Opinion

Opinion

Court
District Court, E.D. California
Filed
Aug 18, 2026
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 DIANA MIGUELDY ANGELICA Case No. 1:26-cv-03825 (EJD)

ORTEGA MEJIA,

8 ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR

Petitioner, WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

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v.

10 Re: Dkt. No. 1

DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA CITY

11 IMMIGRATION PROCESSING CENTER,

et al.,

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Respondents.

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14 Petitioner is an immigration detainee who has been detained without the opportunity for a

15 bond hearing since January 4, 2026. See Dkt. No. 1 at 10. In the instant petition for writ of habeas

16 corpus, she argues that her present detention violates due process, and seeks either immediate

17 release or a bond hearing. Id. at 6. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the petition in

18 part, and orders Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing.

19 I. DISCUSSION

20 Petitioner entered the United States in May 2024, was briefly detained by immigration

21 officials, and then was released on parole to pursue her asylum claim. Dkt. No. 1 at 8. Following

22 her grant of parole, Petitioner applied for asylum, was granted work authorization by USCIS, and

23 began working as a cleaner. Id. at 8–9; Dkt. No. 7-1 at 3. There is no allegation or evidence that,

24 between her release and re-detention, Petitioner violated the terms of her release or committed any

25 crime.

26 On January 4, 2036, Petitioner was re-detained by ICE after she accidentally drove into

27 Mexico. Dkt. No. 1 at 10. That same day, Petitioner was served a Notice to Appear placing her in

1 removal proceedings and charging her as inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), codified

2 at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Id. at 11. Petitioner was ordered removed to Ecuador by an

3 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) roughly two months later. See Dkt. No. 7-3. In ordering her removal, the

4 IJ declined to consider Petitioner’s asylum claim. Id. at 1–3. Petitioner timely appealed the order

5 to the Board of Immigration Appeals on April 15, 2026. See Dkt. No. 7-4. The appeal remains

6 pending. As such, no final order of removal is in effect. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B).

7 II. LEGAL STANDARD

8 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every

9 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)

10 (citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in

11 custody upon the legality of that custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure

12 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas

13 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the

14 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has

15 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

16 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a

17 district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v.

18 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

19 III. DISCUSSION

20 Respondents do not meaningfully address Petitioner’s due process claim. Rather, with

21 almost no analysis, they argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §

22 1225(b) because she is an “applicant for admission” and, therefore, may be mandatorily detained

23 without bond. Dkt. No. 7 at 2.

24 Two subsections of § 1225(b) mandate detention. Section 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) concerns

25 detention during the expedited removal process. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (in the event that an

26 immigration officer determines that a noncitizen applying for admission “has a credible fear of

27 persecution … the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.”).

1 In contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) concerns detention of “applicant[s] for admission.” Under

2 this subsection, “if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission

3 is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a

4 proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

5 There is no evidence in the record here that Petitioner was subjected to the expedited

6 removal process at the border, and thus detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Rather, it appears

7 Petitioner was “detained [at the border] for a proceeding under section 1229a[,]” given that she

8 was charged as inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and placed in full 1229a removal

9 proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); see Jarquin-Gadea v. Noem, No. EDCV25-2800

10 FMO(BFM), 2025 WL 4671202, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (explaining that “noncitizens

11 covered by § 1225(b)(2) are placed in full removal proceedings”). As such, the Court presumes

12 that her detention is controlled by § 1225(b)(2)(A). Rodriguez Vazquez, 026 WL 2196424, at *10

13 (“§ 1225(b)(2)(A), based on its text and context, is best construed as applying to aliens entering

14 the United States at the border”); Cong v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3730-GPC-DEB, 2026 WL 76566

15 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2026) (assuming § 1225(b)(1) controlled detention where petitioner accidentally

16 drove into Mexico and attempted to re-enter the United States); Peng v. Noem, No. 26-CV-1329

17 JLS (SBC), 2026 WL 765628, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2026) (same); Gao v. LaRose, 805 F.

18 Supp. 3d 1106, 1109 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (same).

19 This, however, does not end the inquiry as Petitioner has brought a claim for violation of

20 her due process rights—a claim which Respondents do not substantively engage with in opposing

21 the petition. This Court has previously found that “unreasonably prolonged detention of

22 individuals without a bond hearing under section 1225(b), pending removal proceedings, violates

23 the due process clause.” Bou v. Warden, No. 1:26-CV-03622 (EJD), 2026 WL 1614088, at *4

24 (E.D. Cal. June 4, 2026) (collecting cases); see also Abubakar Abdul-Samed v. Warden of the

25 Golden State Annex Det. Facility, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2025) (“essentially

26 all district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending

27 removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the right to due

1 process”).

2 Due process claims are analyzed “in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a

3 protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures

4 necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the

5 Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D.

6 Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460

7 (1989)). The Court finds that Petitioner has a protected liberty interest here, and due process

8 requires provision of a bond hearing.

9 Petitioner clearly possesses a liberty interest in securing her freedom from detention.

10 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical

11 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

12 690. Petitioner has been detained since January 2026 with no review of the necessity of her

13 continued custody. Additionally, prior to her detention she was living at liberty in the United

14 States on parole. Petitioner has a liberty interest in her release under these circumstances.

15 To determine whether Petitioner’s continued detention without a bond hearing accords

16 with due process, the Court must consider if the duration of Petitioner’s detention has become

17 unreasonable. In determining whether detention has become unreasonably prolonged, courts in

18 this district have considered “the total length of detention to date, the likely duration of future

19 detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the

20 government.” Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022); Bobokulov Akmal v.

21 Warden of Cal. City Det., 2026 WL 657606, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2026) (applying the test

22 enumerated in Lopez to a prolonged detention claim under § 1225(b)(1)); Lebedev v. Warden of

23 Golden State Annex, 2026 WL 482733, at *5–8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2026) (same).

24 These three factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor. As to length of detention, Petitioner’s

25 detention has now reached seven months. Courts have found that detention of similar lengths

26 without a bond hearing weighs in favor of finding that detention has become unreasonable. See,

27 e.g., Castro Ricardo v. ICE Field Off. Dir., No. 26-CV-1195-SAB, 2026 WL 1179786, at *2

1 (W.D. Wash. April 30, 2026) (finding detention prolonged without a hearing at five and a half

2 months); Nche v. Patrick, No. 26-CV-2449-JES-DDL, 2026 WL 1195015, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 1,

3 2026) (finding this factor weighed slightly in favor of a bond hearing after six months of

4 detention); Islamov v. Doe, No. 26-CV-1528-JES-VET, 2026 WL 1179873, at *4 (S.D. Cal. April

5 30, 2026); Amado v. United States Dep’t of Just., No. 25CV2687-LL(DDL), 2025 WL 3079052, at

6 *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (“Courts have found detention over seven months without a bond

7 hearing weighs toward a finding that it is unreasonable.”).

8 The likely duration of future detention also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Petitioner argues

9 that “her BIA appeal and possible petition for review in the Ninth Circuit could lead to additional

10 years of detention while her case is pending.” Dkt. No. 9 at 5. “The Court agrees, as Petitioner’s

11 appeal to the BIA may take months, and any appeal to the Ninth Circuit thereafter may take

12 years.” Alizadeh v. Mullin, No. 26-CV-2924 JLS (MMP), 2026 WL 1625651, at *2 (S.D. Cal.

13 June 5, 2026)

14 Finally, delay in removal proceedings appears neutral since the record does not suggest

15 significant delay by Respondents or Petitioner. Balancing the discussed factors, the Court

16 concludes that Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably prolonged and, therefore, Petitioner

17 is entitled to a bond hearing.

18 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

19 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the petition for writ of habeas corpus

20 and ORDERS the Government to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing within fourteen (14)

21 days, unless Petitioner requests a continuance. The Government SHALL bear the burden of

22 establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to the community or a

23 flight risk if released, and shall release Petitioner if they do not meet this burden. Bond SHALL

24 not be denied on the basis that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) requires mandatory detention. The

25 Court DENIES the Petition to the extent it seeks release.

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] The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case and enter Judgment for Petitioner.

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3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 || Dated: August 18, 2026

RM

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EDWARD J. DAVILA

7 United States District Judge

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Case No.: 1:26-cv-03825-EJD

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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