The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 25-cv-20048-BLOOM/Elfenbein
NATACHA JEAN-FRANCOIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF NORTH MIAMI,
Defendant.
_________________________/
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant The City of North Miami’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (“Motion”), ECF No. [71]. Plaintiff Natacha Jean-Francois filed a Response,
ECF No. [79], to which Defendant filed a Reply. ECF No. [83]. The Court has reviewed the
Motion, the Response, the Reply, the record, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised.
For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff identifies as a Haitian-American female and alleges that, while employed by
Defendant The City of North Miami, she faced discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work
environment. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint asserts three violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act: National Origin Discrimination (Count I), Retaliation (Count II), and Hostile
Work Environment (Count III). ECF No. [63]. The Court denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
the Second Amended Complaint, finding that Plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to state a claim
as to each count. ECF No. [84].
Defendant seeks summary judgment on all counts arguing that Plaintiff’s claims of
discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment fail because she has not shown evidence
to establish a prima facie case, and Defendant has legitimate, non-discriminatory, and non-
retaliatory reasons for each of the disciplinary actions taken against Plaintiff. ECF No. [71].
Plaintiff responds that summary judgment should be denied because the record, viewed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, contains sufficient circumstantial evidence that a reasonable jury could
find discrimination and retaliation. ECF No. [79].
B. Material Facts
Based on the parties’ briefings, the statements of material facts, and the evidence in the
record, the following facts are not genuinely in dispute unless otherwise noted by the Court.1
Defendant hired Plaintiff as a Crisis Intervention Specialist, also known as a Victim’s
Advocate, on January 25, 2011. ECF No. [72] ¶ 1. On February 12, 2021, Plaintiff was involved
in an incident with Detective Kimberly Bonny and Detective Kamesha Moffatt, in which Plaintiff
was “almost physically attacked.” Id. ¶¶ 2-3. That day, Plaintiff reported the incident to command
1 Plaintiff designates many facts as disputed. See generally ECF No. [78-1]. However, many of Plaintiff’s
explanations provide additional information that does not directly dispute Defendant’s facts or Plaintiff
responds with inferences and general conclusions. See Shuler v. Ingram & Associates, 441 F. App’x 712,
715 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Speculation or conjecture cannot create a genuine issue of material fact.”). Moreover,
the Court considers that many of Plaintiff’s facts do not cite to evidence on the record. See, e.g., ECF No.
[78-1] ¶¶ 23, 24, 30, 31, 35, 68. Although Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts is a
Declaration signed by Plaintiff under penalty of perjury, such references to Plaintiff’s own testimony may
not be sufficient to contradict Defendant’s facts without further corroboration. See, e.g., Thomas v. Dade
Cnty. Pub. Tr., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (“[C]onclusory, uncorroborated allegations by
a plaintiff in an affidavit or deposition will not create an issue of fact for trial sufficient to defeat a well-
supported motion for summary judgment.”); McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1240
n.7 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Under the law of this Circuit, we may disregard an affidavit submitted solely for the
purpose of opposing a motion for summary judgment when that affidavit is directly contradicted by
deposition testimony.”); Venerio v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 17-22624-CV, 2018 WL 5283876, at *5 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 17, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 17-22624-CIV, 2018 WL 4771523 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 3, 2018) (“[B]ald conclusions, opinions, and hearsay without supporting specific facts are not
admissible and do not create a genuine issue of material fact.”). Thus, the Court does not strictly adopt what
Plaintiff identifies as facts in dispute and provides its own analysis of the disputed facts based upon the
parties’ briefing, statements of material facts, and associated exhibits.
staff, including Police Chief Larry Juriga. Id. Plaintiff reported that she approached the main door
to the entrance of her work area after her break at 4:00 p.m., and she “noticed [D]etective Moffatt
standing in the alleyway . . . her gaze was already upon [Plaintiff]. . . . She continued to
glare/stance [sic] at [Plaintiff] as [she] passed the copier.” Id. ¶ 4. When Plaintiff walked toward
the desk, Detective Moffatt was still “staring” at Plaintiff, so she asked, “[I]s there a problem?” To
which Detective Moffatt responded, “[W]hat is your problem? You’re staring at me!” Id. at 5.
Plaintiff stated that Detective Moffatt was on the phone at the time, reciting what was happening
with Plaintiff and “pacing back and forth towards [Plaintiff].” Id. at 6. Plaintiff then alleges that
the “next thing [she saw was] both [D]etective Moffatt and [Detective] Bonny approaching [her]
workspace area in a charging manner and stood right in front of the gun storage.” Id. ¶ 7. As they
were retrieving their guns, Detective Moffatt asked, “[W]hat is your problem? You have a problem
with people staring at you?” Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Detective Bonny replied, “[S]he stares all the time, I don’t
know what is her problem?” Id. Plaintiff stood up from her desk and said, “[T]hat’s it! I’m not
going to take this anymore. I’m going to the Chief!” Id. Plaintiff reported that the incident stemmed
from Plaintiff refusing to be a witness for Detective Moffatt in a previous Internal Affairs (“IA”)
investigation. Id. ¶ 9. Sergeant Stacina Jones, Plaintiff’s supervisor, instructed her to remain home
while Defendant investigated her complaints. Id. ¶ 10. About one to two weeks after the February
12, 2021 incident, Plaintiff requested to file a police report, but the Police Chief informed her that
he was investigating the matter and would follow up. ¶ 18.
Detective Moffatt and Detective Bonny reported certain incidents and behaviors of
Plaintiff.2 Id. ¶ 14. Defendant investigated the complaints. Id. ¶15. After the investigation into
those claims, Plaintiff read in a report that Detective Bonny said in an interview, “I guess [Plaintiff]
2 Plaintiff disputes the underlying conduct complained of and the motives of Detective Moffatt and
Detective Bonny but does not dispute that there were complaints filed. ECF No. [78-1] ¶ 12.
don’t want to deal . . . with us. She’s sticking with her kind, the Haitians.” Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff states
that statement came directly from Detective Moffatt’s reprimand, dated February 16, 2021. ECF
Nos. [78-1] ¶ 16; [78-2] at 5.
On April 5, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint of Discrimination with the Florida
Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”), No. 15D-2021-00451 (“April 2021 Charge”),
asserting Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, national origin, age, and
marital status. Id. ¶ 19. Defendant’s internal investigation into Plaintiff’s, Detective Moffatt’s, and
Detective Bonny’s complaints regarding the February 12, 2021 incident was in progress at the time
Plaintiff filed her April 2021 Charge. Id. ¶ 22. Defendant also opened an investigation into
Plaintiff’s alleged interference in an ongoing investigation (“IA Investigation 21-05”). Id. ¶ 25.
On May 6, 2021, the Administrative Review of the February 12, 2021 incident was
concluded, revealing no evidence of a hostile work environment. Id. ¶ 26. During the
Administrative Review, Plaintiff stated that the relationship between Detective Moffatt, Detective
Bonny, Crime Scene Technician (“CST”) Claudia Duverseau, and Plaintiff deteriorated because
of an earlier investigation, which began in November 2020. Id. ¶ 78.3 According to Plaintiff,
because Plaintiff did not testify favorably regarding Detective Moffatt’s complaint, Detective
Moffatt, Detective Bonny, and CST Duverseau changed their behavior toward her. Id. ¶ 28.4 The
3 The parties dispute the reason the investigation was initiated. Defendant states the investigation was
initiated when Detective Moffatt complained about CST Duverseau. ECF No. [72] ¶ 27. Plaintiff states the
investigation was initiated when Detective Moffatt complained about two other Haitian male detectives
(Michel Tovar and Frederick Gedeus) who allegedly made derogatory remarks about Detective Moffatt’s
sexual orientation in Haitian-Creole, a language Detective Moffatt does not speak. ECF No. [78-1] ¶ 27.
4 Plaintiff responds that the change in behavior was because she did not corroborate that two Haitian
Detectives made derogatory statements about Detective Moffatt’s sexual orientation and adds that Detective
Moffatt’s and Detective Bonny’s hostility began not merely because of her refusal to testify but because of
her identity as a Creole-speaking Haitian woman. ECF No. [78-1] at 28.
Administrative Review and Disposition Panel determined that the actions of all parties involved
were not based on any protected characteristics. Id. ¶ 29.
Around August 17, 2021, Plaintiff was sent home for 24 hours without pay. Id. ¶ 33. The
parties disagree as to the reason why, but the incident concerned directives from Commander Horn
regarding retrieving folders related to the Department’s Victims of Crime Act (“VOCA”)
invoices.5 On August 19, 2021, Defendant concluded its investigation into CST Duverseau’s
allegations regarding Plaintiff’s inappropriate involvement in an ongoing investigation on
December 23, 2020. Id. ¶ 34.
On September 8, 2021, Chief Juriga issued a Notice of Intent to Discipline Plaintiff
regarding the events of August 17, 2021. Id. ¶ 36. Chief Juriga issued a written reprimand and a
32-hour suspension without pay, which Plaintiff signed. Id.
On September 28, 2021, Plaintiff received a Notice of Disciplinary Action, specifically an
80-hour suspension, for unauthorized release of confidential information and for interfering with
an ongoing investigation. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. The Notice of Disciplinary Action was issued after a
Disposition Panel convened to review the facts regarding IA Investigation 21-05, regarding
Plaintiff’s interference with another investigation, and ultimately held that Plaintiff released
confidential information about an ongoing investigation and attempted to interfere with the
investigation, violating the City’s various rules and regulations. Id.
On October 5, 2021, the FCHR issued a Determination finding no reasonable cause for
discrimination with respect to Plaintiff’s April 2021 Charge. Id. ¶ 39. The FCHR Determination
5 Defendant states Plaintiff was sent home for insubordination and refusing to comply with Major Donald
Blanchard’s and Commander Brittany Horn’s directives regarding the VOCA invoices, which Plaintiff was
responsible for processing and submitting, and for Plaintiff’s refusal to answer Major Blanchard’s questions
about the same. ECF No. [72] ¶¶ 31-33. Plaintiff states that she was not insubordinate because she was
being asked to do something outside her job duties and that she was sent home without any due process and
in violation of Defendant’s disciplinary policies and procedures. ECF No. [78-1] ¶¶ 31-33.
becomes final if Plaintiff does not file a Petition for Relief within 35 days and the Commission
will dismiss the complaint. Id. ¶ 40.6
On November 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed another Charge of Discrimination with the FCHR,
No. 510-2021-02724 (“November 2021 Charge”), alleging she was discriminated against on the
basis of her race, sex, national origin, and age, and that she was retaliated against. Id. ¶ 41. The
November 2021 Charge raised the February 12, 2021 incident, for which the FCHR already found
no cause, repeating Plaintiff’s contention that the incident occurred because she “did not wish to
participate in an Internal Affairs Investigation of Detective Moffatt’s November 2020 complaint.”
Id. ¶ 42. The November 2021 Charge also included the 32-hour suspension because of the August
17, 2021 insubordination to Commander Brittany Horn and Major Donald Blanchard and receiving
a Notice of Intent to Discipline for Plaintiff’s interference in an ongoing investigation. Id. ¶¶ 43-
44.
On November 8, 2021, Commander Horn emailed Plaintiff requiring her attendance at
NoMi Angels, a community fundraising event for victims of abuse, on Saturday, November 20,
2021. Id. ¶ 45.7 Plaintiff communicated with her superiors regarding her attendance. On November
9, 2021, Commander Horn met with Plaintiff to discuss her response to Commander Horn’s email
stating that Commander Horn could not require her to work on the weekend. Id. ¶¶ 48-49.8
6 Plaintiff states she filed a Petition for Relief within 35 days. ECF No. [78-1] ¶ 40. Defendant responds
that Plaintiff does not cite to the record to support her assertion. ECF No. [82] ¶ 40.
7 Plaintiff responds that her attendance at a fundraising event cannot be mandatory on her regular day off
of work and that she had already informed Sergeant Miranda that she had plans that day but would check
her availability. ECF No. [78-1] ¶ 45. The parties dispute whether the Police Chief required or preferred
her attendance. ECF Nos. [72] ¶ 45; [78-1] ¶ 45.
The parties also dispute whether Plaintiff attended the event. Plaintiff states she cancelled her pre-planned
family event and attended the event. ECF No. [78-1] ¶ 47. Defendant states the record confirms that Plaintiff
refused to attend the event even if she “ultimately (allegedly) attended.” ECF No. [82] ¶ 47.
8 The parties dispute the content, tone, and purpose of that meeting. ECF Nos. [72] ¶¶ 50-52; [78-1] ¶¶ 50-
52.
On April 7, 2022, Defendant issued a Notice of Intent to Discipline Plaintiff regarding the
NoMi Angels event and Plaintiff’s response, specifically a 32-hour suspension without pay and a
deduction of 40 hours from her vacation bank. Id. ¶ 53.9 Plaintiff refused to sign the
acknowledgement of her receipt of the Notice of Intent to Discipline. Id. ¶ 54.
On April 6, 2022, Chief Juriga reduced Plaintiff’s discipline for the release of confidential
information and the improper interference in an ongoing investigation (IA Investigation 21-05)
from the recommended 80-hour suspension without pay to a written reprimand. ECF No. [78-1]
¶ 56. Plaintiff adds that it was after she submitted a rebuttal on October 25, 2021, with evidence
regarding the relationship between CST Duverseau and Retired Detective Alanzo Rhymer. ECF
No. [78-1] ¶ 56. Plaintiff refused to acknowledge her receipt of the Notice of Disciplinary Action.
ECF No. [72] ¶ 57.
On April 8, 2022, Defendant issued a Notice of Intent to Terminate Plaintiff’s employment
due to her refusal to acknowledge receipt of a Notice of Disciplinary Action resulting from IA
Investigation 21-05, which found Plaintiff interfered with an ongoing investigation, and a Notice
of Intent to Discipline memorandum linked to her refusal to attend the NoMi Angels event. Id.
¶ 58. The Notice of Intent to Terminate incorporated Plaintiff’s prior instances of insubordination,
including her insubordination on August 17, 2021, when she refused to follow Commander Horn’s
and Major Blanchard’s orders. Id. ¶ 59.
On April 28, 2022, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) adopted
the FCHR’s Determination regarding Plaintiff’s April 2021 Charge, finding no reasonable cause,
dismissed the Charge, and issued a Notice of Right to Sue. Id. ¶ 60; ECF No. [72-9].
9 Plaintiff states that she was being reprimanded five months after the event, which she attended, and the
delay in the reprimand violated the City’s rules and procedures. ECF No. [78-1] ¶ 53.
On November 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination, No. 510-2022-07920
(“November 2022 Charge”), alleging discrimination based on her age, national origin, race, and
sex. Id. ¶ 61. The November 2022 Charge claimed that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for
filing a Charge without specifying which Charge, verbally counseled Plaintiff, falsely accused
Plaintiff of insubordination, suspended Plaintiff without pay, assigned Plaintiff job duties outside
of her scope, and issued a Notice of Intent to Terminate her employment. Id. ¶ 62. The November
2022 Charge repeated Plaintiff’s allegation from the April 2021 Charge that Detective Moffatt
attempted to physically attack her. Id.
On February 6, 2023, Defendant finalized Plaintiff’s termination and issued a confirmation
letter. Id. ¶ 63. On February 13, 2023, Plaintiff appealed to the City’s Personnel Appeal Board. Id.
¶ 64. The Personnel Appeal Board held hearings on June 26, 2023; July 20, 2023; August 9, 2023;
August 10, 2023; and October 16, 2023. Id. ¶ 65. The Personnel Appeal Board found that
Defendant’s rationale to discipline and terminate Plaintiff for refusing to sign disciplinary action
forms should not constitute insubordination. ECF No. [73-16]. On October 16, 2023, the Personnel
Appeal Board recommended that Defendant reinstate Plaintiff’s employment to a vacant position
with equivalent pay, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment or, if an equivalent
vacant position was not available, Plaintiff should be returned to her original position as a Crisis
Intervention Specialist. Id. ¶ 66. At the time of the recommendation, the Crisis Intervention
Specialist/Victims Advocate position had been filled. Id. ¶ 67.10
On November 2, 2023, Defendant offered Plaintiff the position of Office Administrator in
the Mayor and Council Office, which had the same pay and benefits as her prior position. Id.
10 Plaintiff adds that the position had been filled because of Defendant’s delay in scheduling the appeal
hearing, which unlawfully delayed the process, in violation of her due process rights and the City’s
grievance and appeals policy. ECF No. [78-1] ¶ 67.
¶ 68.11 Plaintiff refused to accept that position. Id. ¶ 69. On December 7, 2023, Defendant paid
Plaintiff backpay from February 6, 2023, until November 20, 2023, in accordance with the
Personnel Appeal Board’s recommendation. Id. ¶ 70.
On October 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination (“October 2024 Charge”)
with the Miami-Dade Commission on Human Rights, asserting that Defendant failed to reinstate
her on the basis of her national origin. Id. ¶ 71. The October 2024 Charge repeated Plaintiff’s
earlier allegations that she was treated differently because of her national origin, citing that
Defendant allowed certain actions against her—the February 12, 2021 incident, being subjected to
name-calling, harassment, and bullying—that others did not experience and added that Defendant
failed to reinstate her in accordance with the Personnel Appeal Board’s recommendation. Id. ¶ 72.
On January 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit. Id. ¶ 73. Plaintiff claims that
Detective Bonny and Detective Moffatt were disciplined multiple times for insubordination. Id.
¶ 74. Detective Bonny and Detective Moffatt received discipline for providing inaccurate
statements during Administrative Review 21-03, concerning the February 12, 2021 incident. Id.
¶ 75. Plaintiff alleges that Commander Horn would “pinpoint[]” Plaintiff by calling Plaintiff to
Commander Horn’s office or “commanding [her] to the floor or somewhere there would be others
present.” Id. ¶ 76. Plaintiff alleges Commander Horn frequently called her to Commander Horn’s
office, singled her out, spoke down to her, reprimanded her in front of others, threatened to send
her home, and assigned her tasks that Plaintiff believed were beyond her job scope. Id. ¶ 77.
11 Plaintiff states it is not an equivalent position because the position offered is a secretarial position
requiring a high school diploma, which is not comparable to an experienced Masters of Social Work, Crisis
Intervention Specialist, which requires, at minimum, a bachelor’s degree. ECF No. [78-1] ¶ 68. Defendant
responds that Plaintiff has no evidence to support her argument that this was not an equivalent position.
ECF No. [82] ¶ 68. Plaintiff points to an email exchange between Plaintiff and Defendant’s Personnel
Department, stating that a November 6, 2023 email acknowledged that there was “no vacant equivalent
position.” ECF No. [78-1] ¶ 68. A review of the emails does not indicate that Defendant stated that the
position offered was not equivalent and instead identifies the job as equivalent in pay and benefits. See ECF
No. [72-11].
Plaintiff alleges CST Duverseau “mimicked” her and made comments in Creole to harass
her. Id. ¶ 78. Plaintiff alleges that CST Duverseau, who sat in front of Plaintiff, often “pretend[ed]”
to be on the phone in front of Plaintiff to avoid speaking with Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 79. Plaintiff testified
that she overheard CST Duverseau say that she could not stand Plaintiff. Id. CST Duverseau is
Haitian and speaks Creole. Id. ¶ 80. Plaintiff claims that she was frequently “fending off officers
walking with guns,” being laughed at, and being purposely “bumped into.” Id. ¶ 81. Plaintiff
maintains that her “performance was always more than adequate.” Id. ¶ 82. Plaintiff claims that
Commander Horn was disrespectful to Haitian employees who worked on the same floor as
Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 83. Plaintiff also admitted that she has not seen Commander Horn interact with any
other ethnic group. Id. ¶ 84. Major Blanchard is Haitian American. Id. ¶ 84.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The parties may support their positions by citations to materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, affidavits, or declarations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A factual
dispute is ‘material’ if it would affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and
‘genuine’ if a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party.” Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)).
A court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, draws “all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant and may not weigh evidence or make credibility
determinations[.]’” Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 934 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2019); see
also Crocker v. Beatty, 886 F.3d 1132, 1134 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e accept [the non-moving
party’s] version of the facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to him as the non-movant.” (citation omitted)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which
a jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252.
The moving party shoulders the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). Once this burden is
satisfied, “the nonmoving party ‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.’” Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 327 F. App’x 819, 825 (11th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986)). Instead, “the non-moving party ‘must make a sufficient showing on each essential element
of the case for which he has the burden of proof.’” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986)). Accordingly, the non-moving party must produce evidence, going beyond the
pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, designate specific facts to suggest that a reasonable jury could find in the non-moving
party’s favor. Shiver, 549 F.3d at 1343. Even “where the parties agree on the basic facts but
disagree about the factual inferences that should be drawn from those facts,” summary judgment
may be inappropriate. Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co., Inc. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294,
1296 (11th Cir. 1983). “If more than one inference could be construed from the facts by a
reasonable fact finder, and that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the
district court should not grant summary judgment.” Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901
F.2d 989, 996 (11th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Count I—Discrimination Based on National Origin
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish her discrimination claim because Plaintiff
has not presented any direct evidence of discrimination, she cannot establish a prima facie case
under the McDonnell Douglas framework, and Plaintiff cannot present a convincing mosaic of
discrimination. ECF No. [71] at 2-8. Plaintiff’s Response does not argue she presented direct
evidence of discrimination or that she has satisfied the McDonnell Douglas framework. See
generally ECF No. [79]. Plaintiff responds that the record contains ample circumstantial evidence
from which a reasonable jury could find discrimination. Id. at 1. Therefore, Plaintiff has presented
a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence to infer discrimination. Id. at 2. Defendant replies
that Plaintiff’s Response relies entirely on a convincing mosaic, which tacitly concedes that she
has no direct evidence of discrimination and cannot satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework.
ECF No. [83] at 1.
1. Summary Judgment Analysis for Employment Discrimination Cases
A plaintiff may establish discrimination through direct evidence, the burden-shifting
framework established in McDonnell Douglas, or demonstrate a “convincing mosaic” of
circumstantial evidence. Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220, 1220 n.6 (citations omitted). To prove a prima
facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, “a plaintiff must prove that he or she was:
(1) a member of the protected class; (2) qualified for the position; (3) subjected to adverse
employment action; and (4) replaced by a person outside the protected class or suffered from
disparate treatment because of membership in the protected class.” Kelliher v. Veneman, 313 F.3d
1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002); Roxbury-Smellie v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 324 Fed. App’x 783, 785
(11th Cir. 2009) (same, in the context of discrimination on the basis of national origin); see
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, (1973) (finding that if plaintiff is able to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, then the burden shifts to defendant to show a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment action).
The Eleventh Circuit has clarified the proper use of the McDonnell Douglas framework
and instructed district courts on the proper review of summary judgment motions in employment
discrimination cases:
If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, she is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of illicit intent. This necessarily means that if the defendant fails to
proffer evidence of a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action,
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff is appropriate. Where, as is more
common, the defendant comes forth with evidence and successfully rebuts the
presumption, the McDonnell Douglas framework—with its presumptions and
burdens—is no longer relevant. It simply drops out of the picture. At this point, the
court must proceed to ask whether the record, viewed in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would
allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination [or retaliation] by the decisionmaker.
A showing of pretext (or lack thereof) would certainly be relevant. But a plaintiff’s
inability to disprove the defendant’s rationale cannot be the sole grounds for
summary judgment.
Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752, 764 (11th Cir. 2025) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). The district court must adopt a different approach if the plaintiff does not establish a
prima facie case. A plaintiff who fails to establish a prima facie case “does not automatically lose
on summary judgment.” Id. “Rather than lose by default, the consequence is that the plaintiff must
produce enough evidence, on her own and without any helpful evidentiary burdens or
presumptions, to demonstrate a material issue of triable fact. A court, therefore, should advance
directly to the convincing mosaic inquiry.” Id. at 765. “The ‘convincing mosaic’ analysis—despite
its flowery language—is a stand-in for the Rule 56 summary judgment standard applied to
employment discrimination.” Id. at 760; see also Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 88 F.4th
939, 946 (11th Cir. 2023) (the convincing mosaic standard is a “rearticulation of the summary
judgment standard”).
Thus, a plaintiff may survive summary judgment by “present[ing] a convincing mosaic of
circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the
decisionmaker.” Gaskin v. Healthtrust Workforce Sols., No. 0:24-CV-60431, 2026 WL 32786, at
*7 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2026). “Such evidence may include ‘(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous
statements . . . , and other bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent might
be drawn, (2) systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees, and (3) that the
employer’s justification is pretextual.’” Ismael, 161 F.4th at 760 (internal citations omitted).
Because Plaintiff does not argue that she has direct evidence of discrimination or that she
has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the Court proceeds to address the parties’
arguments as to a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence.
2. Convincing Mosaic
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not presented a convincing mosaic of circumstantial
evidence. ECF No. [71] at 6. Plaintiff offers no evidence of “suspicious timing” to infer
discrimination because Plaintiff was disciplined for misconduct that was in close temporal
proximity to Plaintiff’s termination. Id. Plaintiff has not pointed to evidence of “ambiguous
statements” to infer discrimination because the one statement of “sticking with her kind, the
Haitians” was made by a non-decisionmaker almost two years before her termination. Id. at 7.
There is also no evidence of systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees where
Commander Horn was disrespectful to other Haitian employees, but Plaintiff has not seen
Commander Horn interact more favorably towards any other ethnic group. Id. at 8. Plaintiff also
cannot establish that Defendant’s reasons to discipline and eventually terminate Plaintiff’s
employment were a pretext for discrimination because Plaintiff, in the relevant time period,
interfered with an ongoing investigation and demonstrated consistent insubordination. Id.
Defendant even reduced one of her disciplinary actions. Id. Plaintiff’s mosaic, even viewing in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff, does not evidence discriminatory intent. Id.
Plaintiff responds that the record contains circumstantial evidence to infer discrimination.
ECF No. [79] at 1. Plaintiff points to the following evidence to support a convincing mosaic:
• Plaintiff’s long positive work history as a Crisis Intervention
Specialist/Victim Advocate that had not included any notice of
insubordination for the prior ten years;
• The February 12, 2021 incident where Detective Moffatt and Detective
Bonny approached and intimidated her after she refused to support
Detective Moffatt in an Internal Affairs matter;
• A national-origin-related remark made by Detective Bonny that Plaintiff
was “sticking with her kind, the Haitians[;]”
• Evidence that Detective Moffatt and Detective Bonny received lesser
discipline despite findings concerning inaccurate statements and/or
insubordination;
• The Personnel Appeal Board’s findings that Detective Moffatt remained
employed with only a written reprimand for insubordination, civilians
should not be held to the same standard as police officers, refusal to sign a
disciplinary form should not constitute insubordination, and Plaintiff met
her burden to overturn her termination;
• The Personnel Appeal Board’s recommendation that the termination be
rescinded;
• The EEOC’s reasonable-cause finding that Plaintiff was subjected to
disparate treatment and suspensions based on national origin;
• Evidence that the August 2021 directive concerned duties outside Plaintiff’s
job description; and
• Evidence that Defendant did not follow progressive and consistent
discipline principles.
ECF No. [79] at 12-13.
Defendant replies that Plaintiff identifies unrelated workplace disputes that have nothing
to do with her national origin. ECF No. [83]. Plaintiff presents petty workplace disputes, her refusal
to accept feedback, and her refusal to follow directives, which is insufficient to constitute
intentional discrimination. Id. Plaintiff has not shown that anyone involved in any of the
employment decisions concerning Plaintiff made those decisions because of her national origin.
Id. at 2.
Plaintiff need only show that her national origin was a motivating factor, not the only
motivating factor for her adverse employment actions. See Quiqq v. Thomas Cnty. School Dist.,
814 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating that a “mixed-motive” discrimination claim under
Title VII can succeed if the plaintiff shows illegal bias “was a motivating factor for an adverse
employment action, even though other factors also motivated the action.”) (internal citation and
quotation omitted). When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff
points to evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that discrimination was a motivating
factor. Specifically, Plaintiff identifies that her supervisor, Commander Horn, was disrespectful to
Haitian employees who worked on the same floor as Plaintiff, ECF No. [72] ¶ 83; Commander
Horn issued directives and was involved in meetings that led to disciplinary actions on the basis
of Plaintiff’s insubordination, Id. ¶¶ 30-33; 36, 45-53; non-Haitian employees received lesser
discipline for insubordination and making false statements, Id. ¶ 75, ECF No. [73-16]; the
Personnel Appeal Board overturned Plaintiff’s termination, finding that Defendant’s rationale to
discipline and terminate Plaintiff for refusing to sign disciplinary action forms should not
constitute insubordination, ECF No. [73-16]; and the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe
Plaintiff was subjected to disparate treatment and suspensions based on her national origin. ECF
No. [78-5].12
Plaintiff also points to disputed evidence to undermine Defendant’s claim that
insubordination justified Plaintiff’s disciplinary actions and termination. The parties dispute
whether Plaintiff was directed to act within her job duties regarding the August 17, 2021 directive
12 Defendant argues that the Court should not defer to the EEOC’s finding on one of Plaintiff’s Charges
because the EEOC has made inconsistent determinations concerning substantially similar claims. ECF No.
[83] at 6-8. The Court agrees with Defendant that it is not bound by the EEOC’s determination. See Kincaid
v. Bd. of Trs., 188 F. App’x 810, 817 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he magistrate judge was not required to defer
or make reference to the EEOC determination; the magistrate judge had to conduct a de novo review of the
claims.” (citing Moore v. Devine, 767 F.2d 1541, 1549–51 (11th Cir.1985))). However, the EEOC’s
determinations are evidence in this case, and the Court does not weigh evidence at summary judgment.
on VOCA invoices and the November 8, 2021 directive regarding the NoMi Angels event. ECF
No. [78-1] ¶¶ 30-33; 36, 45-53. Additionally, the parties contest the context and content of
Plaintiff’s November 9, 2021 meeting with Commander Horn, which resulted in a Notice of Intent
to Discipline Plaintiff for her insubordination. Id. ¶¶ 48-54. Defendant’s Notice of Intent to
Terminate was based, in part, on Plaintiff’s refusal to sign the Notice of Intent to Discipline
regarding the November 8-9, 2021 interactions and Plaintiff’s insubordination regarding the
August 17, 2021 incident. ECF Nos. [72-1] ¶¶ 58-59; [72-8]. As such, those disputed facts are
material to Plaintiff’s discrimination claim.
Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff has not established a convincing mosaic are
unconvincing. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s evidence is not sufficient to infer intentional
discrimination because Plaintiff has not identified a proper comparator; Plaintiff has not shown
ambiguous statements because Detective Bonny’s statement is not evidence of discrimination
because it was allegedly made by a non-decisionmaker outside the presence of Plaintiff; and
Plaintiff has failed to establish systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees
because Plaintiff did not see Commander Horn interact more favorably toward any other ethnic
group. However, a plaintiff does not need to identify a comparator to survive summary judgment.
See Tynes, 88 F.4th at 946 (“[T]he plaintiff’s failure to produce a comparator does not necessarily
doom the plaintiff’s case.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Moreover, the Court may
consider a comparator, ambiguous statements, and better treatment of similarly situated
employees, but the Eleventh Circuit in Ismael clarified that “a plaintiff may avoid summary
judgment by presenting a wide range of circumstantial evidence.” 161 F.4th at 760 (emphasis
added). The Court finds Plaintiff has presented other circumstantial evidence to survive summary
judgment.
Where Plaintiff has pointed to evidence to indicate that Commander Horn acted
disrespectfully toward Haitians, Commander Horn was involved in contentious conversations with
Plaintiff that led to disciplinary actions and ultimately termination, and the Personnel Appeal
Board rejected Defendant’s rationale for Plaintiff’s insubordination, Plaintiff has presented
circumstantial evidence regarding her supervisor’s motivations and that Defendant’s rationale was
a pretext such that a reasonable jury could infer that bias based on Plaintiff’s national origin was a
motivating factor in Defendant’s employment decisions. See Buckley v. Sec’y of Army, 97 F.4th
784, 795 (11th Cir. 2024) (“So while a reasonable jury could infer that Major Zhu took HIPAA
violations especially seriously, it could alternatively draw the reasonable inference that Major Zhu
did not like Buckley and was out to get her. That leaves the question as to why Major Zhu wanted
Buckley dismissed. And that presents a jury question.”). Accordingly, summary judgment is
denied as to Count I.
B. Count II—Retaliation
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not established her claim of retaliation because she
cannot establish a causal connection between her protected activity and any adverse actions taken
against her. ECF No. [71] at 18. Defendant argues that the complaints in the April 2021 Charge
state that the February 12, 2021 incident was the result of Plaintiff failing to participate in the
investigation, not because of her national origin. Id. Therefore, the April 2021 Charge is not a
protected act to support a retaliation claim. Id. If the April 2021 Charge is protected activity,
Plaintiff’s first disciplinary action—suspension for insubordination—was issued on September 8,
2021, approximately eight months after her February complaints and six months after the April
2021 Charge. Id. Plaintiff filed the November 2021 Charge after Defendant recommended an 80-
hour suspension for unauthorized release of confidential information and for interfering with an
ongoing investigation. Id. Defendant initiated its investigation into Plaintiff’s improper
interference on April 26, 2021, six months before the November 2021 Charge. Id. Plaintiff’s
second suspension on April 7, 2022, is too far removed from the April 2021 Charge and the
November 2021 Charge. Id. at 19. Finally, there is no causal connection between the November
2022 Charge and her termination because Defendant issued a Notice of Intent to Terminate on
April 8, 2022, before she filed the November 2022 Charge. Id.
Plaintiff responds that the record contains circumstantial evidence to infer retaliation. ECF
No. [79] at 1. Plaintiff refers to the same mosaic of evidence to support her discrimination claim,
consisting of her long positive work history, workplace hostility following internal-affairs activity,
disputed facts concerning Defendant’s insubordination rationale, unequal discipline, procedural
irregularities, the EEOC’s reasonable-cause determination, and the Personnel Appeal Board’s
recommendation that Plaintiff’s termination be rescinded. ECF No. [79] at 2.13
Defendant replies that Plaintiff fails to offer any evidence that Defendant took employment
actions because of any protected activity. ECF No. [83] at 8. Plaintiff’s Response does not
acknowledge that the chronology of her complaints and adverse employment actions negate any
causal connection. Id. That is true where most of the charges were filed before Defendant initiated
discipline against her, negating any causal nexus. Id.
“In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove
the following elements: (1) she participated in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) she suffered
an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the participation in
13 Plaintiff argues that circumstantial evidence supports finding that she faced adverse employment actions
and termination because of discrimination based on her national origin and in retaliation for filing EEOC
Charges. A plaintiff is free to argue multiple motivations behind adverse employment actions at summary
judgment. See Smitherman v. Decatur Plastics Prods., Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1576-JEO, 2017 WL 3668176,
at *8 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 2017), aff'd sub nom. Smitherman v. Decatur Plastics Prods. Inc, 735 F. App’x
692 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[W]hile a plaintiff may recover only once for a given adverse action, [he or] she
may assert different prohibited motives for it, and . . . the court is to analyze each claim independently under
the applicable causation standard to assess whether sufficient evidence supports that the associated
prohibited animus motivated the employer.”).
the protected activity and the adverse employment decision.” Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212
F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir. 2000). “An adverse employment action is an ultimate employment
decision, such as discharge or failure to hire, or other conduct that alters the employee’s
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprives him or her of employment
opportunities, or adversely affects his or her status as an employee.” Id. at 587 (internal quotations
omitted). “If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, she is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of illicit intent.” Ismael, 161 F.4th at 764. A plaintiff can also survive summary
judgment without establishing a prima facie case of retaliation by showing a “convincing mosaic”
of circumstantial evidence. Id. at 760 (“We have applied [the ‘convincing mosaic standard’] in
equal measure to claims of discrimination and retaliation.”).
Unlike discrimination claims, a retaliation claim must show that a plaintiff’s “protected
activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action.” See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013). “The but-for standard asks whether a particular outcome would
not have happened but for the purported cause.” Yelling v. St. Vincent’s Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329,
1338 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Stated another way, a plaintiff
must prove that had she not complained, she would not have been fired.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am.,
Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924 (11th Cir. 2018). The Eleventh Circuit has held that “causation is met if
there is sufficient evidence the decisionmaker was aware of the employee’s protected conduct and
there was a close temporal proximity between the employer’s awareness and the adverse action.”
Byrd v. Austal USA, LLC, No. 25-13131, 2026 WL 1898261, at *6 (11th Cir. July 1, 2026) (citing
Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare, LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2023)). “[I]f the alleged
retaliatory conduct occurred before the employee engaged in protected activity, the two events
cannot be causally connected.” Decoste v. City of Boynton Beach, 818 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1383–84
(S.D. Fla. 2026), appeal dismissed, No. 26-10632, 2026 WL 1907401 (11th Cir. July 2, 2026)
(citing Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 434 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“When an employer contemplates a given action before the harassment takes place, temporal
proximity between the action and the incident of harassment alone will not suffice to show
causation.”)).
The Court assesses Plaintiff’s retaliation claim using the same framework the Eleventh
Circuit outlined in Ismael. Because Plaintiff does not argue she has established a prima facie case
of retaliation, she is not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of illicit intent. The Court analyzes
whether Plaintiff has proffered evidence that would permit a reasonable juror to infer that
retaliation was a but-for cause of Defendant’s adverse actions.
1. Timeline of Protected Activity and Adverse Employment Actions
As an initial matter, the Court clarifies the timeline of Plaintiff’s protected activity and
adverse employment actions. The record indicates that Plaintiff filed four Charges: on April 5,
2021; November 2, 2021; November 14, 2022; and October 28, 2024. The Court’s Order on
Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint concluded that “Plaintiff cannot establish a causal
connection between her November 12, 2022 Charge and adverse employment actions. The denial
of her training request, failure to recognize her at a ceremony, and issuing a Notice of Intent to
Terminate occurred before she filed the November 2022 Charge. Although Plaintiff was
terminated after filing that Charge, the Notice of Intent to Terminate was issued before the Charge,
which does not support causation.” ECF No. [84] at 14-15. That conclusion similarly applies to
the October 2024 Charge.
Therefore, the Court only considers the adverse employment actions that occurred after
protected activity. The record includes disciplinary actions that occurred after the April 2021
Charge and the November 2, 2021 Charge. The following timeline is relevant to those Charges:
• On April 5, 2021, Plaintiff filed her first Charge;
• On August 17, 2021, Plaintiff was sent home for 24 hours without pay
regarding Commander Horn’s directives regarding VOCA invoices;
• On September 8, 2021, Chief Juriga issued a Notice of Intent to Discipline
Plaintiff regarding the events of August 17, 2021, consisting of a written
reprimand and a 32-hour suspension without pay;
• On September 28, 2021, Plaintiff received a Notice of Disciplinary Action,
receiving an 80-hour suspension for unauthorized release of confidential
information and for interfering with an ongoing investigation, IA
Investigation 21-05;
• On November 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed her second Charge;
• On April 7, 2022, Defendant issued a Notice of Intent to Discipline Plaintiff
regarding the NoMi Angels event and Plaintiff’s response, specifically a 32-
hour suspension without pay and a deduction of 40 hours from her vacation
bank; and
• On April 8, 2022, Defendant Issued a Notice of Intent to Terminate
Plaintiff’s Employment.
The record evidence shows that Plaintiff received disciplinary actions four to six months
after filing her April 2021 Charge and five months after filing her November 2021 Charge.
Contrary to Defendant’s argument, the time between the protected activity and disciplinary actions
is not so tenuous as to negate causation at summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit has held that
when a plaintiff seeks to establish causation in her prima facie case solely through temporal
proximity, the time between the protected activity and the adverse employment action must be
“very close.” See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007). As a
matter of law, a period of three to four months does not establish causation. Id. (“A three-to-four-
month disparity between the statutorily protected expression and the adverse employment action
is not enough. . . . Thus, in the absence of other evidence tending to show causation, if there is a
substantial delay between the protected expression and the adverse action, the complaint of
retaliation fails as a matter of law.”). However, Plaintiff does not purport to establish a prima facie
case of retaliation, nor does she argue causation by temporal proximity alone. Therefore, four to
six months elapsing between protected activity and disciplinary action does not negate causation
at this stage. Rather, Plaintiff argues the mosaic of circumstantial evidence supports an inference
that Plaintiff’s disciplinary actions were in retaliation for filing her Charges.
2. Convincing Mosaic
To support the mosaic that the above disciplinary actions were made in retaliation for
Plaintiff’s April 2021 and November 2021 Charges, Plaintiff points to evidence that she had a
long, positive work history, ECF No. [78-4]; Commander Horn issued directives and was involved
in meetings that led to disciplinary actions on the basis of Plaintiff’s insubordination, ECF No.
[72] ¶¶ 30-33; 36, 45-53; the Personnel Appeal Board rejected Defendant’s justification of
insubordination for her disciplinary actions and termination, ECF No. [73-16]; and Plaintiff’s
superiors—including Commander Horn and Police Chief Juriga—had knowledge that Plaintiff
filed her EEOC Charges, ECF No. [73] at 170-74.14
While Plaintiff points to the same mosaic the Court found sufficient in her discrimination
claim, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not presented a convincing mosaic of circumstantial
evidence such that a reasonable jury could infer retaliation.15 Although circumstantial evidence
supports an inference that Defendant’s insubordination rationale was pretext, Plaintiff does not
point to evidence that shows that her superiors had knowledge of her Charges prior to the
disciplinary actions and that she would not have faced discipline but-for those Charges.
14 Plaintiff’s responsive materials do not point to facts or evidence regarding knowledge that Plaintiff filed
EEOC Charges, but Plaintiff testified in her deposition that her superiors knew she had filed Charges.
15 Such a conclusion follows from the different standards that apply in discrimination and retaliation claims
and that some facts that Plaintiff identifies speak to discrimination based on national origin but not to
retaliation.
Plaintiff testified that her supervisors, including Commander Horn, knew she filed
Charges. ECF No. [73] at 170-74. However, Plaintiff’s testimony is that it is the City’s policy for
every supervisor to be made aware of what occurred after a claim is filed and thus, her supervisors
knew of her filings. Id. Plaintiff does not testify that she has personal knowledge that Commander
Horn, Police Chief Juriga, or her other supervisors actually had knowledge that she filed her EEOC
Charges nor does she point to any evidence to establish the date by which any of her supervisors
may have learned that information such that a jury could infer that the adverse employment
decisions were made with the knowledge of and because of Plaintiff’s Charges. Plaintiff must
present more than a scintilla of evidence to support her position. See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
at 252. She has not done so.
Therefore, Plaintiff has not presented a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence such
that a reasonable jury could infer that Plaintiff would not have been disciplined or terminated but
for her protected activity. Summary judgment is granted as to Count II.
C. Count III—Hostile Work Environment
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a hostile work environment because
Plaintiff cannot show that any alleged harassment was based on her protected class and that any
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of her employment and create a
discriminatorily abusive working environment. ECF No. [71] at 9. The instances Plaintiff identifies
as harassment—Commander Horn’s conduct, Detective Bonny’s comment, exclusion from the
department recognition ceremony, CST Duverseau’s actions, and the February 12, 2021 incident—
were not objectively hostile, were not severe or pervasive, and none of the actions were tied to her
Haitian origin. Id. at 11. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is procedurally barred from raising
the February 12, 2021 incident because Plaintiff raised that allegation in her April 2021 Charge
but failed to file an action within 90 days of the Notice of Right to Sue. Id. at 14.
Plaintiff’s Response does not address any of Defendant’s arguments regarding Plaintiff’s
hostile work environment claim. See generally ECF No. [83].
Defendant replies that Plaintiff abandons her hostile work environment claim by failing to
address it in her Response. ECF No. [83] at 1. Plaintiff’s arguments regarding a convincing mosaic
are irrelevant to a hostile work environment claim. Id. at 7. Because a Court need not consider
assertions made in pleadings but not in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff’s
failure to address her hostile work environment claim is fatal. Id. at 8.
“There is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be
made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment. Rather, the onus is upon the parties
to formulate arguments; grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment
are deemed abandoned.” Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995)
(internal citations omitted). See also Matthis v. Rogers et al., Case No. 25-14096, 2026 WL
2223734, at *4 (11th Cir. Aug. 3, 2026) (finding that plaintiff’s state law claims and three § 1983
claims are “abandoned as a matter of law” because plaintiff’s response to defendants’ motion for
summary judgment failed to respond to arguments concerning those claims); Brasseler, U.S.A. I,
L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 182 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1999) (reiterating “the unremarkable
position that assertions made in the pleadings (e.g., complaint or answer), but not made in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment, need not be considered by the district court or the
appellate court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.”).
Plaintiff does not respond to Defendant’s arguments regarding her hostile work
environment claim. See generally ECF No. [79]. Plaintiff’s Response focuses on presenting a
mosaic of circumstantial evidence, arguing that the record “contains ample circumstantial evidence
from which a reasonable jury could find discrimination and retaliation.” Id. at 1. However,
Plaintiff’s arguments regarding a convincing mosaic do not apply to Plaintiff’s hostile work
environment claim because the Eleventh Circuit has not adopted the convincing mosaic theory in
hostile work environment claims. See Harris v. Pub. Health Tr. Of Miami-Dade Cnty., 82 F.4th
1296, 1304 n.5 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Technically, the standards applicable to Harris’s employment-
discrimination and hostile-work-environment claims are different. For whatever reason, [the
Eleventh Circuit hasn’t] applied the three traditional frameworks—direct evidence, McDonnell
Douglas, and ‘convincing mosaic’—to hostile-work-environment claims.”).
Plaintiff’s Response mentions workplace hostility three times: “The record
includes . . . workplace hostility following internal-affairs activity . . . [;]” “The record contains
evidence of workplace hostility beginning with the February 12, 2021 incident involving
Detectives Kimberly Bonny and Kamesha Moffatt[;]” and “The record includes . . . evidence that
Plaintiff reported hostility and intimidation after refusing to support Detective Moffatt in an
Internal Affairs matter[.]” Id. at 2, 3, 7. None of these statements establish the elements of a hostile
workplace claim16 nor do they respond to Defendant’s arguments that the specific incidents and
behavior Defendant identifies in its Motion were not objectively hostile, were not sufficiently
severe or pervasive, and were not based on Plaintiff’s national origin. Therefore, Plaintiff has
waived any argument regarding a hostile work environment. See UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. of Puerto
Rico v. Efron, No. 23-13879, 2025 WL 1833578, at *10 (11th Cir. July 3, 2025) (“We will not
consider ‘[a] passing reference to an issue in a brief . . . , and the failure to make arguments and
16 “[A] plaintiff wishing to establish a hostile work environment claim [must] show: (1) that he belongs to
a protected group; (2) that he has been subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment must have
been based on a protected characteristic of the employee, such as national origin; (4) that the harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a
discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that the employer is responsible for such
environment under either a theory of vicarious or of direct liability.” Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc.,
277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). “[T]o be actionable, this behavior must result in both an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and an environment that the victim subjectively
perceives to be abusive.” Id. at 1276 (internal quotation omitted; alterations adopted). Defendant argues
Plaintiff has not established the third and fourth elements. ECF No. [71] at 9.
Case No. 25-cv-20048-BLOOM/Elfenbein
cite authorities in support of an issue waives it.’” (citation omitted)). Therefore, Plaintiff has
abandoned her claim. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted as to Count III.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [71], is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.
2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Count I.
3. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Counts I and III.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on September 14, 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
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