Rife

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANIEL EDUARDO FLOREZ

RODRIGUEZ, A# 241 883 891,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-01696

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

JOHN E. RIFE, Acting Field Office

Director of Enforcement and

Removal Operations, Philadelphia

Field Office, Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, et al.,

Respondents.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM

On June 19, 2026, the petitioner, appearing through counsel, filed

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc.

1. In this petition, Daniel Eduardo Florez Rodriguez, a native and citizen

of Colombia, challenges the legality of his pre-removal immigration

detention without an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A). At the time of filing, Florez Rodriguez was being held in

the custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”) at Clinton County Correctional Facility, located in Clinton

County, Pennsylvania.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Florez Rodriguez initially entered the United States without

inspection at or near San Luis, Arizona, on or about September 2, 2022.

Florez Rodriguez was apprehended by United States Border Patrol

shortly thereafter and detained briefly. On September 3, 2022, he was

released on his own recognizance, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).1

Pet. Ex. B, Doc. 1-3. At the time of his release, Florez Rodriguez was

served with a Notice to Appear, DHS Form I-862, dated September 3,

2022, which declared him to be subject to removal as an “alien present in

the United States who has not been admitted or paroled,”2 and which

directed him to appear for a hearing before an immigration judge in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on June 15, 2023. Pet. Ex. A, Doc. 1-2; Resp.

Ex. 2, Doc. 3-3.

1 At the time of his initial release, Florez Rodriguez was served with

an Order of Release on Recognizance, DHS Form I-220A, dated

September 3, 2022, and prepared by a border patrol officer, which advised

that he had been released on his own recognizance pursuant to “section

236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the applicable provisions

of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations.” Pet. Ex. B, Doc. 1-3. The

Order of Release on Recognizance further directed him to report in person

to a local ICE office in York, Pennsylvania, at 9:00 a.m. on September 20,

2022.

2 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring her to be an “arriving

alien” was checked. Pet. Ex. A, Doc. 1-2; Resp. Ex. 2, Doc. 3-3.

Since entering the United States, Florez Rodriguez has resided in

Pennsylvania. He has no criminal history.

On June 17, 2026, Florez Rodriguez was observed leaving the

Walmart Bloomsburg Supercenter by ICE officers working alongside

Hemlock Township police officers under a 287(g) task force agreement.

The Hemlock Township police officers conducted a vehicle stop at a

nearby intersection, where ICE officers questioned Florez Rodriguez

about his identity, nationality, and immigration status. After Florez

Rodriguez confirmed his identity and a records check confirmed his

immigration status, Florez Rodriguez was detained by ICE and

transported to a local ICE office in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, for

processing.

Florez Rodriguez was then transported to Clinton County

Correctional Facility, where he was incarcerated at the time when he

commenced this habeas proceeding. He was subsequently transferred to

the California City Immigration Processing Center, a privately owned

and operated immigration processing center operated under contract

with ICE, which is located in Kern County, California. He has been

denied any opportunity to post bond or to be released on other conditions.

II. DISCUSSION

Since the United States began restricting

immigration into this country in the late 19th century,

it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking

entry into the country and those already residing

within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line”

who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do

not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded

to persons inside the United States. But once a

noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal

circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to

due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s

borders, “whether their presence here is lawful,

unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction

between noncitizens who have entered and reside in

the United States and those who have not yet entered

“runs throughout immigration law.”

, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Idaho 2025) (first

quoting , 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then quoting

, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) (citations omitted).

Consistent with this distinction, “[t]wo statutory sections govern

the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225 and 1226.” , 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal.

Sept. 23, 2025), , No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As

concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law

authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens

into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the

Government to detain certain aliens pending the

outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”

, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added).

Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is

present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an

‘applicant for admission.’” , 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2).

Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who ( ) are arriving in the

United States, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or

have been physically present in the United States for less than two years

without being admitted or paroled, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (the

“designation provision”),3 ( ) are inadmissible either for

3 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of

aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of

aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security,

§ 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii), but the current scope of that designation is “the full

scope of statutory authority,” and thus all aliens who have not been

admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been

physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year

period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited

removal under § 1225(b)(1).

, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025);

misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to

the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); § 1182(a)(6)(C) (inadmissibility based

on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) (inadmissibility for lack of

documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited

removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien

expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which

case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final

determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have

such a fear, until removal. § 1225(b)(1)(B).

, 962 F.3d 612, 618–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (summarizing

expedited removal provisions); , 811 F.

Supp. 3d 274, 291–92 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same);

, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 59–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),

, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).

Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader . . . catchall provision” that applies

, 962 F.3d 612, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic overview

of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii));

, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),

, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).

to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the

United States.4 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); , 583 U.S. at 287.

Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary

(not expedited) removal proceedings. § 1225(b)(2)(A);

§ 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration

judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory

detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A); § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of

Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting

removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on

land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be

returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather

than be detained); , 809 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (“Section

1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow

humanitarian parole.”).

Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to

detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of

4 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to

those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not

relevant here. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B).

removal proceedings.” , 583 U.S. at 289. Such aliens who are

already present in the United States may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c).

Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for

these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a

warrant issued by the Attorney General,[5] an alien may be arrested and

detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from

the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that

such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain

pending. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide

that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that

such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the

alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8),

1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities6 are tasked with an initial bond or

custody determination, §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the

5 This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has

been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in

the applicable regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2);

§§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b).

6 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue

arrest warrants. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8).

alien may request an individualized bond hearing before an immigration

judge, §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); § 1003.19 (setting out

procedures for the review of bond determinations by immigration judges).

, 586 U.S. 392, 397 (2019) (“If the alien is

detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the

Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge

(both exercising power delegated by the Secretary); and the alien may

secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that

he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.”) (citations

omitted). An adverse bond determination by the immigration judge can

be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 U.S.C.

§§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(3).

, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (3d Cir. 2018) (summarizing § 1226(a)

bond procedures).

Finally, “Section 1226(c) . . . carves out a statutory category of

aliens who may be released under § 1226(a).” , 583 U.S. at

289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require

mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond

hearing under § 1226(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may

only be released under very narrow circumstances involving a

determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is

necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a

flight risk or a danger to the community. § 1226(c)(4);

, 583 U.S. at 289.

The petitioner in this case, Daniel Eduardo Florez Rodriguez, has

been detained by immigration authorities without a bond determination

pending disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.7 In his

petition, Florez Rodriguez argues that, because he was detained within

the interior of the United States, he is not properly subject to mandatory

pre-removal-order detention under § 1225(b)(2). Rather, he contends that

he may only be properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires that

he be given an opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. Florez

Rodriguez further asserts a claim under the Administrative Procedures

Act (“APA”) based on the agency’s failure to follow its own bond

regulations.8 In addition to these statutory arguments, Florez Rodriguez

7 The parties do not dispute that the petitioner has been putatively

detained without an opportunity for release on bond pursuant to

§ 1225(b)(2).

8 Having granted relief on the basis of the petitioner’s primary

argues that his pre-removal detention without an opportunity to be

considered for release on bond violates his Fifth Amendment due process

rights.

The respondent, on the other hand, argues that § 1225(b)(2) does

properly apply to the petitioner, and that it prescribes mandatory

detention.9 The respondent further argues that applying § 1225(b)(2)

here comports with due process.

The Third Circuit has recently addressed these very same legal

questions under materially identical facts in a precedential opinion.

, ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 2546223

(3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026). In , the Third Circuit held that “for

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, the noncitizen must do more than be an

‘applicant for admission.’” at *3. Rather, “to fall within

§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s ambit, an ‘applicant for admission’ must engage in

present or ongoing action to gain ‘admission,’ that is, ‘lawful entry . . .

into the United States after inspection and authorization by an

statutory claim—that his detention is pursuant to § 1226(a) rather than

§ 1225(b)(2)—we decline to reach the petitioner’s alternative argument

that his detention violates the APA.

9 We note that the respondent’s answer does not engage with the

petitioner’s APA claim at all. In any event, see note 8.

immigration officer.’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (ellipsis in

original). In other words, to be subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A), an “applicant

for admission” must “engage in an ongoing affirmative act to ‘seek[]

admission’ to the United States.” at *4; at *5 (“§ 1225(b)

governs noncitizens arriving to the United States whereas § 1226

governs those already within our borders.”).10

10 , 175 F.4th 61, 73, 75 (2d Cir.

2026) (“Section 1226(a) plainly applies to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who

are present in the United States, but charged as inadmissible for entering

the country without inspection and admission. . . . Section 1225(b)(2)(A)

applies to those noncitizens who present themselves at a port of entry for

admission, or who cross the physical border into the United States but

are apprehended at the ‘threshold of initial entry.’”);

, 175 F.4th 828, 856 (7th Cir. 2026) (“[T]he

text, statutory context, legislative history, and long-standing Executive

practice all confirm that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to ‘applicants for

admission’ who are seeking lawful entry at the border or ports of entry

and not to noncitizens unlawfully living in the country’s interior.”);

, 175 F.4th 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2026)

(“The text and statutory structure of the INA, bolstered by the long

history of detention across our immigration laws and the congressional

purpose in passing IIRIRA, yield the conclusion that no-bond detention

generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful entry to the country,

and not to aliens who are simply present here.”);

, 175 F.4th 713, 732 (6th Cir. 2026) (holding that noncitizens

without lawful status who had lived in the United States for years were

not “seeking admission” and thus were not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s

mandatory detention scheme); , 180 F.4th 1226,

1239 (10th Cir. 2026) (“The only time a noncitizen can be said to be

seeking admission is when he is seeking to enter the United States at the

As in , Florez Rodriguez is no longer seeking

admission into the United States. At the time of his arrest and detention,

he was not actively attempting to come into the United States at a border

or port of entry. Rather, he is already here, having resided within the

United States for an extended period of time. “Because § 1225(b)(2)(A)

does not apply to [Florez Rodriguez] as [he] [was] not detained at the

border. Since § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those seeking admission,

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) is likewise limited to the border.” (footnote omitted));

at 1248 (“§ 1225(b)(2)(A) applies at the border while § 1226(a) applies to

the interior.”); , 183 F.4th 909, 931 (7th Cir. 2026)

(holding that, “based on the INA’s text, structure, and history,” a

noncitizen, who entered the United States without inspection and was

detained after living there for several years, “is present in the United

States without admission and is not ‘seeking admission,’” and he “is

therefore not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and is eligible for a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a)”); , 183 F.4th 1160, 1172 (9th Cir.

2026) (“[Section] 1225(b)(2)(A), based on its text and context, is best

construed as applying to aliens entering the United States at the border.

Section 1226, by contrast, is best understood as governing inadmissible

and deportable aliens present in the interior of the United States.”);

, ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 2352042, at *11 (1st

Cir. Aug. 13, 2026) (“In sum, our careful study of the disputed statutory

texts leads us to join the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and

Eleventh Circuits in holding that noncitizens . . . who are present in the

United States without admission are not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s

mandatory detention provision, but rather, are governed by § 1226.”);

, ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 2661092, at *6 (4th

Cir. Sept. 10, 2026) (“Section 1226, not Section 1225, applies to

noncitizens who . . . have been present in the United States for years

regardless of how they entered our country.”).

border, [his] detention[] [was] unlawful under that provision of the INA.”

at *7.

Moreover, the Third Circuit also concluded that the

petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing violated the Due Process

Clause. at *8. As in , we assess this petitioner’s due

process claim by considering the factors: “(1) the private

interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an

erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and

the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural

safeguards, and (3) the Government’s interest, including the function

involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or

substitute procedural requirement would entail.” at *9 (quoting

, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). First, as in , we conclude that “mandatory

detention implicates [Florez Rodriguez’s] constitutionally protected

interest in avoiding physical restraint.” (quoting ,

521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, we

too conclude that “the absence of an opportunity for a neutral

decisionmaker to assess whether [Florez Rodriguez] [is] dangerous or [a]

flight risk[] presents a high risk of erroneously depriving [Florez

Rodriguez] of [his] liberty interest.” (citations omitted). Third, on the

record before us, we likewise conclude that “the Government’s legitimate

interest in preventing the release of dangerous noncitizens and those who

might fail to appear at future hearings does not outweigh the other two

factors here, particularly when [this] non-criminal individual[] [was]

detained absent evidence that [he] is dangerous or a flight risk, and the

Government has not argued that [a] bond hearing[] [is] unduly

burdensome.” at *10 (citation omitted).

Thus, we conclude that the factors weigh in the

petitioner’s favor, and his detention without a bond hearing violated his

due process rights.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that, because he is

not actively seeking admission and has been living in interior of the

United States for an extended period of time, the petitioner’s continued

mandatory detention without a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful. Accordingly, we will grant the petition and

order the petitioner’s immediate release from custody.

, No. 26-603, 2026 WL 401189 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2026) (granting

immediate release), ,

___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 2546223 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026);

, No. 25-cv-05930, 2025 WL 3296300 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2025)

(same), , ___ F.4th

____, 2026 WL 2546223 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026).

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: September 15, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge