Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 DANIEL WONG, No. 2:26–cv–01599–DC–CKD (PS)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER

13 v.

(ECF No. 2)

14 CITY OF ROSEVILLE, et al.,

15 Defendant.

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17 Plaintiff Daniel Wong is representing himself in this action and seeks leave to proceed in

18 forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 Plaintiff’s application in support of the IFP

19 request makes the required financial showing. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP

20 request.

21 SCREENING REQUIREMENT

22 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis

23 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a

24 claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

25 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27

26 (2000) (en banc). In performing this screening, the court liberally construes a pro se plaintiff’s

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1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72,

28 and Local Rule 302(c).

1 pleadings. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Boag v.

2 MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam).

3 Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines

4 v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory

5 allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council

6 v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

7 action does not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57

8 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

9 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to

10 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial

11 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

12 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se

13 litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend

14 unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809

15 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Lopez, 203

16 F.3d 1122 (en banc).

17 ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

18 Plaintiff alleges he is the owner of a California-registered limited liability company called

19 Mobility4menow. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that Mobility4menow is in the business of

20 “car sharing.” Id. Plaintiff alleged that in May 2025, he had recently acquired two vehicles that

21 attracted the attention of Defendant Emma Simon, a code officer who had issued warnings for the

22 vehicles not displaying license plates. Id. at ¶ 15.

23 Plaintiff alleges that on July 3, 2025, Roseville police officers arrived at his address to

24 impound two vehicles: a 2005 Ford Ranger and 2012 Chevrolet Volt. Id. at ¶¶ 19-21. Plaintiff

25 alleges he protested the towing and “loudly complained.” Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff alleges he was

26 subsequently handcuffed and arrested by Defendant Officer Brian Mayorga. Id. at ¶ 24. Plaintiff

27 alleges he was transported to South Placer County Jail where he remained in custody until July 8,

28 2025. Id. at ¶ 25. Plaintiff alleges on July 9, 2025, he attempted to reclaim his impounded

1 vehicles. Id. at ¶¶ 27-29. Plaintiff alleges that while visiting the Roseville Police Department, a

2 clerk found his behavior “threatening” and officers were called to assist. Id. at ¶ 29. Plaintiff

3 alleges he was subsequently transported to Sutter Roseville Hospital for an involuntary mental

4 health hold. Id. at ¶ 30. Plaintiff also alleges that the Roseville Police Department conducted a

5 search of his address during his involuntary mental health hold. Id. at ¶ 32.

6 Plaintiff alleges that on October 23, 2025, the Roseville Police Department impounded an

7 additional three vehicles: a 2005 Ford Ranger, a 2012 Chevrolet Volt, and a 2014 Ford Fusion. Id.

8 at ¶ 36. Plaintiff alleged he protested the impoundment and that California Department of Motor

9 Vehicles fees were current on two of the vehicles. Id. at ¶¶ 42-43. Plaintiff alleges that he was

10 again arrested. Id. at ¶ 48. Plaintiff later alleges that when trying to recover his 2012 Chevrolet

11 Volt, he discovered that it had been sold through a lien sale. Id. at ¶ 67. Plaintiff alleges that he

12 nevertheless paid $207 in fees to release the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 65. Plaintiff also alleges that when

13 reacquiring his Ford Fusion, he discovered several personal items were missing, such as a quarter

14 container of motor oil and an Ikea knife set. Id. at ¶ 71.

15 DISCUSSION

16 Plaintiff brings this action against the following defendants: Emma Simon, Brian

17 Mayorga, and Officer Darryl Lopez, Jr. (collectively, “Officer Defendants”) Troy Bergstorm,

18 Chief of Police of the City of Roseville, and City of Roseville. Id. at ¶¶ 4-8. Plaintiff alleges

19 against the Officer Defendants four claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including a First

20 Amendment (free speech), Fourteenth Amendment (malicious prosecution/substantive due

21 process), Fourth Amendment (unlawful seizure, search, and excessive force), and conspiracy to

22 violate civil rights under Sections 1983 and 1988. Id. at ¶¶ 72-96. Plaintiff alleges a Monell claim

23 against Defendant City of Roseville.2 Plaintiff raises a Section 1983 claim for failure to train,

24 supervise, discipline, or correct against Defendants City of Roseville and Bergstorm. Id. at ¶¶

25 104-110. Plaintiff then raises several state claims, including intentional infliction of emotional

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27 2 While the Complaint states the Monell claim is raised against the Defendant Officers, it is

apparent that Plaintiff intends this claim to be raised against Defendant City of Roseville. Id. at ¶¶

28 97-103.

1 distress, assault, battery, negligence, and a violation of California Civil Code § 52.1. Id. at ¶¶

2 111-135.

3 A. Section 1983, Generally

4 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff is required to show that (1) each defendant acted

5 under color of state law, and (2) each defendant deprived him of rights secured by the

6 Constitution or laws of the United States. Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.

7 1997).

8 B. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 First Amendment Claim

9 Plaintiff appears to raise a First Amendment retaliation claim against the Officer

10 Defendants. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 72-76.) To bring a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff

11 must show: (1) that plaintiff was “engaged in a constitutionally protected activity”; (2) that

12 defendant’s actions would “chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the

13 protected activity”; and (3) that “the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in

14 defendant’s conduct.” Sanderlin v. Dwyer, 116 F.4th 905, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation

15 omitted). However, a plaintiff “may not recover merely on the basis of a speculative ‘chill’ due to

16 generalized and legitimate law enforcement initiatives.” Mendocino Environmental Center v.

17 Mendocino Cnty., 14 F.3d 457, 464 (9th Cir. 1994).

18 Plaintiff has failed to show that any defendant retaliated against him under the First

19 Amendment. Plaintiff generally alleges “[a]ll of the acts complained of herein were retaliatory

20 and directed toward [Plaintiff] because of his statements, including criticism of the [Defendant]

21 Officers (sic) conduct.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 75.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Officers “acted

22 deliberately to intimidate and silence [Plaintiff].” Id. at ¶ 76. Plaintiff offers no more than

23 conclusory allegations to support a First Amendment retaliation claim. Therefore, the claim must

24 be dismissed.

25 C. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment Claim

26 To state a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements: (1)

27 “plaintiff must show a government deprivation of life, liberty, or property; and (2) “[p]laintiff

28 must allege conduct that shocks the conscience and offend[s] the community’s sense of fair play

1 and decency.” Cancino Castellar v. McAleenan, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1230 (S.D. Cal. 2019).

2 To succeed on a malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983, “a plaintiff must show the

3 defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the

4 purpose of denying [him] equal protection of another specific constitutional right.” Awabdy v.

5 City of Adelanto, 368 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).

6 Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim under the Fourteenth Amendment fails. While

7 Plaintiff briefly references a “fabricated” police report, the Complaint does not elaborate further.

8 Id. at ¶ 82. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment malicious

9 prosecution claim.

10 Plaintiff also fails to allege a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim.

11 While Plaintiff states he seeks redress from a deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, he

12 does not discuss what acts caused by Defendant Officers shocked the conscience. Instead, he

13 merely states the actions were “shocking to the conscience, beyond the bounds of acts tolerable in

14 civilized society, and so egregious and outrageous…” Id. at ¶ 80. The Court concludes that

15 Plaintiff has merely recited the elements of a cause of action and dismisses his substantive due

16 process claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

17 D. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claim

18 1. Unlawful Seizure

19 Under the Fourth Amendment, individuals are protected from unreasonable searches and

20 seizures. See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). These protections extend to individuals’

21 possessory interests in property. U.S. v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1021 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Soldal

22 v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1992)). For Plaintiff to prevail on a Fourth Amendment

23 Claim, he must establish that the seizure of property was unreasonable. See Levan, 693 F.3d at

24 1030.

25 Plaintiff alleges Officer Defendants performed the following unreasonable seizures: (1)

26 selling Plaintiff’s Chevrolet Volt in a “premature and illegal lien sale,” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 85); (2)

27 collecting an impound release fee after the Chevrolet Volt was sold; (3) impounding Plaintiff’s

28 Ford Fusion and property was subsequently stolen from the vehicle; and (4) detaining Plaintiff

1 and violating his Fourth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 85-88.)

2 Plaintiff alleges the lien sale was in violation of California Vehicle Code § 22851.3

3 because Defendant Officera did not send Plaintiff a notice within 48 hours of removal. Id. at ¶ 59.

4 This notice falls under specific guidelines for vehicles valued at less than $500, which Plaintiff

5 admits. Cal. Vehicle Code § 22851.3; (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 60.) Plaintiff later alleges the Chevy Volt

6 in question is valued between $5,000 and $9,000. Id. at ¶ 61. The Court is confused by Plaintiff’s

7 allegations that Defendant Officers have violated California Vehicle Code § 22851.3, when the

8 Complaint alleges that the car may not qualify under its protection and does not allege whether

9 Defendant Officers valued the car below $500. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s

10 unlawful seizure claim with respect to the lien sale.

11 Plaintiff also alleges unlawful seizures against Defendant Officers because he had to pay

12 an impound fee for the Chevrolet Volt when it was already sold at the lien sale and that personal

13 items were missing from his Ford Fusion once recovering the vehicle. Id. at ¶¶ 86-87. The

14 Complaint fails to state how the Defendant Officers’ conduct contributed to these alleged

15 seizures. Absent any link to an alleged violation, Plaintiff cannot state a claim under § 1983

16 against any of the individual Officer Defendants for these Fourth Amendment seizure claims. See

17 Barnett v. Ubimodo, Inc., 2019 WL 3323496, at *2-3 (D. Or. July 24, 2019) (“[A] ‘plaintiff fails

18 to state [a] plausible claim when [he] lump[s] all the defendants together in each claim and

19 provid[es] no factual basis to distinguish their conduct.’”) (quotation omitted).

20 Lastly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for unlawful seizure based on his detention. Plaintiff

21 merely alleges that Defendants were “without lawful basis, reasonable suspicion, probable cause,

22 or warrant…” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 88.) The Court finds these claims to be “unadorned, the-defendant-

23 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” and dismisses Plaintiff’s unlawful seizure claim. See

24 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

25 2. Unlawful Search

26 A Fourth Amendment violation for an unlawful search occurs when “government officers

27 violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’” Barello v. City of Seal Beach, 2018 WL

28 6219937, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012)).

1 “Police officers are prohibited from entering a person’s home without a warrant” absent a

2 showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id. (quoting LaLonde v. County of

3 Riverside, 204 F. 3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff alleges that the Roseville Police

4 Department searched his home without a warrant while he was placed on an involuntary hold and

5 that he was unlawfully searched when jailed. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 89-90.) However, the Complaint

6 fails to allege any facts suggesting that the Defendant Officers were involved in the warrantless

7 search. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 32, 89.), Further, the Complaint fails to allege any factual allegations of

8 an unlawful search incident to arrest. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Fourth

9 Amendment unlawful search claim. See Soares v. City of Monterey, 2024 WL 4227748, at *2-3

10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2024) (finding plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits of an unlawful

11 search claim where he has failed to give defendants fair notice of the claim under Federal Rule of

12 Civil Procedure 8(a)).

13 3. Excessive Force

14 The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of people to be secure in their persons, houses,

15 papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Police

16 officers violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights when they use excessive force during an

17 arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Such claims are assessed using a

18 standard of objective reasonableness. Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th

19 Cir. 2005).

20 Plaintiff fails to allege an excessive force claim by only offering “labels and conclusions”

21 in support. See Twombly, 550 U.S. 555-557. For example, Plaintiff alleges an “unlawful,

22 unwarranted, and harmful touching…without lawful basis, reasonable suspicion, probable cause,

23 or warrant…” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 91.) Such conclusory pleading fails to satisfy the standards set

24 forth in Twombly and the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

25 E. Plaintiff’s Sections 1983 and 1988 Conspiracy Claims

26 “To state a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) an agreement

27 between the defendants to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, (2) an overt act in

28 furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) a constitutional deprivation.” Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp.

1 2d 1196, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2012). “To plead a claim of conspiracy under § 1983, [a] plaintiff must

2 allege facts with sufficient particularity to show an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate a

3 plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Davis, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.

4 Plaintiff fails to state a conspiracy under Section 1983. The Complaint merely alleges that

5 Defendant Officers “acted… in conspiracy with, and with the agreement, permission, ratification,

6 and approval of, each other to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights…” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 95.) Such

7 conclusory pleading does not meet the particularity standard to demonstrate a meeting of the

8 minds. See Davis, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Section

9 1983 conspiracy cause of action.

10 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is a statutory vehicle for payment of attorneys’ fees and is not a separate

11 cause of action. See Cha v. City and County of San Francisco, 2025 WL 2782587 at *7 (N.D.

12 Cal. Sept. 30, 2025). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot allege a claim for conspiracy under this statute

13 and the Court dismisses his claim.

14 F. Plaintiff’s Monell Claim

15 Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their

16 employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 585 at 691, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is

17 when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those

18 whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the

19 government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. Municipalities are considered

20 “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be liable for causing a constitutional

21 deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178,

22 1185 (9th Cir.2006). To properly plead a Monell claim based on an unconstitutional custom,

23 practice, or policy, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he possessed a constitutional right of which

24 he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) such policy amounts to deliberate

25 indifference to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the

26 constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438

27 (9th Cir. 1997). The municipal policy at issue must be the result of a “‘longstanding practice or

28 custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.’” Price

1 v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308

2 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002)).

3 The Court finds Plaintiff fails to allege a Monell claim against Defendant City of

4 Roseville. While Plaintiff alleges several de facto policies, customs, and practices, including

5 “harassing, intimidating, and threatening to arrest… persons who exercise their First Amendment

6 Rights,” and “inadequately investigating police officer employees,” Plaintiff merely alleges that

7 these customs were “the moving force… behind some or all of the violations…” (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶

8 99-100.) The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to plead factual allegations as to whether

9 Defendants’ alleged policies were the moving force behind his constitutional violations. See

10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation

11 of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”) Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s

12 Monell liability claim.

13 G. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Failure to Train Claim

14 “Failure to train may constitute a basis for Monell liability where the failure amounts to

15 deliberate indifference of the rights of those who train with municipal employees.” Benavidez v.

16 County of San Diego, 993 F. 3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021). The elements of a failure to train are

17 “(1) a constitutional violation; (2) a municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate

18 indifference to constitutional rights; and (3) that the constitutional injury would not have resulted

19 if the municipality properly trained their employees.” Id.

20 The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a failure to train cause of action against

21 Defendant Bergstrom and City of Roseville. While Plaintiff names several failures to properly

22 supervise or discipline employees that amount to de facto policies, he fails to connect these

23 policies to the alleged constitutional injuries. Instead, the Complaint only alleges that the

24 “unconstitutional customs and practices were a direct and legal cause of harm to Plaintiff.” (ECF

25 No. 1 at ¶ 107.) The Court finds that this conclusory reasoning fails to state a failure to train cause

26 of action and must be dismissed. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

27 H. Plaintiff’s State Claims

28 Plaintiff has alleged several state law claims. (ECF No. 6 at ¶¶ 178-182.) The Court lacks

1 | subject matter jurisdiction to evaluate plaintiff's claims having dismissed all remaining federal

2 || claims to this action. See McDaniel v. Hinch, No. 2:17-cv 02448-KJM-CKD (E.D. Cal. July 11,

3 || 2018) (‘[W]ith no stated claim triggering either diversity or federal question jurisdiction, the

4 || complaint is properly subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction’’).

5 I. Leave to Amend

6 The Complaint must be dismissed, but Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended

7 || complaint. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely

8 | clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the

9 || complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”). An

10 || amended complaint should be titled “First Amended Complaint.” Local Rule 220 requires that an

11 || amended complaint be complete by itself without reference to any prior pleading. Failure to file an

12 || amended complaint within thirty (30) days may result in a recommendation to dismiss this action

13 || for failure to prosecute.

14 | CONCLUSION

15 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

16 1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED;

17 2. The Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

18 3. Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days to file an amended complaint. Failure to timely file

19 an amended complaint in compliance with the Court’s order will result in a

20 recommendation that this action be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

21 | Dated: August 19, 2026 / □□ I / dle ae

23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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