The opinion
USCA11 Case: 25-11639 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 09/16/2026 Page: 1 of 5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-11639
____________________
KIRK MICHAEL FIELDS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GWINNETT COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants,
KYLE HOWSE,
ARIEL STEWART,
WAYNE JOHNSON,
ROINELL LEWIS,
CHRISTIAN D'ALLAIRD,
KAYELYN LEWIS,
Defendants-Appellants.
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-11639
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-03684-LMM-JKL
____________________
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This interlocutory appeal concerns the denial of qualified
immunity to a number of officers on Kirk Fields’ claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, excessive force, and abandonment or
destruction of personal property based on incidents in June of 2021
and March of 2022, as well as the denial of state law official immun-
ity on state law claims for trespass against property. Following oral
argument and a review of the record, we reverse in part and dismiss
in part. 1
Our review on qualified immunity is de novo, but because
this case is at the pleading stage, we take as true the factual allega-
tions in the complaint and draw reasonable inferences in Mr. Fields’
favor based on those allegations. See, e.g., Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d
991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003). We also consider the officers’ bodycam
footage to the extent that it is clear, construing any ambiguities in
Mr. Fields’ favor. See, e.g., Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268,
1277–78 (11th Cir. 2023).
1 Because we write for the parties, we assume their familiarity with the record
and set out only what is necessary to explain our decision.
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25-11639 Opinion of the Court 3
First, we do not have jurisdiction over the portion of the of-
ficers’ appeal regarding the denial of state official immunity as to
the state law trespass against property claims. As the officers’ coun-
sel conceded at oral argument, state law official immunity may be
overcome by a showing of malice or bad faith. See Ga. Const. Art.
I, § 2, ¶ 9(d). The district court concluded that, based on the alle-
gations in the complaint, Mr. Fields had sufficiently alleged malice
on the part of the officers with respect to the disposition of his
property. See D.E. 100 at 36–37 (R&R); D.E. 112 at 17 (district court
order). On appeal, the officers contend that the complaint failed to
“plausibly establish” malice or bad faith, see Br. for Appellants at 39,
but this contention is essentially one of pleading/evidentiary suffi-
ciency, and we do not have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to
review interlocutory challenges to immunity denials that are based
on that ground. See, e.g., Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1484 (11th
Cir. 1996) (“[W]e do not have interlocutory jurisdiction to review
the denial of summary judgment where the only issues appealed
are evidentiary sufficiency issues.”).
Second, we reverse the district court’s denial of qualified im-
munity to the officers on the false arrest claims for both incidents.
The bodycam videos, whose authenticity is not disputed, demon-
strate that the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Mr.
Fields in June of 2021 for littering and in March of 2022 for solici-
tation.
Arguable probable cause exists when “reasonable officers in
the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-11639
[d]efendants could have believed that probable cause existed to ar-
rest [the] [p]laintiff.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734
(11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In
June of 2021, the officers saw Mr. Fields in a wooded area where,
along with some of his personal possessions, there was trash which
could have been reasonably considered litter (rubbish or waste ma-
terial that is “discarded or abandoned”) under Georgia law. See
O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-43(a), 16-7-42(1)(a). And in March of 2022, the
officers observed Mr. Fields standing along a highway holding a
squeegee and a sign that read “Need.” Based on these observations,
the officers could have reasonably believed that Mr. Fields was so-
liciting contributions from the occupants of vehicles. See O.C.G.A.
§ 40-6-97(b).
Third, we remand to the district court to consider in the first
instance whether the alleged Constitutional violation for Mr.
Fields’ deprivation of property claim was clearly established at the
time of arrest. Assuming, without deciding, that Mr. Fields’ Fourth
Amendment right was violated when the officers destroyed his
property after his arrest, we conclude that the district court erred
in its qualified immunity analysis when it did not next consider
whether this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation. See Miller v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 129 F.4th 1329,
1333 (11th Cir. 2025) (“[B]efore rejecting a defense of qualified im-
munity, a district court must address each issue with ‘sufficient ex-
planation to provide this Court with an opportunity to engage in
meaningful appellate review.’”) (quoting Danley v. Allen, 480 F.3d
1090, 1091 (11th Cir. 2007)) (alterations adopted). See also Gates v.
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25-11639 Opinion of the Court 5
Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1302 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he clearly-estab-
lished inquiry . . . asks whether the preexisting law was so clear
that, given the specific facts facing a particular officer, one must say
that every reasonable official would have understood that what he
is doing violates the Constitutional right at issue.”) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). 2
Fourth, we remand to the district court for consideration of
the officers’ assertion of qualified immunity as to the March 2022
excessive force claim. That matter was not addressed in the order
under review, see D.E. 100 at 35 n.20, and should be decided by the
district court in the first instance. If it turns out that the officers
had actual probable cause for the March 2022 arrest, then the ex-
cessive force claim will need to be evaluated as a standalone Fourth
Amendment claim.
DISMISSED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.
2 Given our resolution, we need not and do not address the alternative allega-
tions in the complaint that the officers violated Mr. Fields’ Fourth Amendment
rights by abandoning his property.