Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

AMARI J. MOODY,

Plaintiff,

26-CV-283 (LLS)

-against-

NORTHWELL HEALTH, INC.; LENOX HILL ORDER OF DISMISSAL

HOSPITAL; CONCORDE MEDICAL GROUP, WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD

PLLC; JOHN DOES 1–10,,

Defendants.

LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question

jurisdiction, asserting claims under the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and claims under state law. By separate order, the

Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without

prepayment of fees. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the complaint, with 30 days’

leave to replead.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the “special

solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se

pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires

a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and

to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court

to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the

complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must

determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is

entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this complaint against Northwell Health, Inc.; Lenox Hill Hospital;

Concorde Medical Group, PLLC; and John Does 1–10. The following facts are drawn from the

complaint and publicly available court records.1 On February 26, 2025, Plaintiff “underwent

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation

are as in the original unless noted otherwise. See also Anderson v. Rochester-Genesee Reg’l

Transp. Auth., 337 F.3d 201, 205 n.4 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that courts may take judicial

notice of public documents, including court records).

Functional Endoscopic Sinus Surgery” at a “separate institution,”2 after which he experienced

complications, including impaired breathing and dizziness. (ECF 1 at 2-3.) In April 2025, post-

operative imaging showed “ongoing abnormalties.” (Id. at 3.) On May 7, 2025, Plaintiff went to

the Emergency Room at NYU Langone Hospital with “sinus pressure and headache.” (Id. at 3.)

NYU Langone discharged Plaintiff with instructions to follow up with an “ENT” [Ear, Nose, and

Throat] practice, “not neurology or vestibular specialists.” (Id.)

Later that day, Plaintiff was “evaluated” by providers affiliated with Defendants, and they

“redirect[ed]” him “towards vestibular testing,” which, Plaintiff, asserts, was “incompatible

with” his “presenting complaints, post-operative status, and contemporaneous imaging.” (Id.)

According to Plaintiff, Defendants failed to provide “post-operative continuity-of-care” by

failing to “document”: (1) a “secured accepting provider for ongoing ENT management”; (2) a

“physician-to-physician transfer”; and (3) a “structured continuity-of-care plan.” (Id.) Plaintiff

further asserts that Defendants violated his rights under HIPAA, 45 C.F.R. § 164.524, by failing

to provide him with his complete medical “Designated Record Set (“DRS”). (Id.) He also

purports to assert a state-law claim of “Negligent Administration and Record Handling (State

Law) (Against All Defendants),” and he claims that Defendants “breached duties of reasonable

care in administering post-operative follow-up, record handling, and continuity processes.” (Id.

at 4-5.)

Plaintiff characterizes Defendants’ actions as a “procedural category error,” and avers

that his complaint is not “a clinical judgment dispute” and that he does “not plead medical

2 That institution is Mt. Sinai Hospital, which is not a defendant in this action. Plaintiff

filed a separate lawsuit against Mt. Sinai Hospital. See Moody v. The Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 25-

CV-08859 (JHR) (VF) (S.D.N.Y.) (pending);

malpractice and does not ask the Court to adjudicate medical merits.” (Id. at 1.) He seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief and money damages (Id. at 5-6.)

Plaintiff has filed the following motions, which remain pending: a “Rule 60(b)(4) motion

to declare the court’s non-actions void for failure to exercise jurisdiction”; a motion “to compel

§ 1915 screening and judicial assignment”; a “notice of structural defects and required corrective

action”; a renewed emergency motion for preservation and injunctive relief; a motion to “compel

administrative, procedural, and structural compliance; a “consolidated notice of CA2 docketing

defects, deprivation of appellate access, and motion to compel transmission confirmation; and

notice of sua sponte assignment, IFP order signed without judicial assignment, documented

pattern of mandatory obligation failures, and preservation of all objections.” (ECF 7-13.)

DISCUSSION

A. Disability discrimination claims

Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits discrimination “on the

basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,

advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,

leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Under

the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), “no otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United

States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be

denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving

Federal financial assistance[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The substantive standards for claims under

the ADA and the RA are substantially the same, Wright v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corrs., 831 F.3d

64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016), although a claim under the RA must be supported by allegations that the

benefit is part of a “program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” Doe v.

Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To state a claim under either of these statutes, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that

(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the defendant is subject to one of the Acts;

and (3) he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the defendant’s services,

programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the defendant because of his

disability. See Krist v. Kolombos Rest., Inc., 688 F.3d 89, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2012) (Title III of the

ADA); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2009) (RA). Under the ADA and RA, a

“disability” is defined as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being

regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C) (ADA); 29 U.S.C.

§ 705(20)(B) (RA incorporating by reference the ADA’s definition).

The Second Circuit has held that in situations like this, where the plaintiff challenges “the

substance of the services provided” but does not assert “illegal discrimination,” there is no

violation of the federal disability statutes. Doe, 148 F.3d at 84; see e.g., Schnauder v. Gibens,

679 F. App’x 8, 10 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (rejecting assertion that denial of medical

treatment constituted a failure to reasonably accommodate a disability); Cushing v. Moore, 970

F.2d 1103, 1109 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the RA “does not create a cause of action based on

a [disability] that is directly related to providing the very services at issue”); United States v.

Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984) (explaining that “where medical treatment is at

issue, it is typically the [disability] itself that gives rise to, or at least contributes to, the need for

services,” and thus holding that the RA “prohibits discrimination against a [disabled] individual

only where the individual’s [disability] is unrelated to, and thus improper to consideration of, the

services in question”).

Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA or RA. First, Plaintiff does not allege

sufficient facts to suggest that he has a disability as defined by the ADA and RA. He allegedly

experienced complications after undergoing sinus-related surgery, but does not identify his

disability or set forth facts showing that his alleged disability “substantially limits one or more

major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637-39

(1998) (concluding that asymptomatic human immunodeficiency virus, or HIV, is covered by the

ADA because it “substantially limits” the person’s ability to reproduce, which is a “major life

activit[y]”).

Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff has a disability as defined by the statutes, he does

not allege facts suggesting that he was denied Defendants’ services or otherwise discriminated

against with respect to Defendants’ services because of his disability. According to Plaintiff,

Defendants allegedly steered him towards testing that was not suited to the circumstances of his

case; did not provide proper follow-up care; and negligently administered or handled his medical

records. He alleges no facts giving any indication that these acts or omissions occurred because

of, or based upon, his disability. In other words, his claims challenge “the substance of the

services provided” rather than “illegal discrimination.” Doe, 148 F.3d at 84.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim for failure to

state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996

Plaintiff alleges that, by failing to provide him with his complete medical “Designated

Record Set (“DRS”), Defendants violated his rights under the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”). Assuming that such an act or omission implicates

HIPAA, the Court must nevertheless dismiss Plaintiff’s claim, because HIPPA does not provide

for a private right of action. See Meadows v. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 244 (2d Cir.

2020); Rzayeva v. U.S., 492 F. Supp. 2d 60, 83 (D. Conn. 2007) (holding that enforcement of

HIPAA is reserved exclusively to the Secretary of Health and Human Services). The Court

therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claim under HIPAA for failure to state a claim on which relief

may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

C. State-law claims

Plaintiff also asserts state-law claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court cannot

exercise jurisdiction of these claims.

Supplemental jurisdiction

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state-law claims,

however, when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its

early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of

jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (footnote omitted).

Having dismissed the federal claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court

declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of any state-law claims Plaintiff may be

asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006)

(“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by

enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.’” (quoting City of

Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).

Diversity jurisdiction

A federal district court also can consider state-law claims under its diversity jurisdiction.

To establish diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must first allege that he and the defendants are

citizens of different states. See § 1332(a)(1); Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388

(1998). For diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the State where he is domiciled,

which is defined as the place where he “has his true fixed home . . . and to which, whenever he is

absent, he has the intention of returning.” Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d

Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An individual “has but one domicile.”

Id. The citizenship of a limited liability company is determined by the citizenship of each of its

members. Carter v. HealthPort Techs, LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 2016).

There is a second component to diversity jurisdiction—the amount in controversy must

be in excess of the sum or value of $75,000. See Section 1332(a). The sum claimed by a plaintiff

will control if the claim of value is made in good faith. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red

Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). “A plaintiff seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction

‘cannot[,] [however,] meet his burden of proof with mere conclusory allegations of indirect or

speculative value.’” Chavez v. Maker, No. 18-CV-7965 (RA) (GWG), 2019 WL 4926348, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2019) (citation omitted), report & recommendation adopted sub nom., Chavez

v. Wylie, No. 18-CV-7965 (RA), 2019 WL 6873806 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2019); Weir v. Cenlar

FSB, No. 16-CV-8650 (CS), 2018 WL 3443173, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2018) (reasoning that

“the jurisdictional amount, like any other factual allegation, ought not to receive the presumption

of truth unless it is supported by facts rendering it plausible”) (citing Wood v. Maguire Auto.

LLC, No. 09-CV-0640, 2011 WL 4478485, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011), aff’d, 508 F. App’x

65 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)).

Plaintiff provides an address for himself in Georgia, but he does not allege that he is

domiciled there. He also does not provide facts about the domicile of any individual Defendants

or about who the general or limited partners of Concorde Medical Group, PLLC, are or where

they are domiciled. There are also no facts in the complaint demonstrating that the amount in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts

showing that the Court has diversity jurisdiction of any state-law claims he is asserting. The

Court dismisses Plaintiff’s state-law claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

D. Motions

Currently pending are Plaintiff’s motions to “declare the court’s non-actions void for

failure to exercise jurisdiction” and “to compel § 1915 screening and judicial assignment”; a

“notice of structural defects and required corrective action”; a renewed emergency motion for

preservation and injunctive relief; a motion to “compel administrative, procedural, and structural

compliance; a “consolidated notice of CA2 docketing defects, deprivation of appellate access,

and motion to compel transmission confirmation; and notice of sua sponte assignment, IFP order

signed without judicial assignment, documented pattern of mandatory obligation failures, and

preservation of all objections. (ECF 7-13.)

Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court was required, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), to screen his complaint. The Court has now done so, and has directed him to

amend his complaint to address the deficiencies identified in this order. Accordingly, the motion

to “compel” screening is denied as moot. Until Plaintiff files an amended pleading that satisfies

federal pleading rules, he is not entitled to the other relief he seeks, and the Court denies the

other motions without prejudice.

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts

generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its

defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir.

2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has

cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to

amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid

claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v.

USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)).

In an abundance of caution, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to file an amended

complaint.3 In any amended complaint Plaintiff files, he must provide facts that support a

plausible claim arising under state or federal law and that show that the Court has subject matter

jurisdiction of this action. Cf. Roberts v. United States, No. 24-CV-1512 (LTS), 2024 WL

3606708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2024) (instructing frequent pro se litigant that before filing

any lawsuit, he “must make a good faith investigation into whether [he] has a nonfrivolous legal

claim”).

If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will

direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), and for failure to state a claim on which

relief may be granted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with 30 days’ leave to replead.

The Court denies all pending motions without prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is

directed to terminate them. (ECF 7-13.)

3 Plaintiff is now barred under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 from filing new actions IFP without

prior leave of court. Moody v. Emory Healthcare Inc., No. 26-CV-1478 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. May

15, 2026) (entering bar order after giving Plaintiff notice and opportunity to show cause why a

filing injunction should not enter). Plaintiff filed this complaint before the bar order entered.

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil

judgment is entered.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2026

New York, New York

Louis L. Stanton

U.S.D.J.

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