Marron

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Miami Division

Case Number: 21-23190-CIV-MORENO

_CARLOS EDUARDO MARRON, MARIA

MARRON, C.R., a minor, and S.A., a minor,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

NICOLAS MADURO MOROS, FUERZAS

ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIOS DE

COLOMBIA, CARTEL OF THE SUNS,

VLADIMIR PADRINO LOPEZ, MAIKEL □□

JOSE MORENO PEREZ, NESTOR LUIS

REVEROL TORRES, TAREK WILLIAM .

SAAB, and TARECK EL AISSAMI,

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE DECLARATION OF AMBASSADOR

BILLINGSLEA .

Plaintiffs/Judgment Creditors filed motions for expedited consideration of Raul Gorrin

Belisario.and Gustavo Perdomo Rosales’s status as agents and instrumentalities of the

Defendants under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. In support of their motions, Plaintiffs

proffer the declarations of two experts, Douglas C. Farah and Ambassador Marshall S.

Billingslea. Raul Gorrin Belisario, Gustavo Perdomo Rosales, and the licensee, D.E. Wilson (the

Interested Parties) move to strike the declaration of Ambassador Marshall S. Billingslea under 18

U.S.C. § 207, which precludes former employees of the United States from testifying under

certain circumstances. Because the Court finds the statute does not apply in this context, the

Court denies the motion to strike the declaration of Ambassador Billingslea.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the Motion to Strike the Declaration of

Ambassador Marshall Billingslea (D.E. 503) and D.E. Wilson’s joinder of the Motion to Strike

(D.E. 504), .

THE COURT has considered the motion, the response, oral argument, the pertinent

portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is

ADJUDGED that the motion to strike (D.E. 503, 504) is DENIED.

I. Background

Plaintiffs/Judgment Creditors filed motions for expedited consideration of Raul Gorrin

Belisario and Gustavo Perdomo Rosales’s status as agents and instrumentalities of the

Defendants under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. In support of their motions, Plaintiffs

proffer the declarations of two experts, Douglas C. Farah and Ambassador Marshall S.

Billingslea. D.E. Wilson joins Raul Gorrin Belisario and Gustavo Perdomo Rosales’s motion to

strike the expert declaration of Ambassador Marshall S. Billingslea under 18 U.S.C. § 207. The

Court must decide this threshold issue.

A. Background on Ambassador Marshall S. Billingslea

Ambassador Marshall S. Billingslea served as an Assistant Secretary for Terrorist

Financing and Financial Crimes at the U.S. Department of Treasury, Deputy Undersecretary of

the Navy, and President of the Financial Action Task Force. He submitted a declaration in this

case, which explains how Raul Gorrin Belisario and Gustavo Adolfo Perdomo Rosales supported

the regime of Defendant Nicolas Maduro and how, in his view, they are agents and □

instrumentalities of the Defendants/Judgment Debtors. Ambassador Billingslea began his career

in 1995 serving as the Senior Professional Staff Member for National Security Affairs on the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That role included work with the State Department’s

Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and Diplomatic

Security. oe

In 2001, Ambassador Billingslea was appointed as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Negotiations Policy, acting as the U.S. Secretary of Defense’s Chief Negotiator for

international agreements. He was the principal Department of Defense representative on

numerous U.S. arms control delegations, and the U.S. Head of Delegation for Transparency and

Verification negotiations with the Russian Federation. Following that role, Ambassador

Billingslea became the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/

Low-Intensity Conflict after the 9/11 attacks. He also served as Co-Chairman of the Board of .

Directors for U.S. Special Operations Command, where he established the first counter-terrorist

finance cell to disrupt terrorist financiers. On his initiative, the Department of Defense and U.S.

Southern Command transformed their approach to train vetted Colombian military units to target

the leadership of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).

_ From 2003 to 2007, Ambassador Billingslea served at NATO as Assistant Secretary

General of Defense Investment where he established the “Defense Against Terrorism Program of

Work” of all alliance members to collaborate on new technologies to combat terrorism. He was

responsible for the Alliance’s armaments, cooperation policies, its military common funding, and

the NATO standards-setting for military equipment.

Following his time in NATO, he returned to Washington D.C. to serve in the Navy

Department as Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy overseeing clandestine programs and the

long-range budget. His career then turned to the private sector where he became a Managing

Director at Deloitte running tts Federal Business Intelligence Services providing due diligence

for clients including U.S. intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense.

In April 2017, Ambassador Billingslea became Assistant Secretary for Terrorist

Financing and Financial Crimes at the United States Department of Treasury. That position is the

senior official who coordinates the counter-terrorist financing and anti-money laundering efforts

of the Department of the Treasury. There, he built international coalitions and led U.S. efforts to

counter illicit financial activities worldwide. He reorganized the Office of Terrorist Financing

and Financial Crimes to employ cutting edge data analytics against threat networks, which

strengthened the U.S.’s anti-money. laundering capabilities. He served as the President of the

Financial Action Task Force, the global anti-money laundering body. On his initiative, nations

adopted the first ever set of anti-money laundering standards for cryptocurrencies and virtual

assets. In April 2020, President Trump appointed Mr. Billingslea as the Special Presidential

Envoy for Arms Control, where he led talks with the Russian Federation and the People’s

Republic of China. Now, Ambassador Billingslea works in the private sector providing risk and

advisory services. . .

. More specific to this case, Ambassador Billingslea, especially through his roles at the

U.S. Department of Treasury from 2017 to 2020, became knowledgeable about Venezuela, the

Maduro Regime, and the Cartel of the Suns. He is familiar with how the regime and the cartels

commit crimes, including narcotics trafficking, narcoterrorism, money laundering,

currency/exchange rate scams, kidnapping of U.S. citizens, and other acts of kleptocracy and

corruption. He is also familiar with the activities of Gorrin and Perdomo, which he states

include: (1) bribing members of the Maduro regime, (2) laundering money for Maduro and □

others, (3) running corrupt currency conversion/exchange rate schemes for Maduro and other

Defendants, (4) disseminating propaganda supporting the illegitimate Maduro regime, and (5)

suppressing media coverage critical of Maduro and the Cartel of the Suns through the use of

illicit funds to acquire Globovision television. Ambassador Billingslea in his role at the Treasury

Department set the Department’s approach to sanction the Maduro regime and the Cartel of the

Suns. He was personally involved with the January 8, 2019 sanctions against Gorrin and

Perdomo. .

In his declaration, Ambassador Billingslea claims that his opinions are not based on

information he obtained during his government work. Rather, he states they are based on his

personal knowledge and research. He developed a network of confidential informants, including

those who had access to Maduro and other Cartel leadership, who provided him with first-hand

information concerning the conduct of Maduro, the Cartel, and the individual Defendants, as

well as Gorrin and Perdomo. He states he reached his opinions using the same analytical

framework as when he was responsible for assessing whether certain persons provided material

support to financing terrorists while serving in the Department of Defense, the Department of the

Treasury, and the Senate.

, Il. Legal Analysis

At issue is whether to strike the declaration of ‘Ambassador Marshall S. Billingslea under

18 U.S.C. § 207, a federal conflicts-of-interest statute that restricts former Executive Branch

officers. The Court must decide this threshold issue before determining whether the Plaintiffs’

make their prima facie case that Raul Gorrin Belisario and Gustavo Perdomo Rosales are agents

and instrumentalities of the Defendants/Judgment Debtors under the Terrorism Risk Insurance

Act!

A. 18 U.S.C. § 207

! Whether Plaintiffs/Judgment Creditors establish a prima facie showing of agency and instrumentality as to Gorrin

and Perdomo is not the subject of this Order.

. The federal criminal code mandates that former federal employees cannot make “any

communication to or appearance before any .. .court...on behalf of any other person...in

connection with a particular matter — (A) in which the United States .. . is a party or has a direct

and substantial interest .. .[and] (B) in which the [employee] participated personally and

substantially. . ..” 18 U.S.C. § 207(a). The statute specifies that a “former officer or employee in

the executive branch of the United States ... who is subject to the restrictions contained in

_ subsection (a)(1) with respect to a particular matter may not, except pursuant to court order,

serve as an expert witness for any other person (except the United States) in that matter.” 18

U.S.C. § 207G)(6)(A). This provision is reemphasized in the Code of Federal Regulations, which

states that “where the bar of section 207(a)(1) applies, a former [federal] employee may not serve

as an expert witness except: (1) If he is called asa witness by the United States; or (ii) By court

order.” 5 C.F.R. § 2641.301(f)(2).

“Section 207(a) was originally written to reflect the notion that ‘a public servant owes

undivided loyalty to the government.’” Goodeagle v. United States, No. 09-490-D, 2010 WL

3081520, * 2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 6, 2010) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 87-748, at 3 (1961)). The

statute prevents an employee from “resigning his position and ‘switching sides’ in a matter

which was before him in his official capacity.” Jd. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 87-748 at 4).

Goodeagle recognized that § 207’s language is broader than the intent of preventing individuals

to take what they learn in an official government capacity and use it for personal gain in the

private sector. /d. It is Gorrin and Perdomo’s position that this prohibition applies and requires

the Court to strike the declaration. Specifically, they rely on 18 U.S.C. § 207(G)(6), which states:

“Nothing in this section shall prevent an individual from giving testimony under oath, or from

making statements required to be made under penalty of perjury. Notwithstanding the preceding

sentence— (A) a former officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States Lee

who is subject to the restrictions contained in subsection (a)(1) with respect to a particular matter

may not, except pursuant to court order, serve as an expert witness for any other person (except

the United States) in that matter.” It is this restriction on expert testimony that forms the basis of

their motion to strike.

The Interested Parties also rely on an independent regulation setting forth the “policies

and procedures of the Department [of Treasury] regarding the testimony of employees and

former employees” to argue the Court should strike the declaration. 31 C.F.R. § 1.11(a)(1). The

regulation states that “Subject to 5 C. PLR. § 2635.805, an employee or former employee shall not

provide, with or without compensation, opinion or expert testimony concerning official

information, subjects, or activities, except on behalf of the United States or a party represented

by the Department of Justice, without written approval of agency counsel.” 31 C.F.R. §

1.11(f)(1) (emphasis added). The referenced regulation 5 C.F.R. § 2635.805 clarifies that

“Te]mployees may not serve, other than on behalf of the United States, as an expert witness, with

or without compensation, in any proceeding before a court or agency of the United States in

which the United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest, unless the employee's

participation is authorized by the agency[.]” 5 C.F.R. § 2635.805(a)(emphasis added).

B. Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 207 & Standing to Enforce the Statute

Plaintiffs argue that the Interested Parties lack standing to enforce § 207’s prohibition. In

their view, the United States Department of Justice has exclusive authority to enforce the

criminal and civil provisions of Section 207. 5 C.F.R. § 2641.103 (stating “[c]riminal and civil

enforcement of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 207 is the responsibility of the Department of

Justice.”). Despite this regulation, the Interested Parties argue that Plaintiffs conflate § 207(a)

with § 207(j)(6)(A), which they assert is a separate and distinct evidentiary prohibition that

renders inadmissible certain expert testimony in any proceedings where it applies. They also

argue that despite the broad statement that “[cjtiminal and civil enforcement of the provisions of

18 U.S.C. § 207 is the responsibility of the Department of Justice[,]” 5 C.F.R. § 2641.103 only

references the criminal penalties of 18 U.S.C. § 216(a), the civil penalties of §216(b), and the

injunctive relief of § 216(c). Because the regulation makes no mention of § 207())(6)(A), they

claim they have standing to challenge Ambassador Billingslea’s declaration because any party to

a proceeding can invoke an applicable evidentiary rule that Congress enacted.

A review of the entire statute instructs the Court on the resolution of this issue. See Inve:

Walter Energy Inc., 911 F.3d 1121, 1143 (11th Cir. 2018) (‘But we must be mindful that to

ascertain the plain meaning of a statute, ‘[w]e do not look at one word or term in isolation, but

instead we look to the entire statutory context.’”’) (quoting United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d

1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999)). .

In examining 18 U.S.C. § 207, the Court first notes that title 18 is the federal criminal

code, which is titled “Crimes and Criminal Procedure.” The relevant section is found in chapter

11 titled “Bribery, Graft and Conflicts of Interest.” Section 207 itself is named “Restrictions on

former officers, employees, and elected officials of the executive and legislative branches.”

Subsection (a) creates criminal liability when a former government employee knowingly makes a

communication with an intent to influence any court in cases where the United States is a party

or has a substantial interest, in which the person participated personally and substantially as an

officer, and which involved specific parties at the time of the participation. Subsection (a)(3)

clarifies that “[t]he restrictions contained in paragraphs (1) and (2) shall apply -- .. . “only with

respect to a matter in which the United States [or the District of Columbia] is a-party or has a

direct and substantial interest.” Subsection (b) creates a restriction on aiding on advising by any

former officer, and is also punishable criminally as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 216, part.of the same

title as § 207. Subsections (c) through (g) explain different categories of employees to whom the

section applies and certain time restrictions; these sections all reference that violations are

criminally punishable as provided in section 216. Then subsection (h) allows the Director of the

Office of Government Ethics to designate agencies within the executive branch for distinct

functions to clarify § 207(c). Subsection (i) lists definitions pertinent to § 207, such as defining

officers and employees. Then, the pertinent section at issue here is subsection (j), which is titled

“Exceptions.” The first three exceptions clarify that § 207’s prohibition does not apply to official

government duties in connection with carrying out duties on behalf of the United States, the

District of Columbia, state and local governments, or international organizations in which the

USS. participates if the Secretary of State certifies as such. Subsection (j)(4) creates an exception

for an individual making an unpaid statement based on “special knowledge” and subsection

(j)(5) piggybacks on that to add that the restrictions do not apply “with respect to making

communications solely for the purpose of furnishing scientific or technological information|.

It is in this exceptions framework that § 207(G)(6) appears. Subsection (j)(6) is the

provision that the Interested Parties claim creates a standalone evidentiary rule. First, subsection

(j)(6) is titled “exception for testimony.” It states that nothing in § 207 “prevents an individual

from giving testimony under oath, or from making statements required to be made under penalty

of perjury.” Then it states that “[nJotwithstanding the preceding sentence—” “a formier officer or

employee of the executive branch of the United States ... who is subject to the restrictions

contained in subsection (a)(1) with respect to a particular matter may not, except pursuant to

court order, serve as an expert witness for any other person (except the United States) in that

matter.” 18 U.S.C. § 207(j)(6). The Interested Parties request the Court read this subsection G6)

as an evidentiary rule, and ignore the framework within which it is found. Notably, and in their

favor, subsection (j)(6) does not indicate that a failure to comply results in criminal culpability.

Nor does it include an enforcement mechanism as present under subsection (a). But the section is

listed as an exception to the general prohibitions to allow testimony under oath and notes the

exception does not extend to expert witness testimony.

Principles of statutory construction do not support the Interested Parties’ reading and rather

require the Court to find that they are without standing to enforce it. To start, the statute is

contained in the criminal code. It is a longstanding “‘principle that criminal statutes can only be

enforced by the proper authorities of the United States government and a private party has no right

to enforce these sanctions” in civil actions. Bass Angler Sportsman Soc’y v. U.S. Steel Corp., 324

F, Supp. 412, 415 (S.D. Ala. 1971); Jones v. Clinton, 206 F.3d 811, 812 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding a

private party lacks standing to prosecute a criminal action). And the regulations clarify that the

Department of Justice is charged with enforcement. 5 C.F.R. § 2641.103 (stating the “[c]riminal

and civil enforcement of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 207 is the responsibility of the Department

of Justice.”’).

The Court must also read the statute in a manner that gives all sections its meaning. To do

so, the Court must view subsection (j)(6) as an exception to the general prohibition, not as a stand-

alone evidentiary rule. This is especially the case because subsection (j)(6) indicates that it applies

to former officers or employees who are “subject to the restrictions contained in subsection

(a)(1)[.]” Subsection (j)(6) references the general prohibition, and thus the Court will not read it in

isolation.

Moreover, § 207(a)(1) clarifies that this statute does not apply in this case. Jt provides

unequivocally that it only applies to matters “in which the United States...1S a party or has a

direct and substantial interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)(A). Subsection (a)(3)(A) further clarifies

that the restrictions contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 apply only when the United States is a party

or has a direct and substantial interest. The United States is not a party in this case, which

distinguishes this case from Goodeagle where the United States was a party.

This begs the next question as to whether the United States has a direct and substantial

interest in this case. The Interested Parties assert that allowing the garnishment of the Gorrin and

Perdomo assets would deplete the assets from the control of the Department of Treasury, which

gives it power to negotiate with Gorrin and Perdomo, whom, it designated as Specially Designated

Narcotics Traffickers. TRIA, however, sets forth the United States’ interest in ensuring that

terrorism victims can collect blocked assets. In enacting TRIA, Congress allowed terrorism victims

to bypass the usual requirement that a litigant first obtain a license from the Office of Foreign

Asset Control, U.S. Department of Treasury. TRIA therefore cuts against the Interested Parties’

position that the United States has a direct and substantial interest in keeping blocked assets

available as a negotiation tool. Likewise, these assets are blocked and are not owned by the United

States. So allowing the TRIA Plaintiffs to recover as to these assets does not cause a direct financial

loss to the United States, which could, if it were the case, also establish a direct and substantial

interest.

The Court, therefore, finds that § 207(j)(6)’s exception does not create a standalone

evidentiary rule requiring the Court to strike Ambassador Billingslea’s affidavit. 5 C.F.R. §

2641.301(£)(2), which is the regulation relating to 18 U.S.C. § 207, confirms this statutory

interpretation. The regulation clearly states that “where the bar of section 207(a)(1) applies, a

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former employee may not serve as an expert witness” with certain exceptions. 5 C.F.R. §

2641.301(f)(2). The regulation does not support the Interested Parties’ reading of subsection (j)(6)

as providing a standalone evidentiary rule regarding testimony by former employees of the

Executive Branch. Having found § 207 does not apply and that the Interested Parties lack standing

to enforce the criminal statute, the Court need not address whether Ambassador Billingslea’s

affidavit relies on his personal experience while serving the US. Department of Treasury,

The Court next examines whether the restrictions relating to the U.S. Department of

Treasury found in the Code of Federal Regulations apply to require striking of the declaration. The

Interested Parties argue that 31 C.F.R. § 1.11(f)(1) is an independent provision that requires this

Court strike the declaration. But that regulation prohibiting expert testimony by former Department

of Treasury employees is explicitly subject to another regulation 5 C.F.R. § 2635.805. 5 C.F.R. §

2635.805(a) states that “[e]mployees may not serve, other than on behalf of the United States, as

an expert witness, with or without compensation, in any proceeding before a court or agency of

the United States in which the United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest,

unless the employee's participation is authorized by the agency|.]” (emphasis added). Because the

United States is not a party to this case and lacks a direct and substantial interest in this case, the

Court finds that 31 C.F.R. § 1.11(£) does not apply here and the Court denies the motion to strike

the declaration of Ambassador Marshall Billingslea.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this _/ A of September 2026.

FEDER#CO A-MORENO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

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