The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Nicholas Corrow,
Plaintiff,
-v-
2:24-cv-5018
Nassau University Medical Center; John Doe (Surgeon); (NJC) (LGD)
Nassau County Headquarters, County
Office; Officer Lee, Nassau County Police Department,
Precinct Bethpage, New York; John Doe, Detective,
Bethpage, New York; Jane Doe, Paramedic, Nassau County
EMT,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Nicholas Corrow, proceeding pro se, filed this action against the following
entities and individuals: Officer Lee of the Nassau County Police Department (“NCPD”) precinct
in Bethpage, New York; John Doe, a detective in Bethpage, New York; Nassau County
Headquarters (“NCH”); Nassau University Medical Center (“NUMC”); John Doe (surgeon); and
Jane Doe, a paramedic with Nassau County EMT. (Sec. Am. Compl. (“SAC”), ECF No. 15.) The
Second Amended Complaint brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution alleging that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent in providing Corrow medical treatment for an injury to his pinky finger,
which led to amputation of the finger. On June 26, 2026, the Court granted NUMC’s Motion to
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and dismissed with prejudice all claims asserted
against NUMC. (Mem. and Order (“NUMC Dismissal”), ECF No. 86.)
Now before the Court is a motion for judgement on the pleadings (the “Motion”)
pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) by the County
and NCPD’s Officer Lee (together, the “County Defendants”). ((“Mot.”) ECF No. 59.) The
County Defendants argue that: (1) Corrow’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted; (2) Nassau County Headquarters cannot be sued because it is an administrative
arm of Nassau County; (3) Corrow failed to comply with the exhaustion requirements of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”); (4) Officer Lee was not personally involved in the
alleged constitutional violations; and (5) Corrow’s failure to comply with New York General
Municipal Law precludes any state law claims.
For the reasons explained below, the County Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On July 12, 2024, Corrow filed a Complaint in this Court bringing Section 1983 claims
arising out of alleged injuries that he sustained while detained at the Nassau County Correctional
Center. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) On July 22, 2024, the Court filed an electronic order noting that
Corrow did not pay the filing fee required to commence a civil action or file a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Not. of Deficient Filing, ECF No. 2.) As such, the Court instructed
Corrow to either pay the filing fee or complete and return an enclosed application to proceed IFP
and Prisoner Litigation Authorization form (“PLA”) within fourteen days in order for this case to
proceed. (Id.)
The fourteen-day deadline passed, but Corrow did not pay the filing fee or return the IFP
and PLA forms. On August 22, 2024, the Court “direct[ed] Plaintiff to either pay the $405.00
filing fee or file an IFP application and PLA by September 20, 2024.” (Elec. Order, Aug. 22,
2024.) On August 23, 2024, Corrow filed an Amended Complaint, IFP motion, and the PLA.
(Am. Compl.; IFP App., ECF No. 8; PLA, ECF No. 7.)
I. September 24, 2024 Order Dismissing the Amended Complaint
On September 24, 2024, this Court issued an Order granting Corrow’s IFP motion. (See
Order (“IFP Order”), Corrow v. Nassau Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 2:24-cv-5018 (E.D.N.Y.), ECF No.
12.) Upon granting Corrow’s IFP motion, the Court screened the Amended Complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which instructs that “[t]he court shall review . . . as soon as practicable
after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” and “shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint—
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The Amended Complaint brought Section 1983 claims against NUMC, the Nassau
County Police Department, and the Nassau County Police Department Precinct (together, the
“Police Defendants”) alleging deliberate indifference in the medical care provided to Corrow
related to his injured pinky finger. (Am. Compl. ¶ II.) For the reasons set forth in the IFP Order,
the Court dismissed the Amended Complaint for failure to state any plausible claims for relief.
(See IFP Order at 5–13.)
In the dismissal Order, the Court noted that the Police Defendants “are not proper parties
to this action as a matter of law” because it is “well-established that a police department or police
precinct cannot sue or be sued because such entities do not exist separate and apart from the
municipality and do not have independent legal identities.” (Id. at 6 (citing Henry v. Cnty. of
Nassau, 6 F.4th 324, 336 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against police
department because “the Nassau County Police Department is a non-suable agency of Nassau
County”).) In light of Corrow’s pro se status, the Court construed the Amended Complaint’s
claims against the Police Defendants as claims brought against Nassau County. (Id. at 7 (citing
Pena v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, No. 21-cv-2496, 2021 WL 3848299, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
27, 2021) (dismissing claims against Suffolk County Police Department because the department
is an administrative arm of the county that lacks a separate legal identity and construing the
claims against Suffolk County).) In order to prevail on a Section 1983 claim against a municipal
entity, such as Nassau County, a plaintiff must show: “(1) actions taken under color of law; (2)
deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an
official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury.” Roe v. City of Waterbury,
542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91).
Thus, “a municipality can be held liable under Section 1983 if the deprivation of the plaintiff’s
rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the
municipality.” Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012).
The Court assessed the Amended Complaint’s claims against Nassau County under the
aforementioned standards and found that it failed to “allege[] any facts from which this Court
could reasonably construe that the challenged conduct was undertaken pursuant to any custom,
policy, or practice of Nassau County[.]” (IFP Order at 8.) Accordingly, the Court dismissed the
claims against Nassau County without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii),
1915A(b)(1). (Id.) The Court also assessed the Amended Complaint’s claims of deliberate
indifference to Corrow’s medical needs under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Court found that the Amended Complaint did not allege any facts suggesting intentional or
reckless conduct that could give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment or that any
defendant knew of and disregarded any excessive risks to Corrow’s safety, which could give rise
to liability under the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 9–12.)
Finally, in the dismissal Order, the Court granted Corrow leave to file a second amended
complaint and cautioned him “to review the Court’s guidance set forth above concerning the
requirements to allege facts supporting plausible Monell claims against Nassau County . . . and
plausible deliberate indifference claims.” (Id. at 12–13.)
II. The Second Amended Complaint1
On October 17, 2024, Corrow filed a Second Amended Complaint using the Eastern
District of New York’s form for civil rights complaints. (Sec. Am. Compl., ECF No. 15.) As
noted, the Second Amended Complaint names as defendants: (1) Nassau County Headquarters;
(2) Officer Lee, NCPD, Precinct Bethpage; (3) John Doe, Detective, NCPD, Precinct Bethpage;
(4) the NUMC; (5) John Doe (surgeon); and (6) Jane Doe, Paramedic Nassau County EMT. (Id.
at 1–2.) The “Statement of Claim” alleges that the following happened to Corrow on April 4,
2024, at about 9:30 p.m.:
[M]y pinky finger on my left hand was severed accidentally and Nassau County
paramedics were transporting me to Nassau University Medical Center which was
a 5 minute drive from the original scene. Upon arrival of paramedics and the entire
transport procedure my pinky finger was hanging by the skin. Jane Doe of the
paramedic EMT team who provided me medical care insisted to myself the finger
medically would die in 12-15 hours. With this statement she was trying to ensure
myself that in her medical opinion it was going to be medically reattached, as it
only was a 5 minute drive to the facility. When I arrived on a stretcher in the
hospital, procedure for the facility is to provide an individual with reasonable and
adequate care and to be treated fairly without bias as first priority is to save human
1 Excerpts from the Second Amended Complaint have been reproduced here exactly as they
appear in the original. Errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected or
noted.
lives and perform necessary medical procedures. I was denied access to the trauma
unit while suffering from a severed limb requiring hospital staff to adequately
prepare a trauma unit to reattach and save my severed limb. Nassau County Police
Dept. in accordance with the hospital staff instead chose to place me in a regular
room on the ICU floor to make their own decisions on how to treat my finger with
no say, options, or choice to myself. I believe medical malpractice and negligence
are the sole cause of my pinky finger’s amputation.
(Id. § II at 3–4.)2
The Second Amended Complaint further alleges:
In accordance with Nassau Police Dept. which has no medical professional
capacity, the decision to violate my rights and negligently amputate my finger was
made by the officers and detectives on the scene in accordance with the surgeon
who I’ll name as John Doe. My injuries sustained are grave and . . . Nassau
University Medical Center failed to operate under good and accepted standards of
medical care and such departure was the immediate cause of my injuries
directly . . . . In my case, I am pleading with the court that prior bias and prejudice
were an immediate cause of the hospital to deviate from accepted standards of
medical procedure and choose medical malpractice to hurridly perform a procedure
I did not 1) Agree to and the surgeon did not provide me with or disclose any
alternatives and therto failed to inform me of any foreseeable risks associated with
the treatment that a reasonable medical practitioner would disclose in the same
circumstance. Secondly 2) A reasonably prudent patient in the same position would
not have undergone the treatment had I been fully informed of an amputation.
Thirdly 3) A lack of informed consent is a proximate cause of my injury, even so
standing alone if I signed consent, when I did not, does not establish defendants
prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In my attempt to prevail on
this motion for judgment in this medical malpractice action, I am citing Nassau
University Medical Center, Nassau County, John Doe (Surgeon) as the prima facie
for deporting from good and accepted medical standards and the immediate cause
of my injury resulting in permanent amputation as well as post traumatic stress
disorder and mental and physical anguish as well as future wage loss and the
inability to trust a public entity in the future . . . . This surgeon and his explanation
for further amputation of my finger that was given initially would have left me with
nerve damage, however several body cams present on Officer Lee on duty will
show I was given no option and no adequate medical care to ensure proper
procurement of my finger on my hand . . . . This body cam footage will show
Officer Lee cleaning the blood himself when the amputation was over, the surgeons
medical procedure and exploration and the officers on duty using police presence
and persuasion to manipulate a public benefit corporation into bending to their
2 In the “Statement of Claim” section, Corrow also cites to various state court cases.
demands and gravely injuring me permanently instead of providing any alternative
to amputation.
(Id. at 4–7.)
In the space that calls for a description of any injuries claimed and any medical treatment
that was required or received, the Second Amended Complaint alleges:
As an immediate cause of this event, my pinky finger on my left hand was
amputated at no choice of my own. I received unprofessional, inadequate care that
resulted in the removal of my finger instead of providing any means to an
alternative treatment due to prejudice involvement prior with this facility.
(Id. § II.A at 4.)
For relief, Corrow seeks compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of
$5,000,000. (Id. § III.)
III. Nassau University Medical Center’s Motion to Dismiss
On July 31, 2025, NUMC filed a motion to dismiss all claims asserted against it in the
Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6).
(ECF Nos. 54 (notice of motion) and 55 (fully briefed motion).) In its motion, NUMC argued
that the Second Amended Complaint failed to allege a plausible claim of deliberate indifference
concerning the medical care Corrow received for his injured finger because the facts alleged
illustrated that NUMC personnel treated Corrow for his injuries promptly, and Corrow’s
disagreement with the NUMC surgeon’s course of treatment could not give rise to a deliberate
indifference claim. (NUMC Dismissal at 7– 8.) In opposition, Corrow argued that NUMC
exhibited deliberate indifference by placing him in the emergency room rather than within the
hospital’s trauma unit and by failing to prepare him for surgery. (Id. at 8.)
On June 26, 2026, the Court granted NUMC’s motion to dismiss in its entirety and
dismissed all claims against it with prejudice. (Id. at 14.) The Court found that the Second
Amended Complaint did not allege a plausible claim of deliberate indifference because it did not
allege any facts suggesting any intentional or reckless conduct of which any defendant knew or
should have known would pose an excessive risk to Corrow’s health or safety. (Id. at 12.) The
Court found that, at most, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that the surgeon acted with
negligence, which resulted in medical malpractice, but it is well settled that “mere medical
malpractice is not tantamount to deliberate indifference.” (Id. (quoting Swinton v. Livingston
Cnty., No. 21-1434, 2023 WL 2317838, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 2023) (summary order).)
IV. The County Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
On July 18, 2025, the County Defendants filed a letter seeking a pre-motion conference
in anticipation of their motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). (ECF No. 51.) On July 23, 2025, the Court denied the County Defendants’ request for a
pre-motion conference because they had already answered the Second Amended Complaint,
which made any Rule 12(b) motion untimely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (requiring that any
motion to dismiss under the rule to “be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is
allowed”).
On August 14, 2025, the County Defendants filed a letter seeking a pre-motion
conference in anticipation of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). (ECF No.
58.) On August 15, 2025, the Court waived the pre-motion conference requirement and set a
briefing schedule. (Elec. Order, Aug. 15, 2025.) Accordingly, the County Defendants filed a
motion for judgement on the pleadings on September 12, 2025 (ECF No. 59), and Corrow filed
an opposition on October 10, 2025 (Ltr. (“Opp.”), ECF No. 67.) The County Defendants did not
file a reply, and therefore the motion for judgment on the pleadings is fully briefed.
LEGAL STANDARDS
This Court is required to construe pleadings “filed by pro se litigants liberally and to
interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th
62, 67 (2d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Ceara v. Deacon, 916 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007)) (quotation marks omitted).
“The standard for granting a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is identical
to that for granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Lively v. WAFRA Inv.
Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 301 (2d Cir. 2021). A party may move for judgment on the
pleadings after the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay a trial. 1-800 Contacts,
Inc. v. JAND, Inc., 119 F.4th 234, 246 (2d Cir. 2024). “To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the
plaintiff’s complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Lively, 6 F.4th at 301. Further, the court is not to “give effect
to a complaint’s assertions of law or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations; we are to
accept well pleaded factual assertions as true; and we are to draw all reasonable factual
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 119 F.4th at 246. Thus, a court must
“assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations” when evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion,
but “are not bound to accept as true a pleading’s legal conclusion.” Am. Soc’y for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals v. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., 60 F.4th 16, 21 (2d Cir. 2023).
DISCUSSION
The County Defendants argue that the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a
deliberate indifference claim because its allegations are “facially implausible.” (Mot. at 7.)
Indeed, the County Defendants argue that, rather than exhibiting deliberate indifference towards
Corrow’s health, they transported Corrow from Nassau County Correctional Center to NUMC so
that he could receive treatment. (Id.) Further, the County Defendants contend that the Second
Amended Complaint fails to allege that Officer Lee was personally involved in any alleged
constitutional violations, which warrants dismissal of the claims against him. (Id. at 4–5.)
Beyond the plausibility of the pleading’s allegations, the County Defendants also argue that
Corrow failed to exhaust the grievance procedures available to him within the Nassau County
Correctional Center before filing this lawsuit, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).3 (Id. at 5–6.)
In opposition, Corrow argues that he was “surrounded by active NCPD personnel whom
deliberately interfered with medical, violating 4th, 8th, and 14th amendment, among many.”4
3 The County Defendants also move for judgment on the pleadings on any state law claims
asserted in the Second Amended Complaint on the basis that Corrow did not file a notice of
claim pursuant to New York General Municipal Law (“New York Gen. Mun. L.”) § 50-e with
the County prior to commencing this lawsuit. (Mot. at 6.) In his opposition, Corrow clarifies that
he is not asserting negligence and malpractice claims but “constitutional violations and deliberate
indifference are my claim[s].” (Opp. at 4.) Similarly, in his opposition to NUMC’s motion to
dismiss, Corrow specified that the Second Amended Complaint only brings a deliberate
indifference claim under Section 1983 rather than any claims under state law. (See ECF No. 55-3
at 1.) Accordingly, the County Defendants’ argument concerning New York Gen. Mun. L. § 50-e
is moot.
4 Excerpts from Corrow’s opposition to the County Defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings have been reproduced here exactly as they appear in the original. Errors in spelling,
punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected or noted.
(Opp. at 1.) Corrow maintains that Officer Lee “perform[ed] the duty of cleaning blood off of
me,” which establishes personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. (Id. at 2.)5
For the reasons set forth below, the County Defendants fail to show that Corrow did not
satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. However, all claims against the County Defendants
are nevertheless dismissed with prejudice because the Second Amended Complaint fails to state
a plausible claim for deliberate indifference.
I. Claims Against Nassau County Headquarters
The County Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Nassau
County Headquarters is an administrative arm of Nassau County that cannot be sued. (Mot. at 5.)
However, in light of Corrow’s pro se status, the Court construes the Second Amended
Complaint’s claims against Nassau County Headquarters as made against Nassau County. See
IFP Order at 7; see also Pena, 2021 WL 3848299, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2021) (dismissing
claims against Suffolk County Police Department because the department is an administrative
arm of the county that lacks a separate legal identity and construing the claims against Suffolk
5 Corrow’s opposition brief includes additional factual allegations regarding the hospital staff,
the surgeon who treated him, and the police officers present at the hospital. It also raises, for the
first time, claims under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. However,
the Court only considers the factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and Corrow’s
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment because “[a] plaintiff cannot amend [his] complaint by
asserting new facts or theories for the first time in opposition to Defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings.” Washington v. NYC Madison Avenue Medical P.C., No. 20-cv-
3446, 2021 WL 4037518 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2021); see also Rojas v. Nuvem Health LLC, No. 25-
cv-4684, 2025 WL 3157770, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2025) (“Even with the liberal standards
applicable to pro se litigants, the plaintiff cannot amend his complaint by asserting new
allegations for the first time in an opposition to a motion to dismiss.”); Wright v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998) (a party may not amend its pleadings through statements in
motion papers).
County). Accordingly, the Court will proceed with assessing the Second Amended Complaint’s
claims against Nassau County in lieu of Nassau County Headquarters.
II. PLRA Exhaustion
Under the PRLA, plaintiffs who are incarcerated must first exhaust the administrative
remedies available to them prior to bringing Section 1983 claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”) However, plaintiffs “are not
required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, failure to exhaust “is an affirmative defense” that defendants can
raise in a responsive pleading. Id.; see also Williams v. Correction Officer Priatno, 829 F.3d 118,
122 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense under
the PLRA, not a pleading requirement.”).
Nonetheless, “a district court still may dismiss a complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies if it is clear on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff did not satisfy
the PLRA exhaustion requirement.” Williams, 829 F.3d at 122. Courts have dismissed claims for
failure to exhaust in a variety of circumstances, such as: (1) where the complaint itself alleges
that internal investigations are ongoing, see, e.g., Martinez v. Franco, No. 19-cv-8868, 2021 WL
1199188, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021) (dismissing for failure to exhaust “clear from the face
of the Complaint,” where it alleged “that the plaintiff filed a grievance and appealed the
superintendent’s determination and the ‘investigation is ongoing’”); (2) where the complaint was
filed shortly after the underlying incident that gave rise to the lawsuit, making it implausible that
the plaintiff could have exhausted the available administrative remedies in such a short period of
time, see, e.g., Caraballo v. Dep’t of Corr. City of New York, No. 22-cv-971, 2022 WL
16555313 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2022) (dismissing a complaint for failure to exhaust where plaintiff
filed his lawsuit five days after the underlying incidents); and (3) where the plaintiff initiated but
did not complete the grievance process, see, e.g., Leon v. City of New York, No. 13-cv-5407,
2014 WL 3408206 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2014) (dismissing for failure to exhaust where plaintiff
“filed a grievance but did not comply with the [correctional center’s] four-tiered review
process”). However, “the Court cannot simply assume that Plaintiff failed to meet the
requirements of the PLRA” in the absence of allegations establishing that a plaintiff exhausted
administrative remedies. Ayala-rosario v. Westchester Cnty., No. 19-cv-3052, 2020 WL 3618190
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2020).
According to the County Defendants, the Second Amended Complaint should be
dismissed because it “makes no mention” that Corrow “raised his complaints about alleged
medical malpractice and negligence with anyone within the chain of command at the Nassau
County Correctional Center such that a grievance could be inferred even under a liberal
interpretation of the [Second Amended Complaint].” (Mot. at 6.) However, this argument is
contrary to well-settled law, as it attempts to place the burden on Corrow to affirmatively plead
that he has exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. Indeed, the Supreme Court
and Second Circuit have both made clear that plaintiffs like Corrow are not required “to specially
plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; Williams, 829 F.3d
at 122 (“Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense under the PLRA,
not a pleading requirement.”) (emphasis added). The County Defendants fail to show how the
specific allegations of the Second Amended Complaint make exhaustion implausible, and their
attempt to rely on the absence of allegations concerning exhaustion is insufficient to secure
dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint at the pleading stage.
Accordingly, failure to satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement is not a basis for
judgment on the pleadings in favor of the County Defendants.
III. Deliberate Indifference
The County Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Corrow’s
deliberate indifference claim on the basis that the allegations are both “facially implausible” and
that they illustrate that Corrow was promptly transferred to the NUMC for medical treatment.
(Mot. at 7.) In opposition, Corrow argues that the County Defendants interfered with his medical
treatment by denying him access to the NUMC’s trauma unit and “calling the shots” with respect
to his medical care, despite their lack of medical training. (Opp. at 1.) He further argues that
“non-medical personnel and even medical personnel for that matter cannot choose an easier and
less efficacious treatment just because they do not care for you if you’re a pre-trial detainee, this
is deliberate indifference.” (Id. at 4.)
As this Court explained in its Order granting Corrow’s IFP motion and dismissing the
Amended Complaint, as a municipal entity, Nassau County may be held liable for constitutional
deprivations under the standards set forth in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978). Under Monell, “municipalities and other local government units” are “persons” who
may be liable under Section 1983, although they “cannot be held liable under [Section] 1983 on
a respondeat superior theory.” Id. at 690–91. Rather, the plaintiff must show that, “through its
deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Agosto
v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 98 (2d Cir. 2020). In order to bring a Monell claim against
a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts supporting: “(1) a municipal policy or custom that
(2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Friend v.
Gasparino, 61 F.4th 77, 93 (2d Cir. 2023). A plaintiff may establish the existence of a municipal
policy giving rise to Monell liability in four different ways:
(1) a formal policy endorsed by the municipality . . . ; (2) actions directed by the
government’s authorized decisionmakers or those who establish governmental policy . . . ;
(3) a persistent and widespread practice that amounts to a custom of which policymakers
must have been aware . . . ; or (4) a constitutional violation resulting from
policymakers’ failure to train municipal employees.
Deferio v. City of Syracuse, 770 F. App’x 587, 589–90 (2d Cir. 2019); see also Savarese v. City
of New York, 547 F. Supp. 3d 305, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
Here, the County Defendants’ Motion fails to address Monell in any way and does not
argue whether the Second Amended Complaint alleges facts plausibly supporting any of the
aforementioned theories of liability. Instead, it argues that the allegations of the pleading are
implausible and do not support a claim of deliberate indifference. (See Mot. at 3–5.)
A pre-trial detainee’s claims of deliberate indifference are governed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017)
(“A pretrial detainee’s claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement are governed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”); see also Swinton v. Livingston Cnty., No. 21-
1434, 2023 WL 2317838 (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 2023) (analyzing a pretrial detainee’s denial of medical
treatment claim under the Fourteenth Amendment standard) (summary order). To prove a
6 Corrow is a pre-trial detainee, and thus his deliberate indifference claim arises under the
Fourteenth Amendment. (See Opp. at 1.)
Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a pre-trial detainee must meet both an
objective prong and a subjective prong. Id.
First, to satisfy the objective prong, “the alleged deprivation of adequate medical care
must be sufficiently serious.” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated
in part on other grounds by Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2023) (quotation
marks omitted)7; Maldonado v. Town of Greenburgh, 460 F. Supp. 3d 382, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(same). “Factors relevant to the seriousness of a medical condition include whether ‘a reasonable
doctor or patient would find it important and worthy of comment,’ whether the condition
‘significantly affects an individual’s daily activities,’ and whether it causes ‘chronic and
substantial pain.’” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279 (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698,
702 (2d Cir.1998)); see also Sherman v. Cook, No. 3:20-cv-1485, 2021 WL 311283, at *5 (D.
Conn. Jan. 29, 2021) (“A ‘sufficiently serious’ medical condition is a condition that may lead to
extreme or chronic pain, degeneration or death.” (citing Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162–63
(2d Cir. 2003); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996))).
Second, to satisfy the subjective prong, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the
defendant “official acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act
with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even
though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive
risk to health or safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35; see also Horace v. Gibbs, 802 F. App’x 11, 14
7 Salahuddin addresses the objective prong of a deliberate indifference claim in the context of the
Eighth Amendment. See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279. However, the objective prong requires the
same showing under the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments. See Horace v. Gibbs, 802 F.
App’x 11, 14 (2d Cir. 2020).
(2d Cir. 2020) (summary order); Charles v. Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2019)
(holding that while this “formulation of the deliberate indifference standard was developed in
cases involving unconstitutional conditions of confinement,” the “same principles” apply to
claims of unconstitutionally inadequate medical treatment). Further, “[a] plaintiff must show
something more than mere negligence to establish a deliberate indifference claim in the
Fourteenth Amendment context.” Charles, 925 F.3d at 87. Accordingly, “mere medical
malpractice is not tantamount to deliberate indifference, but it may rise to the level of deliberate
indifference when it involves culpable recklessness, i.e. an act or failure to act that evinces a
conscious disregard of substantial medical harm.” Id. However, “mere disagreement over the
proper course of treatment does not create a constitutional claim,” either. Damon v. New York,
No. 8:23-cv-74, 2023 WL 11965130 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2023) (quoting Chance, 143 F.3d at
703), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:23-cv-74, 2023 WL 11965128 (N.D.N.Y. Apr.
24, 2023). Therefore, a detainee “asserting a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate
indifference to his medical needs can allege either that the defendants knew that failing to
provide the complained of medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to his health or that
the defendants should have known that failing to provide the omitted medical treatment would
pose a substantial risk to the detainee’s health.” Charles, 925 F.3d at 87. (emphasis in original).
The County Defendants do not contest that the allegations of the Second Amended
Complaint meet the objective prong of the deliberate indifference claim—namely, that the
deprivation of medical care alleged by Corrow was sufficiently serious. (See Mot. at 3–4.) Here
the objective prong is clearly satisfied, as this Court found in the Order dismissing the claims
against NUMC. (See NUMC Dismissal at 12.) The Second Amended Complaint alleges that
Corrow’s finger was “severed” and “hanging by the skin.” (Sec. Am. Compl. § II at 3–4.) A
severed fingered undoubtedly affects an individual’s ability to participate in daily activities and
likely causes substantial pain. See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279; Sherman, 2021 WL 311283, at
*5.
However, the County Defendants argue that the Second Amended Complaint’s
allegations do not satisfy the subjective prong of a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim because they do not plausibly show that the County Defendants engaged in
any intentional conduct or reckless failure to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that
Corrow’s condition posed to him even though they knew, or should have known, that the
condition would pose an excessive risk to Corrow’s health or safety.
“Non-medical personnel may be held liable for deliberate indifference to medical needs
where a plaintiff demonstrates that the personnel intentionally denied or delayed access to
medical care or intentionally interfered with medical treatment once it was prescribed.” Atutis v.
Harder, No. 9:21-cv-715, 2021 WL 12314320, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. July 20, 2021). For example, in
Reed v. Does 1-6, No. 3:24-cv-1359, 2024 WL 4872150, at *2–4 (D. Conn. Nov. 22, 2024), the
court found that allegations that non-medical correctional facility officers “provided false
information to the hospital staff that prevented Plaintiff from receiving an assessment for proper
treatment for his assault injuries” gave rise to a plausible claim of deliberate indifference because
the defendants “acted intentionally and recklessly to prevent [plaintiff’s] access to necessary
medical treatment.” Similarly, in Febus v. Somody, No. 3:18-cv-640, 2019 WL 1763093, at *4
(D. Conn. Apr. 22, 2019), the court found that a police sergeant acted with deliberate
indifference to a pre-trial detainee’s health when the sergeant interfered with the plaintiff’s
treatment by removing him from the hospital against the treating physician’s instructions.
Accordingly, in order to bring a deliberate indifference claim against non-medical personnel,
there “must be at least some allegations of a conscious or callous indifference to a[n individual’s]
rights.” Dumel v. Westchester Cnty., No. 19-cv-2161, 2021 WL 738365, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
25, 2021).
The crux of Corrow’s deliberate indifference claim against the County Defendants is that
the NCPD officers who accompanied him to the hospital were allegedly involved in his treatment
with the medical staff at Nassau University Medical Center in an improper manner. The Second
Amended Complaint includes the following conclusory allegations:
• “Nassau County Police Dept. in accordance with the hospital staff instead chose
to place me in a regular room on the ICU floor to make their own decisions on
how to treat my finger with no say, options, or choice to myself.” (Sec. Am.
Compl. at 4.);
• “In accordance with Nassau Police Dept. which has no medical professional
capacity, the decision to violate my rights and negligently amputate my finger
was made by the officers and detectives on the scene in accordance with the
surgeon . . . .” (Id. at 5.);
• “This body cam footage will show . . . the officers on duty using police presence
and persuasion to manipulate a public benefit corporation into bending to their
demands and gravely injuring me permanently instead of providing any
alternative to amputation.” (Id. at 7.)
However, the Second Amended Complaint lacks factual allegations supporting the contention
that the Nassau County police officers interfered with decisions concerning where to place
Corrow in the hospital and whether to amputate Corrow’s finger, or more broadly “manipulated”
hospital staff to “bend[]” to their demands. (Id.) Nor do the allegations otherwise suggest that
Nassau County police officers exhibited conscious or callous indifference to Corrow’s health or
that they attempted to delay his treatment. Rather, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that
Nassau County paramedics promptly transported Corrow to the hospital, where Nassau County
police officers acted in concert with the medical staff at Nassau University Medical Center. (Sec.
Am. Compl. at 4.)
Unlike the defendants in Reed and Febus described above, the Second Amended
Complaint does not allege that the County Defendants intentionally misrepresented information,
failed to follow the orders of Corrow’s treating physicians, or otherwise acted in a way that
demonstrates a conscious disregard for Corrow’s health. As such, “[a]bsent any allegation that
defendants deliberately or recklessly exacerbated plaintiff’s condition, delayed seeking medical
attention, or caused him to receive inadequate treatment, plaintiff does not state a plausible claim
for deliberate indifference his medical needs.” Hendrix v. City of New York, No. 12-cv-5011,
2013 WL 6835168, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013).
Although Corrow objects to the surgeon’s decision to amputate his pinky finger, the
Second Amended Complaint alleges that the surgeon informed Corrow that he amputated
Corrow’s pinky finger to prevent further nerve damage. (See Sec. Am. Compl. at 4 (alleging that
the surgeon who operated on Corrow chose to amputate his finger because doing otherwise
would have “left [Corrow] with nerve damage”).) The surgeon is not alleged to have, for
example, amputated Corrow’s finger based on false information presented by the County
Defendants or in response to the County Defendants’ intentional delay in bringing Corrow to the
hospital. Instead, Corrow alleges that, prior to surgery, while he was being transported to the
hospital, his “pinky finger was hanging by the skin.” (Id.)
Accordingly, the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint express Corrow’s
disagreement with the medical treatment that he received, but they do not support a plausible
claim that the County Defendants acted with conscious or callous indifference to Corrow’s
health by interfering with his treatment. Thus, the Second Amendment Complaint fails to allege
a plausible Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against the County Defendants,
and these claims are dismissed.
IV. Personal Involvement
The County Defendants also argue that the Second Amended Complaint fails to make
any substantive allegations against Officer Lee and therefore fails to allege that he was
personally involved in any of the conduct challenged under Section 1983. (Mot. at 4–5.) In
opposition, Corrow repeats his allegation that “Officer Lee . . . perform[ed] the duty of cleaning
blood off of me,” while he was stationed at Corrow’s bedside. (Opp. at 2.)
“[A]n individual may be held liable under . . . [Section] 1983 only if that individual
is personally involved in the alleged deprivation.” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297,
314 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Sanfeliz v. Williams, No. 22-cv-8914, 2026 WL 84517, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2026) (“Personal involvement of the individual Defendants in the alleged
constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages against them under
§ 1983.”) As a result, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, though
the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983
F.3d 609, 616 (2d Cir. 2020). “Personal involvement can be established by showing that
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation; (2) the
defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed
to remedy the wrong; (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which
unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy
or custom; (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who
committed the wrongful acts, or; (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate
indifference . . . by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were
occurring.
Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 314.
The Second Amended Complaint’s allegations regarding Officer Lee are that he “was
cleaning the blood himself when the amputation was over . . . .” (Sec. Am. Compl. at 7.) This
lone allegation regarding Officer Lee is insufficient to raise a plausible Fourteenth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim, as it does not suggest that Officer Lee delayed or interfered with
Corrow’s medical treatment or otherwise acted with a conscious disregard of risks to Corrow’s
health. Accordingly, the deliberate indifference claim against Officer Lee is dismissed.
V. Fictious Defendants
The Second Amended Complaint brings claims against John Doe, an NYPD detective in
Bethpage, New York, and Jane Doe, a Nassau County EMT (together, the “Doe Defendants”).
(See Sec. Am. Compl.) The allegations against the Doe Defendants are identical in all material
respects to the allegations brought against the County Defendants. Accordingly, the Court
dismisses the claims against the Doe Defendants for the reasons set forth in this Memorandum
and Order. See Bailon v. Pollen Presents, No. 22-cv-6054, 2023 WL 5956141, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 13, 2023) (“The Court has discretion to dismiss claims sua sponte pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), particularly where it is clear that a plaintiff could not have prevailed on the facts
alleged in the complaint.”); Muka v. Murphy, 358 F. App’x 239, 241 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary
order) (“A district court’s ability sua sponte to dismiss a [pro se] complaint that lacks a basis in
law or fact is well-established.” (citing Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d
362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000))
VI. Leave to Amend
A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend at least once
when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”
Shomo v. City. of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009). However, leave to amend is
properly denied where amendment would be futile. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d
Cir. 2000). Similarly, “where the Court has put Plaintiff on notice of the deficiencies in his
original complaint and given him an opportunity to correct these deficiencies in an Amended
Complaint, but Plaintiff has failed to do so, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.” Harrison v.
Traylor, No. 17-cv-6678, 2022 WL 580773 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2022) (quoting Coon v.
Benson, No. 09-cv-230, 2010 WL 769226 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010)).
As explained above, earlier in this litigation, the Court dismissed Corrow’s Amended
Complaint after screening it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and granted him leave to file a
second amended complaint. (IFP Order at 12–13.) In the portion of the IFP Order granting
Corrow leave to file a second amended complaint, the Court cautioned Corrow to “review [its]
guidance set forth [in the IFP Order] concerning the requirements to allege facts supporting
plausible Monell claims against [the County Defendants] and plausible deliberate indifference
claims.” (Id. at 13.) Here, the allegations against the County Defendants in the Amended
Complaint and Second Amended Complaint are similar in all material respects and pertain to the
County Defendants’ alleged involvement in the care that Corrow received for his severed pinky
finger. (Compare IFP Order at 2 with supra at Background § II.) As detailed above, these
allegations do not state a plausible Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
the County Defendants.
Because the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint do not cure the specific
deficiencies that the Court identified in the Amended Complaint, the Court denies Corrow
further leave to amend and dismisses the claims against the County Defendants and the Doe
Defendants with prejudice. See Bridges v. Corr. Servs., No. 17-cv-2220, 2022 WL 1500633
(S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2022) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s second amended complaint with
prejudice after it failed to cure the deficiencies in the amended complaint); Coon, 2010 WL
769226 at *6 (same).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the County Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED in its
entirety, and the claims set forth in the Second Amended Complaint against the County
Defendants and Doe Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court shall mail
a copy of this Order to Corrow at his address of record and shall note such mailing on the docket.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
Dated: Central Islip, New York
September 14, 2026
/s/ Nusrat J. Choudhury
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY
United States District Judge