The opinion
Affirmed and Majority and Concurring Opinions filed August 27, 2026.
In The
Fifteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 15-25-00180-CV
ROSALINDA E. ROMERO, Appellant
V.
TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND CORP., Appellee
On Appeal from the 98th District Court
Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-24-009170
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this appeal from an order granting a plea to the jurisdiction, we consider
whether the Legislature intended § 122.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code
to waive the State’s sovereign immunity. We hold that it did not, and so we affirm
the trial court’s order.
BACKGROUND
Rosalinda Romero began working for the Texas Permanent School Fund
Corporation (the Fund) in 2007.1 On June 3, 2024, Romero reported for jury duty at
around 8:00 a.m., but when she learned that her report time had changed to 1:30
p.m., she returned home to telework. After a break for lunch, Romero returned to the
courthouse at around 12:50 p.m. but was soon discharged. She then drove home,
where she worked from 3:30 to 4:00 p.m. When Romero entered her time for the day
on the Fund’s time-tracking software, she logged the entire eight-hour day as jury
duty. Later that month, the Fund discharged Romero.
Romero sued the Fund, alleging in a single claim that it unlawfully terminated
her employment for serving as a juror in violation of § 122.001 of the Civil Practice
and Remedies Code. The Fund answered and filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing
that the Legislature did not clearly and unambiguously waive the Fund’s sovereign
immunity for claims under § 122.001.2 Romero responded that the Legislature did
so when it amended § 122.001 to cover employers generally instead of just “private”
employers. The trial court granted the Fund’s amended plea to the jurisdiction.
Romero appeals.
DISCUSSION
In a single issue, Romero argues that the trial court erred by granting the
Fund’s plea because § 122.001(a) waives the Fund’s sovereign immunity. We hold
that § 122.001 does not clearly and unambiguously do so.3
The Fund is “entitled to sovereign immunity to the same extent as any other
1
The Fund is a special-purpose governmental corporation that manages and invests the
State’s permanent school fund. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 43.052; see also TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 2
(establishing the permanent school fund).
2
The Fund also argued that Romero had not alleged a claim for which immunity is waived
under the Texas Tort Claims Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021.
3
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034 (“[A] statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign
immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.”).
2
state agency.”4 Sovereign immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction.5 When, as here, a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we
determine if the pleader alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s
jurisdiction to hear the case.6 If a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity is allegedly
implicated, as it is here, the waiver must be clear and unambiguous.7 To determine
whether a statute clearly and unambiguously waives sovereign immunity, we may
consult several aids to help analyze the statute for legislative consent to sue.8
Prior to 2019, § 122.001 stated that “[a] private employer may not terminate
the employment of a permanent employee because the employee serves as a
juror[.]”9 In 2019, the Legislature enacted two separate amendments to § 122.001.
One amendment, SB 370, removed the word “private” before “employer.”10 The
other, HB 504, retained the private employer designation but expanded protection to
“grand jurors.”11 Both amendments were enacted and took effect on September 1,
2019.12
4
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 43.056(a).
5
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004).
6
Id. at 226.
7
PHI, Inc. v. Tex. Juvenile Just. Dep’t, 593 S.W.3d 296, 301–02 (Tex. 2019); see TEX.
GOV’T CODE § 311.034.
8
Hillman v. Nueces Cnty., 579 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Tex. 2019).
9
Act of May 17, 1985, 69th R.S., ch. 959, § 1, sec. 122.001, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242,
3315 (emphasis added).
10
Act of May 14, 2019, 86th R.S., ch. 234, § 1, sec. 122.001, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 408, 408
(“An employer may not discharge ... any permanent employee because the employee serves as a
juror[.]”). The amendment also expanded the scope of prohibited activities to include intimidation
and coercion. Id.
11
Act of May 17, 2019, 86th R.S., ch. 356, § 1, sec. 122.001, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 657, 657
(“A private employer may not terminate the employment of a permanent employee because the
employee serves as a juror or grand juror.”).
12
Because both amendments amend the same text, there are two operative versions of Civil
Practice and Remedies Code § 122.001 (a) and (b). “[W]hen the Legislature passes two acts in the
same session, we must construe the two acts in harmony with one another.” Wichita Cnty. v. Hart,
3
Section 122.001(a) does not clearly and unambiguously waive the Fund’s
immunity. Nothing in either version mentions “immunity” or the ability to sue the
State.13 While the Legislature intended to prohibit employees in general from being
terminated for jury service, it did not clearly waive immunity for government
employers in particular. Nor can the intent to prohibit certain acts be transformed
into a waiver simply because the Fund falls within the meaning of one word—
“employer” (in the SB 370 version). This is reinforced by (1) the prohibition against
construing statutory terms in isolation,14 and (2) statutory aids that we use to identify
a waiver in the absence of express language specifying that “immunity is waived.”15
Those statutory aids are: (1) whether the statutory provisions, even if not a
model of clarity, waive immunity without doubt; (2) ambiguity as to waiver is
resolved in favor of retaining immunity; (3) immunity is waived if the Legislature
requires that the entity be joined in a lawsuit even though the entity would otherwise
be immune from suit; (4) whether the Legislature provided an objective limitation
on the governmental entity’s potential liability; and (5) whether the statutory
provisions would serve any purpose absent a waiver of immunity.16 Here, all five
factors weigh against a waiver of sovereign immunity. The statute neither waives
immunity without doubt nor requires the State to be joined. Chapter 122 does not
limit the government’s potential liability and would subject the State to
917 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. 1996).
13
Compare TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 122.001 with TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.152
(“A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter into a contract
and that enters into a contract subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the
purpose of adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract ….”) (emphasis added) and TEX. TAX
CODE § 112.052(a) (“A person may bring suit against the state ….”).
14
Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. 2014).
15
Hillman, 579 S.W.3d at 360.
16
Id.
4
indeterminate damage awards. The statue serves an important purpose absent
waiver: prohibiting employers from taking certain unlawful acts against an employee
for serving as a jury. And if there is any remaining ambiguity on the point, we resolve
it in favor of retaining immunity.
Romero argues that because the Legislature passed two amendments—HB
504 with the word “private” and SB 370 without it—the Legislature must have
intended SB 370 to extend liability to non-private employers. And because the
previous version of § 122.001 specified “private” employers, we should view the
deletion of that word in SB 370 as a clear and unambiguous waiver of Texas PSF’s
immunity. But deleting the word “private” cannot substitute for language clearly
waiving immunity, for the reasons we’ve discussed.
Neither can the interpretive canons on which Romero relies (surplusage and
useless acts) make the statute clear, since “[c]anons of construction are unnecessary
to construe a clear statute.”17 But even were we to apply those canons, we would not
find a waiver. There are other viable readings that retain immunity while giving
effect to every word. For example, “private” may refer only to privately held
corporations, such that its absence in SB 370 would ensure Chapter 122’s protections
extend to employees of publicly held corporations. It could even prohibit (as Romero
argues) retaliation by government employers. But we need not express an opinion
one way or the other, beyond this: the statute does not effect a clear and unambiguous
waiver under either reading.
Romero also directs our attention to SB 370’s “Author’s/Sponsor’s Statement
of Intent” by Senator Kirk Watson.18 [Reply at 2] But it is a well-established rule
that “we do not resort to extrinsic interpretive aids, such as legislative history,” when
17
See City of San Antonio v. Realme, 731 S.W.3d 342, 350 (Tex. 2026).
18
See S. Comm. on State Affs., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 370, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019).
5
“a statute’s unambiguous language controls the outcome.”19 In this case, it would
not be obvious to all other lawmakers reading the proposed bill (with or without the
legislative history) that the amendment was intended to expand government liability
to employees, especially in the absence of a fiscal note saying so.20 We believe that
rule applies here.
We overrule Romero’s issue.
CONCLUSION
The Legislature has instructed us that when governmental immunity is the
issue, there is no “reading between the lines.” We affirm the trial court’s order
granting Appellee’s plea to the jurisdiction.
/s/ Scott A. Brister
Scott A. Brister
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris. (Farris, J.,
concurring).
19
Paxton v. City of Dallas, 509 S.W.3d 247, 257 (Tex. 2017).
20
See Fiscal Note, Tex. S.B. 370, 86th R.S. (2019) (“No fiscal implication to the State is
anticipated.”).
6