Douglas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Sonya Douglas,

Plaintiff, NO. 1:23-CV-14559

v. Judge Edmond E. Chang

Sauk Village, Illinois; and Aretha Burns, Ar-

nold Coleman, Sherry Jasinski, Debbie Wil-

liams, Gary Bell, and Diane Sapp in their in-

dividual capacities,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Sonya Douglas sues Sauk Village and several members of its Board of Trustees

(for convenience’s sake, unless otherwise noted, the Defendants will collectively be

called the Village) after she was fired in April 2023, alleging violations of the Illinois

Whistleblower Act, 740 ILCS 174/15(a), and her due-process rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

R. 97, Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24–56.1 The Village moves to dismiss the due-process

claim. R. 100, Defs.’ Mot. Because Douglas has not plausibly alleged a protected prop-

erty interest, her due-process claim is dismissed, this time with prejudice. And the

Court relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over the state whistleblower claim.

1Citations to the record are “R.” followed by the docket entry number and, if needed,

a page or paragraph number. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the due-process

claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the whistleblower claim

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

I. Background

In evaluating the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual

allegations in the Second Amended Complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Sauk

Village hired Sonya Douglas as a contractor to provide human resources consulting

services in June 2020. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13. Douglas signed a written contract

that specified her employment was at-will—that is, either party could terminate the

contract upon 30-day’s notice. Id. ¶ 15. The contract’s term was indefinite, but the

Village enacted an ordinance providing that consultants are employed for one-year

terms that the mayor can extend indefinitely. Id. ¶¶ 14–15.

In June 2021, the mayor orally offered Douglas a new one-year contract to re-

place the at-will written contract. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 16. According to Douglas,

under the oral offer she could not be terminated “without justifiable reason and a

hearing.” Id. ¶ 17. Douglas accepted the offer. Id. ¶ 20. She worked for the next year

without incident, and the Board approved payment for all of Douglas’s invoices. Id.

Douglas agreed to an identical oral one-year contract in June 2022. Id. ¶ 21. At that

time, the Board authorized an increase in Douglas’s pay, and it continued to pay her

invoices. Id. ¶ 23.

In the fall of 2022, Douglas uncovered alleged financial mismanagement by the

former treasurer, then-Director of Operations of Sauk Village. Second Am. Compl.

¶¶ 25–27, 29. Douglas immediately began to investigate the issue and reported it to

the mayor. Id. ¶ 28. But Douglas says the Director of Operations and members of the

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Board of Trustees attempted to stifle her investigation. Id. ¶¶ 29, 32–33. Eventually,

in the spring of 2023, the mayor called an executive session with the Board, where

Douglas testified about the financial mismanagement she had uncovered. Id. ¶¶ 34–

35. The Director of Operations was fired, but one of the Board members “vowed” that

Douglas “would be terminated in retribution.” Id. ¶¶ 37–38.

In April 2023, the Board held a special session and declared Douglas’s employ-

ment contract was null and void. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 39. The mayor told the Board

that it could not unilaterally rescind Douglas’s contract. Id. ¶ 41. But the Board went

forward with Douglas’s termination: it authorized the Village to hire her replacement.

Id. ¶ 40. It refused to pay Douglas for work she performed between April 2023 and

April 2025. Id. ¶ 42. And it barred Douglas from accessing Village facilities, including

her office. Id. ¶ 44.

After she was fired, Douglas sued Sauk Village and members of the Board of

Trustees. R. 1, Compl. The Village moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to plau-

sibly allege a due-process protected property interest because, according to Douglas’s

allegations, she was an at-will employee. R. 19, Defs.’ First Mot. to Dismiss at 2–4;

see Compl. ¶¶ 15–19. The Court granted the motion but gave Douglas an opportunity

to file an amended complaint. R. 43, 09/30/2024 Order at 1–2.

In the Amended Complaint, Douglas alleged that although her first contract

provided for at-will employment, the mayor orally offered her subsequent one-year

contracts that entitled her to just-cause employment protections and a pre-termina-

tion hearing. R. 50, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–16, 18. But Douglas also alleged that the

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mayor told her the Board was not required to approve the contract. Id. ¶ 17. The

Village moved to dismiss, arguing that the oral contracts were invalid because they

were not approved by the Board. R. 60, Defs.’ Second Mot. to Dismiss at 2–5. The

Court dismissed the Amended Complaint because it contained conflicting allegations

about whether the Board approved the new employment agreement. R. 96,

09/29/2025 Order at 2. The Court granted Douglas one last chance to revise her com-

plaint to sufficiently allege a protected property interest. See id. at 2–3. So Douglas

filed a Second Amended Complaint, Second Am. Compl., which the Village again

moves to dismiss, Defs.’ Mot.

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only

include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the de-

fendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up).2 The Seventh Circuit has explained that this

rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on

the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of

court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v.

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)). At the same time, the Supreme Court in-

structs that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief

2This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,

and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,

18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).

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will ... be a context-specific task.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The Seventh Circuit has

drawn a context-dependent distinction between relatively straightforward employ-

ment discrimination claims versus more complex claims. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A.,

614 F.3d 400, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2010).

“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police

of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up). These allegations “must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The

allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual,

rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

III. Analysis

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To

state a claim for a violation of procedural due process, Douglas must plausibly allege

“(1) deprivation of a protected interest, and (2) insufficient procedural protections

surrounding that deprivation.” Michalowicz v. Village of Bedford Park, 528 F.3d 530,

534 (7th Cir. 2008). The Village argues that Douglas fails to plausibly allege the first

element. Defs.’ Mot. at 2–6.

The Due Process Clause does not itself grant property rights to individuals.

Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Rather, property rights

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“are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings

that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings

that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”

Id. In other words, “[s]tate law defines the property interest, and federal law defines

the process that is due.” Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 604 F.3d 490,

494 (7th Cir. 2010).

Here, Douglas alleges a property interest in her continued contractual employ-

ment with the Village. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48–54. When a plaintiff alleges a

property interest in something intangible, like continued employment, then the plain-

tiff must clearly allege “more than an abstract need or desire for it” or “a unilateral

expectation of it.” Bd. of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577. “He must, instead, have a legiti-

mate claim of entitlement to it.” Id. Thus, a plaintiff must allege a legitimate expec-

tation of continued employment based on a legitimate claim of entitlement. Covell v.

Menkis, 595 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2010).

Specifically, there are two ways Douglas may plausibly allege that a property

interest in continued employment was created: (1) “by an independent source such as

a state law securing certain benefits;” or (2) by “a clearly implied promise of continued

employment.” Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 692 (7th Cir. 1985). An independent

source includes statutes, regulations, and municipal ordinances, whereas clearly im-

plied promises include express or implied contracts, such as “rules or understandings

that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”

Border v. City of Crystal Lake, 75 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). Douglas

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does not allege or cite an independent state law that guarantees her role as a con-

tractor to Sauk Village. See generally Second Am. Compl.; R. 103, Pl.’s Resp. Br. So

for the due-process claim to move forward, she must plausibly allege that a property

interest arose from an express or clearly implied promise of continued employment.

See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601–02 (1972).

A. Oral Contracts

Douglas’s first, written contract could not establish a property interest because

it designated her as an at-will employee. See Warzon v. Drew, 60 F.3d 1234, 1240 (7th

Cir. 1995). But Douglas contends that her subsequent oral contracts with the mayor

created a clearly implied promise of continued employment. Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 4–7.

The Village responds that the oral contracts were invalid because they were not ap-

proved by the Board, which is required under Illinois law. Defs.’ Mot. at 2–4. An im-

plied employment contract receives constitutional protection only if state law recog-

nizes its validity. Perry, 408 U.S. at 602 n.7. And in Illinois, “[m]unicipalities are lim-

ited to only those powers which are given to them by constitution and statute, and a

municipality cannot be bound by a contract that does not comply with the prescribed

conditions for the exercise of its power.” Ad-Ex, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 565 N.E.2d

669, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). Sauk Village is a non-home-rule municipality, so it may

only exercise powers that the state legislature confers upon it by statute. See Haw-

thorne v. Village of Olympia Fields, 790 N.E.2d 832, 840 (Ill. 2003). Thus, if the oral

contracts were invalidated by Illinois statute, then they could not create a protected

property interest.

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In its opening brief, the Village cites four sections of the Illinois Municipal Code

to support its argument that state law does not recognize Douglas’s oral contracts.

See Defs.’ Mot. at 3–4. But none of those statutory subsections say that the Board of

Trustees must approve employment contracts with independent contractors.

First, the Village cites 65 ILCS 5/1-1-2(2). Defs.’ Mot. at 3. This section pro-

vides definitions for terms used in the Code. See 65 ILCS 5/1-1-2. Relevant here, 65

ILCS 5/1-1-2(2)(b) defines “[c]orporate authorities” as “the president and trustees or

similar body when the reference is to villages or incorporated towns.” Id. The Village

argues that this section means that when “corporate authorities” appears in other

parts of the Code, it must include the Board of Trustees (and not just the mayor). See

Defs.’ Mot. at 3. But because this section merely provides definitions, not rules or

limitations on municipalities’ powers, it does not itself require that the Board ap-

proved Douglas’s oral contracts. What’s more, section 5/1-1-2(2) does not say that

every time the phrase “corporate authorities” is used in the Code it always refers to

the village president and the board. Thus, this section does not support the Village’s

claim that Douglas’s contracts had to be approved by the Board.

Next, the Village cites 65 ILCS 5/8-1-1, which simply states that the “corporate

authorities may control the finances of the” municipality. Defs.’ Mot. at 3. But the

power to control finances does not provide any insight into the approval processes for

contractor employment contracts. And the language of the section is permissive—it

says the corporate authorities “may” control finances—so it does not set any limits on

municipalities’ powers. 65 ILCS 5/8-1-1. So again, this citation does not support the

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Village’s argument that Douglas’s employment contracts were invalid because they

were not approved by the Board.

The Village then cites 65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-45. Defs.’ Mot. at 3. Although the Vil-

lage does not identify specific subsections of this statutory provision, the most rele-

vant subsections are (i) and (ii), which set forth the procedure for mayoral approval

and veto of all resolutions and motions that (i) create liability for the municipality or

(ii) appropriate the municipality’s money. 65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-45(i)–(ii). But this section

describes only the mayor’s role in approving resolutions and motions, not the Board.

So this section also does not support the Village’s argument that the Board needed to

approve Douglas’s employment contracts in order to render them valid.

Finally, the Village cites 65 ILCS 5/8-1-7(b). Defs.’ Mot. at 3–4. This section is

more relevant than the others because it grants municipalities the authority to make

contracts for “the employment of outside professional consultants” not exceeding the

term of the mayor in office. 65 ILCS 5/8-1-7(b). But this section is also permissive: it

says that the corporate authorities “may” hire a consultant, and when they do so, the

corporate authorities should appropriate money to pay the consultant on an annual

basis. Id. So again, the statute does not set limits on municipalities’ power to contract

with outside consultants. In contrast, subsection (a)—which generally governs mu-

nicipal contracts—says that if the municipality fails to appropriate money to pay a

contract, the contract is “null and void.” 65 ILCS 5/8-1-7(a). But subsection (b)—which

specifically governs contracts with outside professional consultants—contains no

such language. Indeed, subsection (b) is expressly an exception to subsection (a). 65

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ILCS 5/8-1-7(b) (“Notwithstanding any provision of this Code to the contrary, ….”);

see also 65 ILCS 5/8-1-7(a) (“Except as provided otherwise in this Section, ….”). Thus,

65 ILCS 5/8-1-7(b) actually permits municipalities greater flexibility to form contracts

with consultants without appropriating multiyear salaries up front. Even if the Court

were to read subsection (b) to require the Board to fund Douglas’s position (which

Douglas says the Board did, see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 23), it does not require the

Board to approve her contracts. So, this subsection also does not support the Village’s

argument. Thus, none of the Illinois statutes cited by the Village in its opening brief

support its argument that the Board had to approve Douglas’s contracts.

In its reply brief, the Village cites two additional statutory sections. See R. 105,

Defs.’ Reply Br. at 2–4. The Village points to 65 ILCS 5/3.1-30-5. Defs.’ Reply Br. at

3–4. But again, this section does not help the Village. It merely grants the mayor the

power to appoint—with the advice and consent of the Board—various officers, such

as a treasurer, and “other officers necessary to carry into effect the powers conferred

upon municipalities.” 65 ILCS 5/3.1-30-5(a). But because Douglas was hired as a con-

tractor, not an officer, this section is irrelevant. (As just discussed, 65 ILCS 5/8-1-7(b)

is the statutory section that permits municipalities to hire outside contractors like

Douglas.)

Still, the Village does ultimately identify the one statutory section that sup-

ports its argument: 65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-40. It is true that the Village did not identify

this statute until its reply brief, and it did so only in a string citation. See Defs.’ Reply

Br. at 3. But Douglas was on notice that this was the key statute from earlier briefing

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and from explicit discussion in an order of the Court. See, e.g., 09/29/2025 Order at 2

(discussing 65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-40). So it is fair game for the Village to rely on this stat-

utory section, which details when the Board must vote to approve certain municipal

actions. See 65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-40. Specifically, the statute requires that any resolution

that creates liability against the municipality, or appropriates municipal funds, must

have the concurrence of a majority of the Village’s Board members. Id. (creation of

liability or expenditure of money “shall require the concurrence of a majority” (em-

phasis added)). Because Douglas’s contracts required payment of Village funds, this

statutory section mandates that the Board had to approve those contracts—the

mayor alone could not enter into the employment contracts on the Village’s behalf.

And here, Douglas has not plausibly alleged that the Board voted to approve

the oral one-year contracts after her first year working for the Village. Indeed, Doug-

las does not explicitly allege that the Board approved her contracts at all. See gener-

ally Second Am. Compl. For instance, she does not allege that the Board passed an

ordinance approving her contract or held an official meeting to do so. See generally

id.; see also 09/29/2025 Order at 2 (describing how Board approval of Douglas’s con-

tract would likely “be clear from public records”). Instead, she alleges only that the

Board authorized her salary increase and approved her invoices from June 2022 until

her termination in April 2023. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 23. And she says that it was

common practice for the mayor to offer oral contracts to contractors and for the Board

to fund those positions. See id. ¶ 42; Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 5. Douglas argues that these

allegations are enough to raise a plausible inference that the Board approved her

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contract. Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 4–6. But even assuming these facts are true, they do not

raise a reasonable inference that the Board formally approved her employment con-

tract, as is required by the Illinois statute. These facts merely suggest that the Board

paid Douglas when she billed the Village for her work, which is not the same.

In sum, Douglas’s contracts violated Illinois state law because the Board did

not approve the new contract terms with the concurrence of its members. And because

Douglas’s contracts violate state law, she cannot rely on them to claim a legitimate

expectation of continued employment. Without that law-based expectation, she has

not pleaded a protected property interest under the Due Process Clause. Shlay v.

Montgomery, 802 F.2d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that an oral employment con-

tract was unenforceable, and thus did not establish a property interest, because the

municipal employee who made the promise acted outside of their authority to do so).

B. Village Practice

Douglas alternatively argues that, even if the oral contracts were invalid, the

Village’s practice of offering oral employment agreements and funding the positions

created a legitimate expectation of continued employment. Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 5–6. It is

true that due-process protected property rights need not always be codified in writing;

they may also arise from common practices by the employer. See Tire Town Auto LLC

v. Wood County, 175 F.4th 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2026). But a protected property interest

based on common practice must be established through rules or mutually explicit

understandings, not solely through past actions by the employer. See Hermes v. Hein,

742 F.2d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1984).

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Here, Douglas alleges that “it was the Village’s practice to offer written con-

tracts for 1-year that were open-ended, followed by oral 1-year contracts.” Second Am.

Compl. ¶ 42. And she says that her “predecessor was employed under a similar oral

contract, and she was given a hearing prior to the termination of her employment.”

Id. ¶ 18. Thus, Douglas contends that the Village’s common practices establish that

she was entitled to continued employment.

Douglas relies on Vail v. Board of Education of Paris Union School Distrist

No. 95, 706 F.2d 1435, 1436 (7th Cir. 1983), to support her argument. Pl.’s Resp. Br.

at 7. In Vail, the Board of Education itself recruited and hired the plaintiff. 706 F.2d

at 1436. The Board knew the plaintiff had concerns about job security and repre-

sented that he would be hired for a two-year position, even though it could only guar-

antee one year of employment upfront. Id. In other words, even though the written

employment agreement offered a one-year term of employment, the Board promised

to renew the plaintiff’s contract for a second year. See id. Because of the Board’s rep-

resentations, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff reasonably relied on an im-

plied contract for continued employment, and thus had a protected property interest.

Id. at 1438. But Douglas’s case is distinguishable from Vail. Douglas does not allege

the Village Board directly recruited her or induced her to take on the contractor role

with a promise of job security. See generally Second Am. Compl. So Douglas does not

plausibly allege that she legitimately and reasonably relied on a promise from the

government like the plaintiff in Vail.

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Douglas also cites case law discussing property interests that are created by a

de facto tenure program. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 6–7. A de facto tenure program that

confers a protected property interest is typically found in the context of non-tenured

professors seeking tenure. See, e.g., Perry, 408 U.S. at 601. But this theory has also

been brought by plaintiffs with claims in other employment contexts. See Shlay, 802

F.2d at 922. A plaintiff can plausibly allege a de facto tenure program exists when a

formal tenure system has not been adopted, but the employer adheres to an implied

understanding of continued employment that may create a legitimate claim of enti-

tlement to it. Perry, 408 U.S. at 602.

But the Seventh Circuit rejected a theory of de facto tenure under similar cir-

cumstances in Shlay v. Montgomery. 802 F.2d at 923. There, the plaintiff’s oral em-

ployment contract with the municipality was deemed unenforceable because it vio-

lated state law. See id. at 922. The employee argued that even if the contract was

unenforceable, “his property interest was created as a result of de facto tenure which

he enjoyed” because of the contract, his long tenure in his position, and his history of

receiving raises during his employment. Id. at 922–24. The Seventh Circuit concluded

that the plaintiff’s oral contract could not establish an implied understanding of con-

tinued employment because it was invalid. Id. at 922–23. The court also reasoned

that “longevity alone does not create a property interest,” and “the mere fact that the

City increased compensation and benefits for its employees over the years does not

give rise to a mutual understanding with respect to continued employment.” Id. at

923 (cleaned up).

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So, too, here. Douglas’s unenforceable oral contracts cannot establish an im-

plied understanding of continued employment. See Shlay, 802 F.2d at 923. And alt-

hough Douglas says that she received salary increases during her employment with

the Village, Second Am. Compl. ¶ 23, this fact does not plausibly suggest a mutual

understanding of continued employment, Shlay, 802 F.2d at 923. Douglas also alleges

that her predecessor “was employed under a similar oral contract, and she was given

a hearing prior to the termination of her employment.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 18. But

past actions by the employer cannot alone establish a property interest. Hermes, 742

F.2d at 355. Because Douglas does not allege facts that suggest she had de facto ten-

ure, Douglas cannot plausibly allege a property interest under that theory, either.

Without a property interest, Douglas fails to state a due-process claim. Because

this was Douglas’s third attempt to plausibly allege a due-process violation, and she

still has not done so, the claim is now dismissed with prejudice.

IV. Conclusion

The Village’s motion to dismiss the due-process claim, R. 100, is granted, and

the due-process claim is dismissed with prejudice. Because there are no remaining

federal claims, the Court relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

whistleblower claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); RWJ Mgmt. Co. v. BP Prods. N. Am.,

Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “[w]hen federal claims drop

out of the case,” the trial court has “broad discretion to decide whether to ... relinquish

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supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims”—with a “general presumption

in favor of relinquishment”).

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang

Honorable Edmond E. Chang

United States District Judge

DATE: September 4, 2026

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