The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 9 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NICHOLAS JAMES McGUFFIN, as an No. 25-2548
individual and as guardian ad litem, on D.C. Nos.
behalf of S.M., a minor; S.M., 6:20-cv-01163-MTK
3:21-cv-01719-MTK
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. MEMORANDUM*
KRIS KARCHER,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
MARK DANNELS, PAT DOWNING,
SUSAN HORMANN, MARY KRINGS,
SHELLY MCINNES, RAYMOND
MCNEELY, KIP OSWALD, MICHAEL
REAVES, JOHN RIDDLE, SEAN
SANBORN, ERIC SCHWENNINGER,
RICHARD WALTER, CHRIS WEBLEY,
ANTHONY WETMORE, KATHY
WILCOX, CRAIG ZANNI, DAVID
ZAVALA, JOEL D. SHAPIRO, as
Administrator of the Estate of David. E.
Hall, ESTATE OF DAVID E. HALL,
VIDOCQ SOCIETY, CITY OF
COQUILLE, CITY OF COOS BAY,
COUNTY OF COOS,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Defendants.
NICHOLAS JAMES McGUFFIN, as an No. 25-2558
individual and as guardian ad litem, on
behalf of S.M., a minor; S.M., D.C. Nos.
6:20-cv-01163-MTK
Plaintiffs - Appellees, 3:21-cv-01719-MTK
v.
KIP OSWALD,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
MARK DANNELS, PAT DOWNING,
SUSAN HORMANN, MARY KRINGS,
KRIS KARCHER, SHELLY MCINNES,
RAYMOND MCNEELY, MICHAEL
REAVES, JOHN RIDDLE, SEAN
SANBORN, ERIC SCHWENNINGER,
RICHARD WALTER, CHRIS WEBLEY,
ANTHONY WETMORE, KATHY
WILCOX, CRAIG ZANNI, DAVID
ZAVALA, JOEL D. SHAPIRO, as
Administrator of the Estate of David. E.
Hall, ESTATE OF DAVID E. HALL,
VIDOCQ SOCIETY, CITY OF
COQUILLE, CITY OF COOS BAY,
COUNTY OF COOS,
Defendants.
NICHOLAS JAMES McGUFFIN, as an No. 25-2565
individual and as guardian ad litem, on
behalf of S.M., a minor; S.M., D.C. Nos.
6:20-cv-01163-MTK
2 25-2548
Plaintiffs - Appellees, 3:21-cv-01719-MTK
v.
ERIC SCHWENNINGER,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
MARK DANNELS, PAT DOWNING,
SUSAN HORMANN, MARY KRINGS,
KRIS KARCHER, SHELLY MCINNES,
RAYMOND MCNEELY, KIP OSWALD,
MICHAEL REAVES, JOHN RIDDLE,
SEAN SANBORN, RICHARD WALTER,
CHRIS WEBLEY, ANTHONY
WETMORE, KATHY WILCOX, CRAIG
ZANNI, DAVID ZAVALA, JOEL D.
SHAPIRO, as Administrator of the Estate of
David. E. Hall, ESTATE OF DAVID E.
HALL, VIDOCQ SOCIETY, CITY OF
COQUILLE, CITY OF COOS BAY,
COUNTY OF COOS,
Defendants.
NICHOLAS JAMES McGUFFIN, as an No. 25-2575
individual and as guardian ad litem, on
behalf of S.M., a minor; S.M., D.C. Nos.
6:20-cv-01163-MTK
Plaintiffs - Appellees, 3:21-cv-01719-MTK
v.
CRAIG ZANNI,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
3 25-2548
MARK DANNELS, PAT DOWNING,
SUSAN HORMANN, MARY KRINGS,
KRIS KARCHER, SHELLY MCINNES,
RAYMOND MCNEELY, KIP OSWALD,
MICHAEL REAVES, JOHN RIDDLE,
SEAN SANBORN, ERIC
SCHWENNINGER, RICHARD WALTER,
CHRIS WEBLEY, ANTHONY
WETMORE, KATHY WILCOX, DAVID
ZAVALA, JOEL D. SHAPIRO, as
Administrator of the Estate of David. E.
Hall, ESTATE OF DAVID E. HALL,
VIDOCQ SOCIETY, CITY OF
COQUILLE, CITY OF COOS BAY,
COUNTY OF COOS,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Mustafa T. Kasubhai, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 6, 2026
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge N.R. SMITH.
Kris Karcher, Kip Oswald, Eric Schwenninger, and Craig Zanni appeal the
district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. They
sought immunity from claims of fabrication, suppression, and destruction of
evidence in a conspiracy to bring false charges against Nick McGuffin for the June
2000 death of Leah Freeman in Coquille, Oregon, as well as claims of malicious
prosecution, failure to intervene, and interference with a parental-companionship
4 25-2548
right. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we dismiss in part and
reverse in part.
We dismiss the majority of Appellants arguments for lack of jurisdiction.
While pretrial orders denying qualified immunity are appealable under the
collateral order doctrine, we may not review “fact-related dispute[s] about the
pretrial record” including whether evidence “was sufficient to show a genuine
issue of fact.” Foster v. City of Indio, 908 F.3d 1204, 1209–10 (9th Cir. 2018) (per
curiam) (citation modified) (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307 (1995)).
Instead, our jurisdiction “is limited to resolving a defendant’s purely legal
contention that his or her conduct did not violate the Constitution” or “that a
plaintiff has presented no evidence” of a defendant’s allegedly illegal conduct.
Est. of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 731 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation
modified). With limited exceptions, Appellants arguments as to Counts 1–8
amount to challenges to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence: Each one—even
those clothed in “clearly established law” language—seeks to disrupt findings that
material issues of fact preclude summary judgment. See Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th
877, 886 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that appellants cannot “characterize[] their
[factual] arguments as legal ones” to overcome the “jurisdictional bar” in this
5 25-2548
court’s precedent).1 The district court made findings specific to each individual
Appellant. While the court at times referred to Appellants collectively, the court
referred back to its specific findings and made clear as to every claim that a jury
could find “each [Appellant]” liable. The district court’s findings are conclusive at
this stage because Appellants point to no evidence capable of “blatantly
contradict[ing]” them under Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007). Subject
to the following paragraph, Appellants arguments on Counts 1–8 are therefore
“categorically unreviewable on interlocutory appeal.” Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d
1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009).
We reverse on certain issues not covered by the district court’s findings. To
begin, we reverse the denial of qualified immunity as to Schwenninger and Zanni
on McGuffin’s destruction of evidence claim (Count 7). The district court only
made individualized findings as to Karcher and Oswald, and McGuffin failed to
present evidence that the remaining appellants engaged in the same conduct. See
Est. of Anderson, 985 F.3d at 731 n.3 (considering similar argument on
interlocutory appeal). Similarly, we reverse the denial of qualified immunity as to
Karcher and Oswald on McGuffin’s Brady claim (Count 4). The district court’s
findings cover Zanni and Schwenninger, but no evidence implicates the other two
1
We do not reach any legal questions implicated by McGuffin’s conspiracy claim
(Count 6) because Appellants failed to raise any such issues in their briefing.
6 25-2548
appellants. We reverse the denial of qualified immunity as to Oswald and Zanni on
McGuffin’s fabrication claim (Count 1) for the same reason. As to those counts
and defendants, summary judgment was appropriate because the district court did
not find preclusive fact disputes, and McGuffin failed to establish the defendants’
“personal involvement” in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. See Barren v.
Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (explaining that personal
involvement is a pre-requisite to § 1983 liability).
We also reverse as to McGuffin’s familial association claim. Whether the
law is clearly established applied to a given set of undisputed facts is a “pure
question of law” that we review de novo. Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119,
1123 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Here, McGuffin fails to show that his
minor daughter had a clearly established parental-companionship right. McGuffin
relies on Smith v. City of Fontana, which held that “unwarranted state interference
with [a child’s] relationships with their parents” violates the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418
(9th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la
Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). But Smith is not “particularized to
the facts of th[is] case,” see White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam)
(citation omitted)—including the fact that McGuffin’s daughter was not born until
after much of the allegedly unconstitutional conduct occurred. That fact serves to
7 25-2548
“distinguish this case from clearly established law” and warrants qualified
immunity on remand. See Fuhr v. City of Seattle, 175 F.4th 1081, 1085 (9th Cir.
2026).
DISSMISSED in part; REVERSED in part. The parties shall bear their
own costs.
8 25-2548
FILED
SEP 9 2026
McGuffin, et al. v. Karcher, et al., Nos. 25-2548, 25-2575, 25-2565, 25-2558
N.R. Smith, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I concur in the panel’s decision to the extent it: (1) reverses the denial of
qualified immunity as to Oswald and Zanni on the fabrication of evidence claim;
(2) reverses the denial of qualified immunity as to Schwenninger and Zanni on the
destruction of evidence claim; (3) reverses the denial of denial of qualified immunity
as to Karcher and Oswald on the Brady claim; and (4) reverses the denial of qualified
immunity as to each of the defendants on the familial association claim.
However, I dissent from the panel’s failure to remand each of the remaining
claims, because the district court did not engage in a separate and individualized
analysis of each officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity. We require courts to
complete an “individualized analysis” when confronted with a claim for qualified
immunity and instruct that courts “must carefully examine the specific factual
allegations against each individual defendant.” See Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d
1271, 1287–89 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended (Oct. 31, 2000) (emphasis added). The
district court did not do so here and instead improperly imposed liability “based on
a ‘team effort’ theory,” which will “allow the jury to lump all the defendants together,
rather than require it to base each individual’s liability on his own conduct.” Peck v.
Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and alteration omitted). The
panel’s decision gives short shrift to this issue by stating in a conclusory manner,
“[t]he district court made findings specific to each individual.”
1