Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 KAMILLIA PELTON, No. 2:26–cv–01264–DC–CKD (PS)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER

13 v.

(ECF Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6)

14 SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY, et al.,

15 Defendant.

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17 Plaintiff Kamillia Pelton is representing herself in this action and seeks leave to proceed in

18 forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 Plaintiff’s application in support of the IFP

19 request makes the required financial showing. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP

20 request.

21 SCREENING REQUIREMENT

22 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis

23 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a

24 claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

25 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27

26 (2000) (en banc). In performing this screening, the court liberally construes a pro se plaintiff’s

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1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72,

28 and Local Rule 302(c).

1 pleadings. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Boag v.

2 MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam).

3 Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines

4 v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory

5 allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council

6 v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

7 action does not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57

8 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

9 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to

10 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial

11 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

12 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se

13 litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend

14 unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809

15 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Lopez, 203

16 F.3d 1122 (en banc).

17 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

18 Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). “The

19 court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Therefore, Plaintiff’s

20 motion for leave is granted and the Court will proceed with screening the SAC pursuant to 28

21 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

22 ALLEGATIONS IN THE SAC

23 Plaintiff alleges a string of incidents which occurred between December 2022 and January

24 2023, concerning Defendant Derrod Taylor: (1) Defendant Taylor allegedly distributed intimate

25 material of Plaintiff without her consent; (2) Defendant Taylor allegedly assaulted Plaintiff while

26 she was pregnant; and (3) Defendant Taylor stole money and personal items from Plaintiff’s

27 home. (ECF No. 6 at ¶¶ 27-36.) Plaintiff alleges the response by Stockton Police Department

28 included “no meaningful follow-up” and no “meaningful enforcement action to stop later

1 escalation occurred.” Id. at ¶¶ 28, 33. Plaintiff also alleges that the three incidents were handled in

2 a “fragmented manner that diluted the apparent seriousness of the risk.” Id. at ¶ 34. However,

3 Plaintiff alleges she received an emergency protective order following her assault. Id. at ¶ 30.

4 Plaintiff also alleges that in April 2023, Defendant Taylor stole a firearm from her residence. Id.

5 at ¶ 37.

6 Plaintiff alleges that in Spring 2023, she encountered Defendant Taylor and Defendant

7 Mariah Sisk. Id. at ¶ 41. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Taylor “approached her vehicle in an

8 aggressive manner,” and Plaintiff believed “he was on the run from parole.” Id. at ¶ 43. Plaintiff

9 alleges Defendant Talyor was not apprehended when the authorities arrived, and that Defendant

10 Sisk “threatened in Plaintiff’s presence that they would call Child Protective Services.” Id. at ¶

11 45.

12 Plaintiff alleges that subsequent to the Spring 2023 incident, Defendants Taylor and Sisk

13 “devised a plan to obtain a restraining order against Plaintiff in order to deter Plaintiff from

14 continuing to involve police and to further insulate [Defendant] Taylor from consequences…” Id.

15 at ¶ 53. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sisk obtained a six-month restraining order against

16 Plaintiff which expired near December 2023. Id. at ¶ 54.

17 Plaintiff alleges she filed “repeated” reports to Stockton Police Department during this

18 period. Id. at ¶ 60. Plaintiff also alleges that in January 2024, she filed a written complaint against

19 Defendant Parole Officer Cisenbaugh and his supervisor regarding alleged failures in supervision

20 and victim protection in 2023. Id. at ¶ 66.

21 Plaintiff alleges that in April 2024, she was asked to testify in Stanislaus County Superior

22 Court regarding Defendant Taylor’s alleged theft of her firearm. Id. at ¶¶ 67-68. Plaintiff alleges

23 that she was “not offered a criminal protective order,” “not guided through the process for a

24 cooperating witness,” and “was not offered meaningful victim services or safety planning in

25 connection with her role as a witness.” Id. at ¶ 71. Plaintiff alleges that she was not informed that

26 she needed to request such protections. Id. at ¶ 72.

27 Plaintiff alleges in June 2025, she filed a police report concerning harassment she

28 attributed to Defendant Sisk. Id. at ¶ 83. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Officer Singh, who

1 completed the police report, “did not properly classify Plaintiff as the victim, listed Plaintiff only

2 as a reporting party, omitted material conduct, and delayed transmission of the report to the

3 District Attorney for more than two weeks.” Id. at ¶ 85.

4 Plaintiff alleges that she received a restraining order against Defendant Sisk but received a

5 pattern of “false and retaliatory” Child Protective Services, In Home Supportive Services, and

6 housing-related referrals that she attributes to Defendant Sisk. Id. at ¶ 97. Plaintiff also alleges

7 Defendant Sisk acted with her mother Defendant Sharlise Rand by “attacking” a process server

8 hired by Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 99-107.

9 DISCUSSION

10 A. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

11 Plaintiff alleges First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Derrod Taylor,

12 Mariah Sisk, and Sharlise Rand (“Private Defendants”) San Joaquin, Stockton, and Stanislaus

13 Counties, City of Stockton, and City of Lathrop (“Municipal Defendants”), and Defendant Officer

14 Singh. (ECF No. 6 at ¶¶ 140-147.) Plaintiff alleges Fourteenth Amendment substantive and

15 procedural due process claims against Defendants San Joaquin and Stanislaus Counties, City of

16 Lathrop, and Defendant Officer Singh. Id. at ¶¶ 148-154. Plaintiff alleges a Fourteenth

17 Amendment state-created danger claim against Defendants City of Stockton, City of Lathrop, San

18 Joaquin County, Defendant Parole Officer Cisenbaugh, and Defendant Officers Graves, Centella,

19 Azevedo, Toon, and Singh. Id. at ¶¶ 155-161. Plaintiff alleges liability under Monell against the

20 Municipal Defendants. Id. at ¶¶ 162-170. Plaintiff alleges a civil conspiracy to deprive civil rights

21 against the Private Defendants. Id. at ¶¶ 171-177. Last, Plaintiff alleges an intentional infliction of

22 emotional distress claim against the Private Defendants. Id. at ¶¶ 178-182.

23 1. Plaintiff’s 1983 First and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

24 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff is required to show that (1) each defendant acted

25 under color of state law, and (2) each defendant deprived her of rights secured by the Constitution

26 or laws of the United States. Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1997).

27 A. Private Defendants

28 To prevail on an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the defendant acted

1 under the color of state law. See Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F. 3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing

2 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). “While generally not applicable to private parties, a §

3 1983 action can lie against a private party when ‘he is a willful participant in joint action with the

4 State or its agents.’” Id. (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)).

5 “A plaintiff can show joint action [between a private actor and state entity] either ‘by

6 proving the existence of a conspiracy or by showing that the private party was a willful

7 participant in joint action with the State or by its agents.’” O’Handley v. Weber, 62 F. 4th 1145,

8 1159 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F. 3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012).

9 The SAC does not plead factual allegations demonstrating conspiracy or willful

10 participation between the Private Defendants and the state defendants. Instead, it only alleges the

11 Private Defendants’ conduct created the First Amendment retaliation violation “to the extent [the

12 state defendants] acted jointly or in concert with the state [defendants].” (ECF No. 6 at ¶ 147.)

13 The Court concludes Plaintiff has failed to plead the joint theory of state action and dismisses the

14 Private Defendants from Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation claim.

15 B. Officer Defendants

16 “[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions [are entitled to] a qualified

17 immunity, shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably

18 have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Anderson v.

19 Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).

20 Liability in a personal-capacity suit can be demonstrated by showing that the official

21 caused the alleged constitutional injury. See id. at 166. “A person ‘subjects’ another to the

22 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act,

23 participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

24 do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743

25 (9th Cir. 1978).

26 Plaintiff alleges constitutional violations against each of the officer defendants in both

27 their official and personal capacities. (ECF No. 6.) While the SAC contains a section titled

28 “Individual Defendant Actions and Omissions,” it groups the conduct of each private, officer, and

1 municipal defendant together when pleading each cause of action. (ECF No. 6 at ¶¶ 128-139;

2 140-181.) None of the causes of action describe action taken by an individual defendant, instead,

3 each Officer Defendant’s alleged conduct is indistinguishable from that of a municipal or private

4 defendant. Id. at ¶¶ 143, 151, 157. Absent any link to an alleged violation, Plaintiff cannot state a

5 claim under § 1983 against any of the individual Officer Defendants and they are dismissed from

6 the SAC. See Barnett v. Ubimodo, Inc., 2019 WL 3323496, at *2-3 (D. Or. July 24, 2019) (“[A]

7 ‘plaintiff fails to state [a] plausible claim when [she] lump[s] all the defendants together in each

8 claim and provid[es] no factual basis to distinguish their conduct.’”) (quotation omitted).

9 C. Municipal Defendants

10 “[L]ocal-government entities are considered ‘persons’ under § 1983 and therefore may be

11 liable for causing a constitutional deprivation.” See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

12 690-91 (1978). However, these entities are only liable “for injuries that arise from an official

13 policy or longstanding custom.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. To raise a Monell claim, a plaintiff

14 must allege facts in a complaint “that a [municipal] employee committed the alleged

15 constitutional violation pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a longstanding practice or

16 custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity.”

17 Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (citations omitted). In

18 addition, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the policy was “(1) the cause in fact and

19 (2) the proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918

20 (9th Cir. 1996).

21 The Second Amended Complaint alleges the following policies gave rise to her

22 constitutional injuries:

Fragmented handling of related domestic-violence and retaliatory incidents;

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failure to meaningfully investigate repeated reports; failure to integrate firearm,

24 parole, and domestic-violence information; failure to properly classify victims;

failure to route or meaningfully process reports; failure to provide protective

25 guidance to cooperating witnesses; and tolerance of intimidating obstruction of

complaint access.

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(ECF No. 6 at ¶ 165.) Plaintiff alleges that such policies “were the moving force behind the

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constitutional violations.” Id. at ¶ 169. The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate whether

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1 Defendants’ alleged policies were the moving force behind her constitutional violations. See

2 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation

3 of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”) Therefore, the Court dismisses all Municipal

4 Defendants for failure to plead Monell liability.

5 2. Plaintiff’s 1983 Conspiracy Claim

6 “To state a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) an agreement

7 between the defendants to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, (2) an overt act in

8 furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) a constitutional deprivation.” Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp.

9 2d 1196, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2012). “A § 1983 conspiracy claim may arise when a private actor

10 conspires with a state actor to deprive a person of a constitutional right under the color of state

11 law.” Mau v. City & County of Honolulu, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1187 (S.D. Cal. 2025).

12 The Second Amended Complaint raises a 1983 conspiracy claim against the Private

13 Defendants and “any state actors found to have jointly participated in discovery.” (ECF No. 6 at ¶

14 177.) “To plead a claim of conspiracy under § 1983, [a] plaintiff must allege facts with sufficient

15 particularity to show an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate a plaintiff’s constitutional

16 rights.” Davis, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.

17 The Second Amended Complaint alleges that “two or more persons reached an agreement

18 or tacit understanding to engage in conduct designed to isolate, retaliate against, and intimidate

19 Plaintiff and to interfere with her ability to obtain protection and redress.” (ECF No. 6 at ¶ 172.)

20 Plaintiff later alleges that “certain Doe state actors knowingly joined or facilitated this course of

21 action by failing to intervene despite knowledge of the retaliatory pattern, by minimizing

22 violations, or by processing Plaintiff’s reports in a manner that reinforced the false narrative

23 against Plaintiff.” Id. at ¶ 174. Plaintiff further alleges a long list of events that constitute an overt

24 act, including “false or misleading reports,” “retaliatory restraining order filings,” and “threats to

25 involve CPS.” Id. at 173. Plaintiff has failed to plead with particularity the existence of a

26 conspiracy between the Private Defendants and any alleged state actor. Instead, the Second

27 Amended Complaint pleads threadbare legal conclusions that do not satisfy pleading standards.

28 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid

1 of ‘further factual enhancement.’”) Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s 1983 conspiracy

2 cause of action.

3 3. Plaintiff’s State Law Claim

4 The remaining claim in the SAC is an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim

5 raised against the Private Defendants. (ECF No. 6 at 178-182.) The Court lacks subject matter

6 jurisdiction to evaluate defendants’ claim having dismissed all remaining federal claims to this

7 action. See McDaniel v. Hinch, No. 2:17-cv 02448-KJM-CKD (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2018) (“[W]ith

8 no stated claim triggering either diversity or federal question jurisdiction, the complaint is

9 properly subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction”).

10 4. Leave to Amend

11 The SAC must be dismissed, but Plaintiff is granted leave to file a third amended complaint.

12 See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no

13 amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s

14 deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”). An amended complaint

15 should be titled “Third Amended Complaint.” Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint

16 be complete by itself without reference to any prior pleading.

17 B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel

18 Last, Plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 4.) It is “well-established

19 that there is generally no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases.” United States v. Sardone,

20 94 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1996). In certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request

21 the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935

22 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990).

23 The Court does not find exceptional circumstances in this case and will deny Plaintiff’s motion

24 without prejudice to renewing the request.

25 CONCLUSION

26 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

27 1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED;

28 2. Plaintiff’s motion to consider the Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5) is

1 GRANTED;

2 3. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6) is DISMISSED with leave to

3 amend;

4 4. Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 4) is DENIED without prejudice; and

5 5. Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days to file a third amended complaint. Failure to timely

6 file an amended complaint in compliance with the Court’s order will result in a

7 recommendation that this action be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

8 | Dated: August 19, 2026 □□ I / dip Ze

10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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