The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
OCALA BREEDERS' SALES
COMPANY INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 5:25-cv-00148-JSM-PRL
JOHN C. GREEN, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s third amended motion for partial default
judgment and request for an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 70). After this motion was filed, the
Court received a response to Plaintiff’s second amended motion for default judgment from
Defendant John C. Green (“Defendant Green”), proceeding pro se. (Doc. 73). 1 Defendant
Green confirms that this response was filed solely on his own behalf and not on behalf of any
of the corporate Defendants. (Doc. 73 at 1-2). In his response, Defendant Green requests
affirmative relief, including that the Court set aside the default entered against him and grant
an additional 60 days to conduct discovery. (Id. at 4). The Court shall therefore construe the
response as a motion to set aside the default.
I. BACKGROUND
This case was removed from the Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit in and for
Marion County, Florida, in March 2025. (Doc. 1). As relevant here, on August 25, 2025,
1 Defendant Green filed two responses which appear to be identical. (Docs. 73 and 74). For
the purposes of this order the Court will refer to Doc. 73.
counsel for Defendants at that time was permitted to withdraw, and Defendant Green was
ordered to either hire new counsel within 60 days or file a notice with the court that he wished
to proceed pro se. (Doc. 44 at 2). In this order, the Court directed the Clerk to update
Defendant Green’s record address to 515 North Flagler Drive, West Palm Beach, Florida,
33401. (Id.). Counsel provided this address in their motion to withdraw as the location to
which case documents should be sent in the event that replacement counsel was not retained.
(Doc. 43 ¶ 4). The docket shows that Defendant Green did not raise any objection to that
address. Further, underlying state court records include the following address for Defendant
Green: 515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 350, West Palm Beach, Florida, 33401. (Doc. 7-18 at 2).
Defendant Green provided this address as a forwarding address in a document giving his
consent to the withdrawal of counsel in the state court case. (Id.).2
Thereafter, Defendant Green and the other defendants hired new counsel and
continued to participate in the litigation. (Doc. 45). In February 2026, this counsel also
requested to withdraw, informing the Court that Defendants consented to the withdrawal and
that substitute counsel would be taking over the representation. (Doc. 55 ¶¶ 3, 7). The Court
granted the withdrawal and directed Defendants’ purported replacement counsel to enter an
appearance. (Doc. 56). Withdrawing counsel was also ordered to provide Defendants with a
copy of this order. (Doc. 56 at 2).
On April 17, 2026, this Court ordered Defendants to show cause as to why substitute
counsel had failed to appear. (Doc. 59). Again, the Court directed the Clerk to mail a copy to
2 The suite number from this address was not included in the later motion to withdraw or
subsequent court orders. (Doc. 43 ¶ 4); (Doc. 59 at 2).
Defendant Green at 515 North Flagler Drive, West Palm Beach, Florida, 33401. (Doc. 59
at 2).
On April 28, 2026, Defendants’ purported replacement counsel filed a response
informing the Court that Defendant Green did not retain him in this matter. (Doc. 60). On
May 11, 2026, the Court entered default against Defendant Green and the other Defendants
and directed Plaintiff to file a motion for default judgment. (Doc. 62). Plaintiff initially moved
for default judgment on May 13, 2026. (Doc. 63). The Court denied this initial motion without
prejudice. (Doc. 64). Plaintiff subsequently filed second and third amended motions for
default judgment on June 16, 2026, and August 6, 2026, respectively. (Docs. 68 and 70).
The docket reflects that papers sent to Defendant Green at the 515 North Flagler Drive
address were returned in two instances. (Docs. 61, 66).3 However, Defendant Green failed to
provide the Court with different contact information and took no steps to provide the Court
with a different address after counsel initially provided the 515 North Flagler Drive address
in August 2025. (Doc. 43 ¶ 4).
On August 17th, 2026, Defendant Green filed a response to Plaintiff’s second
amended motion for default judgment. (Doc. 73). This response was received after the Court
entered an order denying the second amended motion without prejudice. (Doc. 62). In his
filings, Defendant Green argues that he did not receive proper service or notice because
Plaintiff’s counsel sent the relevant documents to an improper address. (Doc. 73 at 2).4
Defendant Green contends that his only proper address for service is in Delaware and he “has
at no time acknowledged any other address as an authorized address for service of notice,
3 In the second instance in which mail was returned, a copy of the order was emailed to the
email on file for Defendant Green on June 8, 2026. (Doc. 66).
4 Plaintiff’s proposed partial default judgment order attached to its second amended motion
includes the 515 North Flagler Drive address, including the suite number. (Doc. 68-1 at 2).
motions, or correspondence in this action.” (Doc. 73 at 2).5 Defendant Green asks the Court
to set aside any default entered against him, deny Plaintiff’s second amended motion for
partial default judgment, and extend the discovery period. (Doc. 73 at 4).
II. DISCUSSION
There is no question that Defendant Green was aware of this case’s existence. This
case was initially filed in state court in July 2024, and the parties have been litigating in federal
court since March 2025. (Doc. 1). Defendants, including Defendant Green, have retained
counsel multiple times. See, e.g., (Docs. 44 and 45). Further, Defendant Green was aware that
he would become pro se after the most recent withdrawal of counsel. Withdrawing counsel
represented that Defendant Green consented to the withdrawal and that substitute counsel
would be taking over the case, and the Court ordered withdrawing counsel to provide a copy
of the order granting withdrawal to Defendant Green. (Doc. 55 ¶¶ 3, 7); (Doc. 56). However,
Defendant Green did not actually retain the purported replacement counsel, and his recent
filings are pro se. (Docs. 60, 73).6 Accordingly, the record reflects that Defendant Green has
been aware of the withdrawal of counsel since February 2026, yet he failed to take any action
until his recent filings. (Doc. 73). Therefore, the Court found him in default in May 2026.
(Doc. 62 at 2).
An entry of default may be set aside for good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). What
constitutes good cause may vary depending on the surrounding circumstances. Compania
5 Defendant Green’s recent filings were mailed from a different return address, also from
West Palm Beach. (Docs. 73 and 74).
6 Here, as Defendant Green is now proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his filings
liberally. United States v. Ogiekpolor, 122 F.4th 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th
1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2022)). However, pro se defendants remain subject to procedural rules. Id. (citing
Roy, 53 F.4th at 1346).
Interamericana Exp.-Imp., S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir.
1996) (citing Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 76 (1st Cir. 1989)).
In determining whether to set aside a default, “three elements are key: (1) ‘whether the
default was culpable or willful,’ (2) ‘whether the defaulting party presents a meritorious
defense,’ and (3) ‘whether setting [the default] aside would prejudice the adversary.’” Cap.
City Home Loans LLC v. Darnell, No. 23-12066, 2024 WL 4534567, at *4 (11th Cir. Oct. 21,
2024) (per curiam) (quoting Compania Interamericana, 88 F.3d at 951). However, “these factors
are not ‘talismanic,’ and . . . courts have examined other factors including whether the public
interest was implicated, whether there was significant financial loss to the defaulting party,
and whether the defaulting party acted promptly to correct the default.” Compania
Interamericana, 88 F.3d at 951.
A default may be considered willful “when a litigant has been given ample opportunity
to comply with court orders but fails to effect any compliance.” Id. at 952. However, “if a
‘party willfully defaults by displaying either an intentional or reckless disregard for the judicial
proceedings, the court need make no other findings in denying relief.’” Doe v. Wantong
International, Inc., No: 6:25-cv-179-PGB-DCI, 2026 WL 2469538, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 24,
2026) (quoting Compania Interamericana, 88 F.3d at 951-52); see also Cap. City Home Loans, 2024
WL 4534567, at *4 (finding that the defendant demonstrated “an intentional or reckless
disregard for the judicial proceedings” when she “received and responded to substantial
communications from opposing counsel, demonstrating at least constructive knowledge of
the suit,” but failed to “take proper steps to address” it); Global Aerospace, Inc. v. Platinum Jet
Management, LLC, No. 09-60756-CIV, 2010 WL 331905, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2010)
(denying motion to set aside clerk’s default and finding that the defendant’s conduct was at
least reckless when the defendant “was on notice of [the] case and knowingly chose not to
defend itself for six months”).
Here, given Defendant Green’s knowledge of the case, his complete absence for a six-
month period demonstrates “an intentional or reckless disregard for the judicial proceedings.”
Doe, 2026 WL 2469538, at *1 (quoting Compania Interamericana, 88 F.3d at 951-52); see also
Global Aerospace, 2010 WL 331905, at *6 (declining to set aside default when the defendant
was aware of the case but “knowingly chose not to defend itself for six months”).
Nevertheless, Defendant Green contends that his failure to respond should be excused
by Plaintiff’s use of the incorrect address, which led to his lack of notice of filings in this
action. (Doc. 73 at 2). This argument is unpersuasive. Lack of notice of events in a case due
to a party’s failure to provide updated address information to the court does not excuse
noncompliance with a court order, even if the party is appearing pro se. See Gilbert v. Daniels,
725 F. App’x 789, 792 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in declining to grant the plaintiff relief from the judgment because the plaintiff’s “lack of notice
was due to his failure to notify the court . . . that his mailing address had changed”).
Here, after prior counsel provided Defendant Green’s address to the Court as: 515
North Flagler Drive, West Palm Beach, Florida, 33401 in August 2025 (Doc. 43 ¶ 4),
Defendant Green never made any objection to this address or provided the Court with any
notice of a different address until his filings in August 2026. (Doc. 73 at 2). Any inaccurate
information with respect to Defendant Green’s address does not excuse his six-month absence
from this case and failure to respond to filings from Plaintiff and orders from the Court, which
led to the entry of the default. Gilbert, 725 F. App’x at 792; see also (Docs. 59, 62).
Defendant Green has failed to demonstrate good cause to set aside the default. To the
contrary, the Court finds that his conduct amounts to “an intentional or reckless disregard for
the judicial proceedings.” Doe, 2026 WL 2469538, at *1 (quoting Compania Interamericana, 88
F.3d at 951-52). Therefore, the Court need not consider the remaining factors related to good
cause. Id. (citing Compania Interamericana, 88 F.3d at 951-52).
III. CONCLUSION
Defendant Green’s motion to set aside the default is due to be DENIED. However,
Defendant Green may still contest damages. See Mainsail Dev., LLC v. Rusco Invs., Inc., No.
8:11–cv–45–T–33AEP, 2012 WL 3562029, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2012) (“Although in
default, a defendant is still entitled to contest the amount of damages before the Court enters
a judgment by default.” (citing Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App’x 860, 863 n.5 (11th
Cir. 2007))).
This leaves pending Plaintiff’s third amended motion for default judgment. (Doc. 70).
Plaintiff’s counsel has requested an evidentiary hearing to establish damages arising from
“late fees, board, care and training for the subject horses at issue,” as well as “the amount of
any credit attributable to the resale of the horses.” (Doc. 70 ¶¶ 71-73). However, the Court
believes that these amounts can be established through affidavits and other written
information supplied to the Court. 7
Therefore, Plaintiff shall provide information establishing its unliquidated damages
within 14 days of the date of this order. Plaintiff shall serve this information on Defendant
7 The Court understands that some of these damages may continue to accrue as the case
continues. However, to the extent it is able to do so, Plaintiff shall provide a basis for calculating
these damages, for example via establishing a daily or weekly rate for “late fees, board, care and
training.” (Doc. 70 ¶¶ 72-73). Plaintiff shall also provide any available information to establish the
basis for “credit attributable to the resale of the horses.” (Id. ¶ 73).
Green, along with a copy of the third amended motion for default judgment. Defendant
Green shall be served via certified mail at the address provided in his recent filing: 300
Delaware Ave, Suite 210, Wilmington, Delaware 19801.
Defendant Green shall have 21 days from the date of service to respond to the third
amended motion for default judgment and the information provided to support the
calculation of damages. The Court will consider these documents and set an evidentiary
hearing if necessary.
DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida on September 9, 2026.
[snes
PHILIP R. LAMMENS
United States Magistrate Judge
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party