Velazquez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

EMMANUEL VELAZQUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 3:24-cv-918-MMH-SJH

SERGEANT ALLEN,

SERGEANT WILLIAMS, and

SERGEANT MICHAEL WALIN,

Defendants.

___________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff Emmanuel Velazquez, a convicted state prisoner, sues for

federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and proceeds in forma

pauperis on his Amended Complaint (Doc. 5; Amended Complaint). Generally,

Velazquez alleges that correctional officers at Florida State Prison used

excessive force while escorting him to the medical unit shower on September

10, 2022. See generally id.

In his Amended Complaint, Velazquez sues three correctional officers in

their individual capacities: Sergeants Thomas D. Allen, Patrick A. Williams,

and Michael Walin.1 This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for

1 In his Amended Complaint, Velazquez incorrectly names Defendant Michael Walin

as “Officer Wallace.” Doc. 5 at 3. An earlier order grants Defendants’ unopposed

Summary Judgment (Doc. 24). Velazquez filed his Response (Doc. 27). And

Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 28). The motion is ripe for review.

I. Velazquez’s Allegations

In his Amended Complaint, Velazquez alleges that on September 10,

2022, at about 12:15 a.m., Defendants Allen, Williams, and Walin escorted him

to the medical unit shower at Florida State Prison. Doc. 5 at 6. He asserts that

all three defendants attacked him: Allen struck his face, Walin strangled him

until he passed out, and Williams fractured his ribs with a closed fist punch.

Id. He contends that Walin struck him “behind his head” with an unknown

object and that he was unconscious through most of the beating. Id. According

to Velazquez, he suffered contusions and swelling on the back of his head,

bruising and abrasions on his neck, one or more lower right ribs fractured or

dislocated, and broken teeth. Id. He also alleges that after the attack, Williams

threatened him to “keep quiet.” Id.

Velazquez contends that Defendants’ conduct constitutes excessive force

and violates his Eighth Amendment rights.2 Doc. 5 at 4. He seeks to recover

motion to correct the misnomer and directs the Clerk to correct the docket to reflect

Defendant’s correct name as “Michael Walin.” Doc. 17 at 5.

2 An earlier order directed Velazquez to notify the Court whether he intended to

pursue an additional claim that he was denied adequate medical care and afforded

him an opportunity to file a second amended complaint. Doc. 9. Velazquez notified

the Court that he intended to pursue only an excessive force claim against the three

named Defendants, and he filed no second amended complaint. Doc. 10.

compensatory and punitive damages for physical injuries, mental anguish, and

emotional distress. Id.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The record to

be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits for declarations,

stipulations (including those made for purpose of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).3 An

3 Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding

summary-judgment options.” Rule 56 advisory committee’s note 2010 Amends.

The standard for granting summary judgment remains

unchanged. The language of subdivision (a) continues to

require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. The amendments will not affect continuing

development of the decisional law construing and applying

these phrases.

Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[‘s] notes are not

binding, they are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3

(11th Cir. 2013). Thus, case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of review

remains viable.

In citing to Campbell, the Court notes that it does not rely on unpublished

opinions as binding precedent; however, they may be cited in this Order when the

Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th

1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022), see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2

(“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited

as persuasive authority.”).

issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ.,

93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g

Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support

of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for

summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381

F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no

genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &

Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “When a moving party has

discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the

pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th

Cir. 1995) (citations and quotations omitted).

Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must

view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party

opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th

Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38

F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)). “Summary judgment is improper, however,

if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th

Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. Summary of the Arguments and Evidence

A. Defendants’ Argument and Evidence

Defendants Allen, Williams, and Walin move for summary judgment and

argue that Velazquez cannot prove an Eighth Amendment violation because

the undisputed evidence clearly contradicts his allegations. Doc. 24. They

contend that Velazquez suffered no injuries besides self-inflicted wounds and

they used the least amount of force when escorting Velazquez to the medical

unit shower. Id.4

In support of their motion, Defendants submit the following evidentiary

materials: Defendant Walin’s Incident Report and attached medical records

(Doc. 24-1); the declaration of Kellie Caswell, a Florida Department of

4 Because the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

Velazquez’s Eighth Amendment claim, the Court need not consider Defendants’

additional arguments that Valezquez is entitled to neither compensatory nor punitive

damages.

Corrections (“FDOC”) Legal Nurse Consultant, and Velazquez’s attached

prison medical files (525 pages) (Doc. 24-2); the transcript of Velazquez’s

deposition (Doc. 24-3); Velazquez’s responses to Defendants’ Interrogatories

(Doc. 24-4); the FDOC MINS Incident Report (Doc. 24-5); and the declaration

of Jeffrey McClellan, an Assistant Warden at Florida State Prison (Doc. 24-6).

These evidentiary materials, viewed in the light most favorable to Velazquez,

demonstrate the following:

On September 9, 2022, at approximately 10:38 p.m., Sergeant Michael

Walin observed Velazquez unresponsive in his cell. Doc. 24-1 at 1 (Walin’s

Incident Report). Walin requested medical staff, an officer in charge, and the

Alpha response team to respond for Velazquez’s medical emergency. Id. While

another sergeant operated a handheld video camera,5 Walin breached

Velazquez’s cell door with the Alpha response team, which included Defendant

Allen and other officers, as well as medical personnel. Id.

5 The record contains no video recording of the incident. Defendants explain that a

sergeant operated a handheld video camera, which recorded Velazquez being escorted

to the medical unit, to the medical unit shower, and back to his cell. Doc. 24-1 at 1;

Doc. 24-5 at 5. Defendants explain that “for obvious privacy reasons, there is no

camera recording in the shower.” Doc. 28 at 3. However, the FDOC did not retain the

video recording after its Inspector General’s investigation concluded that Velazquez’s

grievance allegations lacked evidentiary support. Doc. 24 at 3, n. 1. Additionally,

Jeffrey McClellan, Assistant Warden at Florida State Prison, declares that no video

recordings of the incident were retained after the prison’s 30-day retention period.

Doc. 24-6 at 1.

Once Velazquez was fully restrained, he was placed on a stretcher and

delivered to the medical unit where he received a medical assessment by

nurses. Id. at 1 and 4. Nurse Mae Harrold observed that (1) Velazquez was “not

unresponsive [but] just would not answer the officers[;]” (2) there was a large

amount of blood in the cell and in the toilet, and there was no blood on the bed;

and (3) there was blood all over Velazquez’s upper torso but its origin could not

be determined. Id. at 4. Velazquez was then sent to the shower to clean off the

blood. Id.

When Velazquez returned to the clinic from the shower, medical

personnel observed four small puncture wounds, which measured

approximately two centimeters, on his torso under his right arm. Doc. 24-1 at

1. Nurse Harrold asked Velazquez why he did this, and he responded, “I don’t

know.” Id. at 4. The nurse observed that “it appears that the inmate was

collecting blood in cups and putting water in the cups to make it seem like

there was more blood than it really was.” Id. Nurse Collins cleaned Velazquez’s

torso and reported “no bleeding.” Id. at 5. Velazquez was given a referral for

mental health treatment and was returned to his cell without further incident.

Id. Nurse Collins noted that Velazquez would be checked at 2:00 a.m. Id.

Four days later, on September 13, 2022, Velazquez submitted a “sick

call” and was evaluated for what he claimed was a physical altercation. Doc.

24-2 at 473–74 (Velazquez’s medical records). He complained of a headache,

rib pain, bruised eyes, facial swelling, shortness of breath, and right hip pain.

Id. at 473. He reported that his pain was “everywhere” and rated his pain as 9

out of 10. Id. at 474. After assessing Valezquez’s condition, the medical

provider documented that Velazquez was able to ambulate and lift his shirt

and had “full range of motion.” Id. The medical provider further reported that

Velazquez had “no swelling or bruising to [his] face or ribs/ abdomen,” “no

redness to the area [where] he said he had pain,” and “no deformity present

anywhere.” Id. Velazquez was given Tylenol for pain and discharged to his cell.

Id.

Approximately two weeks later, on September 29, 2022, Velazquez again

was seen in the medical clinic. Doc. 24-2 at 460. He reported that he suffered

“staff abuse” on September 9, 2022. Id. He refused to be assessed, but medical

personnel reported that he was alert and ambulatory. Id. Velazquez was

discharged to his cell without treatment. Id. Velazquez’s medical records

contain no additional documents related to the incident. See generally Doc. 24-

2.

On September 28, 2022, Velazquez filed a grievance in which he

complained that he was “taken on a stretcher to medical room while a handheld

camera was recorded” but that the “handheld camera was turned off” before

the three Defendants escorted him to the shower and physically attacked him.

Doc. 24-5 at 3 (FDOC MINS Incident Report). The Incident Report documents

the following (id. at 5–6):

[A] camera review was conducted and shows inmate

Velazquez enter the clinic. Once in the clinic, Inmate

Velazquez enters the medical exam room and multiple

staff members are seen entering and exiting the

medical exam room. Inmate Velazquez is then escorted

to the shower and then escorted back to his assigned

cell. At no time during the camera review does Inmate

Velazquez seem to be under duress. Inmate Velazquez

was provided a witness statement to which he refused

to provide further information. Inmate Velazquez was

afforded the opportunity to be seen by medical to

which he refused. The video recording was downloaded

to the USB drive assigned to the Colonel’s area.

Ultimately, the Office of the Inspector General concluded that “there is no

evidence to substantiate the allegations being made.” Id. at 6.

B. Velazquez’s Argument and Evidence

Velazquez responds in opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment

motion and attempts to raise new claims. Doc. 27. He argues that at around

midnight on the morning of September 10, 2022, he was escorted to the prison’s

medical unit shower because of complications due to his sickle cell disease. Id.

at 2. According to Velazquez, a responding officer was recording with a

handheld camera, but the “camera was erroneously turned off” before

Defendants beat him in the medical unit shower.6 Id. at 6.

In order to show there is a genuine issue for trial, Velazquez files no

additional evidentiary materials, and instead, points to specific documents

already in the record. Specifically, Velazquez emphasizes medical records that

document his chronic sickle cell disease.7 Additionally, Velazquez testified that

he suffers from sickle cell anemia and occasionally experiences weakness and

dizzy spells. Doc. 24-3 at 11 (Velazquez deposition).

Velazquez argues that after he arrived in the medical unit, a responding

officer turned off his handheld camera, and Defendants Allen, Williams, and

Walin escorted him to the shower. Doc. 27 at 2. Velazquez testified that the

shower was located approximately 20 to 30 feet from the medical clinic. Doc.

6 Additionally, Velazquez argues that (1) after he returned to his cell from the medical

unit, two additional officers who are not parties to this case beat him (Doc. 27 at 4)

and (2) he was denied medical care and food (id. at 4–5). However, these additional

allegations of excessive force and denial of food and medical care are not properly

before the Court. When Velazquez elected not to file a second amended complaint, he

abandoned any claim of denial of medical care and any claim against officers other

than the named Defendants. Doc. 10.

7 Velazquez emphasizes his medical history of anemia and sickle cell disease in order

to show that he required medical care on the evening in question not because he had

engaged in self-harm but because he was experiencing complications due to this

condition. The Court independently reviewed all 525 pages of Velazquez’s prison

medical records. The records confirm that “sickle cell trait” and “microcytic

hypochromic anemia” are two of Velazquez’s “Current [Medical] Problems.” See e.g.,

Doc. 24-2 at 25–26, 56, 60, 463–65. However, the record fails to suggest whether

Velazquez required medical attention on the evening in question because of a medical

event related to a chronic blood disorder, or injuries caused by self-harm, or both.

24-3 at 13. As Velazquez entered the shower, both his hands and feet were

restrained. Id. at 14. Once he was in the shower, Velazquez testified,

Defendant Walin approached him from behind and, instead of removing his

restraints, hit him with an unknown object, knocking him unconscious. Id. at

14–15. While he was restrained and on the shower floor, Walin and Allen

choked him and hit him in the face. Id. at 16. Defendants continued to beat

and choke Velazquez until he “passed out a number of times.” Id. at 15. After

Velazquez regained consciousness, one of the defendants threw soap at him

and told him to clean up. Id. Williams beat him in his ribs and threatened him

to keep quiet. Id. at 16. Defendants removed the restraints, and Velazquez was

able to shower. Id. at 17.

After he showered, Velazquez returned to the medical unit, and the

nurse checked his vitals. Id. at 18. He received no treatment and was returned

to his cell without further incident.8 Id. A few hours later, Walin and a nurse

visited Velazquez in his cell to check on his condition. Id. at 23–25. When the

nurse asked Velazquez if he was o.k., Defendant Walin would not allow him to

8 In his response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Velazquez argues that,

after his initial medical assessment, he was referred to a doctor who ordered x-ray

exams to accurately evaluate the internal damages he suffered because of the

incident, including head trauma and fractured ribs. Doc. 27 at 9. However, the records

Velazquez points to do not support this contention. Rather, the records show that in

October 2022, Velazquez was seen for a Chronic Care Consult. Doc. 24-2 at 446–51;

486–91. During this visit, he complained of pain due to a rod in his knee and was

referred for an x-ray. Id. These records lack any reference to injuries allegedly

sustained during the September 10, 2022, incident.

respond. Id. at 25. Velazquez continues to experience pain in ribs on his right

side. Id. at 19. He has received ibuprofen for the pain. Id.

IV. Applicable Law

The Eighth Amendment “prohibits the unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain, or the infliction of pain totally without penological

justification.” Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir. 1987). However, it is

well understood that prison guards, who are charged with maintaining order

and security, may use force when necessary to bring unruly inmates into

compliance. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986); Williams v.

Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991).

In Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020), the

Eleventh Circuit reviewed “the principles applicable to Eighth Amendment

excessive-force” claims:

The Eighth Amendment, among other things,

prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.

Const. amend. VIII. As the Supreme Court has

explained, “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain” qualifies under the Eighth Amendment as

proscribed “cruel and unusual punishment.” Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). Nevertheless, the

Supreme Court has instructed that what rises to the

level of an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”

differs based on the type of Eighth Amendment

violation alleged. Id.

. . . “[T]he core judicial inquiry” requires [the

Court] to consider “whether force was applied in a

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins,

559 U.S. at 37.[9] This standard requires a prisoner to

establish two elements – one subjective and one

objective: the official must have both “acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind” (the subjective

element), and the conduct must have been “objectively

harmful enough to establish a constitutional

violation.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8.

With respect to the subjective element, “to have

a valid claim . . . the excessive force must have been

sadistically and maliciously applied for the very

purpose of causing harm.” Johnson v. Breeden, 280

F.3d 1308, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Thomas v.

Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010).

As for the objective component of an excessive-

force violation, it focuses on whether the official’s

actions were “harmful enough,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8,

or “sufficiently serious,” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,

298 (1991), to violate the Constitution. “Not every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a

federal cause of action.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. “The

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and

unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical

force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 37–38.

Instead, the Eighth Amendment prohibits force that

offends “contemporary standards of decency,”

regardless of whether “significant injury is evident,”

though the extent of injury may shed light on the

amount of force applied or “whether the use of force

could plausibly have been thought necessary.”

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37.

Id. at 1265–66 (internal citations cleaned up).

9 Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (per curiam).

Regardless of the type of force involved, courts consider five distinct

factors when determining whether an officer applied force maliciously and

sadistically for the purpose of causing harm:

(1) the extent of injury; (2) the need for application of

force; (3) the relationship between that need and the

amount of force used; (4) any efforts made to temper

the severity of a forceful response; and (5) the extent

of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as

reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the

basis of facts known to them.

Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Whitley, 475

U.S. at 321; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). Notably, a lack of serious injury, while not

dispositive, is relevant to the inquiry:

“[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one

factor that may suggest ‘whether the use of force could

plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a particular

situation.” Ibid.[10] (quoting Whitley, supra, at 321,

106 S.Ct. 1078). The extent of injury may also provide

some indication of the amount of force applied. . . . An

inmate who complains of a “‘push or shove’” that

causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to

state a valid excessive force claim. Id. at 9 (quoting

Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.

1973)).[11]

Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly

correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts.

An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does

10 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.

11 See Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033 (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later

seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s

constitutional rights.”).

not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim

merely because he has the good fortune to escape

without serious injury.

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37–38. Nevertheless, a prisoner’s injuries or lack thereof

may be “evidence of the kind or degree of force that was used by [an] officer.”

Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 700 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Crocker v.

Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021)).

In considering the Whitley factors, courts must “give a ‘wide range of

deference to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security,’

including when considering ‘[d]ecisions made at the scene of a disturbance.’”

Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v.

Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990)). Moreover, corrections officials

are not required to “convince every inmate that their orders are reasonable and

well-thought out,” and “[c]ertainly . . . are not required to do so where an

inmate repeatedly fails to follow those orders.” Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298,

1307 (11th Cir. 2008), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized by

Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). As such, “courts must

determine whether the evidence goes beyond a mere dispute over the

reasonableness of a particular use of force or the existence of arguably superior

alternatives.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. A case should not go to the jury

“[u]nless it appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of

pain.” Id.

V. Analysis

The Court cannot conclude that the evidentiary materials on file, viewed

in the light most favorable to Velazquez, demonstrate an Eighth Amendment

violation such that a jury could reasonably find in Velazquez’s favor. The

record establishes, and the parties agree, that Defendant Walin observed

Velazquez unresponsive in his cell. Doc. 24-1 at 1. Officers and medical

personnel responded to Velazquez’s cell and transported him on a stretcher

from his cell to the medical unit for assessment. Id. After initial assessment in

the medical unit, the undisputed record shows that all three Defendants

escorted Velazquez to the shower. Doc. 24-3 at 12–17; Doc. 24-5 at 3. It is here

that the parties’ accounts differ on material facts. Velazquez alleges that, in

the shower, he was beaten by Defendants outside the view of any camera. Doc.

27 at 3. Defendants, on the other hand, dispute altogether that they beat

Velazquez and argue that this was not a use-of-force event, but rather, a

medical emergency in which they used “no forceful response.” Doc. 24 at 10.

A. Velazquez’s claim is contradicted by the record.

The problem for Velazquez is that no evidence—other than his own

deposition testimony—supports the contention that Defendants beat him in

the medical unit shower. In fact, his claim is affirmatively contradicted by the

record. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties

tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record,

so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version

of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”); Perez

v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016) (same); Singletary v.

Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174, 1183 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hen the non-movant’s

assertion is so utterly discredited by the record, no genuine dispute of material

fact exists sufficient to prompt an inference on behalf of the non-movant.”)

(quotations omitted).

When asked whether anyone witnessed the attack, Velazquez testified

that nurses and medical staff “probably heard . . . the commotion of [him] being

beaten down.” Doc. 24-3 at 8. However, the medical providers’ reports do not

substantiate Velazquez’s allegation of an unprovoked, brutal attack in the

shower. Doc. 24-1 at 1–5. Instead, medical personnel determined that

Velazquez had engaged in self-harm in his cell. Nurse Harrold observed that

Velazquez arrived at the medical unit with blood covering his torso, and once

he returned from the shower, four small puncture wounds were discovered on

his torso under his right arm. Doc. 24-1 at 1. Nurse Collins observed that once

Velazquez’s torso was cleaned there was “no bleeding.” Id. at 5. Neither nurse

observed any bruising or injuries consistent with the attack that Velazquez

alleges. To the contrary, Nurse Harrold concluded that Velazquez engaged in

self-harm in his cell and “was collecting blood in cups . . . to make it seem like

there was more blood than it really was.” Id. at 1. Velazquez was returned to

his cell without further treatment or incident. Id.

Velazquez’s two subsequent visits to the medical unit similarly do not

support—and instead, contradict—his story of an attack in the shower. Four

days after the incident, Velazquez complained of pain “everywhere,” but the

medical provider documented that he was able to ambulate with “full range of

motion” and had “no swelling or bruising” and “no deformity present

anywhere.” Doc. 24-2 at 473–74. When he returned to the medical unit two

weeks later again complaining of “staff abuse,” Velazquez refused to be

assessed. Doc. 24-2 at 460. Medical personnel documented that he was alert

and ambulatory, and he was discharged without treatment. Id. Therefore,

Velazquez’s story of an unprovoked attack in the shower simply does not align

with records that show he suffered only self-inflicted puncture wounds that

required no medical attention.

Additionally, Velazquez’s suggestion that a handheld camera was turned

off in order to facilitate Defendants attacking him in the shower is clearly

contradicted by the record and affords him no support. Velazquez complained

in his grievance that he was “taken on a stretcher to a medical room while a

handheld camera was recorded” but that the “handheld camera was turned off”

before the three Defendants escorted him to the shower and attacked him. Doc.

24-5 at 3. However, the FDOC MINS report confirms that a review of the

recording was conducted, and the recording showed that Velazquez was

“escorted to the shower and then escorted back to his assigned cell” and that

“[a]t no time . . . does Inmate Velazquez seem to be under duress.” Id.

Finally, no evidence suggests why Defendants would engage in an

unprovoked beating. In fact, Velazquez testified that before the September 10,

2022, incident, he had no altercations or incidents with Defendants. Doc. 24-3

at 8. And, when asked whether anything “happened earlier in the day that may

have prompted this attack,” Velazquez responded “no” and suggested

Defendants “just didn’t feel like working.” Id. at 21.

If this case were to proceed to trial, Velazquez would have only his own

testimony that Defendants beat him for the sole purpose of inflicting pain.

Given the record in this case, such unsubstantiated allegations constitute no

more than a “mere scintilla of evidence” upon which no reasonable jury could

find in his favor. See Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990)

(“A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not

suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find

for that party.”). Indeed, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual

allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.”

Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005). Here, based on the

evidentiary materials submitted by Defendants, and Velazquez’s failure to

point to any evidence other than his own testimony, which is inconsistent with

the record, no reasonable jury could find in his favor on his allegation of

excessive force in the medical unit shower.

B. The Whitley factors balance in Defendants’ favor.

Moreover, affording Defendants Allen, Williams, and Walin “a wide

range of deference” in maintaining prison security, the relevant12 Whitley

factors balance in their favor. The first factor—the extent of Velazquez’s

injuries (or lack thereof)—weighs against a finding of an Eighth Amendment

violation. The record shows that Velazquez was evaluated by medical

personnel after returning from the shower and was found to have no injuries

other than four self-inflicted puncture wounds. Doc. 24-1 at 1. The record

establishes that neither the puncture wounds nor any other medical

condition—no matter the cause—required medical intervention, and

Velazquez was returned to his cell with only a referral for mental health

treatment. Id.

When Velazquez returned to the medical clinic four days later

complaining of pain “everywhere,” the medical provider reported “no swelling

or bruising,” “no redness,” and “no deformity present anywhere,” and

Velazquez was issued only Tylenol for his pain. Doc. 24-2 at 473–74.

12 The fourth Whitley factor—the efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful

response—is not relevant to the issues presented here.

Velazquez’s full medical file contains no additional records related to the

incident nor any records documenting the alleged injuries. Accordingly, the

record shows that the force Defendants used in escorting Velazquez to the

shower did not result in any discernable injury that required medical

intervention. See Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38 (explaining that a “push or shove that

causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive

force claim”) (quotations omitted); see also Charles, 18 F.4th at 700 (explaining

that minor injuries “can be evidence of the kind or degree of force that was used

by the officer”).

Similarly, the second and third factors—the need for force and the

relationship between that need and the amount of force used—also weigh

against a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation. The record shows there

was a need for an officer to intervene in order to maintain order and security

because Defendant Walin observed Velazquez unresponsive in his cell and

experiencing a medical emergency. Doc. 24-1 at 1; see also Whitley, 475 U.S.

at 320– 21. A team of officers and medical staff responded to Velazquez’s cell

and transported him on a stretcher to the medical unit. Doc. 24-1. The record

shows there was a need for Velazquez to shower because he arrived in the

medical unit with blood covering his torso and medical personnel could not

determine from where it originated. Id. Defendants’ conduct of responding to

Velazquez’s medical emergency by escorting him first to the medical unit and

next to the medical unit shower was necessary to respond to Velazquez’s

medical emergency and did not constitute force that is inflicted “maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. Importantly, there is

no evidence—other than Velasquez’s uncorroborated deposition—to show that

Defendants used any more force than necessary to respond to Velasquez’s

medical emergency. Instead, the record evidence shows that he was returned

to his cell without any further use of force or medical intervention.

Finally, the fifth factor—the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and

inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials—weighs against

a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation. The record shows that only

Velazquez’s health and safety were threatened during his medical emergency,

and no other inmates were involved. Because Velazquez arrived at the medical

unit with blood covering his torso, Defendants reasonably perceived a need to

escort Velazquez to the shower in order to facilitate a proper medical

assessment.

Focusing on “the core judicial inquiry” of “whether force was applied in

a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm,” and considering all the evidence, the Court

concludes that Velazquez does not point to evidence reasonably suggesting

Defendants Allen, Williams, and Walin used force maliciously or sadistically

to cause him harm. See Hudson, 503 U.S at 7.

VI. Conclusion

On review of the entire record in the light most favorable to Velazquez,

the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find in favor of Velazquez on

his claim that Defendants applied excessive force against him while escorting

him to the medical unit shower. As such, Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment in their favor.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24) is

GRANTED.

2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Sergeants

Thomas D. Allen, Michael Walin, and Patrick A. Williams, to terminate any

pending motions, and to CLOSE the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 15th day of

September, 2026.

United States District Judge

TpaP-5

C: Emmanuel Velazquez, C02674

Counsel of Record

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