Chestnut

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JANE DOE, Case No. 1:26-cv-02602-JLT-SAB-HC

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S

MOTION TO PROCEED UNDER

13 v. PSEUDONYM

14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al.,

(ECF No. 2)

15 Respondents.

ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING

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17 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is a federal immigration detainee proceeding with a

18 petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

19 A. Motion to Proceed via Pseudonym

20 Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every complaint must

21 include the name of all parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Rule 17 further provides that “[a]n action

22 must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1). The normal

23 presumption is that the parties will use their real names, which is “loosely related” to the public’s

24 right to open courts and the rights of individuals to confront their accusers. Doe v. Kamehameha

25 Schools, 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010). However, courts have allowed a party to proceed

26 in anonymity where special circumstances justify the secrecy. Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced

27 Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000). In the Ninth Circuit, a party may proceed

with the use of a pseudonym “in the ‘unusual case’ when nondisclosure of the party’s identity ‘is

1 necessary . . . to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment.’”

2 Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1067–68 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.

3 Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981)). The Ninth Circuit has held that “a party may

4 preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the party’s

5 need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in

6 knowing the party’s identity.” Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068.

7 Courts have generally allowed a party to proceed with anonymity in three circumstances:

8 (1) “when identification creates a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm”; (2) “when

9 anonymity is necessary ‘to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature’”;

10 and (3) “when the anonymous party is ‘compelled to admit [his or her] intention to engage in

11 illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution[.]’” Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at

12 1068 (first alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that

13 where the use of a pseudonym is used to shield the party from retaliation, the district court

14 should evaluate the following factors: (1) the severity of the threatened harm; (2) the

15 reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears; and (3) the anonymous party’s vulnerability to

16 such retaliation. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068 (citations omitted).

17 Petitioner “is a transgender woman with a criminal history who had exposed cartel

18 corruption in Mexico” and “fears that disclosure of information related to her identity will put

19 her in extreme risk of being harmed, or even killed, if she were deported to Mexico” and that

20 “having sensitive personal information made public could worsen her mental health condition

21 and expose her to harm while she remains in detention.” (ECF No. 2 at 1–2.1) Respondents

22 oppose the use of a pseudonym given that: (1) previous litigation, such as Petitioner’s state court

23 criminal proceedings and immigration removal case have been under Petitioner’s name; (2) as an

24 immigration case, the contents of any pleading in this matter are not visible to the public via

25 ordinary online access; and (3) the documents with sensitive information about Petitioner are

26 extraneous to the merits of the question presented about Petitioner’s detention. (ECF No. 9 at 1.)

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1 Courts have granted motions to file pseudonymously based on the petitioners’ fears of

2 persecution and retaliation should their identities be revealed. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 732 F.

3 Supp. 3d 1071, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (“Given the circumstances of Mr. Doe’s petition and his

4 allegations that he will face torture or death if he returns to Mexico, the Court previously granted

5 Mr. Doe’s motions to proceed under pseudonym[.]”); E.O.P. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00721-

6 SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1735396, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 23, 2025); Doe v. Wofford, No. 1:24-cv-

7 00943-EPG-HC, 2025 WL 1305859, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2025); A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-

8 cv-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 871334, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2025).

9 Based on the Court’s review of the severity of the harm, the reasonableness of the

10 Petitioner’s proffered fears, and Petitioner’s vulnerability to retaliation, the Court finds that the

11 need for anonymity in this case outweighs countervailing considerations. See Kamehameha

12 Schools, 596 F.3d at 1042. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion to proceed via pseudonym is

13 granted.

14 B. Supplemental Briefing

15 Respondents contend that due to Petitioner’s convictions for lewd and lascivious acts, in

16 violation of California Penal Code section 261.5(d), and felony possession of a stolen vehicle, in

17 violation of California Penal Code section 496D(A), Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention

18 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). (ECF No. 9 at 3.) Petitioner “does not concede that she is subject to

19 detention under § 1226(c): Ninth Circuit precedent is clear that a violation of CPC § 261.5(d) is

20 not a categorical aggravated felony or crime involving moral turpitude (‘CIMT’) that would

21 render an individual subject to detention under § 1226(c)” and notes that Respondents “do not

22 provide any authority to support their position.” (ECF No. 10 at 13.) Further, in 2024 an

23 immigration judge (“IJ”) found Petitioner to be eligible for a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a).

24 The IJ denied bond and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal based on

25 dangerousness rather than finding Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c).

26 Petitioner asserts that “[i]t is not necessary for this Court to determine the basis of Jane’s

27 statutory detention authority in order to adjudicate her as-applied constitutional challenge to her

1 | to 8 US.C. § 1226(a), Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189 (9th Cir. 2022), would be

2 | applicable. In Rodriguez Diaz, the Ninth Circuit found § “1226(a) offers substantial procedural

3 | protections to detained persons,” “§ 1226(a)’s procedures satisfy due process,” and due process

4 | did not require a second bond hearing at which the government bears the burden of proof by

5 | clear and convincing evidence for a petitioner detained under § 1226(a) fourteen months after his

6 | first § 1226(a) hearing was held. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1193, 1213, 1203-14.

7 The Court finds that the statutory basis for Petitioner’s detention is relevant to the due

8 | process analysis and supplemental briefing on this issue would assist the Court in this matter.

9 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that:

10 1. Petitioner’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; and

11 2. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order, Respondents SHALL FILE

12 a supplemental brief addressing:

13 a. The statutory basis for Petitioner’s detention and whether this case is

14 distinguishable from Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189 (9th Cir. 2022);

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16 b. The procedural posture of Petitioner’s immigration case and the impact, if any, on

17 the pending petition if there has been a change in the procedural posture; and

18 3. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of Respondents’ supplemental brief,

19 Petitioner MAY FILE a supplemental brief.

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>] IT IS SO ORDERED. DAA Le

22 | Dated: _ August 26, 2026 _ Oe

STANLEY A. BOONE

23 United States Magistrate Judge

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