Cook

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JACQUES COOK, JR., ) Case No. 1:25-cv-2398

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge

) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

SHELTON COLEMAN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jacques Cook Jr. brings this suit without a lawyer against Defendants

Shelton Coleman, Betty Weaver, and the City of Cleveland alleging a due process

violation under Section 1983 and various State-law claims. Defendants move for

judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply, DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to toll the

statute of limitations, and GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ motion for judgment on

the pleadings.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain numbered

paragraphs. Also, Plaintiff named Betty Weaver as a Defendant. However, in their

motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendants clarify that Ms. Weaver now uses

the last name Beal. (ECF No. 8, PageID #65.) Accordingly, throughout this Order,

the Court refers to this Defendant as Betty Beal. Taking the facts alleged in the

complaint as true and construing them in Plaintiff’s favor, as the non-moving party,

the complaint alleges the following facts.

Plaintiff Jacques Cook, Jr. alleges that the City of Cleveland employed and

trained Shelton Coleman and Betty Beal. (ECF No. 1-2, PageID #9.) On or around

November 30, 2022, Mr. Coleman issued a “No Trespass Order” against Mr. Cook

that barred his entry into city hall. (Id., PageID #10.) Plaintiff alleges that

Mr. Coleman and Ms. Beal were “acting within the scope of their employment” and

“improperly used their official positions to punish [him].” (Id.) He claims that the

no-trespass order was a “false written statement,” which Mr. Coleman and Ms. Beal

“collaborated to create and publish” about him. (Id.)

According to the complaint, Mr. Coleman and Ms. Beal prepared a statement

accusing Mr. Cook of being “belligerent and threatening Ms. [Beal’s] life” during an

altercation on or around November 15, 2022. (Id., PageID #10.) The statement was

published, “including but not limited to being placed in official files or communicated

to third parties.” (Id., PageID #10.)

Plaintiff alleges that the “wrongful issuance” of the no-trespass order and “the

false accusation of life threats” were “extreme and outrageous.” (Id., PageID #12.)

Also, he alleges that the no-trespass order was “made with reckless disregard for the

truth or with actual malice” and was “issued without any prior notice, evidentiary

hearing, opportunity to respond, or established appeal process[.]” (Id., PageID #10;

see also id., PageID #11.)

Because of Mr. Coleman’s and Ms. Beal’s conduct, Plaintiff alleges that he

suffered severe emotional distress, reputational harm, and financial loss. (Id.,

PageID #10–11.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff sued Defendants Shelton Coleman, Betty Beal, and the City of

Cleveland alleging violation of due process under Section 1983 and bringing three

claims under State law for “defamation (libel),” “intentional infliction of emotional

distress,” and “malicious, bad faith, or wanton/reckless conduct.” (ECF 1-2, PageID

#10–12.) In his claim under Section 1983, sues Mr. Coleman and Ms. Beal in their

individual and official capacities and seeks to hold the City liable for failure to

adequately train and supervise its employees under Monell v. Department of Social

Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

On October 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed his complaint in State court. (ECF No. 1-2.)

Defendants timely removed this action to federal court. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants

move for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 8.) After he opposed the motion (ECF

No. 10) and Defendants replied (ECF No. 15), Plaintiff moved for leave to file a sur-

reply (ECF No. 16), which the Court DENIES pursuant to Section 9.D. of its Standing

Order. Later, Plaintiff moved to toll the statute of limitations, specifically for his

“defamation and libel claims[.]” (ECF No. 17, PageID #146.)

GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent

standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365

(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the lenient treatment

accorded pro se plaintiffs has limits, see e.g., Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416

(6th Cir. 1996). Pro se litigants must still meet basic pleading requirements, and

courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf or create claims for

them. See Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App'x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001).

“The only difference between Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b)(6)” is timing. Hunter

v. Ohio Veterans Home, 272 F. Supp. 2d 692, 694 (N.D. Ohio 2003). Rule 12(c)

provides that, once “the pleadings are closed” a party may “move for judgment on the

pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings . . .

generally follows the same rules as a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule

12(b)(6).” Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Assoc., 958 F.3d 470, 480 (6th Cir. 2020)

(citing D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 2014)); see also Holland v.

FCA US LLC, 656 F. App’x 232, 236 (6th Cir. 2016).

On a motion under Rule 12(c), courts “must follow the Supreme Court’s

changes to the pleading standards in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).” Bates, 958 F.3d at 480 (citing Engler v.

Arnold, 862 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2017)). “In other words, judgment on the

pleadings is appropriate where, construing the material allegations of the pleadings

and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the

Court concludes that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Anders v. Cuevas, 984 F.3d 1166, 1174 (6th Cir. 2021). In construing the pleadings,

the Court accepts the factual allegations of the non-movant as true, but not

unwarranted inferences or legal conclusions. Holland, 656 F. App’x at 236–37 (citing

Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000)).

While “the court’s decision rests primarily upon the allegations of the

complaint[,]”JTO, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 242 F. Supp. 3d 599, 602 (N.D.

Ohio 2017), it may also consider matters of public record, orders, items appearing in

the record of the case, and exhibits attached to or made part of the complaint, Amini

v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001). Only “well-pleaded factual

allegations” that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief” and “allow the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged” will survive. Bates, 958 F.3d at 480 (quotation and citation omitted).

Conversely, “[m]ere labels and conclusions are not enough[.]” Engler, 862 F.3d at

575. Nor are facts that are “merely consistent with” liability. Bates, 958 F.3d at 480

(quotation omitted).

ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that the applicable statutes of limitation bar each claim.

(ECF No. 8, PageID #74–76.) Plaintiff argues that this action is timely under Ohio’s

savings statute. (ECF No. 10, PageID #104.) Generally, it is inappropriate to dismiss

claims based on a statute of limitations at the Rule 12 stage. Snyder-Hill v. Ohio

State Univ., 48 F.4th 686, 698 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). But if the allegations

in the complaint “affirmatively show” that a claim is time barred, then dismissal is

warranted. Id. (quoting Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 717 F.3d 459, 464

(6th Cir. 2013)). Therefore, to determine the timeliness of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court

reviews the procedural history of Plaintiff’s original action and this action.

In his motion to toll the statute of limitations, Plaintiff raises for the first time

that he “did not, and could not, reasonably discover” the no-trespass order until

January 24, 2024. (ECF No. 17, PageID #146.) As Defendants point out in their

opposition to the motion to toll the statute of limitations, they raised the timeliness

issue in their motion for judgment on the pleadings, yet Plaintiff did not mention the

January 24, 2024 date until his motion to toll, which he filed after the close of briefing

on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Moreover, the pleadings contain no

allegations or other information regarding the January 24, 2024 date. But a party

may not amend through a brief. See, e.g., Thomas v. United Steelworkers Local 1938,

743 F.3d 1134, 1140 (8th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases). And when Defendants raised

the statutes of limitation in their motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff

could have sought leave to amend his complaint, but he did not do so. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In any event, Plaintiff has not sought leave to amend. Accordingly,

the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to toll the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 17.)

For purposes of calculating the applicable limitations period for each claim, the Court

does not consider the argument raised for the first time in Plaintiff’s motion to toll

the statute of limitations, which finds no support in the pleadings or in the briefing

on Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleading.

I. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process (Count 1)

Section 1983 itself does not provide a statute of limitations. In such

circumstances, federal courts borrow the applicable limitations period from the most

analogous one available under State law. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50

(1989). Here, the most closely analogous limitations period under Ohio law is the

general two-year limitations period for bringing a tort action. See Ohio Rev. Code

§ 2305.10; see Beaver Street Invs., LLC v. Summit Cnty., Ohio, 65 F.4th 822, 826 (6th

Cir. 2023); Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc).

When a cause of action under Section 1983 accrues and begins to run presents

“a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace v.

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). The limitations period begins to run “when the

plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the claim.”

Holson v. Good, 579 F. App’x 363, 366 (6th Cir. 2014). To ascertain when that occurs,

a court determines “what event should have alerted the typical lay person to protect

his or her rights.” Kuhnle Bros., Inc., v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 520 (6th

Cir. 1997); see also Printup, 654 F. Appx. at 785. A plaintiff should know of the injury

when it should have been discovered through the “exercise of reasonable diligence.”

Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984). This discovery rule accounts for

situations “where the injury complained of may not manifest itself immediately and,

therefore, fairness necessitates allowing the assertion of a claim when discovery of

the injury occurs beyond the statute of limitations.” Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia,

LLC, 717 F.3d 459, 470 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing NCR Corp. v. U.S. Mineral Prods.

Co., 72 Ohio St. 3d 269, 1995-Ohio-191, 649 N.E.2d 175, 177 (1995)).

Plaintiff alleges that the no-trespass order was issued on November 30, 2022.

Based on the allegations in the complaint, there is no reason to believe that Mr. Cook

or should have known of the no-trespass order at that time or reasonably close to it.

Indeed, it followed some sort of incident on November 15, 2022 between Mr. Cook and

Ms. Beal. (ECF No. 1-2, PageID #10.) With a two-year limitations period, Plaintiff

had to file suit by November 30, 2024. He brought suit in State court within this

timeframe, filing his first case on May 21, 2024. (See Cook v. City of Cleveland, No.

CV-24-997746 (Cuyahoga Cnty. C.P.).) But that lawsuit only brought a claim for

defamation and libel. Although it is unclear what other claims Plaintiff might have

tried to bring, he did not assert a claim under Section 1983 or federal law. Therefore,

no tolling occurred, at least with respect to Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983, and

he did not file this lawsuit until October 1, 2025—well after expiration of any

reasonable time for filing suit.

Under Ohio’s savings statute, assuming it applies, a plaintiff “may commence

a new action within one year after the date of the reversal of the judgment or the

plaintiff's failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original

applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.19.

The State trial court dismissed Mr. Cook’s first lawsuit on October 1, 2024 for failure

to prosecute. (See Cook v. City of Cleveland, No. CV-24-997746, Judgment Entry (Oct.

1, 2024) (dismissing the case for want of prosecution).) Although Plaintiff argues that

dismissal of his first action occurred on October 4, 2024 (ECF No. 10, PageID #104),

the State court’s docket reflects that the judgment was signed and entered on October

1, 2024. Under Section 2305.19, this dismissal constitutes a “failure otherwise than

upon the merits” and it triggers the later of the two deadlines for filing suit on the

facts presented. Therefore, the statute gave Plaintiff a year from that date to

commence suit. Still, he filed his complaint in State court on October 2, 2025. (ECF

No. 1-2.) Therefore, the Ohio savings statute does not make this lawsuit timely.

Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that the no trespass order constitutes a

continuing violation, making the claim timely. (ECF No. 10, PageID #104.) As

Defendants note (ECF No. 15, PageID #129), Plaintiff did not include a continuing

violation theory or allege the facts supporting one in his complaint. Again, Plaintiff

may not use a brief to insert an argument into the case that the pleadings do not. In

any event, Plaintiff points to no authority that Section 1983 employs the continuing

violation doctrine when determining or applying the applicable limitations period.

With respect to Plaintiff’s Monell claim, a municipality “may not be sued under

§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Department

of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (2018). “Instead, it is when execution of a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the

government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. “There can be no liability

under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation.” Robertson, 753 F.3d

606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014). The “conclusion that no officer-defendant has deprived the

plaintiff of any constitutional right a fortiori defeats a claim against the government

entity as well.” Scott v. Clay Cnty., 205 F.3d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing City of

Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799)) (cleaned up). Because Mr. Cook’s federal

due process claim is not timely, Plaintiff cannot maintain a Monell claim either.

II. State-Law Claims

Plaintiff asserts three State-law claims against Defendants for “defamation

(libel)” (Count 2), “intentional infliction of emotional distress” (Count 3), and

“malicious, bad faith, or wanton/reckless conduct” (Count 4). (ECF No. 1-2, PageID

#11–12.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over

these claims. Under federal law “the district courts shall have supplemental

jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within

such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under

Article III.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This grant of jurisdiction brings all claims arising

from a common nucleus of operative fact before the Court. Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners

Ins. Fund, 844 F.3d 576, 588 (6th Cir. 2016).

Even then, a court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” in

certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine

of discretion.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

To determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, “a federal court should

consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity[.]” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); see also James v. Hampton, 592 F. App’x 449, 462–63

(6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1882

(6th Cir. 1993)). Section 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction where “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex

issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims

over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional

circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”

Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claim as untimely, the Court

may, in its discretion, either retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State-law claims and

proceed on the merits, Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639–40

(2009), or decline jurisdiction and dismiss the complaint without prejudice to

Plaintiff’s right to pursue the remaining claim in State court, see 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). “[G]enerally ‘when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the

balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the [S]tate law claims.”

Packard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Columbus, 423 F. App’x 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Musson Theatrical v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th Cir.

1996)); see also Juergensen v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 5:18-cv-1825, 2018 WL

5923707, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2018).

Based on its review of the record, the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim under State-law. Because the Court dismisses the

federal claims, the balance of considerations favors remanding this action to the State

court. In this way, Plaintiff may pursue his remaining claims there should he choose

to do so.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for leave to

file a sur-reply (ECF No. 16), DENIES Plaintiff's motion to toll the statute of

limitations (ECF No. 17), and GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ motion for judgment

on the pleadings (ECF No. 8). The Court grants Defendant’s motion with respect to

the federal claims in Count 1 and remands the balance of the case to the Cuyahoga

County Court of Common Pleas.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 8, 2026

J.PhilipCalabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

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