prejudice if defendant establishes a reasonable probability that the verdict in this case might have been affected by the alleged error of counsel. See State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 592 , 769 P.2d 1017, 1038 (1989), aff'd, 497 U.S. 639 , 110 S.Ct. 3047 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990).

As a preliminary matter, we note that a strong presumption exists that counsel's performance fell within the broad range of conduct considered reasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. at 2065 ; Nash, 143 Ariz. at 398 , 694 P.2d at 228 . That is, judicial scrutiny of such conduct is highly deferential, granting wide latitude to the tactical choices of counsel. Nash, 143 Ariz. at 398 , 694 P.2d at 228 . Within this framework, a detailed review of defendant's allegations is warranted.

Defendant contends that his counsel filed an insufficient number of pretrial motions. Counsel filed 9 motions during a 7-month period, 4 of which defendant alleges were routine. Not only does defendant fail to overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonable, but he also fails to show any resulting prejudice. Although this court will presume prejudice when defense counsel fails entirely to subject the state's case to meaningful adversarial testing, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 , 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); Nash, 143 Ariz. at 398-99 , 694 P.2d at 228-29 , we do not find that this case represents such an extreme failure on counsel's part. Consequently, defendant must show that the reliability of the guilt determination was undermined by counsel's alleged omissions. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n. 26, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 n. 26. Defendant has not done so and, therefore, we reject this claim for lack of prejudice.

Similarly, defendant challenges his counsel's failure to file a notice of change of judge. See rule 10.2, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. This court recognizes the strong presumption that such a choice is trial strategy. State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 , 771 P.2d 1382, 1390 (1989). Defendant fails to offer any evidence to counter this presumption. Furthermore, even assuming that counsel's choice was unreasonable, no prejudice resulted because the judge to whom defendant's case was originally assigned was removed when defendant's own motion was granted.

Defendant argues that his counsel failed properly to examine or investigate the paint smear because he neither (1) requested that the bicycle be made available for testing nor (2) investigated alternative sources of the paint smear. Both claims can be rejected for lack of prejudice. First, defendant admits that a defense expert later examined the paint smear. Although this examination took place approximately two years after the state's examination, defendant has not shown that the time lapse resulted in prejudice to the defense. Second, defendant offers no proof that investigations into possible alternative sources of the paint smear would have yielded anything valuable to the defense. Thus, the required showing of prejudice has not been met.

Defendant next argues that his counsel made two errors regarding the grand jury proceedings: (1) he did not present any evidence; and (2) he did not object to the Pima County Grand Jury hearing evidence when the venue of the kidnapping case had been moved. In both instances we find that counsel's choices can be regarded as tactical decisions rather *601 than error. Defendant's conclusory allegations that these tactical choices were detrimental are not sufficient to displace the wide latitude this court grants to such choices. Further, even assuming that counsel made an error, defendant does not demonstrate any resulting prejudice to him. An error — even one with the potential to affect a grand jury's charging decision — is rendered harmless by the trial jury's subsequent guilty verdict. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 73 , 106 S.Ct. 938, 943 , 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986) (petit jury's guilty verdict rendered harmless any conceivable error in the grand jury's charging decision caused by alleged violation of rule 6(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); State v. Just, 138 Ariz. 534, 541-42 , 675 P.2d 1353, 1360-61 (App. 1983). Therefore, we reject these claims both for lack of merit and lack of prejudice.

Defendant challenges two aspects of his counsel's conduct regarding examination of the victim's bones: (1) failure to obtain an additional medical expert after the appointed pathologist became a state's witness; and (2) failure to prevent burial of the bones. Given our decision today that defendant was not denied a fair trial when his motion for exhumation of the bones was denied, we conclude that the defense was not prejudiced by the inability further to examine the bones. See infra Part 4.

Defendant argues that his counsel failed properly to investigate the case and interview witnesses. He contends that this deficient performance was immediately prejudicial to his defense because many of the witnesses were transients, drifters, drug addicts, and alcoholics, whose memories faded with the passage of time. Counsel, however, did interview a number of witnesses, so he did not fail entirely to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. Thus, defendant is not entitled to a presumption of prejudice. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 , 104 S.Ct. at 2047 . Defendant has not shown that any witness possessed any information helpful to his defense which, because undiscovered, undermined the reliability of the guilt determination. Therefore, we reject this claim for lack of prejudice.

Defendant contends that his counsel failed to maintain a professional relationship with him because (1) counsel failed to communicate with him directly, but rather communicated through letters; and (2) counsel was burdened by an actual conflict of interest as evidenced by his concern over funds spent on the case. We reject the first claim for lack of prejudice. We have found only one instance in the record where Mr. Couser communicated to defendant by letter. This letter, which concerned Mr. Couser's disapproval of defendant's meeting with a newspaper reporter, reminded defendant that he had been counseled not to discuss his case with the media. We find that defendant was not prejudiced by this incident.

We reject defendant's second claim of unprofessional conduct on the merits. Defendant must show that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, not merely that a possibility of such a conflict existed. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 , 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Defendant's unsupported accusation that his counsel was inordinately concerned about the amount of money expended for his defense is insufficient to demonstrate a conflict of interest.

Finally, defendant argues that the Pima County appointment system results in deficient representation for defendants. He urges that we review this system as we did the Mohave County system in State v. Smith, 140 Ariz. 355 , 681 P.2d 1374 (1984). However, we find no indication of such systemic ineffectiveness here. Moreover, in Smith , in 1984, we referred to the Pima County system as an illustration of a system not burdened by such ineffectiveness. Smith, 140 Ariz. at 363 , 681 P.2d at 1382 . Therefore, we decline to engage in an extensive review of the Pima County appointment system.

Considering all the circumstances of this case, we find that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel by Mr. Couser. Each of defendant's allegations *602 lacks the support necessary to sustain an ineffectiveness claim. Additionally, the brevity of defendant's representation by his appointed attorney, the length and extent of his trial, and the competence of his retained attorney all militate against a determination that his defense was prejudiced.

3. Eyewitness Identifications

Defendant claims that the trial court's refusal to suppress eyewitness identifications that were allegedly biased by "suggestive, improper, tainted and unreliable" pretrial identification procedures denied him due process of law. Defendant focuses primarily on the witnesses' exposure to extensive media coverage of the victim's disappearance and defendant's later arrest and prosecution, and he argues that this exposure so tainted the witnesses that any subsequent identifications were inherently unreliable. We address the question of media exposure separately from other possibly suggestive pretrial viewings of defendant.

A. Media Exposure

To consider fully defendant's claim that exposure to publicity tainted the subsequent witness identifications, we first examine the scope and nature of the media coverage of this case. The victim's abduction became an immediate media sensation in the Tucson area. In the hours following the kidnapping, the media disseminated information to the community concerning the search for the young girl and the nascent investigation into her disappearance. Perhaps fueled by the resulting atmosphere of intense community concern and outrage over the senselessness of the crime, the press continued to devote significant coverage to the case, with defendant's arrest and subsequent prosecution receiving particular attention. As the trial judge would later remark, "To live in Pima County and avoid exposure to this coverage would have required one to be a hermit living in a cave." Press coverage of defendant included:

— photographs of him being arrested and transported in handcuffs;

— close-up photographs of his face;

— videotapes of him being arrested and escorted from a police vehicle by law enforcement officials;

— videotapes of his return to Tucson;

— extensive videotaped coverage of his hearings;

— voice-overs and/or lead-ins accompanying the videotapes identifying Atwood as "the suspect" and "the defendant," with frequent references to his prior convictions and parole status; and

— newspaper articles, accompanied by photographs of defendant, providing information about his background, prior convictions, and parole status, and discussing evidence incriminating him in the victim's kidnapping and murder.

Approximately one year before his trial, defendant moved to suppress the identification testimony of 14 witnesses, claiming that some might have been subject to improperly suggestive identification procedures and that all had been tainted by pretrial publicity. In response to defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court held an 11-day Dessureault hearing, see State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 384 , 453 P.2d 951, 955 (1969), to determine the admissibility of the various identifications. The trial court concluded that all 14 witnesses had been exposed to one or more pretrial viewings of defendant under circumstances that were inherently suggestive. The court stated:

As a result of all this exposure every eye-witness has had one or multiple prehearing and pretrial viewings of the Defendant. Whatever the witnesses' opportunity and ability to make their original observations and then to recall and testify about them, those observations cannot be free of influence from their subsequent viewings of the Defendant in the various suggestive circumstances.

The trial court, relying on Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and its predecessors, then applied a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to determine whether the *603 admission of the various identifications would violate defendant's constitutional right to due process. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 113-14 , 97 S.Ct. at 2252-53 ; see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). Based on its analysis, the court suppressed the identification testimony of two witnesses, but refused to suppress the identification testimony of the remaining 12 witnesses.

We review a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress under a "clear abuse of discretion" standard. See State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 236 , 686 P.2d 750, 759 (1984) ("It is well established in this state that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion."), citing State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250 , 665 P.2d 972 (1983); State v. Ferreira, 128 Ariz. 530 , 627 P.2d 681 (1981). Based on our review of the relevant authority and the record in this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to suppress the identification testimony of any of the 12 witnesses who testified.

Initially, we recognize that each of the cases relied on by the trial court in conducting its analysis concerned unnecessarily suggestive government identification procedures, and note that the record in this case reveals no such procedures. However, we do not believe that unnecessarily suggestive government identification procedures are a sine qua non of due process concerns. Rather, we believe that " reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony ...," Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 , 97 S.Ct. at 2253 (emphasis added), and the trial court properly read Manson and its predecessors as requiring it to make an initial determination as to the reliability of the identification testimony of the 14 witnesses. Similarly, we believe that the trial court properly considered the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the identification testimony of the witnesses was reliable. Manson, 432 U.S. at 113-14 , 97 S.Ct. at 2252-53 . [1] Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's analysis is supported by well-established Supreme Court precedent.

We also believe that the trial court's decision to admit the identification testimony of 12 of the 14 witnesses is supported by the record. After conducting the Dessureault hearing, and after considering the factors bearing on reliability under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court concluded that the identification testimony of 12 of the 14 witnesses was reliable. Indicative of the trial court's conscientiousness in conducting this hearing is its finding that the identification testimony of two witnesses was not reliable. In addition to conducting a conscientious hearing, we believe that the trial court properly concluded that the identification testimony of 12 of the 14 witnesses was reliable. Although the record indicates that each of the 14 witnesses was exposed to inherently suggestive viewings of the defendant, the record does not indicate that the identification testimony of any of the 12 witnesses who testified was thereby rendered so unreliable that its admission would violate due process. We therefore find no error.

B. Other Pretrial Viewings

Our review of the record indicates that the only other potentially suggestive pretrial viewings of defendant were (1) a photo spread shown to a young witness; (2) the same photo spread as witnessed by the youth's mother as she looked over his shoulder; and (3) the showing of black and white photos of defendant to another witness, Michael Eggers, by an investigator hired by defendant's first attorney. The trial court considered each of these viewings in its ruling on defendant's motion to *604 suppress. A trial court's decision concerning the reliability of an identification will not be overturned on appeal absent clear and manifest error. State v. Myers, 117 Ariz. 79, 84 , 570 P.2d 1252, 1257 (1977). We find no such error in the trial court's determination; defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied.

We also note that, even if these witnesses had been irreparably tainted by the pretrial viewings, no prejudice inhered to defendant. The young boy did not testify at trial, and his mother was called as a defense witness. Michael Eggers was called as a prosecution witness and he identified defendant as the man he had seen in a trailer park near the victim's school. However, assuming arguendo that his identification was tainted by the viewing of the photographs, that viewing was initiated by defense counsel's own investigator. Therefore, no basis existed for suppressing Eggers' identification.

4. Denial of Exhumation

Defendant contends that his right to a fair trial was violated by the trial court's refusal to order exhumation of the victim's remains. The skeletal remains were discovered in April 1985 and were buried one month later. Prior to burial, the remains were examined by Drs. Froede and Birkby, at the prosecution's request, and by Drs. Keen (the Yavapai County Medical Examiner) and Chilton (a forensic odontologist), at defense counsel's request. Apparently, all of the examiners reached similar conclusions — that the remains belonged to the victim, but that the cause of death could not be determined.

At the time the victim's parents arranged for funeral services, Lamar Couser was defendant's attorney. Defendant had requested that Stanton Bloom represent him, but Bloom had not yet accepted the case. The prosecution therefore notified both Couser and Bloom of the pending burial. Couser, as attorney of record, chose not to seek a delay of the funeral to allow for further examination of the bones, despite Bloom's request that he do so. Funeral services took place on May 30, 1985.

On November 4, 1985, Bloom, who had since assumed defendant's representation, moved for the exhumation of the remains. The motion stated that,

[b]ecause the autopsies previously done on the bones of [the victim] were totally inconclusive, this Defendant moves that these bones be exhumed in order to administer justice. It is felt that evidence can be secured by disinterment which would create material valuable and highly relevant in establishing the accused's guilt or innocence.

Bloom supplemented this motion with his own affidavit, stating that he had spoken with an expert, whose identity he refused to disclose, who had assured him that he would be able to determine the cause of death. The affidavit also indicated that the unknown expert's examination might entail sending the remains out of the United States.

The motion to exhume was denied by the trial court without comment. The defense initiated special action proceedings seeking appellate review of this ruling, but both the court of appeals and this court declined to accept jurisdiction. See Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, 2 CA-SA 335 (jurisdiction declined Jan. 7, 1986), and Arizona Supreme Court, CV-86-0085-PR (petition for review denied March 25, 1986).

The power to grant the exhumation of human remains lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, see, e.g., Moss v. State, 152 Ala. 30, 34 , 44 So. 598, 599 (1907), and we will not overturn the court's decision on this matter absent an abuse of that discretion. We find no abuse in this case. The trial court was presented only with Mr. Bloom's cryptic promises that "valuable and highly relevant" evidence could be discovered by exhumation. However, he revealed neither the name of the expert nor the basis for the expert's conclusions. "Exhumation of the victim's body is to be allowed only under extraordinary circumstances. Where existence of the evidence sought was so speculative and uncertain, and its value in aiding defendant's defense so conjectural and remote, the trial court properly exercised its discretion *605 in refusing appellant's motion." Commonwealth v. Kivlin, 267 Pa.Super. 270, 281 , 406 A.2d 799, 805 (1979); see also Annotation, Disinterment in Criminal Cases, 63 A.L.R.3d 1294 , 1302 (1975) (exhumation is appropriate when "absolutely essential to the administration of justice"). We find no error in the denial of the motion to exhume the victim's remains.

5. Alleged Prosecutorial and Police Misconduct

Defendant claims that several instances of prosecutorial and police misconduct denied him a fair trial. We categorize these alleged instances of misconduct into 4 areas: (A) investigative misconduct by both the police and prosecution; (B) prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury; (C) improper contact between the prosecution and the media; and (D) trial misconduct. [2] We examine each category separately.

A. Alleged Investigative Misconduct

1. Burial of Victim's Remains

Defendant argues that the prosecutor, John G. Davis, III, had agreed with Stanton Bloom (before Bloom became attorney of record) that the victim's remains would not be buried until mid-June 1985 to enable a defense expert to examine the bones. At the victim's parents' request, however, the remains were buried on May 30, 1985, before Bloom could have them examined. Defendant suggests that, in allowing the victim's parents to proceed with the funeral, the prosecution failed to preserve valuable evidence and thereby denied defendant a fair trial.

Contrary to defendant's argument, we believe that he was not denied a fair trial. Two experts for the defense had already examined the victim's remains before funeral arrangements were made. The prosecutor notified both Couser and Bloom of the pending burial. Couser, who was still attorney of record, chose not to seek a delay of the funeral, despite Bloom's request to do so. Thus, the defense was offered access to the evidence before the remains were buried, and, in fact, two defense experts examined the remains.

Additionally, both Drs. Birkby and Keen were unable to determine the cause or exact date of death, and the record does not reflect that additional examination of the victim's remains would have yielded any evidence useful to the defense. In fact, in his motion to exhume, defendant did not present any evidence — other than Bloom's personal affidavit — indicating that further examination of the bones would have proven fruitful. We therefore conclude that defendant was not denied a fair trial by the burial of the victim's remains.

2. Police Investigation

Defendant also claims that the police and prosecution failed adequately to investigate alternative theories of the case. He asserts that the prosecution did not fully investigate other supposed sightings of defendant or the possibility that some other person had kidnapped the victim. Although we will not address individually each of defendant's grievances with the investigatory process, the essence of the argument is that the "prosecution singled out [defendant] and proceeded to build their case to the exclusion of other leads."

As a preliminary matter, we note that our review of the record does not support *606 defendant's claim that the prosecution "singled" him out. The police did in fact question, investigate, and evaluate the disparate sources of information concerning the case. Concededly, their investigation quickly narrowed its focus on defendant. This concentration, however, was engendered by the evidence pointing to him, not by an apparent desire of the police or prosecution to find a person upon whom to place the blame, regardless of that person's guilt or innocence.

Nevertheless, we will reverse defendant's conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct if two conditions are satisfied: (1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the jury's verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial. See State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520, 526 , 703 P.2d 464, 470 (1985). We decline to find that the police or prosecution acted improperly in failing exhaustively to investigate the hundreds of reports they received from Tucson citizens claiming to possess information concerning the case. This fact, coupled with our determination that the police did not improperly "single out" defendant to the exclusion of equally viable suspects, leads us to conclude that no misconduct occurred in the investigation of the victim's disappearance. We are therefore unpersuaded by defendant's argument.

Of course, integral to defendant's argument is the suggestion that further or more thorough investigation would have revealed defendant's innocence. However, we will not speculate on appeal about "what might have been" or "what could have happened." We again stress that we are not the jury. We have already concluded that ample evidence existed to support the convictions. Thus, even if we were to find that the police and/or prosecution acted improperly in failing to investigate alternative theories in this case, the record does not disclose a reasonable likelihood that their misconduct could have affected the jury's verdict. For this additional reason, we reject defendant's claim.

3. The "Cuckoo File"

Defendant takes issue with the prosecutor's reference to his file of telephone calls and letters from Tucson residents as his "cuckoo file." [3] He also complains about the timeliness with which the file was disclosed to the defense. We find no merit in either claim.

First, the jury did not hear the file referred to as a "cuckoo file;" therefore, defendant can claim no prejudice from the use of this name. Second, although criminal defendants have a due process right to disclosure, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), this right only extends to the disclosure of material evidence. Thus, although untimely disclosure may be as constitutionally reprehensible as complete nondisclosure, reversal is appropriate only when it is reasonably probable that the jury's verdict would have been different had the evidence been disclosed at a time when it would have been of value to the defense. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d 641, 647 (9th Cir.1988). The United States Supreme Court has held that "[t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish `materiality' in the constitutional sense." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , *607 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) ("The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."). Under this standard, the file did not constitute "material" evidence. We therefore find no error. [4]

B. Alleged Misconduct Before the Grand Jury

Defendant next complains that the prosecution presented misleading information to the Grand Jury that indicted him on the murder charge. We will not consider this issue on appeal; defendant raised the argument in a special action proceeding through which he sought review of the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Both the court of appeals and this court declined to accept jurisdiction. See Arizona Court of Appeals, Division 2, 2 CA-SA 335 (jurisdiction declined Jan. 7, 1986); Arizona Supreme Court, CV-86-0085-PR (petition for review denied March 25, 1986). The issue is therefore moot. See State v. Agnew, 132 Ariz. 567, 573 , 647 P.2d 1165, 1171 (App. 1982); see also United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72-73 , 106 S.Ct. 938, 943 , 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986) (petit jury's guilty verdict rendered harmless any conceivable error in the grand jury's charging decision caused by alleged violation of rule 6(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); State v. Verive, 128 Ariz. 570, 574-75 , 627 P.2d 721, 725-26 (1981) (defendant cannot, by appeal from conviction, obtain review of matters relevant only to grand jury proceedings that had no effect on the subsequent trial).

C. Alleged Prosecutorial Contact with the Media

Defendant asserts that the prosecution acted improperly in releasing certain information to the press. Although we recognize the potential for serious infringement of a defendant's right to a fair trial when the prosecution engages in extrajudicial contact with the media, see, e.g., United States v. Milanovich, 303 F.2d 626, 629-30 (4th Cir.1962), our concern in addressing alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the actual effect of the conduct on defendant's trial. "[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 , 102 S.Ct. 940, 947 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982); cf. State v. Hallman, 137 Ariz. 31, 37 , 668 P.2d 874, 880 (1983) ("Misconduct alone will not cause a reversal, but only where the defendant has been denied a fair trial as a result of the actions of counsel."). Because we hold that defendant was not denied a fair trial because of pretrial publicity, we do not address the various alleged incidents of improper contact with the media. See infra Part 15. [5]

*608 D. Alleged Trial Misconduct

Defendant raises several instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct at the trial. We address each claim individually.

1. Witness's Reference to Polygraph

Defendant asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to warn a state's witness not to testify that he had taken a polygraph test. The prosecutor admitted failing to inform the witness, but he maintained that the omission was unintentional. In its brief, the state asserts that the witness's statement was made "only after the defense counsel pressed him very hard to state precisely when he had first recalled a particular piece of information during the various interviews he had with police investigators." The state contends that defense counsel "opened the door" for the improper statement through his questioning, and that defendant therefore cannot claim error. See State v. Ikirt, 160 Ariz. 113, 115 , 770 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1987); State v. Roberts, 144 Ariz. 572, 575-76 , 698 P.2d 1291, 1294-95 (App. 1985).

The statement concerning the polygraph was made while defense counsel was cross-examining Jack McDonald about when he remembered defendant's telephone conversation with his mother in which McDonald testified that defendant stated, "Even if I did do it, you have to help me." Defense counsel was attempting to elicit from McDonald an explanation about why he did not mention the conversation to the police until several weeks after the Kerrville arrest:

MR. BLOOM: Where were you when the information came to you after you had given all the long statements to the Police?

Where was it this business of information came to your mind?

WITNESS: I think it was when I was taking the lie detector test.

Defendant argues that the issue is not that this statement was heard by the jury, but rather that the prosecutor failed to warn the witness not to mention the polygraph. Apparently, he asserts that, regardless of lack of prejudice to defendant, the prosecutor's failure to warn the witness was improper conduct rising to the level of constitutional error. We disagree. Our concern in examining any claim of prosecutorial conduct is with the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 219 , 102 S.Ct. at 947 . Thus, if prosecutorial misconduct were present in this case, that misconduct would not merit reversal of defendant's conviction unless it denied him a fair trial. See, e.g., Milanovich, 303 F.2d at 630 ; State v. Marquez, 113 Ariz. 540, 544 , 558 P.2d 692, 696 (1976) ("where the reference to the [polygraph] examination does not prejudice the defendant, there is no reversible error").

We find that defendant was not denied a fair trial by the reference to the polygraph. Even without addressing the possibility that defense counsel opened the door to this testimony, the reference to the polygraph and the possible reflection it had on McDonald's veracity are insufficient, when viewed in relation to the totality of the *609 evidence presented by the state, to suggest that defendant's right to a fair trial was abrogated by the incident. Finally, any possible error was rendered harmless by the court's immediate instruction to the jury to disregard the witness's answer. See State v. Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138, 141 , 449 P.2d 603, 606 (1969).

2. Emotional Witness

Defendant next argues that the prosecution engaged in misconduct in connection with the testimony of Sam Hall, the teacher who saw defendant's car in an alley near the Homer Davis Elementary School. Hall became emotionally upset during direct examination and the prosecutor attempted to calm him. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the testimony was a "staged performance" and that the witness had been "prompted" by the prosecution. According to the defense, this prompting was illustrated by the witness's charged responses to the prosecutor's questions and his contrastingly calm testimony during cross-examination.

The trial court denied the motion for mistrial. We will not reverse the trial court's ruling on this issue absent an abuse of discretion. See Hallman, 137 Ariz. at 37 , 668 P.2d at 880 ; State v. Williams, 121 Ariz. 213, 215 , 589 P.2d 456, 458 (App. 1978); see also State v. Carr, 91 Or. App. 673, 675 , 756 P.2d 1263, 1264 (1988). We find no abuse. Although the record reflects that Hall became agitated during his testimony and that he perhaps was overcome with emotion, the trial judge was in the best position to evaluate the effect of Hall's demeanor on the jury. See State v. Wayman, 104 Ariz. 125, 127 , 449 P.2d 296, 298 (1969); State v. Chears, 231 Kan. 161, 166 , 643 P.2d 154, 158 (1982). With the jury present, the trial judge discussed with Hall his emotional state and requested that he answer questions with "yes or no" whenever possible. In addition, the jury was instructed that it "must not be influenced by sympathy or prejudice." The court's comments at the time of the incident, together with its instruction to the jury, sufficiently countered any negative impact Hall's loss of composure might have had on the jury. Further, we do not believe, given the length of the trial and the magnitude of evidence presented, that the jury was impermissibly tainted by the emotional display of one witness on the second day of trial. We therefore need not address defendant's underlying contention that the testimony was "prompted" or "staged."

3. Testimony of Victim's Mother

Defendant next argues that, by calling the victim's mother to testify in both its case-in-chief and as a rebuttal witness, the prosecution engaged in prejudicial misconduct designed to arouse sympathy from the jury. We do not believe, however, that allowing the victim's mother to testify constituted reversible error. Mary's mother was uniquely aware of her daughter's activities leading up to the kidnapping and, concerning her testimony in rebuttal, she was able to describe certain of her daughter's characteristics that conflicted with the testimony of persons who claimed to have seen the child at a local mall. Despite the potentially prejudicial effects of permitting a victim's mother to testify, we do not believe that the trial court in this case erred in allowing this probative testimony. See Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 568 (11th Cir.1983) ("The trial court has broad discretion in passing on the admissibility of evidence, including testimony that may be calculated to create prejudice against or sympathy for the accused. It is for the trial court to determine whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by possible prejudicial impact."); see also United States v. Donley, 878 F.2d 735, 738-39 (3d Cir.1989) (trial court has discretion to determine whether testimony of victim's mother is sufficiently probative to outweigh prejudicial effects); State v. Purcell, 117 Ariz. 305, 309 , 572 P.2d 439, 443 (1977) (upholding trial court's decision to allow murder victim's son to testify).

4. Testimony Concerning Underpants Found Near Victim's Remains

Defendant next argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during *610 direct examination when he questioned a detective from the Pima County Sheriff's Department concerning items found in the vicinity of the victim's remains. The detective responded that one item recovered was a pair of little girl's underpants. The prosecutor asked no further questions about the underpants. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor was attempting to mislead the jury by failing to elicit from the detective that the victim's mother had been unable positively to identify the underpants as her daughter's, and that he thereby engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. See infra Part 17(G).

Regardless of the prosecutor's motive in questioning the detective, the jury was informed through defense counsel's thorough cross-examination that the victim's mother had not positively identified the underpants. We therefore find that defendant was not prejudiced by the incident.

5. Comments Made by Prosecutor

Defendant contends that the prosecutor made improper comments in both the trial and closing argument that prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Particularly, defendant takes issue with what he describes as the prosecutor's repeated gratuitous comments attempting to ingratiate himself with the jury. [6] For example, at the close of defense counsel's direct examination of a witness, the prosecutor engaged in the following colloquy with the witness:

MR. DAVIS: If I don't ask you any questions, will you promise not to knock me down the next time we play soccer?

WITNESS: No.

MR. DAVIS: Well, no questions anyway.

Of course, the record cannot reveal the nuances of the prosecutor's courtroom demeanor. Nevertheless, although we do not find an excess of such statements in the record, this exchange was not an isolated event. Indeed, the trial judge found it necessary more than once to admonish the prosecutor — outside the jury's hearing — to refrain from the extraneous comments.

Defendant also argues that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's statements during closing argument. Specifically, the record reveals that the prosecutor questioned defense counsel's motives for making certain improper statements in closing argument, [7] and repeatedly joked about the defense counsel's lengthy presentation style. [8]

The state responds that the prosecutor's gratuitous remarks were "utterly innocuous attempts to leaven the grinding seriousness of week after week of murder trial with a few minor pleasantries." We agree with the state's conclusion that the prosecutor's comments and asides throughout the trial were "innocuous," although we express no opinion on the prosecutor's reasons for making them. We are more reluctant, however, to dismiss as innocuous Mr. Davis's jocular remarks about defense counsel's closing argument and especially his comments concerning defense counsel's *611 motives. Although we recognize that an adversarial setting may encourage some good humored — and even ill-humored — repartee between attorneys, we believe that, regardless of its effect on defendant's trial, the prosecutor's attempts to discredit the defense attorney before the jury evidenced a lack of discretion and a disregard for the high standards expected of attorneys who represent the public interest, and as such they were not "innocuous." Regardless of whether Mr. Davis's glibness and his personal comments about the defense counsel were precipitated by the culmination of a long, emotional trial, or whether they were encouraged by the gavel-to-gavel televised coverage of the case, we find his statements unnecessary and inappropriate.

Nevertheless, we do not believe that the comments deprived defendant of a fair trial. As this court has held:

In determining whether remarks made by counsel in a criminal case are so objectionable as to warrant a new trial, the trial court should consider (1) whether the remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) the probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks. Misconduct alone will not mandate that the defendant be awarded a new trial; such an award is only required when the defendant has been denied a fair trial as a result of the actions of counsel.

State v. Hansen, 156 Ariz. 291, 296-97 , 751 P.2d 951, 956-57 (1988) (citation omitted). We further noted in Hansen that "the trial court is in a better position to judge whether the prosecutor is unduly sarcastic, his tone of voice, facial expressions, and their effect on the jury, if any. Accordingly, we defer to the trial court's judgment in the absence of patent error." Hansen, 156 Ariz. at 297 , 751 P.2d at 957 . Concerning the gratuitous remarks, the trial court reprimanded Mr. Davis outside the jury's hearing and threatened further sanctions if he continued making them. Apparently, the court did not find further sanctions necessary. Concerning the "why do you break the rules" statement, the court told the prosecutor that he had gone "far enough," in effect instructing him not to break the rules himself.

Although "in capital cases appellate courts are prone to scrutinize [improper statements] more carefully," Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 117 , 297 P. 1029, 1036 (1931), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279 , 320 P.2d 467 (1958), we do not believe that the prosecutor's behavior, albeit unnecessary and inappropriate, rose to the level of reversible error. See, e.g., United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1542 (11th Cir.1985) ("Reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct requires that the conduct be `so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.'"), quoting United States v. Blevins, 555 F.2d 1236, 1240 (5th Cir.1977). The statements conceivably were attempts to call to the jurors' attention matters irrelevant to the determination of defendant's guilt or innocence. The probability that the statements actually influenced the jury's verdict, however, is remote. We find no patent error.

6. Consolidation and Severance

Defendant claims that the lower court's refusal to sever the kidnapping and murder offenses at trial constitutes reversible error. He alleges that consolidation of the two charges (1) caused prejudice to his defense; (2) resulted in a "rub-off" effect whereby neither offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) prevented him from testifying on one charge and not the other, thereby violating his fifth amendment rights. The state initially responds to these allegations by arguing that defendant did not file a proper motion to sever, resulting in a procedural waiver under rule 13.4, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. We will address the procedural issue first, before considering the merits of defendant's allegations.

The state notes that, prior to arguing its motion for consolidation, defendant filed both an opposition to the state's motion *612 for consolidation and a motion to sever. After argument, the trial court granted the state's motion to consolidate; immediately, defendant renewed his motion to sever. The state contends that, technically, defendant's conduct does not comport with rule 13.4, which speaks of filing a motion to sever only after a motion to consolidate has already been granted. Thus, the state argues, this technically incorrect motion to sever, coupled with the Arizona courts' prior strict application of the waiver provisions of rule 13.4, requires this court to reject defendant's claim on procedural grounds.

Although the state is correct in asserting that the waiver provisions of rule 13.4 have been strictly applied, the cases it cites are not on point. See State v. Haas, 138 Ariz. 413 , 675 P.2d 673 (1983); State v. Bruni, 129 Ariz. 312 , 630 P.2d 1044 (App. 1981). In each of those cases, the court found that a defendant's motion to sever was waived when it was not properly renewed during trial or at the close of evidence. Haas, 138 Ariz. at 425 , 675 P.2d at 685 ; Bruni, 129 Ariz. at 316 , 630 P.2d at 1048 . Failure to do so violated the explicit requirements dictated by rule 13.4(c). In this case, however, defendant's conduct does not violate any specific provision of the rule. Although the state argues that the rule prohibits such conduct by implication, we are unconvinced.

Moreover, rule 1.2, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that the criminal rules "shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, [and] the elimination of unnecessary delay and expense...." For this court to conclude that a procedural waiver resulted from defendant's conduct — i.e., conduct that is not proscribed by any rule — would be to contradict the principles of construction provided by rule 1.2. Accordingly, we do not find that defendant's motion to sever was waived.

When reviewing the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to sever, this court will not find reversible error absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Comer, 165 Ariz. 413, 418 , 799 P.2d 333, 338 (1990); State v. Day, 148 Ariz. 490, 493 , 715 P.2d 743, 746 (1986). Given this standard, we will review each of defendant's allegations separately.

First, defendant contends that the trial court's refusal to sever the kidnapping and murder charges prejudiced his defense. A clear abuse of discretion is established only when a defendant shows that, at the time he made his motion to sever, he had proven that his defense would be prejudiced absent severance. State v. Via, 146 Ariz. 108, 115 , 704 P.2d 238, 245 (1985); State v. Lucas, 146 Ariz. 597, 601 , 708 P.2d 81, 85 (1985). This burden of proof is not met, however, when "evidence as to one set of charges would have been admissible at the trial on the other set `as part of the complete picture.'" Via, 146 Ariz. at 115 , 704 P.2d at 245 , quoting State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 483 , 566 P.2d 273, 284 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).

In this case, the kidnapping charge was the underlying offense supporting the felony murder charge. Consequently, a substantial portion of the evidence regarding the kidnapping charge would have been admissible at trial for the felony murder charge to provide the jury with a "complete picture" of the events preceding defendant's arrest. In fact, another court has affirmed the propriety of consolidating a kidnapping offense with a felony murder offense in two cases with strikingly similar factual backgrounds to that of this case. See People v. Cunningham, 194 Colo. 198, 201 , 570 P.2d 1086, 1088 (1977) (a defendant charged with kidnapping a child, who was later found dead, was also charged with felony murder); People v. McCrary, 190 Colo. 538, 551-52 , 549 P.2d 1320, 1330-31 (1976) (a defendant charged with kidnapping a child, whose body was found some time later, was subsequently charged with felony murder). Therefore, because defendant did not meet his required burden of proof, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Second, defendant claims that the trial court's refusal to sever the two *613 charges resulted in a "rub-off" effect whereby neither charge was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. He cites a line of cases espousing the rub-off doctrine, which provides that cases with multiple defendants and a great disparity in the weight of evidence against each defendant pose a danger that the guilt of one defendant will rub-off on the other defendant. See United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 977 (D.C. Cir.1976); United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir.1971). Thus, a trial court's refusal to sever defendants' trials under such circumstances constitutes an abuse of discretion. Donaway, 447 F.2d at 943 .

Although conceding that these cases are not directly on point, defendant argues that the rub-off doctrine should apply by analogy to the trial court's refusal to sever the kidnapping and murder offenses in this case. We disagree.

In Comer , we rejected a similar argument when the defendant in that case claimed that a guilt determination on one charge may have influenced the jury's guilt determination on the other charge. Comer, 165 Ariz. at 419 , 799 P.2d at 339 . We ruled that a defendant is not prejudiced if the jury is (1) instructed to consider each offense separately, and (2) is advised that each offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Comer, 165 Ariz. at 419 , 799 P.2d at 339 . In this case, the trial court's instructions fulfilled both requirements. Accordingly, we find no prejudice to defendant and, therefore, no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Finally, defendant maintains that the trial court's refusal to sever the two offenses prevented him from testifying on one charge and not the other. Severance, however, is not automatic whenever a defendant decides to testify on some charges, but not others. Comer, 165 Ariz. at 419 , 799 P.2d at 339 . He must show "that he has both important testimony to give on some counts and strong reasons for not testifying on others." Comer, 165 Ariz. at 419 , 799 P.2d at 339 ; accord United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 483 (9th Cir.1983). Defendant's general explanation did not reach the level of specificity necessary to meet this requirement. See Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 977 (D.C. Cir.1968). Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

7. Defendant's Arrest, Detention and Interrogation, and the Searches of Defendant's Car

A. The Arrest

Defendant contends that he was improperly arrested and detained by federal authorities in Texas and that the trial court therefore should have suppressed any evidence obtained as a result of the arrest. FBI agents arrested defendant in Kerrville, Texas on September 20, 1984 (three days after the victim's disappearance), pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by a United States magistrate in Tucson. The warrant charged defendant with kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201 .

Except for a limited number of circumstances not relevant in this case, kidnapping becomes a federal offense only when the victim is "willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1). Defendant argues that, because no evidence of interstate transportation existed, federal authorities improperly relied on the presumption of interstate transportation found in 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (b) to establish the required nexus. Section 1201(b) provides that "the failure to release the victim within twenty-four hours after he shall have been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away shall create a rebuttable presumption that such person has been transported in interstate or foreign commerce." Relying on United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.1978), defendant asserts that § 1201(b)'s presumption of interstate transportation is unconstitutional and that, because the FBI had no probable cause to believe a federal crime had been committed absent that presumption, his arrest deprived him of due process.

The state attacks defendant's argument on several grounds, noting first that the record does not indicate that the magistrate *614 actually relied upon the presumption. Because the affidavit did not mention the § 1201(b) presumption, argues the state, the magistrate conceivably could have drawn his own reasonable inference that the victim had been transported interstate from the facts that the victim had not been seen in 3 days and that the suspect had been located in Texas. The state further argues that Moore , which "stands completely alone in its condemnation of the § 1201(b) presumption," is inapposite to this case because it concerned the use of the presumption at trial, not in an arrest warrant affidavit.

We are persuaded by the state's argument, for even if the magistrate did rely on the presumption, we do not find Moore persuasive authority for the argument that the presumption is unconstitutional when used to establish probable cause to arrest. In Moore , the court reversed the kidnapping convictions of two defendants because § 1201(b)'s presumption of interstate transportation formed the only substantial basis to establish an interstate nexus. After examining a string of United States Supreme Court cases concerning "the constitutionality of statutory presumptions in the trial of criminal cases, " Moore, 571 F.2d at 85-86 (emphasis added), citing Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 , 63 S.Ct. 1241 , 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 , 85 S.Ct. 754 , 13 L.Ed.2d 658 (1965); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 , 89 S.Ct. 1532 , 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969), the court concluded:

We simply cannot say with substantial assurance that for purposes of proving the transportation of a kidnapping victim in interstate or foreign commerce such transportation is more likely than not to have occurred whenever the victim is not released within 24 hours of his disappearance.

Moore, 571 F.2d at 86-87 (emphasis added). The court, therefore, held that "the presumption of interstate transportation embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (b) is unconstitutional when used to prove an element of the federal crime of kidnapping. " Moore, 571 F.2d at 86 (emphasis added).

However, assuming arguendo that the federal magistrate in this case relied upon the presumption, we see no similar constitutional infirmity when the presumption is considered in the determination of probable cause to arrest, as opposed to the determination of guilt or innocence. An arrest warrant issues upon a showing of probable cause to believe a suspect is committing or has committed an offense. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 , 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1648 , 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). Only a probability and not a prima facie showing of criminal activity is required. State v. Dixon, 153 Ariz. 151, 153 , 735 P.2d 761, 763 (1987), citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). The United States Supreme Court noted in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1309 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949), that "[t]here is a large difference between the two things to be proved [ i.e., guilt beyond a reasonable doubt versus probable cause], as well as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them." The Court stressed:

Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that which long experience in the common-law tradition, to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.

However, if those standards were to be made applicable in determining probable cause for an arrest or for search and seizure, ... few indeed would be the situations in which an officer, charged with protecting the public interest by enforcing the law, could take effective action toward that end.

Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 174 , 69 S.Ct. at 1310 .

As the court in Moore itself noted, "[in creating the interstate transportation presumption,] Congress clearly was primarily interested in expediting FBI investigation *615 in kidnapping cases in order to apprehend the criminal and save the victim's life. " Moore, 571 F.2d at 84 (emphasis added). We believe that the use of the presumption in determining probable cause to arrest is consistent with, rather than violative of, this objective, and we do not believe defendant was denied due process merely because the presumption may have been relied upon to invoke federal authority to arrest.

The trial court found sufficient probable cause to support the magistrate's issuance of the arrest warrant. On review, we will defer to the trial court's decision on this matter in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Boyer, 106 Ariz. 32, 34 , 470 P.2d 439, 441 (1970). Our review of the record indicates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to quash the arrest warrant.

B. The Detention and Interrogation

Defendant next argues that "immediately after" the arrest, the presumption of interstate transportation was rebutted by Jack McDonald's statements to the FBI that the victim had not been in defendant's car when the two men left Arizona. According to defendant, those statements were confirmed when the search of the car failed to reveal evidence indicating that the victim had been inside it. He reasons that, because the presumption was rebutted, the FBI violated his right to due process and a speedy trial when it detained him in federal custody for 10 days.

Although McDonald told the FBI agents that, to his knowledge, no child had been in the car as it traveled interstate, the agents were not required to accept the statement as either truthful or informed. To suggest that probable cause evaporated "immediately after" the arrest simply because McDonald told FBI agents that no child had been in the car is tantamount to arguing that an arresting authority is obligated to release a criminal suspect if he or she makes any exculpatory statement, regardless of its veracity. At the time of the arrest, the agents had no reason to accept McDonald's statement as true. It is ludicrous to suggest that they were required to release a suspected kidnapper because his companion denied any interstate transportation.

Further, even if we were to conclude that the federal authorities were obligated to release defendant after the veracity of McDonald's statement had been confirmed, the record indicates that they did not receive that verification until after additional federal charges justifying defendant's continued incarceration had been filed against him. McDonald's statement that no child had been in the car was not "verified" until September 27, when McDonald was given a polygraph test. By September 25, however, a parole violation warrant was forwarded from California to the FBI in San Antonio. This complaint would have justified defendant's detention in federal custody, even if the United States could not have properly detained defendant on the kidnapping charge.

Defendant nevertheless suggests that his federal detention was the product of a collusive agreement between Arizona and federal authorities to keep him in custody until Arizona investigators could obtain a warrant to arrest him on state kidnapping charges. Initially, we note that the United States Supreme Court has commented that "[f]ree and open cooperation between state and federal law enforcement officers is to be commended and encouraged." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). Naturally, such cooperation is improper when it is used to facilitate a deprivation of a defendant's rights. However, we find nothing offensive in the joint efforts of the state and federal agencies in this case.

Defendant was arrested in Kerrville on September 20 pursuant to a federal warrant. The next day he was transported to San Antonio for his initial appearance. In accordance with rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the federal magistrate at the initial appearance set defendant's preliminary hearing for October 1 — 10 days after the initial appearance. At the preliminary hearing, the federal authorities *616 would have been required to establish probable cause that a federal offense had been committed and that defendant had been the perpetrator. See rule 5.1(a); 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 14.1, at 237 (1984). Thus, the FBI was given until October 1 to determine whether the necessary interstate nexus existed, and accordingly it was under no obligation prior to the preliminary hearing to release defendant for lack of probable cause.

Although we now know that the victim was not taken out of Arizona, her body was not located until several months after defendant's arrest, and the information provided by McDonald did not conclusively negate the possibility of a federal offense. Both state and federal investigations were on-going while defendant was in federal custody. The fact that these investigations subsequently revealed insufficient evidence of a federal offense does not invalidate the detention. The federal charge against defendant was dismissed and defendant was released from federal custody before the government was required to show probable cause at the preliminary hearing. We find no error in the federal government's decision to detain defendant until October 1, 1984.

C. The Searches

Defendant further argues that the FBI improperly searched his automobile. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress all items found in the two FBI searches. The first search occurred at the automobile dealership in Kerrville, Texas where defendant had taken his car for repair and where he was arrested. The second search was performed two days later at the FBI storage facility in San Antonio pursuant to a federal search warrant. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that the original search in Kerrville could be supported on two separate bases: (1) the FBI was entitled to perform a search of the vehicle incident to a valid arrest, and (2) defendant had consented to the search. The court further concluded that the search warrant was supported by probable cause and that the subsequent search was therefore valid.

1. The First Search

Regarding the initial search of defendant's vehicle, we agree with the trial court that defendant validly consented to the search. [9] Shortly after being brought to the Kerrville Police Station, defendant was given a "Consent to Search Form." The form, which was normally used to obtain consent to search a suspect's "premises," had been altered to describe defendant's automobile. Specifically, the form used the word "premises" three times. The form given to defendant still mentioned "premises" twice, but the word had been crossed out once and had been replaced with the word "vehicle" and a description of defendant's car. The location of the vehicle was listed as "Ken Stoepel Ford, 400 Sidney Baker, Kerrville, TX." [10] An FBI agent read the form to defendant and advised him that he need not consent to the search. Defendant read the form himself, indicated that he understood it, and then signed it.

Our review of the record indicates that the trial court properly concluded that this consent was voluntarily given and was not the product of duress or coercion. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); see also United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 783 (9th Cir.1989) (trial court's determination of voluntariness upheld by appellate court unless clearly erroneous); United States v. Sealey, 830 F.2d *617 1028, 1032 (9th Cir.1987) (same). Of course, we recognize that the potential for coerced consent is greater when, as in this case, a suspect is in custody when the consent is given. However, "the fact of custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced ... consent to search." United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 , 96 S.Ct. 820, 828 , 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). Rather, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 , 93 S.Ct. at 2048 . Even considering the cumulative effect of the factors at play in this case, however, we find no indication that defendant's consent was involuntary.

In examining the implications of defendant's arrest on his ability to give truly voluntary consent, defendant urges this court to "be aware of the `vulnerable subjective state' of ... defendant as well as the possibility of `subtly coercive police questions,' and the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation." United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir.1973), quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229, 247 , 93 S.Ct. at 2049, 2058 . In giving due consideration to these factors, however, we also consider the sophistication of the accused and whether Miranda warnings were tendered. See United States v. Heimforth, 493 F.2d 970, 972 (9th Cir.1974).

Given the facts of this case, we do not believe that defendant's will was overcome by any coercive atmosphere attendant to the arrest and detention. Indeed, as the trial court found, rather than exhibiting trepidation and concern, defendant was "calm and inquisitive" during his arrest and in his conversations with the FBI. Defendant also was read his Miranda warning prior to giving consent, and he was specifically told by the FBI agents that he need not consent to the search of his vehicle. Defendant nevertheless contends that he signed the consent form because the FBI agents "threatened" to obtain a search warrant if he did not cooperate. Our review of the record does not reveal such an ultimatum. Even if one had been made, however, we would not find that event sufficient to render defendant's consent involuntary in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Talkington, 843 F.2d 1041, 1049 (7th Cir.1988) (when considered in the totality of the circumstances, a defendant's consent may be free and voluntary despite fact that agents threaten to obtain warrant if defendant does not consent); United States v. Compton, 704 F.2d 739, 742 (5th Cir.1983) (threat made by federal law enforcement officers to obtain search warrant if suspect did not cooperate did not invalidate written consent to search).

Further, defendant's argument that his "physical and mental state" prevented him from making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights is not borne out by the record. Although defendant may have smoked marijuana 3 days prior to his arrest, McDonald testified that he did not see defendant consume any alcohol or drugs after they left Tucson. In addition, the FBI agents observed no indication that defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. We concur with the trial court that alcohol and drug use did not leave defendant incapable of voluntarily consenting to the search. See United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1297 (8th Cir.1986) ("[T]he mere fact that one has taken drugs, or is intoxicated, or mentally agitated, does not render consent involuntary.... In each case, `[t]he question is one of mental awareness so that the act of consent was the consensual act of one who knew what he was doing and had a reasonable appreciation of the nature and significance of his actions.'"), quoting United States v. Elrod, 441 F.2d 353 , 355 (5th Cir.1971); see also United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 376-77 (10th Cir.1985) (suspect who "staggered and swayed" under intoxication was still capable of giving consent to search glove box).

We also are unconvinced that defendant was misled by the FBI's use of the altered consent form. Although the standard form was intended for consent to search premises, it had been altered to apply to defendant's vehicle. We recognize that the alteration contained an error (the form referred to defendant's car as a 260Z *618 rather than a 280Z), but we do not believe that the error prevented defendant from understanding that he was consenting to the search of his automobile. Despite the word change and the inaccuracy in the description of the vehicle, the form clearly referred to the search of a black 1975 Datsun with defendant's California license plate number.

Defendant further argues, however, that even if he did consent to the search, the actual search conducted by the FBI exceeded the scope of the consent given. We disagree. Defendant consented to a "complete search" and authorized the agents to take "any letters, papers, materials or other property which they may desire." He asserts on appeal that he "did not authorize the opening of bags, suitcases, picnic baskets, or looking underneath these items." We find no merit in this argument. In United States v. Covello, 657 F.2d 151 (7th Cir.1981), the court addressed a defendant's claim that FBI agents had exceeded the scope of the consent given in a form identical to the consent form at issue in this case. In reversing the trial court's suppression of evidence, the court noted:

The form authorized the agents "to conduct a complete search" of the car. (Emphasis supplied.) The district court would read "complete" to mean "incomplete." Furthermore, those agents were authorized "to take from [the] premises any letters, papers, materials, or other property which they may desire." In the absence of the word "complete," one possibly might construe the consent in a limited fashion, however, the addition of the word "complete" indicates that consent was extended to everything within the automobile. Such a construction is further supported by the permission given to the agents to remove items from the automobile. "Letters" and "papers" would not be expected to be lying around loose. They would be contained in something.

Covello, 657 F.2d at 154 ; see also United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1176 (3d Cir.1988).

We find defendant's assertion that he somehow intended to limit the manner in which the search was executed disingenuous at best. Accordingly, we find no error.

Thus, we conclude that defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle, and that the search was conducted within the bounds of the consent given. We therefore find no error in the trial court's refusal to suppress evidence obtained from the search.

2. The Second Search

We likewise concur in the trial court's conclusion that probable cause existed to justify the second search performed pursuant to the federal search warrant. See State v. DeBoucher, 135 Ariz. 220, 227 , 660 P.2d 471, 478 (App. 1982) (reviewing courts give great deference to magistrate's probable cause determination). Defendant argues, however, that the trial court should have suppressed evidence obtained in the second search because the FBI lacked authority to tow his car from Kerrville to San Antonio before obtaining the search warrant. We disagree. Defendant was arrested at the Ken Stoepel Ford dealership in Kerrville on September 20. Once defendant was in custody, the FBI became responsible for the car's safekeeping and the vehicle was properly seized incident to the arrest. The car remained at the dealership overnight, where it was guarded by FBI agents. This situation, however, would not have been feasible on an extended basis. Being responsible for the vehicle, the FBI had the authority to move it to the Bureau's San Antonio facility, where it could be more conveniently secured.

D. Defendant's Statements to the FBI

Defendant next argues that he was improperly advised of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and that the trial court therefore should have suppressed statements elicited *619 from him after his arrest. [11] We find no merit in this argument. Although we may conclude that defendant waived his Miranda rights only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension, see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986), citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979), our review of the record does not indicate, as defendant suggests, that the "statements, admissions, or tests elicited from him were a direct result of either physical or mental coercion." Nor does it reflect any discrepancy in defendant's ability to comprehend his waiver.

Specifically, we are unable to discern any improper, coercive activity by FBI agents who repeatedly administered defendant's Miranda warnings, both orally and on printed forms. Further, defendant stated that he understood his rights and, contrary to his present assertion, he read part of his waiver of rights form aloud before signing it, thereby indicating to those present that he could read and understand. Although defendant mentioned that he was tired, he continued to talk with the agents and made no request or suggestion that he wished to end the discussion. Also, as we have noted, defendant's ability to comprehend was not impaired by drug or alcohol use at the time of his arrest, and his demeanor was both calm and inquisitive. In short, defendant's sweeping allegations of physical and mental coercion are not substantiated by the record. We find no irregularity in defendant's custodial interrogation and we conclude that the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the statements he made to the FBI concerning his activities on and around September 17, 1984.

Perhaps realizing the ethereal nature of his coercion claims, defendant argues that, even if no Miranda violation occurred, his statements were nevertheless inadmissible at trial because they were irrelevant, immaterial, and highly prejudicial. The statements were admitted, in redacted form, through the testimony of FBI special agent Patrick C. McCormick, who interviewed defendant in Kerrville. Although defendant's argument is not entirely clear, he also apparently asserts that because his statements were neither decidedly exculpatory nor decidedly inculpatory, they were not "admissions" within the meaning of rule 801(d)(2)(A), Arizona Rules of Evidence. The statements therefore were hearsay and, because they did not fall within any recognized hearsay exception, they were inadmissible. [12]

Rule 801(d)(2)(A) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is his own statement, made in his individual capacity. Defendant's statements to the FBI easily satisfy the facial requirements of the rule. We find no support for defendant's argument that the statements were not admissions because they were neither exculpatory nor inculpatory. For a defendant's statement to be an admission, "it is not necessary to show that the statement was against the interest of the party at the time it was made." 1 M. Udall, J. Livermore, P. Escher, & G. McIlvain, Arizona Practice: Law of Evidence § 125, at 255 (3d ed. 1991). Rather, "[t]he only limitation, in short, to the use of an opposing party's words is the rule of relevance." Udall at 257. Certainly, a criminal suspect's statements about his activities on the day of an alleged crime are relevant.

The only remaining limitation on the admissibility of defendant's statements was the possibility that the probative value *620 of the statements was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See rule 403. This determination was within the trial court's discretion and we will reverse the trial court's decision only in the event of an abuse of that discretion. State v. Neal, 143 Ariz. 93, 101 , 692 P.2d 272, 280 (1984); State v. Clabourne, 142 Ariz. 335, 343 , 690 P.2d 54, 62 (1984). We find no abuse in this case. Although Agent McCormick was permitted to testify that defendant told the FBI he was in the victim's neighborhood the day she disappeared because he was looking for a person from whom he eventually purchased marijuana, we do not conclude that the trial court erred in determining that the probative value of this information outweighed its potentially inflammatory effects on the jury. Given the gravity of the crime for which defendant was on trial and the fact that the jury had been voir dired concerning their attitude toward drugs, we are unconvinced that the reference to marijuana was impermissibly prejudicial. We find no error in the admission of defendant's statements.

8. Defendant's Motion for Continuance

Defendant argues that the trial court violated his right to a fair trial when it denied his request for a continuance so his attorney could interview the prosecution's paint expert and other witnesses. The prosecution's first paint expert, an FBI agent assigned to examine defendant's car and the victim's bicycle, died prior to trial. James Corby, the agent who assumed responsibility for the case, conducted his own tests, choosing not to rely on the first expert's findings and conclusions. Defense counsel apparently did not receive all of Corby's findings until the day before he was scheduled to interview Corby — approximately one month before trial. Counsel claimed that, as a result of the late disclosure, he was unable adequately to prepare for the agent's testimony. On appeal, defendant also argues that denying the continuance prevented his trial counsel from interviewing several other witnesses. As the state notes, however, only three of the witnesses mentioned by defendant were called at trial.

Rule 8.5(b), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that "[a] continuance shall be granted only upon a showing that extraordinary circumstances exist and that delay is indispensable to the interests of justice." The grant of a continuance is an exercise of the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Amarillas, 141 Ariz. 620, 622 , 688 P.2d 628, 630 (1984), citing State v. Sullivan, 130 Ariz. 213 , 635 P.2d 501 (1981). Further, the trial court's denial of a motion for continuance will not be disturbed unless (1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying the motion, and (2) prejudice resulted. Amarillas, 141 Ariz. at 622 , 688 P.2d at 630 .

We do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in this case. Although the court denied defendant's motion, it held that the defense would be permitted to interview any witness before he or she testified, even if recesses were necessary to accommodate the interviews. Of course, interviewing witnesses in the course of trial certainly is not the most desirable procedure. However, we will not second guess the trial court's decision in this matter. Defense counsel had been involved in the case for well over one year, and more than two years had elapsed since defendant's arrest. We do not believe that the trial court exceeded its discretion in determining that the defense's failure to interview various witnesses, most of whom had not been selected by the prosecution to testify at trial, did not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" necessitating a delay "indispensable to the interests of justice."

Further, regarding evidence concerning the paint sample, the record indicates that the defense was not entirely blameless in creating the delays in preparation. For example, the defense was aware that the first paint expert was desperately ill with cancer long before his death, yet, despite attempts by the prosecution to facilitate the expert's deposition, the defense did not attempt to preserve the testimony for trial. Most importantly, defendant is unable to *621 demonstrate that any prejudice actually inhered from the trial court's ruling. The record does not indicate that defendant's trial counsel was ineffective or impaired in any way during opening statements or in his examination of witnesses.

Concerning the state's paint expert, the defense's pretrial interview with Agent Corby lasted an entire day, and, although he was unable to interview Corby about certain graphs and charts supplied the day before the interview, defense counsel's cross-examination of the agent at trial was extensive and reflected no lack of preparation. Thus, even if a continuance to permit interviews would have been advisable in this case, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's determination that the case should proceed to trial.

9. Jury Selection

Defendant next argues that Maricopa County's juror selection procedure denied him a trial before an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. Specifically, defendant posits that the county's practice of selecting jury pools from voter registration and Department of Motor Vehicles lists results in the exclusion of cognizable groups from the jury venire because those groups are generally underrepresented on the voter and DMV lists. For example, according to defendant, of the approximately 130 prospective jurors in the pool for his trial, two were Black and approximately 6 were Hispanic.

Defendant also addresses other perceived shortcomings in the jury selection process, both in general and with specific reference to his case. He contends that the length of his trial resulted in the exclusion of persons who were not employed by businesses having a policy of compensating their employees during jury duty. He argues that the $12.00 per diem granted jurors, see A.R.S. § 21-221, was insufficient to compensate adequately those jurors whose incomes were not supplemented by their employers. As a result, he claims that this "cognizable group" of persons not compensated by their employers during jury duty was underrepresented in the jury panel.

Further, he asserts that employees in the Jury Commissioner's Office were improperly allowed to exclude prospective jurors "without standards, guidelines, or court review." That is, members of the Jury Commissioner's staff were permitted to excuse jurors who contacted the Commissioner's office after receiving their summonses and who claimed some form of hardship. According to defendant, as a result of these undocumented, unsupervised excusals, many prospective jurors were removed from the pool before the merits of their "hardships" could be evaluated.

Concerning defendant's claim that Blacks and Hispanics were underrepresented in the jury pool, we note initially that the mere observation that a particular group is underrepresented is insufficient to support a constitutional challenge. State v. Lee, 114 Ariz. 101, 103 , 559 P.2d 657, 659 (1976). To succeed on a claim that underrepresentation in a particular case violated the sixth amendment fair cross-section requirement, defendant must make a prima facie showing that (1) the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) the representation of the group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979).

Although we recognize that Blacks and Hispanics qualify as distinctive groups under the Duren analysis, see Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1280 , 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977) (Hispanics are distinct group); United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir.1989) (same); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 498 , 92 S.Ct. 2163, 2166 , 33 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972) (Blacks are distinct group); People v. Harris, 36 Cal.3d 36, 51 , 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 790 , 679 P.2d 433, 441 (1984) (Blacks and Hispanics are cognizable groups for purposes of fair cross-section analysis), and even assuming *622 that a venire of 130 individuals which includes two Blacks and approximately 6 Hispanics indicates an underrepresentation of those groups, defendant has failed to satisfy the third requirement of Duren . At no time has defendant provided or analyzed information indicating that either of these groups is systematically excluded in the jury selection process in a way that results in its underrepresentation. Of course, without such information and analysis, this court cannot determine whether an identifiable underrepresentation is the result of systematic exclusion in the jury selection process. Thus, we express no opinion on whether exclusive use of voter registration and DMV lists could result in the systematic exclusion of certain minorities in the community. We hold only that defendant's reliance on isolated, subjective observations of alleged underrepresentation is insufficient to support his sixth amendment claim.

Similarly, defendant's argument that the length of his trial resulted in the exclusion of persons who were not employed by businesses having a policy of compensating their employees during jury duty also fails to survive Duren . The sixth amendment fair cross-section guarantee concerns the representation of "distinctive" groups in the community. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 , 99 S.Ct. at 668 . That is, to succeed in a fair cross-section claim, a defendant must demonstrate that the persons he asserts were excluded from the venire were members of a group that is a "recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied." Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494 , 97 S.Ct. at 1280 .

In asserting simply that "individuals who are not employed by larger corporations" were excluded from the jury pool, defendant has failed to demonstrate that such individuals constitute a distinct group. Indeed, defendant has made no credible effort — either before the trial court or in his briefs to this court — to prove that the persons he claims were targeted for exclusion are a constitutionally significant group under Duren . Further, even if defendant had attempted to fulfill his obligation under Duren , we express serious doubts about whether "individuals not employed by large corporations" constitute a distinctive group. The hurdle a defendant must overcome to establish the existence of a group for sixth amendment purposes is set forth clearly in United States v. Abell, 552 F. Supp. 316 (D.Me. 1982), and we borrow substantially from that opinion to illustrate defendant's burden in this case:

In order for a class to be legally cognizable, it must be characterized by "a common thread ... a basic similarity in attitudes or ideas or experiences which ... cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process." United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir.1977). There must be a definite and ascertainable membership:

A cognizable group is not one whose membership shifts from day to day or whose membership can be arbitrarily selected.

United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affirmed, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 , 93 S.Ct. 1397 , 35 L.Ed.2d 602 (1973).

In addition to internal cohesion, the group must be perceived as distinct by the community at large. Evidence of community discrimination tends to indicate that "a group [is] sufficiently distinct from the community to be a credible target for the exercise of community prejudices." Ciudadanos Unidos de San Juan v. Hidalgo Cty., 622 F.2d 807 , 818 n. 21 (5th Cir.1980).

In all but the clearest cases, such as classes based on race or gender, the presence of a cognizable class within the community must be established with respect to the particular community as a matter of fact:

Throughout our history differences in race and color have defined easily identifiable groups which have at times required the aid of courts in securing equal treatment under the laws. But community prejudices are not static, and from time to time other differences from the community norm may *623 define other groups which need the same protection. Whether such a group exists within a community is a question of fact. (Emphasis added).

Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 , 74 S.Ct. 667, 670 , 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954).

Abell, 552 F. Supp. at 322 .

We do not believe that those people whose employers do not compensate them while they serve jury duty share such an "internal cohesion" or "a basic similarity in attitudes or experiences" to characterize them as a distinct group. Accord People v. Harris, 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1076-78 , 767 P.2d 619, 637-38 , 255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 370-71 (1989) (persons whose employers were unwilling to continue payment of salaries for the protracted period of a capital case did not constitute a "cognizable class"). And, more importantly, defendant has offered no evidence to refute our impressions of his position. See Harris, 47 Cal.3d at 1078 n. 12, 767 P.2d at 638 n. 12, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 371 n. 12 ("Defendant asserts that self-employed persons `surely share a common perspective,' but neither supports that assumption with anything in the record or of which judicial notice might be taken, nor demonstrates that none of the other jurors could have shared that perspective."). We therefore conclude that defendant's argument falls short of the constitutional mark established in Duren , and we accordingly find no constitutional infirmity in the juror selection process in this case.

We note that defendant also asserts that the juror selection process in this case violated equal protection principles. Even though we believe that defendant has standing to raise this claim, see, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), we hold that defendant has failed to establish the degree of underrepresentation "by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as ... jurors, over a significant period of time." Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494 , 97 S.Ct. at 1280 .

Concerning his claim that "persons not employed by large corporations" were systematically excluded from the jury pool, we hold that, as with his sixth amendment claim, defendant has failed to demonstrate that those persons constitute a distinct group for purposes of equal protection analysis. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494 , 97 S.Ct. at 1280 . We therefore find no merit in defendant's equal protection arguments.

We likewise find no merit in defendant's argument that members of the Jury Commissioner's staff improperly excused prospective jurors who contacted the Commissioner's office claiming undue hardship. "The office of `jury commissioner' was established to assist the courts with the jury selection process and to insulate judges from having to consider every request for excusal." State v. Fendler, 127 Ariz. 464, 470 , 622 P.2d 23, 29 (App. 1980). According to defendant, court personnel excused prospective jurors because they were not citizens, they no longer lived in Maricopa County, they had a felony record, they did not speak English, they were responsible for young children or elderly people in their home, and for various other hardships. He asserts that these dismissals were improper because the trial judge did not automatically dismiss other prospective jurors who suffered similar hardships.

Given, however, that 136 prospective jurors were qualified for defendant's trial, we fail to see how defendant was prejudiced by the excusals granted by court personnel, who were acting within the broad discretion afforded the Jury Commissioner's Office. See Fendler, 127 Ariz. at 470 , 622 P.2d at 29 (jury commissioners are given broad measure of unilateral discretion in determining whether a prospective juror should be excused from service). As the trial judge himself noted, "I am satisfied, from those 137 or so [prospective jurors] that we did see here in this courtroom, that we got a fairly good cross section of people as far as ages and economic backgrounds, and every other way that I can think of." Although some prospective jurors were excused by the Commissioner's office due to hardship, defendant was still afforded an ample pool from which to select a fair and impartial jury. As we have *624 previously held, "A defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a fair and impartial jury for the trial of his case, but he is not entitled to be tried by any particular jury; therefore, unless the record affirmatively shows that such a fair and impartial jury was not secured, the conviction must be confirmed." State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 50 , 579 P.2d 542, 554 (1978). Given that a pool of over 130 prospective jurors was provided and nothing in the record indicates that the jury selected from those candidates fell short of the requisite standards of fairness and impartiality, we reject defendant's claim that he was prejudiced by court personnel's excusal of prospective jurors.

10. "Death Qualification" of Jury

Defendant next argues that, because juries in Arizona do not determine sentencing, the trial court should not have "death qualified" the jury during voir dire. He asserts that, by engaging in a death qualification of the prospective jurors, the trial court "biased and prejudiced the jury." We disagree.

We have expressly held that jury questioning regarding capital punishment is permissible where the questioning determines bias of a nature which would prevent a juror from performing his duty. Under the procedure used in Arizona in death penalty cases, the jurors' duty is to determine guilt or innocence, while the sentence of death is solely the responsibility of the trial judge. Nevertheless, voir dire questioning related to a juror's views on capital punishment is permitted to determine whether those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties to decide the case in accordance with the court's instructions and the juror's oath.

State v. Martinez-Villareal, 145 Ariz. 441, 449 , 702 P.2d 670, 678 (1985) (citations omitted); see also State v. White, 168 Ariz. 500, 509-10 , 815 P.2d 869, 878-79 (1991); State v. Wiley, 144 Ariz. 525, 533-35 , 698 P.2d 1244, 1252-54 (1985), overruled on other grounds, State v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 541 , 760 P.2d 541 (1988).

The United States Supreme Court has indicated that "an impartial jury consists of nothing more than `jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.'" Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 , 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1767 , 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 , 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (emphasis omitted). Defendant neither asserts nor demonstrates that any participant on his jury failed to fulfill this obligation. See Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir.1988). We therefore find no error.

11. Jury Instructions

Defendant raises numerous alleged errors in the instructions given to the jury and in the trial court's failure to instruct on certain issues. We address each challenged instruction separately.

A. Kidnapping Instruction

Over defendant's objection, the trial court gave the following instruction regarding the kidnapping charge:

The crime of kidnapping requires proof of the following three things.

1. The defendant knowingly restrained another person's movements, and

2. The restraint was accomplished:

A. By physical force, intimidation or deception, and

B. In a manner which interfered substantially with the person's movements, and

3. The restraint was with the intent to inflict death, physical injury or a sexual offense on a person.

Defendant claims that this instruction was given in error because the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove kidnapping or the occurrence of a sexual offense and because the term "sexual offense" is vague and ambiguous. We find no merit in these arguments. As we have already concluded, ample evidence existed to substantiate the kidnapping charge. See supra Part 1(A). Further, the state was required to prove only that defendant kidnapped the victim with the intent to commit a sexual offense. See A.R.S. § 13-1304(A). *625 Thus, although the state did not establish that defendant actually committed a sexual offense, it presented evidence to the jury from which it could conclude that defendant had the intent to commit such an offense when he abducted her. That was all the state was required to do. See, e.g., State v. Adrian, 111 Ariz. 14, 18 , 522 P.2d 1091, 1095 (1974) ("It should be emphasized that the offense of kidnapping with intent to commit rape can be established without proof of a subsequent rape where the circumstances indicate an intention to rape."). We therefore find no error in instructing the jury on the kidnapping charge.

In addition, we find no ambiguity or vagueness in the instruction itself. Despite defendant's argument to the contrary, we conclude that the term "sexual offense" was sufficiently specific to guide the jury in determining whether defendant's actions fell within the scope of the kidnapping statute. As one court has noted, "People of average intelligence will understand the term `sexual offense' to mean illegal sexual conduct. In light of this common, ordinary meaning, no definitional instruction was required. Ordinary words and phrases in statutes require no definition because they are presumed to be understood by the jurors." People v. Dasher, 198 Cal. App.3d 28, 36 , 243 Cal. Rptr. 486, 490 (1988). Further, as the state correctly observed, no reason exists for requiring specific instructions to be given about the various forms of sexual activity envisioned by the statute because any sexual activity with an 8-year-old child would be a crime, and thus would be a "sexual offense" that would support the kidnapping charge.

B. Felony Murder Instruction

At trial, defendant objected to instructions given to the jury concerning felony murder. Defendant continues to argue that insufficient evidence existed to support the felony murder charge and that the state abused its discretion in seeking only a felony murder instruction rather than a premeditated murder instruction. We have already concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's verdict on the felony murder charge. See supra Part 1(B). Defendant's first argument therefore fails. Defendant's claim that the prosecution abused its discretion in seeking a felony murder conviction is likewise unsupportable. The essence of this claim is that the prosecution somehow gained an unfair advantage by charging felony murder because it did not have to prove specific intent on the part of defendant. This analysis is clearly wrong.

First, the prosecution was required to prove the specific intent to commit the predicate felony, and "the mens rea necessary to satisfy the premeditation element of first-degree murder is supplied by the specific intent required for the felony." State v. McLoughlin, 139 Ariz. 481, 485-86 , 679 P.2d 504, 508-09 (1984), citing State v. Arias, 131 Ariz. 441 , 641 P.2d 1285 (1982). We have upheld the constitutionality of this procedure, McLoughlin, 139 Ariz. at 486 , 679 P.2d at 509 , and defendant's argument fails to persuade us that our prior holding was incorrect. Therefore, defendant's assertion that the prosecution was not required to prove specific intent is inaccurate.

Second, the prosecutor has broad discretion — even in capital cases — to charge defendant with the crimes he or she thinks appropriate, and we will not interfere with that discretion unless the prosecutor acts illegally or in excess of his or her powers. State v. Murphy, 113 Ariz. 416, 418 , 555 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1976). Aside from his assertion that the state gained an "unfair advantage" by pursuing the felony murder charge, defendant has not demonstrated how the prosecutor's decision to seek the felony murder conviction in this case constituted an abuse of discretion or an illegal action, and our review of the record fails to reveal any impropriety in the prosecutor's charging decision. We therefore find no error.

C. Unanimous Verdict Instruction

Before the jury retired to deliberate, the trial court, over defendant's objection, *626 gave the following instruction concerning the unanimity of their verdict:

The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each of you agree thereto. In other words, ladies and gentlemen, your verdict in this case, when you return a verdict, must be unanimous.

It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and deliberate with a view toward reaching that agreement if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself. You must do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with the other jurors.

In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if you are convinced it was erroneous, but do not surrender your honest convictions as to the weight or the effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of the other jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.

Defendant argues that this instruction was "coercive rather than instructive," and he takes particular issue with the court's instruction that the jurors should deliberate with a view toward reaching an agreement if they could do so "without violence" to their individual judgment. Although defendant does not elaborate on why this statement is especially coercive, [13] we presume his argument is that the "without violence" language suggested to the jurors that they could refuse to agree on a verdict only under the most extraordinary or extreme circumstances and that the statement therefore coerced the jury into reaching a verdict. We disagree.

Initially, we note that coercion by the trial court most commonly occurs during jury deliberations when the court tries to move a deadlocked jury toward a verdict. State v. McCutcheon, 162 Ariz. 54, 59 , 781 P.2d 31, 36 (1989). In this case, the challenged statements were made before the jury began deliberating, suggesting that the dynamics between the judge and jury lacked the coercive atmosphere present when a judge impresses upon a deadlocked or struggling jury the court's desire for a verdict. Nevertheless, the timing of the instruction, although highly relevant, is not dispositive of the issue. Rather, we will find coerciveness if, under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court's actions or remarks displaced the independent judgment of the jurors. State v. McCutcheon, 150 Ariz. 317, 320 , 723 P.2d 666, 669 (1986).

We find that the trial court's remarks did not have an improper effect upon a reasonable juror. The jury had not yet retired, and thus the jurors were not suffering from the fatigue or frustration that may accompany difficult hours of divisive deliberation which may, in turn, cause jurors to be susceptible to undue pressure from the bench. Further, the trial court expressly informed the jurors not to surrender their honest convictions concerning the weight of the evidence solely because of other jurors' opinions or "for the mere purpose of returning a verdict." We cannot conclude from these remarks that the jury received an improper message from the court encouraging them to compromise their individual impressions of the case so that a verdict could be reached. We therefore find no error in the unanimous verdict instruction.

D. Denial of Willits Instructions

Defendant requested, and the trial court refused, the following instruction concerning the state's alleged failure to preserve evidence with potentially exculpatory value:

You are instructed if the State did not conduct tests or did tests without disclosing the results, then you may infer that *627 the evidence would have been against the State.

This type of instruction is known as a Willits instruction, see State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184 , 393 P.2d 274 (1964), and it permits a jury to draw an inference against the prosecution if the state allows evidence within its control to be destroyed. State v. Broughton, 156 Ariz. 394, 399 , 752 P.2d 483, 488 (1988). This form of instruction is appropriate when a defendant proves that (1) the state failed to preserve "material and reasonably accessible evidence that had a tendency to exonerate the accused," and (2) prejudice resulted. State v. Reffitt, 145 Ariz. 452, 461 , 702 P.2d 681, 690 (1985); see Broughton, 156 Ariz. at 399 , 752 P.2d at 488 . A Willits instruction, however, is not appropriate if defendant fails to establish that the lost evidence would have had a tendency to exonerate him. Broughton, 156 Ariz. at 399 , 752 P.2d at 488 .

Defendant focuses on two pieces of evidence that he argues justified his proposed Willits instruction: the victim's bones, which were interred before defendant's second trial counsel had the remains examined by additional defense experts, and "certain FBI and DPS test results," which defendant claims the state did not disclose. Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court refused the proposed Willits instruction based on this evidence. That decision was within the trial court's discretion and we will not reverse it absent a clear abuse of that discretion. See State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464 , 687 P.2d 1214, 1219 (1984). We find no such abuse.

Concerning the victim's bones, we have already concluded that the state did not act improperly in allowing the burial. See supra Part 5(A)(1). Thus, defendant was not entitled to a Willits instruction for that evidence. Further, we find defendant's allegation that the state failed to disclose "certain FBI and DPS test results" unsupported by the record. Defendant does not attempt to specify which information was withheld by the prosecution, let alone how he was prejudiced by its withholding. We also view defendant's assertion in light of the state's statement to the trial court that "[a]ll the scientific examinations or testing of the evidence was disclosed under Rule 15." Therefore, given that defendant raises nothing more than a vague accusation of prosecutorial improprieties concerning unnamed test results, and any such impropriety is not apparent by our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Willits instruction.

Defendant also requested a Willits instruction concerning portions of a 1 1/2 to 2 hour interview he gave Lupita Murrillo, a Tucson television reporter on March 4, 1985. The edited and televised version was reduced to 3 or 4 minutes. Apparently, the prosecution attempted to have the outtakes of the original interview preserved, but was unsuccessful.

During its case-in-chief, the state presented the testimony of John Bowron, a Pima County Sheriff's Department corrections officer who was present during the interview. Officer Bowron testified that, during the meeting with Ms. Murrillo, defendant recanted his original story that he had stabbed a man in a drug transaction on the day the victim disappeared. According to Bowron, defendant informed Murrillo that he told this story to his companions at De Anza Park so that they "would think he was a tough guy."

At trial, defendant complained that because the entire, unedited interview was unavailable for the jury's viewing, he was prejudiced by Bowron's testimony and that he was therefore entitled to a Willits instruction concerning the outtakes of that interview. He requested, and the court refused, the following instruction:

If the defendant made statements to KVOA-TV Television in Tucson for one hour to one and a half hours, but a very small portion of that statement was recalled by the witness and preserved by KVOA-TV, you can infer that additional statements were made by the defendant indicating that he is not guilty of the charges.

*628 To succeed in obtaining a Willits instruction, defendant must convince the trial court that he was actually prejudiced by the prosecution's failure to preserve the "obviously material, and reasonably accessible" evidence. Perez, 141 Ariz. at 464 , 687 P.2d at 1219 . Assuming arguendo that the interview tapes were both obviously material and reasonably accessible, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested Willits instruction because defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice.

Defendant argues on appeal that he was prejudiced because the "complete story was not presented to the jury." With the actual tapes no longer available, however, Lupita Murrillo was the only other source from which the "complete story" — or a reasonable reconstruction — could be obtained. As the state informed the trial court, however, Ms. Murrillo's own interview with counsel not only substantiated Officer Bowron's testimony, but provided even more damaging recollections of her discussion with defendant, apparently including an admission by defendant that he in fact had had blood on his hands when he returned to De Anza Park. Our review of the record has revealed nothing to contradict this account of Ms. Murrillo's recollection of the interview. Thus, defendant failed to demonstrate that the absent evidence would have tended to exonerate him. See Broughton, 156 Ariz. at 399 , 752 P.2d at 488 .

Given these facts from which to rule on the requested Willits instruction, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Defendant failed to establish any prejudice caused by the unavailable evidence. Accordingly, he was not entitled to his proposed Willits instruction.

E. Denial of Unlawful Imprisonment Instruction

Defendant next argues that the trial court's refusal of defendant's request to instruct the jury that unlawful imprisonment is a lesser included offense of the crime of kidnapping amounted to reversible error. See State v. Caudillo, 124 Ariz. 410 , 604 P.2d 1121 (1979); State v. Celaya, 135 Ariz. 248 , 660 P.2d 849 (1983); A.R.S. § 13-1303 ("A person commits unlawful imprisonment by knowingly restraining another person."). Defendant's argument, however, disregards a crucial aspect of our analysis in both Caudillo and Celaya : that the evidence presented at trial must support the giving of a lesser included offense instruction. See, e.g., Celaya, 135 Ariz. at 253 , 660 P.2d at 854 (" Where a defense theory is reasonably supported by the evidence, it is reversible error not to give [the lesser included offense instruction]....") (emphasis added); State v. Schroeder, 95 Ariz. 255, 259 , 389 P.2d 255, 257 (1964) (lesser included offense instructions are justified only when evidence exists upon which the jury could convict defendant of a lesser offense).

Although defendant suggests that, upon reviewing the evidence, the jury could have concluded that he accidentally struck the victim's bike and then picked her up to return her to her home unharmed, this suggestion runs counter to the entire thrust of the defense presented at trial. Defense counsel offered an alibi defense, claiming not that defendant might have taken the girl and released her unharmed, but that defendant had absolutely no contact with the child at all. [14]

*629 As we held in State v. Caldera, 141 Ariz. 634, 637 , 688 P.2d 642, 645 (1984), when a defendant proffers an alibi defense, the record usually contains little evidence to support an instruction on a lesser included offense. Because defendant argued solely that he did not commit the offense charged and the state argued solely that he did commit the offense, no theory is advanced to support the theory of a lesser included offense. Caldera, 141 Ariz. at 637 , 688 P.2d at 645 . Thus, in this case, the defense did not attempt to argue that defendant came into contact with the victim and released her unharmed. Concerning the possibility that, despite defendant's alibi defense, the jury nevertheless could have been convinced by the evidence presented that he had taken the child and then released her, we find our discussion in Schroeder persuasive:

There remains the possibility, of course, that the jury might simply disbelieve the state's evidence on one element of the crime. If so, it is argued, conviction of a lesser offense is still possible. This reasoning, however, would require instructions on all offenses theoretically included in every criminal information [or indictment]. The law does not require or even permit such a procedure.

Schroeder, 95 Ariz. at 259 , 389 P.2d at 258 . We therefore find no error in the trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of unlawful imprisonment. We also find no error, fundamental or otherwise, in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on kidnapping as a class 4 felony, in which the victim is released voluntarily by defendant without physical injury in a safe place. See A.R.S. § 13-1304(B). As with unlawful imprisonment, the evidence presented at trial did not support such an instruction. [15]

F. Denial of Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses of First Degree Murder

In the same vein, defendant attacks the trial court's failure to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offenses of first degree felony murder, claiming that this refusal amounted to fundamental error. Indeed, because defendant's trial counsel explained to the trial court that he did not believe instructions on the lesser included offenses of murder were appropriate in this case, [16] the failure to instruct the jury on these matters would have to be fundamental error to merit reversal.

Our prior rulings, however, clearly demonstrate that a court does not err in refusing to instruct a jury on lesser included offenses in a felony murder case. See State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 30 , 734 P.2d 563, 572 (1987). As we emphasized in LaGrand , "no lesser included offense to felony murder exists because the mens rea necessary to satisfy the premeditation element of first degree murder is supplied by *630 the specific intent required for the felony." LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 30 , 734 P.2d at 572 , citing State v. Arias, 131 Ariz. 441, 443-44 , 641 P.2d 1285, 1287-88 (1982); Celaya, 135 Ariz. at 255 , 660 P.2d at 856 . Thus, we find defendant's argument wholly without merit and hold that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte about lesser included offenses of felony murder.

12, 13 and 14. Publicity and the Jury

Issues 12, 13 and 14 are discussed below in part 15.

15. Publicity and Fair Trial

Defendant raises four issues concerning the impact of pretrial and trial publicity on his right to a fair trial. Those issues are (12) whether the jury was biased by the publicity attendant to his case; (13) whether the trial court should have sequestered the jury during voir dire and trial; (14) whether the trial court improperly denied defendant's motion to change venue; and (15) whether defendant was otherwise denied a fair trial because of the publicity surrounding his prosecution. Because these challenges all focus on the extent and effect of publicity in this case, and because they overlap significantly in the issues they raise, we address them together.

As we have noted, this case generated significant media attention. Indeed, publicity in Tucson and Pima County was so extensive that the trial court granted a change of venue to Maricopa County. The court had expressed to both the prosecution and the defense its desire to keep the new trial location confidential, but as we discussed in our analysis of defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claims, the prosecutor revealed the new venue in court while the media was present. See supra Part 5(C), n. 5. As a result, argues defendant, the media attention did not subside, but rather relocated to Phoenix, where it pervaded television and newspaper coverage. Defendant asserts that this media coverage impeded the selection of a fair and impartial jury, and he asserts that the pro

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