Ripa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

REY DAVID MORALES MORA,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-1411-JEP-PDB

WARDEN, FLORIDA BAKER

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE, et

al.,

Respondents.

__________________________________/

ORDER

Through counsel, Petitioner, a detainee of the United States

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking an order directing Respondents

to release him. (See Doc. 1 at 15). Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who entered

the United States on March 8, 2018. (Id. at 1). On April 29, 2026, ICE detained

Petitioner during a probation meeting. (Id. at 6–7). Petitioner contends that

his current detention without a bond hearing as contemplated by § 1226

violates due process and the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (See id.

at 10–14).

This Court previously addressed claims and arguments similar to those

raised in this case, concluding that the Court has jurisdiction, but the relevant

statutory language and context support the Federal Respondents’ position that

an alien without lawful admission who has resided in the United States for

some appreciable period of time is subject to mandatory detention under

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Diaz Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t of Removal Operations,

817 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2026); see also Lozano Sousa v. Ripa, No. 3:25-

cv-1617-JEP-PDB, 2026 WL 958794 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2026). It likewise

concluded that a mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) comported with

due process requirements. See Diaz Lopez, 817 F. Supp. 3d at 1278; Lozano

Sousa, 2026 WL 958794, at *4. However, on May 6, 2026, the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals took the opposite approach on the substantive issue under

the INA, concluding that Ҥ 1225 applies to arriving aliens seeking entry at the

border, whereas § 1226 applies to aliens unlawfully in the interior.” Hernandez

Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1276 (11th Cir.

2026).1 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision addressed only the statutory

interpretation issue—it did not address any due process claim.

1 Although the mandate has not yet issued, the Eleventh Circuit’s published

opinion has immediate precedential effect. See Martin v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 944,

945 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that a published opinion “is the law in this circuit

unless and until it is reversed, overruled, vacated, or otherwise modified by the

Supreme Court of the United States or by [the Eleventh Circuit] sitting en banc,” and

that a stay of the mandate “in no way affects the duty of . . . the courts in this circuit

to apply now the precedent established by” the published opinion “as binding

authority”); 11th Cir. IOP—Cir. R. 36.2 (“Under the law of this circuit, published

opinions are binding precedent. The issuance or non-issuance of the mandate does

not affect this result.”).

The Federal Respondents concede that Petitioner is being detained

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is entitled to a custody redetermination.

(Doc. 9 at 1, 3). Nevertheless, the Federal Respondents argue that the petition

should be dismissed without prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies because he “has not alleged that he requested, much

less was denied, a custody redetermination or bond hearing.” (Id. at 4).

Petitioner filed a reply, arguing that the Court should excuse the exhaustion

requirement because “[t]he [p]etition was filed against the backdrop of years

of agency litigation and administrative decisions asserting that immigration

judges lacked jurisdiction to provide bond hearings to large categories of

detained noncitizens.” (Doc. 11 at 2).

A petitioner must exhaust all available administrative remedies before

filing a § 2241 petition in federal court. See Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d

467, 475 (11th Cir. 2015). While exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement,

a federal court may not disregard a failure to exhaust and grant relief on the

merits if the respondent properly asserts the defense. Id. at 474–75.

Because Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing before an

immigration judge, he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See,

e.g., Portillo v. Gualtieri, No. 8:26-CV-1718-KKM-LSG, 2026 WL 2069943, at

*2 (M.D. Fla. July 17, 2026) (concluding that the petitioner failed to exhaust

administrative remedies because she did not seek a bond redetermination

before an immigration judge); Vasquez Martinez v. Warden, No. 3:26-CV-1841-

MMH-LLL, 2026 WL 2388997, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2026) (same); Rosales

Ramirez v. Warden, No. 3:26-CV-943-CCB-SJF, 2026 WL 2363587, at *3 (N.D.

Ind. Aug. 14, 2026) (same). In contrast to the cases in which the Court

previously excused an alien’s failure to exhaust,2 before Petitioner filed the

petition, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that aliens detained within the

interior of the United States, such as Petitioner, are entitled to a bond hearing,

and the Federal Respondents expressly concede in this case that Petitioner is

being detained pursuant to § 1226. Further, the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) “is obliged to apply the precedent of the relevant court of appeals in

cases arising within the associated circuit—even if the Attorney General or the

BIA itself disagrees with that precedent.” Garcia v. Garland, 73 F.4th 219, 230

n.7 (4th Cir. 2023); see also Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1303 (11th Cir.

2017) (“Immigration Judges are also bound both by agency precedent and by

precedent established by the federal appellate courts.” (citation omitted)).

As such, the Court no longer is persuaded that a request for a bond

redetermination would be futile or predetermined. Therefore, if Petitioner

2 See, e.g., Bracho v. Woodall, No. 3:26-CV-293-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 2249510,

at *1 n.2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2026); Lopez Velasquez v. Warden, N. Fla. Det. Ctr., No.

3:26-CV-919-JEP-MCR, 2026 WL 2013976, at *1 n.2 (M.D. Fla. July 13, 2026); Suazo-

Calderon v. Mullin, No. 3:26-CV-575-JEP-MCR, 2026 WL 1745796, at *1 n.1 (M.D.

Fla. June 17, 2026).

desires a bond hearing before an immigration judge,3 he may request one orally

or in writing to the immigration court. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(b), (c).4 He may

then appeal the immigration judge’s decision to the BIA. See id. §§ 1003.1(b)(7),

1003.19(f).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

(Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice for Petitioner’s

failure to exhaust.

2. The Warden’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) is DENIED as moot.

3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment dismissing without

prejudice the petition, terminate any pending motions as moot,

and close this case.

3 Petitioner is not entitled to immediate release. See Portillo, 2026 WL

2069943, at *2 (“Because a bond hearing provides adequate procedure, the

‘comfortable majority position’ remains that a habeas petitioner is entitled only to a

bond hearing, not immediate release.” (quoting Molina v. Warden, Glades Cnty. Det.

Ctr., No. 2:26-CV-2009-KCD-KRH, 2026 WL 1965132, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2026))).

4 “A request for a bond hearing should state: the full name and alien

registration number (‘A number’) of the alien; the bond amount set by the

[Department of Homeland Security]; and if the alien is detained, the location of the

detention facility.” Executive Office for Immigration Review, Policy Manual, Bond

Proceedings, Chapter 8.3(c), available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/policy-manual-

eoir/part-II/icpm/chapter-8-3.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on September 18,

2026.

JORDAN E. PRATT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Counsel of Record