CDCR

1

2

3

4

5

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

8

9 ISAAC LAMAAR MONTGOMERY, Case No. 1:25-cv-00708-KES-EPG (PC)

10 Plaintiff,

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

11 v. RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S

CLAIMS OF FAILURE TO PROTECT AND

12 GONZALEZ, et al., CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN

VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH

13 Defendants. AMENDMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT

GONZALEZ AND DOES 1-5 PROCEED

14 PAST SCREENING AND ALL OTHER

CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS BE

15 DISMISSED

16

(ECF No. 31)

17

18

19 I. INTRODUCTION

20 Plaintiff Isaac Lamaar Montgomery is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

21 pauperis in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1, 7). In his initial

22 complaint filed on June 11, 2025, Plaintiff alleged Defendant Gonzalez and other Doe

23 Defendants forced Plaintiff and other inmates to clean up a deceased inmate’s blood and bodily

24 fluids without appropriate protective equipment. (ECF No. 1 at 8).

25 On October 29, 2025, the Court screened the complaint and found that Plaintiff made

26 cognizable claims for Failure to Protect and Conditions of Confinement Against Defendants

27 Gonzalez and DOES 1-10. (ECF No. 10). On February 11, 2026, the District Judge ordered that

28 “[t]his action shall proceed only on Plaintiff’s claims for failure to protect and conditions of

1 confinement in violation of the eighth amendment against defendants Gonzalez and Does 1-

2 10.” (ECF No. 17).

3 However, Plaintiff has had difficulty identifying and serving defendants. The Court has

4 twice attempted service on Defendant Gonzalez through the California Department of

5 Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), but CDCR has responded that it lacks sufficient

6 information to identify that person given the number of Officers at the institution with the last

7 name of Gonzalez or Gonzales. (ECF No. 15, 16, 26, 27).

8 On July 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, in which

9 he sought leave to file a first amended complaint in order to present more complete facts of the

10 case and more fully identify the defendants. (ECF No. 29). On July 15, 2026, the Court granted

11 Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint in order to provide him with an

12 additional opportunity to better explain the incident and identify the responsible defendants.

13 (ECF No. 30).

14 Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on August 10, 2026. (ECF No. 31) and it is

15 now before the Court for screening. Upon review, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claims

16 for failure to protect and conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment

17 against Defendants Gonzalez and Does 1-5 proceed past the screening stage and all other

18 claims and defendants be dismissed.

19 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

21 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

22 The Court must dismiss a complaint, or a portion of it, if the prisoner raises claims that are

23 frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

24 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),

25 (2). Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 7), the Court may also screen

26 the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii), which directs the Court to dismiss a case

27 at any time if the Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or

28 seeks relief against an immune defendant.

1 III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT1

2 Plaintiff sues: (1) CDCR; (2) correctional officer M. Gonzalez; and (3) correctional

3 officers Does 1-5. He alleges the events described in the amended complaint occurred on June

4 6, 2024, at the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”) located in Corcoran, CA. (ECF

5 No. 31 at 4).

6 Plaintiff alleges the following. On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff found his cellmate Fennell

7 bleeding from a cut to his wrist and Plaintiff sought assistance from Doe correctional officers.

8 Plaintiff and two other inmates were directed to exit the cell and wait in the dayroom. (ECF No.

9 31 at 4). Eventually, Defendant Gonzalez directed Plaintiff and two inmates to return to their

10 cell. Plaintiff states that upon returning to his cell he felt sick, due to the smell and sight of

11 blood within the cell following the death of inmate Fennell. (Id.). Approximately thirty minutes

12 later, Defendant Gonzalez returned to the cell with cleaning supplies and directed Plaintiff to

13 clean up the blood. (Id.). Plaintiff was not provided with any training or personal protective

14 equipment. (Id.). Plaintiff claims he had to use a “beanie” and “t-shirt to wipe up the blood.

15 (Id.).

16 On June 14, 2024, an inmate was assigned to Plaintiff’s cell who Plaintiff represents

17 had fresh cuts on his wrists. The inmate stated he had just come from a crisis bed after

18 attempting suicide. Plaintiff states he immediately when to a C/O station to complain that an

19 inmate who recently attempted suicide was placed in his cell following the suicide of his

20 former cellmate. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff claims he was unable to sleep at night because of a fear of

21 waking up to find this inmate had killed himself. (Id.).

22 For relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, among other things. (Id.

23 at 10).

24 IV. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT

25 a. Section 1983

26 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

27

28 1 For readability, minor alterations, like omitting capitalization, have been made to some of Plaintiff’s

quotations without indicating each change.

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

1 usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

2 jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

3

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

4 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely

5 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor,

6 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see

7 also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los

8 Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir.

9 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

10 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under

11 color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or

12 federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also

13 Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of

14 state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983,

15 ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an

16 act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is

17 made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007)

18 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)).

19 “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a

20 ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others

21 to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d

22 at 743). This standard of causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation

23 of proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981);

24 see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

25 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the

26 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual

27 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have

28 been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,

1 691, 695 (1978).

2 b. Failure to Protect

3 Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a failure to protect claim based on an alleged failure to

4 provide him with training and personal protective equipment to clean up the blood remaining

5 following his cellmate’s death.

6 “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit

7 inhumane ones . . . . ” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citation and quotation

8 marks omitted). Among other things, the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take

9 reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of . . . inmates.” Id. (citation omitted). To establish

10 a failure to protect claim, a prisoner must establish that prison officials were deliberately

11 indifferent to a sufficiently serious threat to the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 837.

12 “‘Deliberate indifference’ has both subjective and objective components.” Labatad v.

13 Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013). The prisoner must show that “the

14 official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety; the official must

15 both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

16 serious harm exists, and [the official] must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

17 “Liability may follow only if a prison official ‘knows that inmates face a substantial risk of

18 serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’”

19 Labatad, 714 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847).

20 Neither negligence nor gross negligence warrant liability under the Eighth Amendment.

21 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36 & n4. An “official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he

22 should have perceived but did not, ... cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of

23 punishment.” Id. at 838. Instead, “the official's conduct must have been ‘wanton,’ which turns

24 not upon its effect on the prisoner, but rather, upon the constraints facing the official.” Frost v.

25 Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03

26 (1991)).

27 Liberally construing the allegations for the purposes of screening, the Court finds

28 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint has sufficiently stated a claim of failure to protect in

1 violation of the Eighth Amendment against defendants Gonzalez and Does 1-5. Plaintiff

2 alleges that defendants only provided Plaintiff with the supplies to clean up the cell,

3 notwithstanding the fact that he lacked any training or personal protective equipment to safely

4 to do so.

5 Based on these allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim for failure to protect

6 against defendants Gonzalez and Does 1-5 may proceed past screening.

7 c. Conditions of Confinement

8 “It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions

9 under which [the prisoner] is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”

10 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

11 (1994). Conditions of confinement may, consistent with the Constitution, be restrictive and

12 harsh. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d

13 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006); Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1996); Jordan v.

14 Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Prison officials must, however,

15 provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.”

16 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other

17 grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); see also Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726,

18 731 (9th Cir. 2000); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982); Wright v. Rushen,

19 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981).

20 Two requirements must be met to show an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511

21 U.S. at 834. “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id.

22 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, “a prison official must have a

23 sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which for conditions of confinement claims “is one of

24 deliberate indifference.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Prison officials

25 act with deliberate indifference when they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate

26 health or safety. Id. at 837.

27 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges a claim for

28 unconstitutional conditions of confinement against Defendant Gonzalez the Doe correctional

1 officers to proceed past screening. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendants knowingly

2 exposed him to an unsanitary and unsafe condition by requiring him to clean up a deceased

3 inmate’s blood without sufficient protective equipment or training.

4 d. Deliberate Indifference

5 Plaintiff’s amended complaint brings a claim of deliberate indifference for what appears

6 to be defendants’ disregard for his complaints about having a cellmate who previously

7 attempted suicide, following the incident with his former cellmate Fennell.

8 “Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth

9 Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.” Long v. County of Los

10 Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim

11 based on prison medical treatment, an inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious

12 medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v.

13 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’

14 by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

15 injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) that “the defendant’s

16 response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

17 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies v. Miller,

18 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

19 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

20 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know of

21 and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be aware of facts from

22 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must

23 also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate indifference

24 can be established “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or

25 possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citation

26 omitted).

27 Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the introduction of this new cellmate to his cell fail to

28 state a constitutional claim. Plaintiff alleges that unable to sleep at night because of a fear of

1 waking up to find this new inmate had killed himself. (ECF No. 31 at 8). However, Plaintiff

2 does not include facts that indicate the correctional officer defendants he complained to were

3 aware he had a serious medical risk following the suicide of his former cellmate, nor that the

4 defendants acted with a deliberate indifference to this risk. Notably, Plaintiff includes no

5 allegations that he informed defendants about his fear or defendants’ responses, if any, to his

6 fear. Plaintiff only claims he pled with the Housing Unit C/Os to move the inmate. (Id.).

7 As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference against any of the

8 defendants.

9 e. Claims Against CDCR

10 Plaintiff also names CDCR as a defendant, although Plaintiff’s complaint does not

11 contain any allegations against CDCR.

12 CDCR is not a proper defendant for Plaintiff’s claims. As described above, section

13 1983 applies to “persons” who violate someone’s constitutional rights. CDCR is not a

14 person—it is the State of California’s Department for Corrections and Rehabilitation. See

15 Allison v. Cal. Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969) (California Adult Authority and

16 San Quentin State Prison not persons within meaning of Civil Rights Act). Moreover, CDCR

17 is part of the State of California and thus is immune from this type of lawsuit under the

18 Eleventh Amendment and the related doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Brown v. Cal. Dep't

19 of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (California Department of Corrections and

20 California Board of Prison Terms entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Pittman v.

21 Oregon Employment Dep't, 509 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n unconsenting State is

22 immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of

23 another State.”).

24 Accordingly, CDCR is not a proper defendant in this action and is subject to dismissal.

25 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

26 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s amended complaint and finds that Plaintiff’s claims

27 for failure to protect and conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth against Defendant

28 Gonzalez and Defendants Does 1-5 proceed past screening and all other claims and defendants

een eee NE IIE III II III EE

1 || be dismissed.

2 For the above reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

3 1. This case proceeds on Plaintiffs claims for failure to protect and conditions of

4 confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendant Gonzalez

5 and Defendants Does 1-5?

6 2. All other claims and defendants be dismissed without prejudice for failure to

7 state a claim.

8 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

9 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).. Within

10 || thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may

11 || file written objections’ with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to

12 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed

13 || fifteen (15) pages. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be

14 || considered. Exhibits shall not be filed with objections, but they may be referenced by the

15 || document and page number. No new exhibits may be filed with objections. The parties are

16 || advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the

17 || “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772

18 || F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir.

19 |] 1991)).

0 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ August 24, 2026 [Jee hey

22 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

23

24

? Plaintiff is advised that Doe Defendants cannot be served until Plaintiff has identified them and filed a

25 || motion to substitute, or amended his complaint to substitute, the named defendants in place of the Doe

6 defendants. For service to be successful, the Court and/or the United States Marshal must be able

to identify and locate the defendants to be served.

27 3 Plaintiff may file a statement with the Court representing that he agrees to proceed only on the claims

of failure to protect and conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment against

28 || Defendant Gonzalez and DOES 1-5 and voluntarily dismiss the remaining claims and defendants. If

Plaintiff does so, the case will proceed on these claims without further order from the district judge.