The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ANDREW JESSE HERNANDEZ, SR., No. 2:25-cv-1412 CSK P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 ROBERT ST’ANDRE, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff seeks relief
18 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this Court by Local Rule 302
19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
20 Plaintiff is granted an opportunity to elect to proceed against only certain defendants, or
21 may elect to amend his complaint as discussed below.
22 I. SCREENING STANDARDS
23 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
24 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
25 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raised claims that are legally
26 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
27 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
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1 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
3 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an
4 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
5 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
6 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
7 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.
8 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably
9 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at
10 1227.
11 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain
12 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
13 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic
14 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
15 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a
16 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations
17 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555.
18 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the
19 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v.
20 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal
21 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as
22 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the
23 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
24 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
25 II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
26 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the violation of a federal
27 constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under
28 the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d
1 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the
2 facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal
3 connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation.
4 See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44
5 (9th Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable
6 for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
7 (2009). The requisite causal connection between a supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the
8 violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights can be established in a number of ways, including
9 by demonstrating that a supervisor’s own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision,
10 or control of his subordinates was a cause of plaintiff’s injury. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
11 1208 (9th Cir. 2011).
12 III. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
13 Plaintiff’s verified complaint alleges the following. On August 12, 2022, while plaintiff
14 was housed at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”), plaintiff’s assigned physician ordered plaintiff
15 an “accommodating custom wheelchair.” (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Despite such order, from 2022 to
16 2025, plaintiff was denied the custom wheelchair that plaintiff needs because of his paraplegia in
17 violation of the Eighth Amendment.1 (Id. at 5-10.) As a result, plaintiff has suffered severe
18 back/pain, muscle spasms, sleepless nights, the grave limitation of his ability to participate in
19 daily living activities such as self-help groups, educational activities, recreation and work. (Id. at
20 9.) Such denial forced plaintiff to use an inferior, standard wheelchair, which he claims caused
21 further long term spinal and nerve damage. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff names the following defendants:
22 defendants Robert ST’Andre, Warden; Gena Jones, Director of CDCR; Kathleen Allison,
23 Secretary of CDCR; Rob Bonta, Attorney General; Kimberly Thornton, Chief Deputy Warden;
24 Brian Wheeler, ADA-Associate Warden; Todd Murray, Chief Medical Officer; and Kevin Reuter,
25 Chief Medical Executive. As relief, plaintiff seeks the issuance of the “Accommodating
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27 1 On [date], plaintiff’s second and third claims were severed from this action, and plaintiff was
ordered to proceed on his first claim, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, in this
28 action.
1 QUICKIE custom wheelchair,” as well as money damages. (ECF No. 1 at 20.)
2 IV. DISCUSSION
3 A. Standards Governing Eighth Amendment Medical Claims
4 To state an Eighth Amendment claim that a prison official is deliberately indifferent to an
5 inmate’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must show
6 that the prison official knew that a prisoner faced a substantial risk of serious harm and
7 disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Jett
8 v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). The two-part test for deliberate indifference
9 requires plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that failure to treat a
10 prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton
11 infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.”
12 Id. Under the relevant Eighth Amendment standard, “prison officials who actually knew of a
13 substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded
14 reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (“A
15 prison official’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure reasonable safety”) (internal
16 quotation marks and citation omitted). To be deliberately indifferent in violation of the Eighth
17 Amendment, a prison official must have a subjective “state of mind more blameworthy than
18 negligence,” akin to criminal recklessness. Id. at 835, 839-40.
19 Negligence allegations are insufficient. Deliberate indifference “requires more than
20 ordinary lack of due care.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
21 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). The indifference to the prisoner’s medical needs must be substantial --
22 negligence, inadvertence, or differences in medical judgment or opinion do not rise to the level of
23 a constitutional violation. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (negligence
24 constituting medical malpractice is not sufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation).
25 B. Serious Medical Need
26 Plaintiff’s paraplegia constitutes a serious medical need.
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1 C. Deliberate Indifference
2 1. Supervisory Defendants
3 Plaintiff claims Rob Bonta, Attorney General, cannot claim “blind ignorance” or “lack of
4 participation” when he is charged with supervising and ensuring his subordinates are complying
5 with the constitution, and “indirectly permitted” defendants to deny plaintiff the “accommodating
6 custom wheelchair.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Gena Jones, Director of
7 CDCR, is personally in charge of all state “subordinates employed within the CDCR,” and
8 therefore “is both directly and indirectly a willing participant in the deliberate” denial of the
9 custom wheelchair “while under her supervision.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Although plaintiff uses the
10 term “directly,” he provides no facts demonstrating her personal involvement or knowledge of
11 plaintiff’s serious medical need. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Kathleen Allison, Secretary
12 of CDCR, is directly in charge of all state employed subordinates within CDCR, and thus is “both
13 directly and indirectly a willing participant in the deliberate denial of the custom wheelchair.
14 (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff alleges defendant Kathleen Allison permitted the deprivation, but
15 provides no facts showing her personal involvement or knowledge of plaintiff’s serious medical
16 need. (Id.)
17 Plaintiff cannot state cognizable civil rights claims against these defendants based solely
18 on their supervisory roles. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Rather, plaintiff must show that each
19 defendant knew that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by
20 failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Plaintiff provides no facts
21 showing that any of these three defendants were even aware of plaintiff’s serious medical need.
22 Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Rob Bonta, Gena Jones and Kathleen Allison are dismissed.
23 2. Defendant Kevin Reuter
24 Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Kevin Reuter, Chief Medical Executive, are
25 contradictory and conclusory. First, plaintiff alleges that defendant Kevin Reuter “personally
26 approved the procurement and ordering of plaintiff’s accommodating custom wheelchair on
27 August 12, 2022.” (ECF No. 1 at 8.) About a year later, plaintiff filed a grievance inquiring
28 about the status of his custom wheelchair, and defendant Kevin Reuter responded, stating plaintiff
1 would not be receiving the custom wheelchair but did not provide a reason why. (Id.) Plaintiff
2 then concludes that defendant Kevin Reuter became a “willing and active participant” in the
3 denial of the custom wheelchair for the entire 2022-2025 period. (Id.) But plaintiff provides no
4 specific facts showing that this defendant was deliberately indifferent after having approved the
5 custom wheelchair. Defendant Kevin Reuter’s response to plaintiff’s grievance was
6 informational and does not show any intentional acts of interfering or hindering the provision of
7 the custom wheelchair. Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Kevin Reuter are dismissed with
8 leave to amend.
9 4. Remaining Defendants
10 Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining defendants, Robert ST’Andre, Warden, Kimberly
11 Thornton, Chief Deputy Warden, Brian Wheeler, ADA-Associate Warden, and Todd Murray,
12 Chief Medical Officer, are sufficient, for purposes of screening under § 1915, to state cognizable
13 Eighth Amendment claims based on their roles in denying or hindering plaintiff’s custom
14 wheelchair.
15 V. PLAINTIFF’S OPTIONS
16 Plaintiff may proceed forthwith to serve defendants Robert ST’Andre, Kimberly
17 Thornton, Brian Wheeler, and Todd Murray, and pursue his potentially cognizable Eighth
18 Amendment claims against only those four defendants, or he may delay serving any defendant
19 and attempt to state a cognizable claim against the remaining defendants. If plaintiff elects to
20 proceed forthwith against defendants Robert ST’Andre, Kimberly Thornton, Brian Wheeler, and
21 Todd Murray, against whom he stated potentially cognizable Eighth Amendment claims for
22 relief, then within thirty days plaintiff must so elect on the attached form. In this event the Court
23 will construe plaintiff’s election as consent to dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claims against
24 defendants Kevin Reuter, Rob Bonta, Kathleen Allison, and Gena Jones without prejudice.
25 Under this option, plaintiff does not need to file an amended complaint.
26 Or, plaintiff may delay serving any defendant and attempt again to state a cognizable
27 claim against defendants Kevin Reuter, Rob Bonta, Kathleen Allison, and Gena Jones. If plaintiff
28 elects to attempt to amend his complaint to state a cognizable claim against such defendants,
1 plaintiff has thirty days to amend. Plaintiff is not granted leave to add new claims or new
2 defendants.
3 Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is brought
4 in the right place, and plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It must
5 contain a request for particular relief. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who
6 personally participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right.
7 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation
8 of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act, or omits to perform an act
9 he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation).
10 A district court must construe a pro se pleading “liberally” to determine if it states a claim
11 and, prior to dismissal, tell a plaintiff of deficiencies in his complaint and give plaintiff an
12 opportunity to cure them. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000). While
13 detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
14 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 at 678 (citing Bell
15 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual
16 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
17 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570).
18 A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
19 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility
standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for
20 more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
21 defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.
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23 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Although legal conclusions can
24 provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations, and are not
25 entitled to the assumption of truth. Id.
26 An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading.
27 Local Rule 220; see Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015)
28 (“an ‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-
1 | existent.’” (internal citation omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original
2 || pleading is superseded. Plaintiff is not granted leave to add new claims or new defendants.
3 | VI. CONCLUSION
4 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
5 1. Claims against defendants Kevin Reuter, Rob Bonta, Kathleen Allison, and Gena Jones
6 || are dismissed with leave to amend. Within thirty days of service of this order, plaintiff may
7 || amend his complaint to attempt to state cognizable claims against such defendants. Plaintiff is
8 | not obligated to amend his complaint.
9 2. The allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state potentially cognizable Eighth
10 || Amendment claims against defendants Robert ST’Andre, Kimberly Thornton, Brian Wheeler, and
11 || Todd Murray based on their roles in denying or hindering plaintiff's custom wheelchair. See
12 | U.S.C. § 1915A. If plaintiff chooses to proceed solely as to such claims, plaintiff shall so
13 || indicate on the attached form and return it to the Court within thirty days from the date of this
14 | order. In this event, the Court will construe plaintiff's election to proceed forthwith as consent to
15 || an order dismissing defendants Kevin Reuter, Rob Bonta, Kathleen Allison, and Gena Jones
16 || without prejudice.
17 3. Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be
18 || dismissed.
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20 | Dated: August 14, 2026 A aA
Cn Ye \L
CHI SOO KIM
22 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
23 || /1/mem1412.140
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ANDREW JESSE HERNANDEZ, SR., No. 2:25-cv-1412 CSK P
12 Plaintiff,
NOTICE OF ELECTION
13 v.
14 ROBERT ST’ANDRE, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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Plaintiff elects to proceed as follows:
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______ Plaintiff opts to proceed with his Eighth Amendment claims against
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defendants Robert ST’Andre, Kimberly Thornton, Brian Wheeler, and
20 Todd Murray. Under this option, plaintiff consents to dismissal of the
Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Kevin Reuter, Rob Bonta,
21 Kathleen Allison, and Gena Jones, without prejudice.
22 OR
23 _____ Plaintiff opts to file an amended complaint and delay service of process.
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DATED:
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_______________________________
26 Plaintiff
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