Jaber

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

JALLIAH JABER, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:26 CV 309 CDP

)

TITLE PREMIER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Self-represented plaintiffs Jalliah and Mohammed Jaber allege that they

were the victims of a foreclosure rescue scam which ultimately resulted in their

losing title to and being evicted from their home in St. Louis County. They

challenged the eviction in St. Louis County Circuit Court and were denied relief.

Their complaint in this case has seven counts and names six defendants, and all

paragraphs are incorporated into all claims. Most defendants have filed motions to

dismiss or motions for more definite statement, in part because it is not clear from

the complaint which counts are brought against which defendants.

The only two federal counts, Count IV, titled “RESPA Violations (12 U.S.C.

§ 2605)” and Count V, titled “FDCPA Violations (15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, 1692e,

1692F),” make specific allegations against only defendant ServiSolutions, LLC,

who was plaintiffs’ former mortgage servicer. Plaintiffs’ briefs in response to the

other defendants’ motions to dismiss make it clear that these federal claims are

brought only against ServiSolutions. ServiSolutions has filed a motion to dismiss

those federal claims.

The remaining counts are based on state law and appear to be against all

defendants: Count I seeks quiet title to the property; Count II seeks a declaratory

judgment that the Warranty Deed is void ab initio, Count III it titled “Fraudulent

Inducement;” Count VI is titled “Abuse of Process,” and Count VII is titled

“Notarial Misconduct/Negligence.” Plaintiffs have also filed a motion for

preliminary injunction, seeking an order restoring their ownership and possession

of the home.

For the reasons that follow, I will grant ServiSolutions’s motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ federal claims against it for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6),

Fed. R. Civ. P. Because those federal claims provide the basis for this Court’s

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and there is no diversity or other basis for

original jurisdiction, I will exercise my discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)

and dismiss without prejudice all the state-law claims. I will also deny all other

pending motions.

Factual Background

Plaintiffs allege that during their marriage, they obtained a mortgage loan to

purchase a home in St. Louis County, Missouri, and defendant ServiSolutions,

LLC serviced the loan. When plaintiffs later sought to refinance the mortgage

loan, defendants Gail and Pierre Snodgrass1 offered to assist them. Plaintiffs allege

that instead of helping them, the Snodgrasses fraudulently induced them to sign

documents that transferred ownership of the home to a company owned by the

Snodgrasses, defendant New Beginning Properties, LLC. Plaintiffs allege that

although the St. Louis County Recorder of Deeds refused to record the deed based

on suspected fraud, the Snodgrasses misrepresented that the deed was valid in state

court and obtained an ex parte eviction order. As a result, plaintiffs and their

children were removed from their home.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that they were evicted without notice and

without an opportunity to be heard. Their memorandum in support of their motion

for preliminary injunction, however, shows that they unsuccessfully sought to set

that order aside and later “dismissed” their challenge. See ECF 37-1 headers p. 21,

pp. 23-28, and pp. 30- 34.2

1 Plaintiffs state in a brief opposing another motion to dismiss that Defendant Pierre Snodgrass

was “a trusted family member.” ECF 21 at p. 1. In the lengthy memorandum filed in support of

their motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiffs state that Defendant Gail Snodgrass is the

cousin of plaintiff Jalliah Jaber. ECF 37 at header pp. 1-2.

2 Plaintiffs’ filings are lengthy and confusing and appear to have been drafted using some form of

artificial intelligence large language model – among other things, they cite non-existent cases for

non-existent quotations and sometimes their various filings contradict one another. They have

explained the citation errors as simple mistakes. I accept plaintiffs’ explanation, and throughout

this opinion, I am assuming all facts alleged are true and am considering those facts in the light

most favorable to them, given that this is a motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs allege that when they notified ServiSolutions that the deed was

fraudulent, ServiSolutions misrepresented that a certified deed existed, failed to

correct the error, and refused to communicate with them. After plaintiffs and their

children were evicted, the Snodgrasses paid off the mortgage loan. Plaintiffs allege

that “ServiSolutions acted as a debt collector in connection with loan servicing”

and “communicated debt/account information to unauthorized third parties after

notice,” “made false and misleading representations in connection with debt

collection,” and “used unfair and unconscionable means to collect/enforce the

debt.” Complaint, ECF 1, pp. 11-12, ¶¶ 72-75.

Discussion

ServiSolutions seeks dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that this

Court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which provides that,

with some exceptions, federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over

challenges to state court judgments. Kvalvog v. Park Christian School, Inc., 66

F.4th 1147 (8th Cir 2023). Whether these RESPA and FDCPA claims would be

barred under the complicated circumstances here is not clear and would require the

Court to consider more fully all the state-court proceedings. But it is not necessary

for me to decide that issue, because it is very clear from the face of the complaint

that – assuming this Court has jurisdiction – the RESPA and FDCPA claims must

be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim even aside from any

Rooker-Feldman arguments.

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., the

complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). When ruling on a

motion to dismiss, this Court must take the allegations of the complaint as true and

liberally construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2003). This is

especially true when, as here, plaintiffs are proceeding pro se. Pro se complaints

must be liberally construed, “and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading

standard than other parties.” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d

843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). Nevertheless, pro se pleadings must

state sufficient facts that, taken as true, support the claims advanced. Stone v.

Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).

Count IV – RESPA Violation against ServiSolutions

ServiSolutions argues that plaintiffs fail to state a RESPA claim because the

complaint contains no allegations indicating that they submitted a qualified written

request that would have triggered its obligation to respond under the statute.

ServiSolutions also contends that the complaint does not specify how it failed to

comply with RESPA or allege that plaintiffs’ damages were the result of the alleged

failure. I agree.

RESPA is a consumer protection statute that imposes certain duties on

mortgage loan servicers with respect to the loans they service. Under RESPA, a

mortgage loan servicer may be liable for damages to a borrower if it fails to

adequately respond to a qualified written request (QWR) for information relating

to the servicing of a loan. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)-(f). A QWR is a written

correspondence that (1) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the

name and account of the borrower and (2) includes a statement of the reasons the

borrower believes that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail regarding

other information sought by the borrower. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B).

When a loan servicer receives a QWR from a borrower, the servicer must

respond to the borrower within 30 days. Wirtz v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC,

886 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)). The servicer may

respond in one of the following three ways: (1) correct the borrower’s account and

notify the borrower of the correction; (2) after conducting an investigation, provide

the borrower with a statement of the reasons for which the servicer believes the

borrower’s account is correct; or (3) after conducting an investigation, provide the

borrower with the requested information or an explanation of why the information

is unavailable or cannot be obtained by the servicer. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C.

§ 2605(e)(2)(A)-(C)). If the servicer fails to adequately respond, the borrower is

entitled to “any actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure.” 12

U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1).

Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege that they sent ServiSolutions a written

correspondence, which is required for an inquiry to constitute a QWR under

§ 2605(e)(1)(B). Instead, they allege that they “notified” ServiSolutions that the

transfer was fraudulent. Complaint, ECF 1, p. 8, ¶ 45. This is not sufficient, as

RESPA requires a writing. Additionally, their allegation that they notified

ServiSolutions of the Snodgrasses’ fraud is not related to the “servicing” of their

mortgage loan as that term is defined under RESPA. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(3)

(defining servicing as receiving scheduled periodic payments from a borrower

pursuant to a loan and making the payments of principal and interest with respect

to the amounts received from the borrower) and § 2605(k)(1)(C) (providing that a

servicer must “respond to a borrower’s requests to correct errors relating to

allocation of payments, final balances for purposes of paying off the loan, or

avoiding foreclosure, or other standard servicer’s duties”). See also Perron ex rel.

Jackson v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 845 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2017) (a

QWR cannot be used to collect information about, or allege an error in, the

underlying mortgage loan); Medrano v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 704 F.3d 661, 667

(9th Cir. 2012) (letters challenging only a loan’s validity or its terms are not

qualified written requests requiring a response under § 2605(e)).

Even had plaintiffs adequately alleged the existence of a QWR and a

violation of RESPA, the complaint fails to allege any damages that were the result

of ServiSolutions’s failure to comply with RESPA. Actual damages are an

essential element of a claim under RESPA. See Wirtz at 718. Accepting plaintiffs’

allegations as true, it was the Snodgrasses’ fraudulent misconduct that caused

plaintiffs’ damages, not ServiSolutions’s misrepresentation that the deed was valid.

Count IV must therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Count V – FDCPA Violation against ServiSolutions

The FDCPA is a federal statute designed to prohibit debt collectors from

employing harassing, false, deceptive, misleading, or otherwise unfair or

unconscionable means to collect debt. Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d

1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2002). The FDCPA imposes civil liability only on debt

collectors. Volden v. Innovative Fin. Sys., Inc., 440 F.3d 947, 950 (8th Cir. 2006).

The term “debt collector” does not include any person collecting or attempting to

collect a debt owed or due another to the extent such activity “concerns a debt

which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692a(6)(F)(iii). Under the FDCPA, “a debt collector does not include the

consumer’s creditors, a mortgage servicing company, or an assignee of a debt, as

long as the debt was not in default at the time it was assigned.” Perry v. Stewart

Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985)(emphasis added); Marshall v.

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 445 F. App’x 900 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing

Perry with approval).

Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that ServiSolutions acted as a debt

collector within the meaning of the FDCPA because none of the complaint’s

allegations suggest that the mortgage loan was in default at the time ServiSolutions

began servicing it. Indeed, the only date alleged in the complaint is the date the

fraudulent deed was notarized, and that date is not relevant to plaintiffs’ FDCPA

claim. See Lansing v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-3132, 2011 WL 6754083, at

*2 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2011) (dismissing FDCPA claim against the assignee of

plaintiff’s mortgage because plaintiff pleaded no facts regarding the dates of

default of mortgage and assignment). Further, the complaint’s allegations are

entirely conclusory and give no indication of how ServiSolutions might have

violated the FDCPA. See Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 672 (8th Cir.

1995) (concluding that the complaint fell short of meeting even the liberal standard

for notice pleading because it was “entirely conclusory, giving no idea what acts

the individual defendants are accused of that could result in liability”).

Plaintiffs failed to respond to ServiSolutions’ arguments about the FDCPA

claim in their initial opposition to the motion to dismiss. After ServiSolutions

pointed that out, plaintiffs sought leave to file a sur-reply. Although there is no

good cause shown, I have considered the proposed sur-reply, but it does not help.

Plaintiffs apparently seek to clarify that the conduct they are challenging in their

FDCPA claim is ServiSolutions’s communication with the Snodgrasses in

connection with the mortgage loan without plaintiffs’ permission, which they

contend violates § 1692c(b). Again, the complaint’s allegations are simply that the

Snodgrasses eventually paid off the mortgage, but nothing in the complaint alleges

the substances of any communications that ServiSolution may have had with the

Snodgrasses before the state court resolution of the eviction case. Merely

communicating with a successor owner is not the type of conduct § 1692c(b)

prohibits. The FDCPA as a whole is designed to prevent debt collectors from

engaging in harassing, abusive, shaming, and oppressive tactics to collect debt

from consumers. Peters, 277 F.3d at 1054. In keeping with that purpose,

§ 1692c(b) is specifically designed to prevent debt collectors from communicating

with third parties about a consumer’s debt for the purpose of harassing and

embarrassing the consumer into settling his or her debt. Examples of

communications prohibited under § 1692c(b) include publishing shame lists and

calling consumers’ friends, families, and employers about consumers’ debt. See

Brown v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 804 F.3d 740, 743 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The ban on

communicating with third parties like employers is meant to protect debtors from

harassment, embarrassment, loss of job, and denial of promotion.” (citation

modified)). That is not what plaintiffs allege happened here.

Liberally construing plaintiffs’ allegations, ServiSolutions was not

communicating with the Snodgrasses for the purpose of inducing plaintiffs to settle

a debt, because ServiSolutions no longer believed that plaintiffs owned the house

or owed any additional payments on the mortgage loan. See McIvor v. Credit

Control Servs., Inc., 773 F.3d 909, 914 (8th Cir. 2014) (concluding that “for a

communication to be in connection with the collection of a debt, an animating

purpose of the communication must be to induce payment by the debtor”). Thus,

Count V fails to state a claim against ServiSolutions and must be dismissed.

State Law Claims

Plaintiffs’ remaining five claims are brought under Missouri state law.

Because I will dismiss all claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction, I

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims

and will dismiss them without prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also

Streambend Properties II, LLC v. Ivy Tower Minneapolis, LLC, 781 F.3d 1003,

1016-17 (8th Cir. 2015) (“When a district court dismisses federal claims over

which it has original jurisdiction, the balance of interests usually will point toward

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” (quoting In

re Canadian Import Antitrust Litig., 470 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2006))).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant ServiSolutions’s motion to

dismiss [13] 1s GRANTED as to Counts IV and V and those Counts are

DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other claims are DISMISSED

without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions are DENIED

as moot.

A separate Judgment will be entered this same date.

Cathur,

Catlni-s 0 Loy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 9th day of September, 2026.

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