Opinion

Sage

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Sep 11, 2026
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PEDRO TIXI ROMERO, : Civil No. 1:26-CV-01296

:

Petitioner, :

:

v. :

:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE :

UNITED STATES, et al., :

:

Respondents. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

Before the court is a motion to enforce filed by Petitioner Pedro Tixi

Romero (“Petitioner”). (Doc. 13.) For the reasons that follow, the motion will be

denied and this case will be closed.

BACKGROUND

On July 21, 2026, the court issued a memorandum and order granting

Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Docs. 10, 11.) Therein, the court

held that Petitioner was being improperly detained by Respondents’ interpretation

and application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and permanently enjoined Respondents from

detaining Petitioner under Section 1225. (Doc. 10, pp. 3–11; Doc. 11.)1 The court

ordered that Petitioner be provided an individualized bond hearing before an

immigration judge by June 17, 2026. (Doc. 10, p. 11; Doc. 11.) The court did not

1 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.

close the case and required that Petitioner file a status report to advise the court of

the status of the bond hearing by August 18, 2026. (Doc. 11.)

A hearing was held before an immigration judge on August 4, 2026. (Doc.

15-2.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the immigration judge denied Petitioner

bond stating that he is a danger to the community and a flight risk. (Docs. 15-1,

15-2.)

Respondents filed a status report on August 17, 2026, and Petitioner filed a

motion to enforce on August 25, 2026. (Docs. 12, 13.) On September 2, 2026,

Respondents filed a brief in opposition, and no reply brief was filed. (Doc. 15.)

Thus, the motion to enforce is ripe for review.

DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, in response to the motion to enforce judgment,

Respondents argue that the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the bond hearing

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) and that Petitioner must first exhaust his

administrative remedies through the Board of Immigration Appeals. (Doc. 15, pp.

6–10.)

Section 1226(e) bars the court from reviewing the discretionary judgment of

an immigration judge and from setting aside a decision regarding detention or

revocation or denial of bond or parole. But it does not bar the court from

reviewing constitutional challenges through habeas review. Demore v. Kim, 538

U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (“Section 1226(e) contains no explicit provision barring

habeas review, and we think that its clear text does not bar respondent’s

constitutional challenge to the legislation authorizing his detention without bail.”)

Thus, the court has jurisdiction to review the pending motion and determine

whether the bond hearing complied with the court’s prior order and was

constitutionally adequate.

As to exhaustion, Respondents’ argument also fails. Although exhaustion is

often required, there is no statutory requirement for exhaustion as “exhaustion

exists only as a judicially created doctrine applied at the Court’s discretion.”

Kashranov v. Jamison, 2:25-cv-5555, 2025 WL 3188399, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14,

2025) (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). And exhaustion

“is likewise not required when it would be futile.” Demirel v. Fed. Det. Ctr.

Phila., No. 25-cv-5488, 2025 WL 3218243, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025)

(citation omitted). Here, the court finds that exhaustion is unnecessary and futile

as Petitioner is requesting that the court review the constitutionality of the bond

hearing that it ordered.

Turning to the merits of Petitioner’s motion, he argues that he was denied a

constitutional bond hearing before the immigration judge on August 4, 2026.

(Doc. 13.) He states that although he was represented by counsel, he was not

provided with an adequate and competent interpreter for the hearing. (Id.) He also

generally argues that the hearing was not constitutional. (Id.)

Respondents submit that the bond hearing does not fall under the

fundamentally unfair exception as outlined in case law. (Doc. 13, pp. 10–14.)

They argue that after counsel for Petitioner submitted evidence and argument, the

immigration judge found Petitioner to be a danger to the community and a flight

risk. (Id. at 10.) Additionally, Respondents submit that Petitioner was provided

with a Spanish interpreter at the bond hearing and no arguments were made by

Petitioner or his counsel to suggest that the interpreter was not sufficient. (Id. at

13.) For these reasons, Respondents urge the court to deny the motion to enforce

judgment.

Respondents rely on Borbot v. Warden Hudson County Correctional

Facility, 906 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2018), in arguing that a bond hearing must be

constitutionally or legally deficient for this court to order a second bond hearing.

The court agrees that Borbot’s holding applies, and finds that the fundamentally

unfair exception is inapplicable here.

The Attorney General, through an immigration judge, is required to provide

aliens with a fundamentally fair bond hearing. Ghanem v. Warden Essex Cnty.

Corr. Facility, No. 21-1908, 2022 WL 574624, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2022). A

bond hearing before an immigration judge is fundamentally fair when it provides

due process and due process, in turn, requires three things. Quinteros v. Warden

Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 7847 F. App’x 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2019). “An alien: (1) is

entitled to factfinding based on a record produced before the decisionmaker and

disclosed to him or her; (2) must be allowed to make arguments on his or her own

behalf; and (3) has the right to an individualized determination of his or her

interests.” Id. (quoting Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001)

(cleaned up).

Applying these due process requirements to the August 4, 2026 hearing, the

court finds that the immigration judge provided a fundamentally fair hearing.

From a review of the transcript provided by Respondents, the immigration judge

engaged in factfinding based on the record before him, which appears to have been

disclosed to Petitioner. The immigration judge also allowed Petitioner’s counsel to

make arguments on his own behalf and present evidence, and provided Petitioner

with an interpreter. Lastly, the immigration judge made a determination of

Petitioner interests, although Petitioner disagrees with that determination.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, the motion will be denied, the

court will enter judgment in favor of Petitioner, and close this case.

s/Jennifer P. Wilson

JENNIFER P. WILSON

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: September 11, 2026

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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