The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 FERNANDO R. JIMENEZ, No. 2:25-cv-3646 TLN CSK P
12 Plaintiff, ORDER
13 v.
14 PLACER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
et al.,
15
Defendants.
16
17
18 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
19 § 1983 and requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This
20 proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
21 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
22 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
23 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C.
24 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in
25 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct
26 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and
27 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments
28 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. These
1 payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the
2 amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C.
3 § 1915(b)(2).
4 Plaintiff is granted an opportunity to proceed with the Fourth Amendment excessive force
5 claims against defendants Slater, DeSilva, Buyers, Dad, Milam, Smith, Ivanov, Farren, Oliver,
6 Steen, Menard, Walter and Sexton, raised in claims three and five, and the Fourth Amendment
7 unreasonable search and seizure claim against defendants Machado, Meier and Tredennick, raised
8 in claim nine.
9 I. SCREENING STANDARDS
10 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
11 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
12 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raised claims that are legally
13 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
14 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
15 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
16 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
17 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an
18 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
19 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
20 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
21 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.
22 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably
23 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at
24 1227.
25 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain
26 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
27 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic
28 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
1 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a
2 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations
3 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555.
4 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the
5 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v.
6 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal
7 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as
8 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the
9 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
10 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
11 II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
12 Plaintiff’s complaint contains fourteen claims for relief. Named as defendants are the
13 Placer County Sheriff’s Office (“PCSO”), Placer County Deputy District Attorney O’Hair, PCSO
14 Detective Slater, PCSO Detective DeSilva, PCSO Detective Cuevas, PCSO Deputy Buyers,
15 PCSO Deputy Tredennick, PCSO Detective Machado, PCSO Detective Meier, Sacramento
16 County Sheriff’s Office (“SCSO”), SCSO Deputy Dad, SCSO Deputy Milam, SCSO Deputy
17 Smith, SCSO Deputy Menard, SCSO Deputy Walton, SCSO Deputy Sexton, SCSO Deputy
18 Ivanov, SCSO Deputy Farren, SCSO Deputy Oliver, SCSO Deputy Steen, SCSO Deputy Card,
19 Placer County District Attorney Investigator Swisher and Placer County District Attorney
20 Investigator Bryan. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) In the discussion of claim two, plaintiff also names SCSO
21 Deputy Milton as a defendant. (Id. at 7.) As relief, plaintiff seeks money damages. (Id. at 27.)
22 A. Claim One
23 Claim one raises a claim for unlawful detention in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
24 Amendments. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff claims that on December 21, 2023, defendants Slater and
25 DeSilva requested that defendant SCSO and its employees pulled plaintiff over. (Id.) Plaintiff
26 was pulled over while driving his 2021 Chevy Tahoe on Highway 50 near the Jefferson
27 Boulevard off ramp. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that defendants Slater, DeSilva and each of the SCSO
28 employees involved had their firearms pointed at plaintiff and handcuffed plaintiff. (Id. at 5.)
1 Plaintiff claims that he was unlawfully detained in the back of a SCSO vehicle for sixty minutes
2 without probable cause. (Id.) Plaintiff was taken to the Placer County Jail where he was detained
3 for eight hours without probable cause. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that none of the defendants
4 involved in his detention had knowledge, reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that
5 plaintiff committed a criminal offense or was about to commit a criminal offense. (Id.) Plaintiff
6 claims that defendants Slater and DeSilva went off their hunch, as testified. (Id.) Plaintiff claims
7 that at the preliminary hearing conducted on February 13, 2024, defendant Slater testified that on
8 December 21, 2023 at 5:24 a.m. she detained plaintiff in the back of a patrol car although she did
9 not know plaintiff was involved in criminal activity. (Id. at 6.)
10 A plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim for damages arising out of alleged unconstitutional
11 activities that resulted in his criminal conviction unless the conviction is first reversed, expunged,
12 set aside or otherwise called into question. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994).
13 Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that where a plaintiff, convicted of a crime under state
14 law, seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, “the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor
15 of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would,
16 the complaint must be dismissed.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
17 At the same time, a plaintiff may still bring § 1983 for claims challenging unconstitutional
18 activities leading up to an arrest if plaintiff’s success on these claims would not necessarily
19 invalidate a conviction or sentence. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (explaining that, “[b]ecause of
20 doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error, such a
21 § 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was
22 unlawful”) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); Beets v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d
23 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he relevant question is whether success in a subsequent § 1983
24 suit would ‘necessarily imply’ or ‘demonstrate’ the invalidity of the earlier conviction or
25 sentence.”).
26 The Ninth Circuit has found that Heck bars § 1983 claims premised on arrest and
27 detention without probable cause where that arrest and detention resulted in the plaintiff’s
28 conviction. See Smithart v. Towrery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (“There is no question that
1 Heck bars [plaintiff’s] claims that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and brought
2 unfounded criminal charges against him”); see also Espinoza v. California Highway Patrol, 2016
3 WL 4943960, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2016) (finding that Heck barred plaintiff’s claims based
4 on allegations of unlawful arrest and detention); Garrett v. Ruiz, 2013 WL 1342850, at *7 (S.D.
5 Cal. Apr. 3, 2013) (“[I]f plaintiff were claiming that [the relevant police officers] lacked probable
6 cause to arrest him,” then Heck “would clearly apply to bar his suit”) (emphasis in original).
7 Plaintiff’s claim that he was unlawfully detained on December 21, 2023 appears likely
8 barred by Heck. While plaintiff was housed at the Placer County Jail when he filed this action,
9 court records reflect that plaintiff is now housed at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”).
10 Plaintiff’s transfer to KVSP suggests that plaintiff was convicted of criminal charges stemming
11 from his December 21, 2023 arrest and detention. Plaintiff’s claim that defendant Slater testified
12 at plaintiff’s preliminary hearing regarding the circumstances of plaintiff’s apparent arrest and
13 detention suggests that a finding in plaintiff’s favor as to his unlawful detention claim would
14 invalidate his conviction. For these reasons, plaintiff’s unlawful detention claim raised in claim
15 one is dismissed. If plaintiff files an amended complaint raising this claim, plaintiff shall address
16 why this claim is not barred by Heck.
17 In claim one, plaintiff also appears to raise a claim pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Social
18 Sers., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) against defendant PCSO and the individually named defendants in
19 their official capacities. (See ECF No. 1 at 4.) “There is no longer a need to bring official
20 capacity-actions against local government officials, for under Monell…local government units
21 can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473
22 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14 (1985). Accordingly, this Court treats the official capacity claims against the
23 individual defendants as a claim against defendant PCSO.
24 “[A] local government [or its entities] may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury
25 inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy
26 or custom, ... inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”
27 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. “Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s
28 lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to
1 practically have the force of law.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). To properly
2 plead a claim under Monell, it is insufficient for a plaintiff to simply allege that a policy, custom,
3 or practice exists. See AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636–37 (9th Cir.
4 2012). Plausible facts supporting such a policy or custom must be pled. See id. at 637. A
5 Monell claim may not be premised on an isolated or sporadic incident. See Gant v. County of
6 Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2014).
7 Plaintiff claims that defendant PCSO has “a policy, practice, custom, and/or regulation”
8 that when implemented violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) These
9 allegations are not sufficient to state a Monell claim. Plaintiff fails to identify the challenged
10 policy, practice, custom or regulation. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed. If plaintiff raises a
11 Monell claim in an amended complaint, plaintiff must specifically identify the policy, practice,
12 custom or regulation that led to the deprivation of his constitutional rights.
13 B. Claim Two
14 In claim two, plaintiff raises a claim for unlawful imprisonment in violation of the Fourth
15 and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Plaintiff claims that on December 21, 2023 to
16 the present, defendants PCSO, Slater, DeSilva, Buyers, O’Hair, SCSO, Dad, Milton, Smith,
17 Menard, Farren, Oliver, Steen and Card arrested and detained plaintiff without probable cause.
18 (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he has been deprived of his liberty since December 21, 2023. (Id.)
19 It appears that claim two is barred by Heck because a finding that defendants arrested and
20 detained plaintiff without probable cause would invalidate plaintiff’s conviction. For this reason,
21 plaintiff’s claim for unlawful imprisonment raised in claim two is dismissed. If plaintiff files an
22 amended complaint raising this claim, plaintiff shall address why this claim is not barred by
23 Heck.
24 In claim two, plaintiff raises a Monell claim against defendant PCSO and the individually
25 named defendants in their official capacities. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) This Court treats the official
26 capacity claims against the individual defendants as a claim against defendant PCSO. See
27 Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 167 n.4. Plaintiff claims that defendant PCSO has “a policy, practice,
28 custom, and/or regulation” that when implemented violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (ECF
1 No. 1 at 7.) As discussed above, these allegations are insufficient to state a Monell claim. See
2 County of Tulare, 666 F.3d at 636–37. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed. If plaintiff raises a
3 Monell claim in an amended complaint, plaintiff must specifically identify the policy, practice,
4 custom or regulation that led to the deprivation of his constitutional rights.
5 C. Claims Three and Five
6 In claims three and five, plaintiff raises claims for excessive force in violation of the
7 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments based on defendants pointing their weapons at him during
8 his arrest. (ECF No. 1 at 8, 11.) In claim three, plaintiff also raises an excessive force claim
9 based on defendants applying handcuffs too tightly. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Claims of excessive force
10 that “arise[ ] in the context of an arrest ... [are] most properly characterized as ... invoking the
11 protections of the Fourth Amendment” against unreasonable seizures. See Graham v. Connor,
12 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness inquiry “in an excessive
13 force case is an objective one.” Id. at 397. The question is “whether the officers’ actions are
14 ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard
15 to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id.
16 In claim three, plaintiff claims that defendants Slater, DeSilva, Buyers, Dad, Milam,
17 Smith, Ivanov, Farren, Oliver, Steen and Card all pointed their firearms at plaintiff during his
18 arrest. (ECF No. 8.) In claim five, plaintiff names three additional defendants who allegedly
19 pointed their firearms at plaintiff, i.e., defendants Menard, Walter and Sexton. (Id. at 11.) In
20 claim five, plaintiff claims that all defendants kept their firearms pointed at him even after he was
21 handcuffed and not resisting. (Id.) In claim five, plaintiff claims that all defendants threatened
22 to shoot him and plaintiff believed that all defendants were going to carry out their threat to shoot
23 him. (Id. at 12.) In support of claim one, plaintiff claims that defendants pointed their guns at his
24 head and body. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff claims that he did not attempt to flee, did not resist and
25 complied with all requests. (Id.) Plaintiff claims he was unarmed. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that
26 defendants stated that the scene was “code 4,” meaning safe. (Id.) This Court finds that claims
27 three and five state potentially colorable Fourth Amendment excessive force claims based on
28 defendants’ allegedly pointing their guns at plaintiff under these circumstances. See Foster v.
1 City of Indio, 908 F.3d 1204, 1218 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Espinosa v. City and County of San
2 Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We have held only that ‘pointing a loaded gun at a
3 suspect, employing the threat to use deadly force’ may constitute excessive force.”) (emphasis in
4 original).
5 In claim three, plaintiff also claims that defendants handcuffed plaintiff in extremely tight
6 handcuffs, causing pain, numbness to plaintiff’s hands, severe lacerations, and stinging. (ECF
7 No. 1 at 8.) Plaintiff claims that he immediately told all defendants that the handcuffs were
8 hurting his hands and causing injuries and pain. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff also claims that defendants
9 aggressively yanked plaintiff by the metal handcuffs, causing cuts to his wrists. (Id.) This Court
10 finds that plaintiff states a potentially colorable Fourth Amendment excessive force against the
11 defendants named in claim three regarding the application of tight handcuffs and their alleged
12 failure to loosen them. See Gonzalez v. City of Phoenix, 163 F.4th 1289, 1303 (9th Cir. 2026)
13 (“We have repeatedly held that force can be unreasonable when undue pressure caused by
14 physical restraints is not alleviated.”) (citing Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th
15 Cir. 2004) (officers used excessive force “in making the arrest and continuing the restraint by
16 handcuffs that hurt and damaged [arrestee’s] wrist.”); LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d
17 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2000) (allegations that officers “tightly handcuffed [arrestee] and refused to
18 loosen the cuffs when he complained” raised a factual dispute on plaintiff’s excessive force
19 claim)); Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]o place and keep [arrestee]
20 in handcuffs that were so tight that they caused her unnecessary pain violated her Fourth
21 Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure.”); Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433,
22 1436 (9th Cir. 1993) (officers used excessive force because defendant “has presented no evidence
23 that would justify handcuffing [arrestee] so tightly that he suffered pain and bruises, or to justify
24 his refusal to loosen the handcuffs after [arrestee] complained”)).
25 In claims three and five, plaintiff raises Monell claims against defendant PCSO and the
26 individually named defendants in their official capacities. (ECF No. 1 at 8, 10.) This Court treats
27 the official capacity claims against the individual defendants as a claim against defendant PCSO.
28 See Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 167 n.4. Plaintiff claims that defendant PCSO has “a policy, practice,
1 custom, and/or regulation” that when implemented violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (ECF
2 No. 1 at 8, 10.) As discussed above, these allegations are insufficient to state a Monell claim.
3 See County of Tulare, 666 F.3d at 636–37. Accordingly, these Monell claims are dismissed. If
4 plaintiff raises these Monell claims in an amended complaint, plaintiff must specifically identify
5 the policy, practice, custom or regulation that led to the deprivation of his constitutional rights.
6 D. Claim Four
7 In claim four, plaintiff raises a claim of false arrest in violation of the Fourth, Fifth and
8 Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 1 at 10.) Plaintiff claims that on December 21, 2023,
9 defendants Slater and DeSilva unlawfully “implemented a deliberate question-first tactic, two-
10 part interrogation technique designed to circumvent plaintiff’s Miranda right and led Slater and
11 DeSilva to have false probable cause…for a misdemeanor violation of Cal. Health & Safety Code
12 sec. 7054.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues that defendants Slater and DeSilva knew that they had no
13 probable cause to arrest plaintiff for violating California Health and Safety Code § 7054. (Id.)
14 It appears that claim four is barred by Heck because a finding in plaintiff’s favor as to
15 claim four would invalidate plaintiff’s conviction. For this reason, plaintiff’s claim for false
16 arrest raised in claim four is dismissed. If plaintiff files an amended complaint raising this claim,
17 plaintiff shall address why this claim is not barred by Heck.
18 In claim four, plaintiff raises a Monell claim against defendant PCSO and the individually
19 named defendants in their official capacities. (ECF No. 1 at 10.) This Court treats the official
20 capacity claims against the individual defendants as a claim against defendant PCSO. See
21 Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 167 n.4. Plaintiff claims that defendant PCSO has “a policy, practice,
22 custom, and/or regulation” that when implemented violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (ECF
23 No. 1 at 10.) As discussed above, these allegations are insufficient to state a Monell claim. See
24 County of Tulare, 666 F.3d at 636–37. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed. If plaintiff raises a
25 Monell claim in an amended complaint, plaintiff must specifically identify the policy, practice,
26 custom or regulation that led to the deprivation of his constitutional rights.
27 E. Claim Six
28 In claim six, plaintiff claims that he was prosecuted based on false reports in violation of
1 the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 1 at 13.) Plaintiff appears to claim that
2 from December 21, 2023 to the date of the filing of his complaint, defendants DeSilva, Swisher
3 and Bryan made reports that were used by defendant O’Hair in his prosecution of plaintiff. (Id.)
4 Plaintiff claims that these reports contained false and fabricated information. (Id. at 13-15.)
5 Plaintiff claims that the defendants named in claim six conspired to violate his constitutional
6 rights. (Id. at 13.)
7 It appears that claim six is barred by Heck because a finding in plaintiff’s favor as to this
8 claim would invalidate plaintiff’s conviction. For this reason, claim six is dismissed. If plaintiff
9 files an amended complaint raising this claim, plaintiff shall address why this claim is not barred
10 by Heck.
11 In claim six, plaintiff raises a Monell claim against defendant PCSO and the individually
12 named defendants in their official capacities. (ECF No. 1 at 13.) This Court treats the official
13 capacity claims against the individual defendants as a claim against defendant PCSO. See
14 Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 167 n.4. Plaintiff claims that defendant PCSO has “a policy, practice,
15 custom, and/or regulation” that when implemented violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (ECF
16 No. 1 at 13.) As discussed above, these allegations are insufficient to state a Monell claim. See
17 County of Tulare, 666 F.3d at 636–37. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed. If plaintiff raises a
18 Monell claim in an amended complaint, plaintiff must specifically identify the policy, practice,
19 custom or regulation that led to the deprivation of his constitutional rights.
20 F. Claim Seven
21 In claim seven, plaintiff raises a claim for prosecutorial misconduct in violation of the
22 Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 1 at 16.) Plaintiff claims that defendant
23 O’Hair engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during plaintiff’s prosecution by coercing and
24 tricking witnesses, withholding evidence, falsifying evidence and recording and listening to
25 phone calls between plaintiff and his lawyer. (Id. at 16-18.)
26 It appears that claim seven is barred by Heck because a finding that in plaintiff’s favor as
27 to this claim would invalidate plaintiff’s conviction. For this reason, claim seven is dismissed. If
28 plaintiff files an amended complaint raising this claim, plaintiff shall address why this claim is
1 not barred by Heck.
2 G. Claim Eight
3 In claim eight, plaintiff alleges violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical
4 care in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 1 at 19.) Plaintiff claims
5 that on December 21, 2023, defendants Slater and DeSilva knew that plaintiff had cancer,
6 diabetes and high blood pressure. (ECF No. 1 at 19.) Plaintiff claims that while defendants had
7 plaintiff in their custody for eight hours, they refused to check plaintiff’s diabetes and refused to
8 provide plaintiff with several medications, which defendants had in their possession. (Id.)
9 Plaintiff claims that defendants’ actions exacerbated his medical conditions and caused plaintiff’s
10 cancer to spread. (Id.)
11 Claim eight appears to be based on post-arrest medical care plaintiff allegedly failed to
12 receive as well as medical care plaintiff allegedly failed to receive following his transport to the
13 Placer County Jail where he was detained for eight hours. Post-arrest claims for denial of medical
14 care during and immediately following arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s
15 objective reasonableness standard. See Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d
16 1090, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2006) (analyzing post-arrest medical care under objective reasonableness
17 standard). When an arrestee is injured or suffers a medical crisis during or immediately after an
18 arrest, a police officer satisfies his or her constitutional obligations “by either promptly
19 summoning the necessary medical help or taking the injured detainee to the hospital.” Id. at
20 1099.
21 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial jail detainees have the right to receive
22 adequate medical care during their detention. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118,
23 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018). To establish a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against an
24 individual defendant under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial
25 detainee must show that:
26 (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the
conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those
27 conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious
harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures
28 to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the
1 circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk
involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct
2 obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused
the plaintiff's injuries.
3
4 Id. at 1125.
5 Regarding plaintiff’s claim that defendants failed to provide plaintiff with post-arrest
6 medical care, this Court find that plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts demonstrating that he
7 experienced a medical crisis requiring immediate medical attention. Accordingly, this claim is
8 dismissed.
9 Regarding plaintiff’s claim that defendants failed to provide plaintiff with medical care
10 while he was detained at the Placer County Jail for eight hours, this Court finds that plaintiff fails
11 to plead sufficient facts demonstrating that defendants’ failure to check plaintiff’s diabetes and
12 give plaintiff his medications put plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm. Plaintiff fails to
13 allege that he suffered any injury as a result of not having his blood pressure taken or receiving
14 his medication. Plaintiff’s claim that defendants caused plaintiff’s cancer to spread is
15 unsupported. Plaintiff also fails to plead sufficient facts demonstrating defendants’ involvement
16 in his failure to receive adequate medical care at the Placer County Jail. Plaintiff claims that
17 defendants Slater and DeSilva are detectives with the PCSO as opposed to medical staff at the
18 Placer County Jail. In order to proceed with his Fourteenth Amendment claim against defendant
19 Silva and DeSilva based on his failure to receive adequate medical care while detained at the
20 Placer County Jail, plaintiff must plead specific facts demonstrating the involvement of
21 defendants Slater and DeSilva in the alleged deprivation. For these reasons, plaintiff’s Fourteenth
22 Amendment inadequate medical care claim is dismissed.
23 In claim eight, plaintiff raises a Monell claim against defendant PCSO and the
24 individually named defendants in their official capacities. (ECF No. 1 at 19.) This Court treats
25 the official capacity claims against the individual defendants as a claim against defendant PCSO.
26 See Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 167 n.4. Plaintiff claims that defendant PCSO has “a policy, practice,
27 custom, and/or regulation” that when implemented violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (ECF
28 No. 1 at 19.) As discussed above, these allegations are insufficient to state a Monell claim. See
1 County of Tulare, 666 F.3d at 636–37. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed. If plaintiff raises a
2 Monell claim in an amended complaint, plaintiff must specifically identify the policy, practice,
3 custom or regulation that led to the deprivation of his constitutional rights.
4 H. Claim Nine
5 In claim nine, plaintiff raises a claim for deprivation of property in violation of the Fourth
6 and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 1 at 20.) Plaintiff also appears to raise state law claims
7 for replevin and conversion. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that on December 21, 2023, defendants
8 Machado, Meier and Tredennick entered plaintiff’s residence and took plaintiff’s eight dogs,
9 which were not included in a search warrant. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that defendants did not
10 provide plaintiff with notice that they took his dogs. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that three of his dogs
11 were emotional support dogs. (Id.)
12 1. Due Process Claim
13 “[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not
14 constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
15 Amendment if a meaningful post deprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v.
16 Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); see Rogers v. Reichard, 2024 WL 51315, at *6 (W.D. Wash.
17 Jan. 4, 2024) (applying Hudson to county employees); Huemer v. Santa Cruz County Animal
18 Shelter Foundation, 2022 WL 2276891, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2022) (applying Hudson to
19 county employees). Because plaintiff claims that his dogs were not included in the search
20 warrant, this Court finds that plaintiff claims that the deprivation was unauthorized.
21 California has established a process, see Cal. Penal Code §§ 1536-1540, by which
22 individuals may seek to obtain the return of their property taken during a search. California Penal
23 Code § 1540 addresses property seized that was not described in a warrant:
24 If it appears that the property taken is not the same as that described
in the warrant, or that there is no probable cause for believing the
25 existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, the
magistrate must cause it to be restored to the person from whom it
26 was taken.
27 The procedures in §§ 1536-1540 provide an adequate post-deprivation process. See
28 Perkins v. City of West Covina, 113 F.3d 1004, 1010–11 (9th Cir. 1997), reversed on other
1 grounds, 525 U.S. 234 (1999), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 167 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1999).
2 Because California provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the alleged unauthorized
3 deprivation, plaintiff has not stated a potentially colorable due process claim. Accordingly, this
4 claim is dismissed.
5 2. Fourth Amendment Claim
6 The Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens the right “to be secure in their ... effects[ ]
7 against unreasonable searches and seizures ....” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[A] search or seizure
8 pursuant to an otherwise valid warrant is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the extent
9 it exceeds the scope of the warrant.” United States v. Ramirez, 976 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2020).
10 Plaintiff’s claim that defendants Machado, Meier and Tredennick seized plaintiff’s eight
11 dogs, which were not included in the search warrant, states a potentially colorable Fourth
12 Amendment claim.
13 3. Monell Claim
14 In claim nine, plaintiff raises a Monell claim against defendant PCSO and the individually
15 named defendants in their official capacities. (ECF No. 1 at 20.) This Court treats the official
16 capacity claims against the individual defendants as a claim against defendant PCSO. See
17 Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 167 n.4. Plaintiff claims that defendant PCSO has “a policy, practice,
18 custom, and/or regulation” that when implemented violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (ECF
19 No. 1 at 20.) As discussed above, these allegations are insufficient to state a Monell claim. See
20 County of Tulare, 666 F.3d at 636–37. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed. If plaintiff raises a
21 Monell claim in an amended complaint, plaintiff must specifically identify the policy, practice,
22 custom or regulation that led to the deprivation of his constitutional rights.
23 4. State Law Claims
24 Plaintiff raises state law claims for conversion and replevin. To bring a claim against a
25 current or former California state or local public employee to recover money damages for an
26 injury resulting from an act or omission within the scope of the employee’s public employment, a
27 claimant must present the claim within six months after the accrual of the cause of action to the
28 employing public entity before bringing the action. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 911.2(a), 945.4, 950,
1 950.2, 950.6; see also Robinson v. Alameda Cty., 875 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
2 (outlining the statutory scheme). The claimant must present to the employing entity the
3 circumstances giving rise to the claimed damages and identify the public employee who caused
4 the damages (see Cal. Gov’t Code § 910(c)-(e)), and the employing public entity must reject the
5 claim before the claimant can proceed to court (see id. § 950.6).
6 No court suit for damages may be maintained until a written claim has been presented to
7 and rejected by the public entity. Id. §§ 945.4, 950.6; see also Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils.
8 Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995); State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234,
9 1243-45 (2004). A tort claim against a public employee is subject to dismissal if a plaintiff fails
10 to plead compliance or excuse from compliance with this claim presentation requirement. See
11 Pickering v. Enenmoh, 722 Fed. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Claim presentation
12 requirements under the California Government Claims Act... are elements of the plaintiff’s cause
13 of action and conditions precedent to the maintenance of the action.” (citation and quotation
14 marks omitted)); Bodde, 32 Cal. 4th at 1243 (quoting Burgdorf v. Funder, 246 Cal. App. 2d 443
15 (Cal. App. 1966) (“[A] plaintiff must... allege in his complaint that he has complied with the
16 claim [presentation] statute in order to state a cause of action against a public employee.”)).
17 Plaintiff fails to plead compliance with the Government Claims Act as to his state law
18 claims for conversion and replevin. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed. If plaintiff files an
19 amended complaint raising these claims, plaintiff must present facts demonstrating compliance
20 with the Government Claims Act.
21 I. Claims Ten and Fourteen
22 In claims ten and fourteen, plaintiff raises Monell claims against all defendants, including
23 defendants PCSO and SCSO. (ECF No. 1 at 21, 25.) This Court treats the Monell claims as
24 raised against defendants PCSO and SCSO. See Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 167 n.4. In claim ten,
25 plaintiff claims that defendants PCSO and SCSO have a policy, practice, custom and/or
26 regulation that caused plaintiff’s injuries and caused plaintiff to be unlawfully detained, arrested
27 without probable cause, subjected to the excessive use of force, assault and battery, medical
28 neglect and deprived of his property. (ECF No. 1 at 21.) Plaintiff claims that on December 1,
1 2025, defendant O’Hair advised the court that the policies in effect at the time of plaintiff’s arrest
2 were constitutionally inadequate, deficient and insufficient. (Id.) In claim fourteen, plaintiff
3 claims that defendants have a policy, practice, custom and/or regulation that when implemented
4 violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Id. at 25.)
5 The Monell claims raised in claims ten and fourteen mirror the Monell claims raised in the
6 claims discussed above and are deficient for the same reasons. Plaintiff fails to plead plausible
7 facts describing the specific policies, practices, customs or regulations that led to the alleged
8 violations of his constitutional rights. See County of Tulare, 666 F.3d at 639. It also appears that
9 plaintiff’s Monell claims are based on single incidents, which are insufficient to state a Monell
10 claim. See Gant, 772 F.3d at 618. This Court also observes that some of plaintiff’s Monell
11 claims may be Heck barred. For example, were the Court to find that defendant PCSO or
12 defendant SCSO had a policy to arrest individuals without probable cause, a finding in plaintiff’s
13 favor as to this claim may imply the invalidity of plaintiff’s conviction. If plaintiff files an
14 amended complaint raising Monell claims based on policies related to his arrest and conviction,
15 plaintiff shall address the applicability of Heck to these claims. For the reasons discussed above,
16 claims ten and fourteen are dismissed.
17 J. Claim Eleven
18 In claim eleven, plaintiff alleges violation of the Bane Act. (ECF No. 1 at 22.) California
19 Civil Code section 52.1, known as the Bane Act, “protects individuals from conduct aimed at
20 interfering with rights that are secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried
21 out ‘by threats, intimidation or coercion.’” Reese v. Cty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040
22 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff fails to plead compliance with the
23 Government Claims Act as to his Bane Act claim. See Pickering, 722 Fed. App’x at 696.
24 Accordingly, plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is dismissed. If plaintiff files an amended complaint
25 raising a Bane Act claim, plaintiff must present facts demonstrating compliance with the
26 Government Claims Act.
27 K. Claim Twelve
28 In claim twelve, plaintiff alleges that all defendants owed plaintiff a duty of care “to not
1 assault and battery, unlawfully detain him, deliberately and negligently fail to provide life
2 threatening medications for his cancer, diabetes and high blood pressure, not to fabricate false
3 reports, not to coerce witnesses, not to deprive plaintiff of his 8 dogs without due process, not to
4 conduct illegal search, not to use excessive force, and not to make an unlawful and false arrest.”
5 (ECF No. 1 at 23.) The legal grounds of claim twelve are not clear. By claiming that defendants
6 violated their duty of care to plaintiff, plaintiff may be raising a state law claim for negligence.
7 Plaintiff fails to plead compliance with the Government Claims Act as to his negligence claim,
8 which is required. See Pickering, 722 Fed. App’x at 696. Accordingly, claim twelve is
9 dismissed. If plaintiff raises a negligence claim in amended complaint, plaintiff must present
10 facts demonstrating compliance with the Government Claims Act.
11 L. Claim Thirteen
12 In claim thirteen, plaintiff appears to raise state law claims for the intentional and
13 negligent infliction of emotional distress. (ECF No. 1 at 24.) Plaintiff fails to plead compliance
14 with the Government Claims Act as to these state law claims, which is required. See Pickering,
15 722 F. App’x at 696. Accordingly, plaintiff’s state law claims for the intentional and negligent
16 infliction of emotional distress are dismissed. If plaintiff files an amended complaint raising
17 these claims, plaintiff must present facts demonstrating compliance with the Government Claims
18 Act.
19 M. Defendant Cuevas
20 The complaint contains no specific allegations against defendant Cuevas. The Civil
21 Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:
22 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation
23 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .
. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
24 or other proper proceeding for redress.
25 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the
26 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See
27 Monell, 436 U.S. 658; Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the
28 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act,
1 participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to
2 do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743
3 (9th Cir. 1978).
4 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of
5 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant
6 holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional
7 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);
8 Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague
9 and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights
10 violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
11 All claims against defendant Cuevas are dismissed because the complaint contains no
12 specific allegations linking defendant Cuevas to any claims. If plaintiff files an amended
13 complaint naming defendant Cuevas, plaintiff must include allegations linking defendant Cuevas
14 to the alleged deprivation.
15 III. PLAINTIFF’S OPTIONS
16 Plaintiff may proceed forthwith to serve defendants Slater, DeSilva, Buyers, Dad, Milam,
17 Smith, Ivanov, Farren, Oliver, Steen, Menard, Walter and Sexton with the Fourth Amendment
18 excessive force claims, raised in claims three and five, and defendants Machado, Meier and
19 Tredennick with the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim, raised in claim
20 nine, and pursue his potentially cognizable claims against only those defendants, or he may delay
21 serving any defendant and attempt to cure the pleading defects as to his other claims. If plaintiff
22 elects to proceed forthwith as to his potentially colorable Fourth Amendment claims raised in
23 claims three, five and nine, then within thirty days plaintiff must so elect on the attached form. In
24 this event the Court will construe plaintiff’s election as consent to dismissal of the remaining
25 claims without prejudice. Under this option, plaintiff does not need to file an amended complaint.
26 Or, plaintiff may delay serving any defendant and attempt to cure the pleading defects as
27 to those claims found not potentially colorable above. If plaintiff elects to file an amended
28 complaint, plaintiff has thirty days to amend. Plaintiff is not granted leave to add new claims
1 or new defendants. Plaintiff’s amended complaint may not exceed twenty (20) pages.
2 Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is brought
3 in the right place, plaintiff has complied with the California Government Claims Act, and plaintiff
4 is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It must contain a request for particular relief.
5 Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who personally participated in a substantial
6 way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743
7 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right if he does an
8 act, participates in another’s act, or omits to perform an act he is legally required to do that causes
9 the alleged deprivation).
10 A district court must construe a pro se pleading “liberally” to determine if it states a claim
11 and, prior to dismissal, tell a plaintiff of deficiencies in his complaint and give plaintiff an
12 opportunity to cure them. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000). While
13 detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
14 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
15 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff
16 must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
17 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570).
18 A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
19 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility
standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for
20 more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
21 defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.
22
23 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Although legal conclusions
24 can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations, and are
25 not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id.
26 An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading.
27 Local Rule 220; see Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015)
28 (“an ‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-
1 existent.’” (internal citation omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original
2 pleading is superseded. Plaintiff is not granted leave to add new claims or new defendants.
3 IV. CONCLUSION
4 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
5 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.
6 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff
7 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
8 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the
9 Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently
10 herewith.
11 3. The following claims are dismissed with leave to amend: one, two, four, six, seven,
12 eight, the procedural due process, Monell and state law claims raised in claim nine, ten, eleven,
13 twelve, thirteen, fourteen and all claims against defendant Cuevas. Within thirty days of service
14 of this order, plaintiff may amend his complaint to attempt to cure the pleading defects as to these
15 claims. Plaintiff is not obligated to amend his complaint. Plaintiff’s amended complaint may not
16 exceed twenty (20) pages.
17 4. The allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state potentially cognizable Fourth
18 Amendment excessive force claims against defendants Slater, DeSilva, Buyers, Dad, Milam,
19 Smith, Ivanov, Farren, Oliver, Steen, Menard, Walter and Sexton, raised in claims three and five,
20 and Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims against defendants Machado,
21 Meier and Tredennick, raised in claim nine. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. If plaintiff chooses to
22 proceed solely as to such claims, plaintiff shall so indicate on the attached form and return it to
23 the Court within thirty days from the date of this order. In this event, the Court will construe
24 plaintiff’s election to proceed forthwith as consent to an order dismissing the defective claims
25 without prejudice.
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
1 5. Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be
2 | dismissed.
3
4 | Dated: August 17, 2026
Cin □□□
CHI SOO KIM
6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
7
8
9
10
1]
12
13 Jime3646.14/2
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
21
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 FERNANDO R. JIMENEZ, No. 2:25-cv-3646 TLN CSK P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. NOTICE OF ELECTION
14 PLACER COUNTY SHERRIF’S OFFICE,
et al.,
15
Defendants.
16
17 Plaintiff elects to proceed as follows:
18 ______ Plaintiff opts to proceed with his Fourth Amendment excessive force
claims against defendants Slater, DeSilva, Buyers, Dad, Milam, Smith,
19
Ivanov, Farren, Oliver, Steen, Menard, Walter and Sexton, raised in claims
20 three and five, and his Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure
claims against defendants Machado, Meier and Tredennick, raised in claim
21 nine. Under this option, plaintiff consents to dismissal of the remaining
claims raised in the complaint and defendant Cuevas without prejudice.
22
OR
23
_____ Plaintiff opts to file an amended complaint and delay service of process.
24
25 DATED:
26 _______________________________
Plaintiff
27
28