The opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2811
MARIA ANGELICA GONZALEZ PEREZ, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
TODD W. BLANCHE,
Attorney General of the
United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
Nos. A206-911-530, A206-911-531, A206-911-532,
A206-911-533, A206-911-534
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 12, 2025 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 8, 2026
____________________
Before ROVNER, PRYOR, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.
ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Maria Angelica Gonzalez
Perez (“Perez”) and her four children seek review of an order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming and adopting
the adverse decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying
their requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and
2 No. 23-2811
protection from removal under the Convention Against Tor-
ture (“C.A.T.”). We deny the petition for review because Pe-
rez failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before the
Board.
I.
Perez and her children are natives and citizens of Mexico.
They lived in Ciudad Hidalgo, Michoacán, until 2014, when
they left Mexico and entered the United States after request-
ing political asylum at the border. (Perez’s husband entered
this country separately, without inspection.) Perez and her
children were placed in removal proceedings, where they
conceded their removability. Perez applied for the above-
noted forms of relief based on her experience with the Cabal-
leros Templarios cartel—the Knights Templar—in 2014. The
IJ conducted a hearing on those applications in November
2018. Perez testified at that hearing.
Perez stated that, in September 2014, she received a phone
call from someone identifying themselves as a member of the
Knights Templar. The caller claimed to know where she and
her children lived and where the children attended school. He
described the children’s school schedule and provided other
details suggesting that the family was being monitored. He
threatened that the children would be kidnapped if she did
not pay the cartel 5,000 pesos per child. He also warned her
not to contact the authorities because that would be worse for
her and her children. Perez said that she hung up the phone
and (temporarily) disconnected it. She did not contact the au-
thorities, because “[i]n my town there is corruption and we all
know about it.” A.R. 128. She explained that the police in Ciu-
dad Hidalgo are known to ignore, if not facilitate, cartel ex-
tortion.
No. 23-2811 3
Two days later, the caller contacted Perez a second time,
again identifying himself as a member of the Knights Templar
cartel and directing her not to hang up the phone. He admon-
ished Perez that he “was not playing around,” and that he
knew the location of her children. A.R. 129. At that point, she
hung up the phone, gathered her children from their schools,
and fled Ciudad Hidalgo with the children and her husband
to a small farmhouse five hours away. After staying at the
farmhouse for a few days and raising funds from friends, the
family emigrated to the United States.
Perez also testified regarding an incident in October 2013
involving her sister, Maria Lidia. Maria Lidia’s family had re-
ceived phone calls from Knights Templar members demand-
ing money, and the family ignored the demands until the car-
tel kidnapped Maria Lidia’s husband and then demanded 3
million pesos as ransom. It was at that point that Maria Lidia
contacted Perez and asked for help. The family was able to
secure the husband’s return after transferring 1 million pesos,
the titles to two vehicles, and the deed to the family’s house
to the cartel.
Like Perez, her sister did not report the kidnapping to the
police because of their reputed corruption. Maria Lidia appar-
ently did contact the military for assistance, but military offi-
cials responded that it was not their responsibility. She and
her family remain in Mexico but periodically relocate in order
to evade the cartel.
Another of Perez’s sisters, Selena, as well as Perez’s father
continue to live in Ciudad Hidalgo and have not been ex-
torted or harmed. Perez has not heard from the Knights Tem-
plar cartel since she left Mexico in 2014. But she does not
4 No. 23-2811
believe that she and her family can return, because “every-
thing in Mexico is the same.” A.R. 137.
Apart from her own testimony, Perez’s application was
supported by her sworn affidavit in addition to one from her
sister Maria Lidia; news articles documenting widespread
criminal activity, including kidnappings, in Mexico along
with corruption and lawlessness among the police in Ciudad
Hidalgo; a report documenting prior police advice not to re-
port cartel extortion; and a 2017 State Department report not-
ing the violence perpetrated by organized criminal groups in
Mexico along with endemic corruption among public offi-
cials.
After hearing the evidence, the IJ found Perez’s testimony
credible but nonetheless denied her relief. With respect to the
asylum claim, the IJ found that:
(1) Perez had not shown that she suffered past persecution
in Mexico. The threats from the Knights Templar, “while in-
timidating, were not credible or immediate,” given that the
cartels never carried through on their threats even after Perez
and her family failed to comply with their demands. A.R. 429.
(2) Even if Perez established past harm, she failed to tie
that harm to a protected ground, including membership in a
particular social group. The social group that Perez identified
was “resident of a town that cannot be protected by the gov-
ernment.” Assuming that was a cognizable social group, Pe-
rez did not connect that group to the alleged harm she suf-
fered. “There is no evidence that the cartel members were con-
cerned with any characteristic other than the respondent’s
perceived ability to ‘fill their coffers.’ Instead, the threats are
No. 23-2811 5
more indicative of extortion and general crime, which are not
bases for asylum.” A.R. 430 (citations omitted).
(3) Perez did not demonstrate that the Mexican govern-
ment is unable or unwilling to protect her from the cartel’s
threats. She never sought out the assistance of the authorities
when contacted by the cartel, and the documentary evidence
she submitted indicated that Mexican authorities are treating
crime seriously and are taking steps to reduce cartel violence.
A.R. 430.
(4) In view of the foregoing findings as to past persecution,
Perez was not entitled to a presumption that she has a well-
founded fear of future persecution in Mexico. Further, she
had not otherwise demonstrated that she harbors such a well-
founded fear: (a) Although she subjectively fears that the
Knights Templar cartel will harm her if she returns to Mexico,
she did not present evidence suggesting how the cartel will
find and harm her. Her father and one sister continue to re-
side in Ciudad Hidalgo safely. (b) The record did not reflect a
pattern or practice of persecution of persons similarly situated
to Perez. “Generalized violence and harsh conditions are not
enough to demonstrate such a pattern or practice.” (c) She did
not demonstrate that she was unable to relocate within Mex-
ico to avoid the harm she fears. She and her family did relo-
cate internally for a brief time after the second threatening
phone call and avoided harm; her sister had successfully re-
located elsewhere in Mexico after her husband was kid-
napped; and the documentary evidence likewise suggested
that internal relocation was possible as a means of evading
the cartel. A.R. 430-31.
6 No. 23-2811
(5) Because Perez did not demonstrate her eligibility for
asylum, she necessarily failed to meet the more stringent cri-
teria for withholding of removal. A.R. 432.
(6) Finally, as to the CAT claim, torture entails “an extreme
form of cruel and inhuman treatment,” and Perez had not
shown she faced a “substantial risk” of such severe mistreat-
ment if she were returned to Mexico. Although her evidence
indicated that violence is widespread throughout Mexico,
“[t]his generalized violence, while concerning, does not
demonstrate that the respondent faces a substantial risk of
torture.” Likewise, with respect to cartel violence in Mexico,
Perez had not shown that the Knights Templar cartel was
more likely than not to learn of her prospective return to Mex-
ico, find her, and torture her, or that the Mexican government
would acquiesce in the cartel’s torture. And, again, she had
not shown why relocation within Mexico would not suffice as
a way to avoid the cartel. AR. 432-33.
Perez appealed the IJ’s adverse decision to the BIA. After
setting forth the facts of her case and the general legal princi-
ples applicable to her claims for relief, she presented her ar-
guments as to the IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding ex-
clusively in the following four numbered paragraphs of her
brief:
17. The government of Mexico could [not] pro-
tect and would not be able to protect Respond-
ents [Perez and her children] if they were forced
to go back to Mexico. This is evident by the
widespread corruption of police officers in
Mexico.
No. 23-2811 7
18. Respondent suffered past persecution and
fears future persecution on account of her mem-
bership in a particular social group.
19. These horrifying events clearly establish that
(1) Respondent suffered past persecution based
on membership in a particular social group,
(2) Respondents have a well-founded fear of fu-
ture persecution based on membership in a par-
ticular social group, (3) it is more likely than not
that Respondents would be persecuted because
of membership in a particular social group, and
(4) that it is more likely than not that Respond-
ents would be tortured if removed to Mexico.
We know this to be true because Respondent’s
brother-in-law was indeed kidnapped after they
failed to pay Caballeros Templarios.
20. The Court, however, determined that the
“threats, while intimidating, were not credible
or immediate, given that the cartels never car-
ried through on their threats even after [Perez]
failed to comply with their demands.” Novem-
ber 7, 2019 Decision (“Decision”) at 4. The car-
tel[‘]s threats were clearly credible and immedi-
ate given that Respondent’s brother-in-law was
kidnapped for one month because they failed to
comply with the cartel’s demands. And Re-
spondents were not harmed or kidnapped be-
cause they fled immediately after receiving the
second threat. Under the Court’s reasoning, Re-
spondents should have waited until after they
were kidnapped or harmed before fleeing. The
8 No. 23-2811
threats cannot be mere harassment when the
same cartel has carried out their threats against
Respondents’ family.
A.R. 23.
The BIA adopted the IJ’s opinion as its own and affirmed
the denial of relief, stating as follows:
We agree with the Immigration Judge, for the
reasons set forth in the [IJ’s] decision, that the
respondent did not prove that her harm rose to
the level of persecution, that her harm was on
account of a protected ground, that the Mexican
government was unable or [unwilling] to pro-
tect her, that her subjective future fear of harm
was objectively reasonable, and that she could
not relocate. We also agree with the Immigra-
tion Judge that she did not prove her entitle-
ment to [relief under] CAT.
A.R. 4 (citations & footnote omitted).
II.
In order to qualify for asylum, Perez must establish that
she qualifies as a “refugee,” meaning she is “unable or unwill-
ing” to return to Mexico because (1) she either has suffered
past harm in her home country rising to the level of persecu-
tion or has a well-founded fear of suffering harm in the future
that rises to the level of persecution, (2) the harm she experi-
enced (or reasonably fears) is on account of one or more stat-
utorily protected grounds including, as relevant here, mem-
bership in a particular social group, and (3) the mistreatment
she experienced (or fears she will encounter in the future) was
(or will be) committed by the government or by a private
No. 23-2811 9
actor that the government was either unable or unwilling to
control. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i);
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1); Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 668, 669–
71, 675 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Borjas Cruz v. Garland, 96 F.4th
1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 2024); Gonzalez Ruano v. Barr, 922 F.3d 346,
352, 354 (7th Cir. 2019); Orellana-Arias v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 476,
484–86 (7th Cir. 2017); Urbina-Dore v. Holder, 735 F.3d 952, 953
(7th Cir. 2013). She bears the burden of proving each of these
elements, such that her failure to establish any one of them
would be fatal to her claim for asylum, obviating any need to
consider the other elements. E.g., de Paz-Peraza v. Bondi, 140
F.4th 390, 395 n.2 (7th Cir. 2025).
Perez must establish the same elements in order to qualify
for withholding of removal, except that she must demonstrate
a clear probability of persecution, as opposed to a reasonable
possibility of persecution, if she is returned to Mexico. E.g.,
Rivas-Jarquin v. Bondi, 149 F.4th 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2025). So, if
she does not meet the bar for asylum, she necessarily does not
meet the standard for withholding of removal. Id.
Finally, in order to qualify for relief under the CAT, Perez
must establish that it is more likely than not she will be subject
to torture if she is returned to Mexico. Barry v. Barr, 916 F.3d
666, 669 (7th Cir. 2019); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a).
Torture is defined as any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such pur-
poses as obtaining from him or her or a third
person information or a confession, punishing
him or her for an act he or she or a third person
has committed or is suspected of having com-
mitted, intimidating or coercing him or her or a
10 No. 23-2811
third person, or for any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind, when such pain or suf-
fering is inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or
with the consent or acquiescence of, a public of-
ficial acting in an official capacity or other per-
son acting in an official capacity. …
8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); see Fiddler v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 757, 760–
61 (7th Cir. 2025). We will find the petitioner’s burden satis-
fied if she shows there is a substantial risk she will be tortured
if removed from the United States. Barry, 916 F.3d at 669. Con-
sistent with the definition of torture, she must make some
showing that the torture will be perpetrated by, at the behest
of, or with the consent or acquiescence of public officials. Id.
Before seeking judicial review of the agency’s adverse de-
cision, a petitioner must exhaust the administrative remedies
available to her as a matter of right. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
A court may review a final order of removal
only if the applicant first exhausts “ ‘all admin-
istrative remedies available to the alien as of
right,’ 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), and ... this includes
the obligation first to present to the Board any
arguments that lie within its power to address.”
Issaq v. Holder, 617 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Ghaffar v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 651, 655
(7th Cir. 2008)). To exhaust a claim, the peti-
tioner must argue it specifically and with
enough detail to put the Board on notice that the
petitioner is trying to challenge the immigration
judge’s decision based on that argument.
Kithongo v. Garland, 33 F.4th 451, 458 (7th Cir.
2022). “It is not enough that the new argument
No. 23-2811 11
bears some relation to the evidentiary record.”
Nyandwi v. Garland, 15 F.4th 836, 841 (7th Cir.
2021).
Munoz-Rivera v. Garland, 81 F.4th 681, 687–88 (7th Cir. 2023)
(footnote omitted); see also Perez-Castillo v. Blanche, 177 F.4th
837, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2026) (argument not made to Board
waived for purposes of judicial review). The exhaustion pro-
vision of section 1252(d)(1) is a mandatory claim-processing
rule, as opposed to a jurisdictional rule. Santos-Zacaria v. Gar-
land, 598 U.S. 411, 417–23 (2023); Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch, 845
F.3d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 2016). As such, the rule is subject to
waiver and forfeiture, but if properly invoked by the govern-
ment, it must be enforced. Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing
Servs. of Chicago, 583 U.S. 17, 20 (2017); Chavarria-Reyes, 845
F.3d at 279.
As the government points out, Perez made only cursory
challenges to the IJ’s adverse conclusions as to her asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT claims in the four num-
bered paragraphs we quoted above. In those paragraphs, she
did not articulate to what particular social group she and her
family belonged; she did not confront the IJ’s determination
that the Knights Templar were only interested in extorting
money from her family and had not targeted her based on her
membership in any social group; she did not preserve an ar-
gument that she had an objectively reasonable fear of future
persecution; nor, relatedly, did she argue that internal reloca-
tion would not enable her to avoid future harm from the car-
tel. (The possibility of relocation, of course, bore upon the
likelihood of future persecution.) It may be clear enough that
Perez intended to challenge the IJ’s adverse holdings on some
if not all of these points, but in no way did Perez—who was
12 No. 23-2811
represented by counsel 1—actually develop an argument en-
gaging with the IJ’s reasoning and alerting the Board as to
why, exactly, she believed the IJ erred. 2 “Exhaustion means
not just taking an appeal to the Board but also presenting an
argument, so that the Board has ‘an opportunity to pass upon
the particular legal arguments and contentions that [the alien]
now raises.’” Chavarria-Reyes, 845 F.3d at 279 (quoting Zequiri
v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 364, 369–70 (7th Cir. 2008)); see also Khan
v. Holder, 766 F.3d 689, 701–02 (7th Cir. 2014); cf. Long-Gang
Lin v. Holder, 630 F.3d 536, 543 (7th Cir. 2010) (merely men-
tioning IJ’s adverse findings, without advancing arguments
as to why those findings were erroneous, was insufficient to
preserve challenge in court of appeals). 3
Perez therefore forfeited any argument as to these points,
which were essential both to her asylum, withholding of re-
moval, and CAT claims and to the IJ’s rationale for denying
relief to Perez on those claims. Because she forfeited those ar-
guments, she deprived the Board of the opportunity to ad-
dress the merits of the arguments and therefore failed to
1 Perez is represented by different counsel in this court.
2 By contrast, Perez arguably at least minimally developed arguments
as to why, in her view, the IJ erred in not treating the cartel’s threats to her
family as imminent and credible, and why the Mexican police would be
unable or unwilling to protect her family from the cartel if she and her
children were deported to Mexico.
3 Perez’s notice of appeal to the Board (A.R. 36-39) is of no help to her
in this regard, in that it does not outline any of the arguments she intended
to raise with the Board. Cf. Juarez v. Holder, 599 F.3d 560, 564 n.3 (7th Cir.
2010) (petitioner’s notice of appeal “stated the basic contours of the claims
she wished to make” to the Board, so as to preserve those arguments and
exhaust her administrative remedies).
No. 23-2811 13
exhaust her administrative remedies. Perez consequently can-
not raise such arguments here; and because those arguments
address essential elements of her claims, relief as to these
claims is foreclosed to her in this court.
III.
The events that Perez has recounted are disturbing. But
she failed to make a comprehensive case in her appeal to the
Board, leaving key elements of her claims for asylum, with-
holding of removal, and relief under the CAT—and the IJ’s
reasons for denying those claims—unaddressed. She there-
fore forfeited any arguments she might have had as to those
elements, and in turn failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies as required by section 1252(d)(1). The government
has timely noted and relied upon the lack of exhaustion, and
we are obligated to recognize the lack of exhaustion and deem
relief to Perez on her asylum, withholding of removal, and
CAT claims foreclosed. E.g., Chavarria-Reyez, 845 F.3d at 279.
The petition for review is DENIED.