Opinion

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 LAVARDO JOHN BASDEN (A-Number: No. 1:25-CV-00123-KES-EGC (HC)

240-452-962),

12

Plaintiff,

13 ORDER GRANTING SECOND AMENDED

v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

14 CORPUS

WARDEN, Golden State Annex, et al.,

15 Doc. 21

Defendant.

16

17

18 Petitioner Lavardo John Basden is a federal immigration detainee proceeding pro se with

19 a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner asserts that his

20 prolonged detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Doc. 21 at 25–27.

21 On January 8, 2026, petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus and request for injunctive

22 relief. Doc. 1. On February 13, 2026, respondents filed a response. Doc. 14. On February 27,

23 2026, petitioner filed his first amended habeas petition. Doc. 16. On March 26, 2026, the

24 magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations to deny the petition. Doc. 18. On

25 April 17, 2026, the petitioner filed objections to the findings and recommendations. Doc. 19. On

26 July 27, 2026, petitioner filed his second amended petition and a motion for a temporary

27 restraining order. Docs. 21, 22. On August 12, 2026, respondents filed their opposition to the

28 second amended petition. Doc. 26.

1 For the reasons set forth below, the petition is granted.

2 I. BACKGROUND

3 Petitioner is a citizen of The Bahamas who entered the United States on July 26, 2001 on

4 a B-2 temporary visitor visa as a child. Docs. 14-1, Declaration of Alejandro Parra Jaimes

5 (“Jaimes Decl.”) at ¶ 5; 14-3 at 4; see Doc. 19 at 1. Petitioner’s visa expired on January 25, 2002.

6 Doc. 14-1, Jaimes Decl. at ¶ 5. Petitioner attended elementary through high school in Florida.

7 Doc. 19 at 1.

8 Petitioner was convicted of a federal felony (carjacking) in March 2022 and a state felony

9 (robbery) in April 2022. Doc. 14-1, Jaimes Decl. at ¶¶ 6–7. After his release from criminal

10 custody, petitioner was taken into U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody.

11 Docs. 14 at 1; 21 at ¶ 52. Petitioner states he was detained by immigration authorities on

12 October 1, 2025; respondents indicate that petitioner was detained on November 8, 2025. Docs.

13 21 at ¶ 2; 14 at 1; see Doc. 14-3 at 5. Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

14 1226(c) at Golden State Annex. Docs. 14 at 1; 21 at ¶ 1; see Doc. 14-1, Jaimes Decl. at ¶ 9.

15 On June 16, 2026, the immigration judge denied petitioner’s applications for relief and

16 order him removed to The Bahamas. Doc. 26-1 at 1–4. Petitioner appealed the decision on

17 July 6, 2026. Doc. 26 at 1. Currently, petitioner’s appeal is pending; a briefing schedule has not

18 yet been issued. Id.

19 II. LEGAL STANDARD

20 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every

21 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)

22 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a petitioner who

23 demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C.

24 § 2241(c)(3). A writ of habeas corpus is a critical check upon the executive power, ensuring that

25 individuals are not detained “except in accordance with law.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525 (citing

26 I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). The “traditional function of the writ is to secure

27 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). The district court

28 has jurisdiction over challenges to immigration-related detention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

1 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)).

2 III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

3 Petitioner argues that his now ten-month detention without a bond hearing violates the

4 Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.1 See Doc. 21 at 25–27. Respondents argue that

5 petitioner does not have a procedural or a substantive due process right to a bond hearing. See

6 Doc. 26 at 2–3. Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1226(c), which applies to noncitizens who are

7 “deportable or inadmissible based on a qualifying, enumerated offense.” Avilez v. Garland, 69

8 F.4th 525, 530 (9th Cir. 2023). Detention under § 1226(c) is mandatory and under this statute, “a

9 noncitizen is not statutorily entitled to a bond hearing.” Id.

10 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from depriving

11 an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872

12 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The due process clause applies to all “persons” within the borders

13 of the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.

14 In Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Court upheld 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) on a facial challenge.

15 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). The Court explained that Congress enacted that

16 provision because, in many cases, noncitizens with qualifying criminal convictions failed to

17 appear for their proceedings or committed further crimes while their removal proceedings were

18 pending. See id. at 518–20; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (identifying

19 prevention of flight and danger to the community as the two legitimate regulatory goals of

20 immigration detention). Demore emphasized that in the “majority of cases,” § 1226(c) detention

21 “lasts for less than . . . 90 days” and that in the 15% of cases involving appeals, that additional

22 process “takes an average of four months.” Id. at 529. Demore rejected the petitioner’s claim

23 that it was unconstitutional to detain him for this “brief period.” Id. at 523.

24 But “[d]ue process protections do not disappear simply because mandatory detention

25 1 Petitioner states he was detained on October 1, 2025. Doc. 21 at ¶ 2. Respondents indicate that

petitioner was detained on November 8, 2025. Doc. 14 at 1. Respondents date is based on a

26

I-213 form prepared on May 14, 2025. See Doc. 14-3 at 5. Respondents do not mention the

27 difference in date in either their response or opposition. See Docs. 14, 26. As such, this order

uses the date stated by petitioner. However, as there is only a five-week difference between the

28 two dates, the analysis would be the same using respondents’ date.

1 under Section 1226(c) is at least initially permissible.” Doe v. Becerra, 732 F. Supp. 3d 1071,

2 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2024). Demore rejected a facial challenge to § 1226(c), and to prevail on such a

3 challenge, a plaintiff must show that a statute is “unconstitutional in every conceivable

4 application.” Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998). In contrast, an

5 as-applied challenge requires a plaintiff to show only that “the application of the statute to a

6 specific factual circumstance” is unconstitutional. Hoye v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 857

7 (9th Cir. 2011).

8 As other courts have explained in considering Demore, its conclusion that § 1226(c) is

9 constitutional in some of its applications “does not mean that the Court does not have the power

10 to grant petitions for habeas corpus raising as-applied constitutional challenges to [§ 1226(c)]

11 detention . . . .” Perera v. Jennings, 598 F. Supp. 3d 736, 744 (N.D. Cal. 2022); see also German

12 Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 208–10 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that

13 Demore involved a facial challenge and did not foreclose as-applied challenges); Black v. Decker,

14 103 F.4th 133, 149 & n.22 (2d Cir. 2024). Petitioner brings such an as-applied challenge, arguing

15 that his now ten-month detention has become unreasonably prolonged in violation of the Due

16 Process Clause.

17 Procedural due process claims are analyzed “in two steps: the first asks whether there

18 exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the

19 procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the

20 Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-cv-01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D.

21 Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460

22 (1989)).

23 A. Liberty Interest

24 Petitioner has a clear liberty interest in securing his freedom from detention. “Protected

25 liberty interests ‘may arise from two sources—the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the

26 States.’” Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983)).

27 Petitioner’s interest arises directly from the Due Process Clause. “Freedom from imprisonment—

28 from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the

1 liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); see

2 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992) (“Freedom from physical restraint [is] a

3 fundamental right[.]”).

4 Respondents argue that petitioner’s detention under § 1226(c) “comports with due process

5 without regard to whether such detention is assertedly ‘prolonged’” and that there is no “danger

6 of indefinite detention” because petitioner’s removal “is likely in the reasonably foreseeable

7 future.”2 Doc. 26 at 2. Here, an immigration judge ordered petitioner’s removal, a decision

8 which petitioner appealed. Docs. 26 at 1; 26-1 at 1–4. The appeal is still pending and a briefing

9 schedule has not been issued. Doc. 26 at 1. Although petitioner may eventually have a final

10 order of removal, petitioner has been detained for ten months without a bond hearing while his

11 case is still moving through the appeals process. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that § 1226(c)

12 detainees have a “liberty interest” in “freedom from prolonged detention,” Singh v. Holder, 638

13 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2011), and other courts in this circuit have recently held that a

14 noncitizen “has a protected liberty interest in avoiding prolonged detention that has not been

15 justified,” Maria v. Warden, No. 1:26-CV-03957-TLN-CKD, 2026 WL 2070039, at *2 (E.D. Cal.

16 July 17, 2026); Shehata v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-CV-02840-DJC-SCR, 2026 WL 1257227, at *3

17 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:26-CV-02840-DAD-SCR,

18 2026 WL 1712600 (E.D. Cal. June 12, 2026) (“Petitioner has a strong liberty interest in avoiding

19 prolonged detention without any bond hearing[.]”). As such, petitioner has established a liberty

20 interest.

21 B. Necessary Procedures

22 Courts in this circuit have taken a variety of approaches to decide whether due process

23 requires a bond hearing in a particular immigration detention case. See, e.g., Rodriguez Diaz v.

24

2 Respondents also argue that “[p]etitioner is free to end his detention at any time by departing the

25

country” and that petitioner continued detention is due to him pursing appeal of his removal.

Doc. 26 at 3. But “[p]etitioner’s BIA appeal (and his appeal to the Ninth Circuit, should he

26

pursue it) is perfectly legitimate” and it is not compatible “with our system of government that

27 [p]etitioner should simply have to forfeit his due process rights because he is choosing . . . to

pursue the rights provided to him by our laws.” Romero Romero v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-08031-TSH,

28 2021 WL 254435, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2021).

1 Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022) (applying the Mathews test to determine whether a

2 noncitizen detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) was entitled to a second bond hearing); Lopez

3 v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (considering “the total length of detention

4 to date, the likely duration of future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused

5 by the petitioner and the government” in the § 1226(c) context); Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1117

6 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (considering six factors, including “the likelihood that the removal

7 proceedings will result in a final order of removal,” in the § 1225(b) context).

8 In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court held that “identification of the specific

9 dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”:

10 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;

second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through

11 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s

12 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

13 requirement would entail.

14 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

15 The Ninth Circuit has found that “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must

16 account for the heightened governmental interest in the immigration detention context.”

17 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1206. Courts in the district have frequently applied the Mathews

18 factors in the context of a noncitizen detained pursuant to § 1226(c) for a prolonged period. See,

19 e.g., Christian Medina Guel v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-CV-0426-DAD-DMC-HC, 2026 WL 2267924,

20 *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2026); Rafael P. v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention Facility,

21 No. 1:25-cv-1738-DAD-JDP, 2026 WL 534408, *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2026); Flores Jimenez v.

22 Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01104-KES-HBK, 2026 WL 1040948, *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2026).

23 Accordingly, the court will apply the Mathews test.

24 1. Petitioner’s Private Interest

25 The Ninth Circuit has held that it is “beyond dispute” that a noncitizen’s private interest is

26 “fundamental: freedom from imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due

27 Process Clause.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Foucha v.

28 Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). And “an individual’s private interest in ‘freedom from

1 prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably substantial.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (citing

2 Singh, 638 F.3d 1196, 1204–05). As petitioner has already been detained ten months without a

3 bond hearing, the first factor weighs in petitioner’s favor.

4 2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

5 The purpose of immigration detention is to protect the community from dangerous

6 noncitizens and prevent noncitizens from fleeing. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “In evaluating

7 the risk of erroneous deprivation in the context of noncitizen detention, the Ninth Circuit has

8 looked to whether the detainee has a statutory right to procedural protections, such as

9 individualized custody determinations and the right to seek additional bond hearings throughout

10 detention.” Eliazar G.C. v. Wofford, No. 1:24-cv-01032-EPG-HC, 2025 WL 711190, *6 (E.D.

11 Cal. Mar. 5, 2025) (citation and internal quotations omitted) (citing Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at

12 1209–10). Under § 1226(c), petitioner does not have the statutory right to a bond hearing to

13 determine whether he is a flight risk or a danger. Avilez, 69 F.4th at 530. “As additional

14 procedures are not mandated under § 1226(c), the risk of erroneous deprivation as [p]etitioner’s

15 time in detention lengthens is not insignificant.” Eliazar G.C., 2025 WL 711190, *7. As

16 petitioner has not received any procedural opportunity to address danger and flight risk issues

17 while he has been detained for ten months pending his removal proceedings, there is some risk of

18 erroneous deprivation.

19 3. Government’s Interest

20 Regarding the third factor, “the government clearly has a strong interest in preventing

21 aliens from ‘remain[ing] in the United States in violation of our law’” and “has an obvious

22 interest in ‘protecting the public from dangerous criminal aliens.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at

23 1208 (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 518). But the “government interest at stake here is not the

24 continued detention of [p]etitioner, but the government’s ability to detain him without a bond

25 hearing.” Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Off., No. 3:19-cv-01358-S, 2020 WL 1862254, at *7 (D.

26 Or. Mar. 25, 2020). And “[c]ourts generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing

27 is relatively minimal, and there is nothing in the record . . . demonstrating that providing

28 [p]etitioner with a bond hearing would be fiscally or administratively burdensome.” Eliazar

1 | GC, 2025 WL 711190, *8. The third factor weighs in petitioner’s favor.

2 In summary, on balance the Mathews factors weigh in favor of petitioner. Accordingly,

3 | petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing.

4] IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

5 The Court ORDERS:

6 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED.

7 2. Respondents are ORDERED to provide petitioner Lavardo John Basden (A-Number: 240-

8 452-962) with a bond hearing before an immigration judge to be held within fourteen (14)

9 days that complies with the requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th

10 Cir. 2011), at which:

11 a. “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner is a

12 flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond,” Singh, 638 F.3d

13 at 1203, and

14 b. the immigration judge should consider petitioner’s financial circumstances or

15 alternative conditions of release in the event petitioner is determined not to be a

16 danger to the community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention

17 without bond.

18 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all remaining pending motions and the findings

19 and recommendations (Doc. 18) as moot, and to close this case.

20

21

97 | ITIS SO ORDERED. _

23 Dated: _ August 20, 2026 4h | |

UNITED STATES DISTRICT □□□□□

25

26

27

28