McWilliams

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

MONICA MCWILLIAMS CASE NO. 3:25-CV-00984

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

NEW VISION LEARNING ACADEMY MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D.

MCCLUSKY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 15] filed by

Defendant, New Vision Learning Academy (“NVLA”). Plaintiff, Monica McWilliams

(“McWilliams”) filed an Opposition to NVLA’s Motion [Doc. No. 22], and NVLA filed

a Reply [Doc. No. 29].

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND

A. McWilliams’ Employment History

In August of 2021, McWilliams started at NVLA as a third-grade teacher.1 May

2024, her contract was not renewed at the end of the academic year.2 The events that

occurred during her three years of employment are discussed below.

1 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 1]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 1].

2 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 2]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 2].

Shortly after beginning her employment, McWilliams informed Dr. Andrea

Miller (“Dr. Miller”), NVLA’s Executive Director, that she had a medical condition

that prevented her from standing for extended periods.3 At Dr. Miller’s request,

McWilliams provided NVLA with a physician’s note stating that she could not stand

for prolonged periods and needed to sit periodically throughout the day.4 McWilliams

provided NVLA with an updated physician’s note during each year of her

employment.5 Her most recent note stated that she should wear soft-soled shoes and

be permitted to take breaks from standing every fifteen minutes.6 During

McWilliams’ first two years of employment and for most of her third year, NVLA

permitted her to wear soft-soled shoes and take breaks as needed.7

B. 2024 LEAP Testing

Each year, NVLA administers the Louisiana Educational Assessment Program

(“LEAP”) examinations.8 The Louisiana Department of Education (“DOE”) provides

participating schools and teachers with a testing manual governing administration

of the examinations.9 The manual directs a teacher assigned to proctor the

examination to “[c]ontinually monitor the testing process by moving unobtrusively

throughout the room.”10

3 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 6]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 6].

4 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶¶ 7–8]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶¶ 7–8].

5 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 9]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 9].

6 [Id.].

7 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 12]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 12].

8 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 13]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 13].

9 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 14]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 14].

10 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 15]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 15].

McWilliams completed the first day of the 2024 LEAP examination without

incident.11 On the morning of the second day, McWilliams informed Dr. Miller and

NVLA Test Coordinator, Votika Lynch (“Lynch”), that her feet were bothering her.12

The parties dispute what occurred thereafter.13

McWilliams contends that Dr. Miller told her that she was required to stand

and could not take a break, rejected Lynch’s suggestion that McWilliams lean against

a wall, and directed McWilliams to go home until testing was completed.14 NVLA

maintains that Lynch suggested that McWilliams lean against a desk or wall and

take extended breaks between examinations, but that McWilliams declined those

suggestions and elected to use paid time off until testing concluded.15 McWilliams left

NVLA during the LEAP testing period and returned after testing concluded.16

C. McWilliams’ Contract Not Renewed

Following the conclusion of the 2023–2024 academic year, Dr. Miller informed

McWilliams that NVLA would not renew her teaching contract.17 McWilliams states

that Dr. Miller told her that NVLA was “going in a different direction.”18 McWilliams

further contends that at the time of nonrenewal, Dr. Miller did not identify LEAP

scores or attendance at school events as reasons for the nonrenewal at that meeting

or previously.19

11 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 17]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 17].

12 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 17];

13 Compare [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶¶ 18–22], with [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶¶ 18–22].

14 [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶¶ 18–22].

15 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶¶ 18–22].

16 Compare [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 22], with [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 22].

17 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 27]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 27].

18 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 41]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 41].

19 [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 27; id. at ¶¶ 16–17].

However, NVLA maintains that its decision was based on McWilliams’ failure

to participate in school events and on low LEAP scores attributed to her students.20

According to NVLA, teachers were expected to attend evening and school-day events,

and McWilliams failed to participate regularly.21 McWilliams disputes both that

attendance at after-hours events was discussed during her interview and that she

failed to attend such events.22

NVLA also relies on LEAP data from the 2021–2022 and 2022–2023 academic

years.23 NVLA states that, during the 2021–2022 school year, fifty-one (51) percent

of McWilliams’ students scored either “approaching basic” or “unsatisfactory” in

English Language Arts and fifty-three (53) percent received an “unsatisfactory” score

in social studies.24 NVLA further states that, during the 2022–2023 school year,

eighty-two (82) percent of McWilliams’ students scored either “approaching basic” or

“unsatisfactory” in English Language Arts and all of her students scored either

“approaching basic” or “unsatisfactory” in social studies.25 McWilliams argues that

the publicly available DOE data does not identify which third-grade students she

taught and therefore cannot be attributed specifically to her classroom.26

20 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 28].

21 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶¶ 4–5, 28].

22 [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶¶ 4–5, 28].

23 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶¶ 25–26].

24 [Id. at ¶ 25].

25 [Id. at ¶ 26].

26 [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶¶ 23–26].

D. Events Following Nonrenewal

On July 25, 2024, McWilliams applied for disability-retirement benefits

through the Teachers’ Retirement System of Louisiana (“TRSL”).27 In connection with

that application, McWilliams described physical limitations affecting her ability to

perform certain duties associated with her teaching position.28 NVLA contends that

McWilliams’ TRSL application and subsequent approval demonstrate that she could

not perform the duties of a third-grade teacher.29 McWilliams disputes that

characterization and maintains that the TRSL materials addressed her ability to

work without restrictions rather than her ability to perform the job with reasonable

accommodations.30

On August 11, 2024, McWilliams mailed NVLA a certified letter requesting

that NVLA complete paperwork necessary for her TRSL application.31 NVLA

contends that McWilliams’ application for and receipt of TRSL disability-retirement

benefits demonstrate that she could not perform the duties of a third-grade teacher.32

Dr. Miller also directed Lynch to prepare a written account concerning the May

7, 2024, LEAP-testing incident.33 The document is dated May 7, 2024, but states that

McWilliams “returned on Wednesday, May 15, 2024.”34 McWilliams contends that

this indicates the document was created or backdated after May 7, 2024.35 NVLA

27 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 30]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 30].

28 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 31]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 31].

29 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶¶ 31–35].

30 [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶¶ 31–35].

31 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 36]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 36].

32 [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 37].

33 [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 5].

34 [Id. at ¶ 6].

35 [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶¶ 5–7].

disputes that contention and maintains that Lynch prepared the document on May

7, 2024, and referred to McWilliams’ anticipated return in the past tense because

Lynch knew when McWilliams was expected to return.36

The parties also dispute who replaced McWilliams following the nonrenewal.37

NVLA maintains that Jennifer Lewis (“Lewis”), an existing NVLA teacher, was

reassigned to the sole third-grade section after McWilliams’ departure, and that

Brittany Shaw (“Shaw”) was later moved from kindergarten to a newly created

additional third-grade section after enrollment increased.38 Dr. Miller testified that

she believed Lewis was in her forties, but the record does not establish Lewis’s age

with specificity.39 McWilliams contends that Shaw, who was substantially younger

and not yet certified, replaced her.40

On March 19, 2025, McWilliams filed a Charge of Discrimination with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).41 McWilliams identified

disability as the basis for the alleged discrimination.42 In describing the events

underlying her charge, McWilliams stated that NVLA failed to accommodate her

during the 2024 LEAP testing period, sent her home until testing concluded, and later

declined to renew her employment.43 McWilliams further stated that the reason given

for the nonrenewal was that NVLA was “going in a new direction.”44 McWilliams

36 [Doc. No. 29, pp. 9–10].

37 Compare [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶¶ 8–12], with [Doc. No. 29, pp. 6–7].

38 [Doc. No. 29, pp. 6–7].

39 [Doc. No. 22-3, p. 65].

40 [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶¶ 8–12].

41 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 38]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 38].

42 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 39]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 39].

43 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 40]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 40].

44 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶ 41]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 41].

mailed NVLA a settlement demand on June 10, 2025, and filed this action on July 9,

2025.45

The issues have been briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Courts must “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution in favor of

one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law.” In re Genesis

Marine, LLC, 164 F.4th 448, 453 (5th Cir. 2026) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). And a dispute about a material fact “is ‘genuine’ if the

evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Put differently, courts must grant

summary judgment against a party who does not—or cannot—show “the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial.” Guillot ex rel. T.A.G. v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743, 750 (5th Cir. 2023)

(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).

The movant must first point to “particular parts of materials in the record,”

such as depositions, documents, electronic information, affidavits, interrogatories,

etc., to show there is no genuine dispute of material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

Once the movant does so, the burden shifts to the nonmovant who “must go beyond

45 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶¶ 43–44]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶¶ 43–44].

his pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute of

material fact for trial.” Clark v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., 141 F.4th 653, 659 (5th

Cir. 2025) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). The nonmovant cannot “defeat summary

judgment with” metaphysical doubts as to the facts, “‘conclusory allegations,’

‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or ‘only a scintilla of evidence.’” In re Genesis Marine,

164 F.4th at 453 (collecting cases).

Finally—and most importantly—when resolving summary judgment motions,

“courts may not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, or

resolve factual disputes” and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible

inferences “in favor of the non-moving party.” Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18

F.4th 157, 160 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation modified) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

B. Disability Discrimination Claim

McWilliams brings claims for disability discrimination under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law

(“LEDL”). “The LEDL, codified in LA. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23:301, et seq., is modeled after

the ADA.” Conine ex rel. Estate of Addie v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 966 So. 2d 763,

767 (La. App. 2007). “In interpreting Louisiana’s employment discrimination laws,

[Louisiana] courts have relied upon similar federal statutes and the interpreting

federal jurisprudence.” Id.

The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual based on the

individual’s disability.42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688,

694 (5th Cir. 2014). An employee may use “direct or circumstantial evidence, or both”

to establish a case of discrimination. Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 340 (5th

Cir. 2019). Because McWilliams relies on circumstantial evidence, the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework applies. Goudeau v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 793

F.3d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 2015).

The framework first requires the employee to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination. See LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 694. That requires an employee to

establish (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she was qualified for

the job, and (3) she was fired on account of her disability. See Nall, 917 F.3d at 341.

“The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”

Turner v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 675 F.3d 887, 892 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Texas

Dep't of Cmty. Affs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)). If a prima facie case is

established, the employer has the burden of “articulat[ing] a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason” for the firing. See id. If the employer does so, the burden

returns to the plaintiff “to produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that

the employer’s articulated reason is pretextual.” Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs. N.A.,

Inc., 813 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016).

McWilliams has a physical impairment that substantially limits her ability to

stand for prolonged periods and requires periodic sitting. NVLA knew of that

limitation and accommodated it throughout most of her employment.46 The record

therefore establishes that McWilliams has a disability within the meaning of the

46 [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶¶ 6–12]; [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶¶ 6–12].

ADA. The parties principally dispute whether she was otherwise qualified for the

third-grade teaching position.

The parties dispute whether McWilliams was qualified for her role as a third-

grade teacher. To be a qualified employee, McWilliams must be able to show that she

could either (1) “perform the essential functions of the job in spite of [her] disability,”

or (2) that “a reasonable accommodation of [her] disability would have enabled [her]

to perform the essential functions of [her] job.” LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 697.; see also

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The employer has the burden of defining the essential functions

of a particular position. EEOC v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 696

(E.D. La. 2011) (citing Dropinski v. Douglas County, 298 F.3d 704, 707 (8th Cir. 2002))

(holding that when an employer disputes whether or not an employee can perform

the essential functions of a job, the employer has the burden of demonstrating what

the essential functions are).

McWilliams performed the third-grade teaching position for nearly three

academic years while receiving the requested periodic-standing accommodation. At

no point was McWilliams informed that she had failed to perform any essential

function of the role of teacher, nor has any attempt been made to distinguish

“essential” from “marginal” functions as it pertains to this role. See 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2.

Separately, the parties dispute the effect of McWilliams’ application for

disability-retirement benefits. Without resolving the evidentiary dispute, an

application for disability benefits granted without considering reasonable

accommodation is not dispositive in establishing qualifications to work with

reasonable accommodation. See Cleveland v. Pol’y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795,

802–03 (1999). Although, contrary to McWilliams’ assertion, Dr. Cynthia Brown-

Manning did in fact certify that McWilliams suffered from a “total and permanent”

disability, the question posed considered only work “without any restrictions” and did

not contemplate reasonable accommodation.47 McWilliams testified that she could

teach and perform her job if permitted periodic breaks from standing. On this record,

a reasonable jury could find that she could perform the essential functions of the

third-grade teaching position with reasonable accommodation.

The parties do not dispute that the nonrenewal of McWilliams’ contract was

an adverse employment action; they dispute whether it occurred because of her

disability. See Spears v. Louisiana College, No. 20-30522, 2023 WL 2810057, at *2

(5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2023). In Gosby, the Fifth Circuit held that close temporal proximity

between an event highlighting an employee’s disability and her termination may

establish prima facie causation. Gosby v. Apache Indus. Servs., Inc., 30 F.4th 523, 527

(5th Cir. 2022). Although only six days separated the events in Gosby, the court relied

on retaliation cases recognizing longer periods as sufficiently close, including a six-

and-one-half-week interval. Id. (citing Lyons, 964 F.3d at 305). Here, seventeen days

separated McWilliams’ disability-related dispute with Dr. Miller and the nonrenewal.

That McWilliams’ annual contract was then approaching renewal does not

defeat the prima facie inference. See id. at 527 (“If in fact her short-term position was

47 Compare [Doc. No. 22, p. 14], with [Doc. No. 15-8, p. 6, sec. 10C].

to end for other reasons at the same time, that can be shown by the employer as part

of its response.”). Therefore, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to

conclude that McWilliams has shown the basis for a causal connection between her

disability and termination and, along with the other elements, has made a prima

facie case.

After the employee makes out a prima facie case, the employer must articulate

a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action; if it does

so, the burden shifts back to the employee. See Goudeau, 793 F.3d at 474. “This

burden is satisfied by introducing evidence which, if true, would permit the trier-of-

fact to conclude that the termination was nondiscriminatory.” Medina v. Ramsey Steel

Co., 238 F.3d 674, 684 (5th Cir. 2001). At that point, the employee must present

“‘substantial evidence’ that the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

termination is pretextual.” Delaval v. PTech Drilling Tubulars, LLC, 824 F.3d 476,

480 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222,

233 (5th Cir. 2015)). She may do so by showing that the employer’s explanation is

false or “unworthy of credence.” Id. (quoting Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578

(5th Cir. 2003)).

In this case, NVLA offers two reasons for McWilliams’ termination: (1) her

alleged failure to attend school activities and (2) the test performance of her third-

grade class. The parties dispute the factual question of McWilliams’ attendance at

the activities in question. NVLA claims McWilliams “did not participate” in

extracurricular programming.48 McWilliams claims she “cannot recall any events

[she] was not able to attend.”49 Resolving those conflicting accounts would require the

Court to make a credibility determination, which it cannot do on summary judgment.

See Guzman, 18 F.4th at 160.

There is also the matter of McWilliams’ students’ performance on the LEAP

exam during the three years she taught at NVLA. In her affidavit, Dr. Miller states

that DOE provided NVLA teacher-specific LEAP results and identified poor results

for McWilliams’ students in 2021–2022 and 2022–2023.50 In order to argue this claim

is pretextual, McWilliams contends that her students’ scores were comparable to the

performance of students throughout NVLA.51 Dr. Miller did not agree with that

characterization but admitted that NVLA was performing poorly and had received a

“D” rating from the state. 52

McWilliams received positive performance evaluations, was never disciplined

or reprimanded, and received a favorable recommendation from Dr. Miller

approximately one year before her contract was not renewed.53 Neither the alleged

attendance problems nor the LEAP scores were communicated to McWilliams as

reasons for the nonrenewal.54 NVLA does not identify 2023–2024 scores as a basis for

the nonrenewal. Viewed in McWilliams’ favor, the record contains evidence from

which a reasonable jury could question whether the asserted performance concerns

48 [Doc. No. 15-5, pp. 43–46].

49 [Doc. No. 22-13, ¶ 4].

50 [Doc. No. 15-6, ¶¶ 7–13].

51 [Doc. No. 22, pp. 14–15].

52 [Doc. No. 22-3, p. 51].

53 [Doc. No. 22-1, p. 11]; [Doc. No. 22-3, pp. 90–91].

54 [Doc. No. 22-3, pp. 47–49].

motivated the nonrenewal. Therefore, resolution of McWilliams’ claim of

discrimination is not appropriate on summary judgment and the genuine disputes of

material fact must be resolved by the jury.

C. Failure to Accommodate Claim

No “covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the

basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement,

or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,

conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “[T]he term

‘discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability’ includes . . . not

making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of

an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

In this case, even accepting McWilliams’ version of events, NVLA provided

reasonable accommodation. McWilliams maintains that Dr. Miller sent her home for

the remainder of LEAP testing after refusing to permit periodic sitting.55 But the

Fifth Circuit recognizes that time off, whether paid or unpaid, can constitute

reasonable accommodation. See Delaval v. PTech Drilling Tubulars, L.L.C., 824 F.3d

476, 481 (5th Cir. 2016); Moss v. Harris Cnty. Constable Precinct One, 851 F.3d 413,

418 (5th Cir. 2017). And the ADA requires reasonable accommodation, not the

employee’s preferred accommodation. Jennings v. Towers Watson, 11 F.4th 335, 344

(5th Cir. 2021).

55 [Doc. No. 22-1, pp. 23–26].

Moreover, the conflict arose only during the limited LEAP testing period, when

NVLA required proctors to continuously monitor students by moving throughout the

room. McWilliams returned to work after testing concluded.56 Thus, even if Dr. Miller

directed McWilliams to use leave rather than McWilliams electing to do so, the leave

accommodated the temporary conflict between McWilliams’ standing restriction and

NVLA’s testing requirements.

McWilliams argues that NVLA should instead have permitted periodic sitting

and relies on Louisiana v. EEOC, 784 F. Supp. 3d 886, 893 (W.D. La. 2025).57 But

Louisiana applied the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, which expressly prohibits

requiring leave when another reasonable accommodation is available. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000gg-1(4). The ADA contains no comparable provision. Because NVLA provided

reasonable accommodation, it was not required to provide McWilliams’ preferred one.

Jennings, 11 F.4th at 344.

Accordingly, McWilliams cannot establish that NVLA failed to reasonably

accommodate her disability. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate on this

claim.

D. Age Discrimination Claim

NVLA first argues that McWilliams failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies because her EEOC Charge (the “Charge”) identified disability, but not age,

as the basis of discrimination.58 A judicial complaint, however, is not limited by the

56 [Id.].

57 [Doc. No. 22, pp. 18–21].

58 [Doc. No. 15-9].

boxes checked on an EEOC charge. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455,

462, 464 (5th Cir. 1970). Rather, the Court considers the scope of the EEOC

investigation that could “reasonably be expected to grow out of” the charge. Id. at 466.

McWilliams’ Charge challenged the nonrenewal of her employment and

alleged that NVLA told her it was “going in a different direction.”59 She did not check

the age-discrimination box or mention her age, and she maintains that she did not

know the age of the teacher she believed replaced her when she filed the Charge.60

She argues that an investigation into the challenged nonrenewal could reasonably

include inquiry into who assumed her position and whether age played a role in that

decision.61

The Court agrees. McWilliams’ age claim concerns the same adverse

employment action identified in the Charge and presents an alternative

discriminatory motive for that decision. Under Sanchez’s liberal construction of

EEOC charges, an investigation into the nonrenewal could reasonably have

encompassed the circumstances surrounding McWilliams’ replacement. See Sanchez,

431 F.2d at 462–66. Accordingly, McWilliams exhausted her administrative remedies

as to her ADEA claim.

NVLA separately argues that McWilliams failed to provide the notice required

for her state-law age-discrimination claim under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:303(C).62

An EEOC charge may satisfy that notice requirement when the state-law claim falls

59 [Doc. No. 22-1, p. 25].

60 [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 8].

61 [Doc. No. 22, pp. 25–26].

62 [Doc. No. 15-2, pp. 13–15].

within the discrimination reasonably encompassed by the charge. See McNulty v. Cox

Media Grp. LLC, No. 18-01372, 2019 WL 1716313, at *8 (W.D. La. Feb. 12, 2019).

Because the Court finds that McWilliams’ age-discrimination claim could reasonably

be expected to grow out of the Charge, the Charge likewise provided NVLA sufficient

notice of the state-law claim. The Louisiana age-discrimination claim is analyzed

under the same framework as the ADEA claim. See Conine ex rel. Estate of Addie v.

Universal Oil Prods. Co., 966 So. 2d 763, 767 (La. App. 2007).

On the merits, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of age discrimination

by showing that she: (1) was discharged; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was

within the protected class; and (4) was replaced by someone substantially younger or

otherwise discharged because of her age. Goudeau v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 793

F.3d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 2015). An employee is not “replaced” merely because another

employee later performs some of her former duties. Where a position is eliminated

and its duties are distributed among existing employees, there is no replacement. See

Ernst v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 1 F.4th 333, 339–40 (5th Cir. 2021); Meinecke v. H &

R Block of Hous., 66 F.3d 77, 84 (5th Cir. 1995). Conversely, the employee who

assumes the position vacated by the plaintiff is the relevant replacement, even if

related duties are later reallocated. See Pilcher v. Cont’l Elecs. Corp., No. 96-11130,

1997 WL 361738, at *3–4 (5th Cir. July 8, 1997).

McWilliams contends that she was replaced by Shaw, a twenty-four-year-old

teacher who was less experienced and not yet certified.63 The undisputed chronology

63 [Doc. No. 22-14, ¶ 8].

does not support that characterization. Dr. Miller testified that Lewis took over the

third-grade class McWilliams had taught.64 At that time, NVLA had only one third-

grade section, and Lewis was reassigned from first grade to that section.65 Only after

enrollment increased did NVLA add an additional third-grade section and move Shaw

from kindergarten into that additional section.66 McWilliams offers no evidence

contradicting that sequence. Lewis therefore assumed the position vacated by

McWilliams; Shaw filled a later-created position after NVLA expanded the grade.

Because Lewis and not Shaw replaced McWilliams, Shaw’s age, certification,

experience, and salary do not establish the fourth element of McWilliams’ prima facie

case. Because Lewis, not Shaw, replaced McWilliams, evidence concerning Shaw’s

age, certification, experience, and salary does not establish the fourth element of

McWilliams’ prima facie case. McWilliams has not produced evidence from which a

reasonable jury could find that Lewis was substantially younger or that the

nonrenewal otherwise occurred because of age.

Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate on McWilliams’ federal and

state age-discrimination claims.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

64 [Doc. No. 22-3, pp. 52–65].

65 [Id.].

66 [Id.].

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that New Vision Learning

Academy’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 15] is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the

Motion is GRANTED as to McWilliams’ failure-to-accommodate claims under the

Americans with Disabilities Act and Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, and

those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the

Motion is GRANTED as to McWilliams’ age-discrimination claims under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act and Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law,

and those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED as to McWilliams’

disability-discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and

Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law.

MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 10th day of September 2026.

Unie fares DISTRI Joke

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