Benton

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 MICHAEL BENTON, No. 2:24-cv-1294 DC AC

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 BBBB BONDING CORPORATION, et

al.,

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Defendants.

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18 Before the court is defendants’ motion to compel further responses to various Requests for

19 Production of Documents (“RFP”), Interrogatories, and Requests for Admissions (“RFA”), filed

20 June 15, 2026. ECF No. 41. The court took this matter under submission (ECF No. 48) and now

21 grants the motion in part and denies it in part, as follows.

22 INTRODUCTION

23 This action was commenced in the San Joaquin County Superior Court but removed to

24 this court on May 3, 2024. ECF No. 1. The first amended complaint, filed June 20, 2024 (ECF

25 No. 6), seeks to bring a class action asserting wage and hour violations by the corporate

26 defendant, BBBB Bonding Corporation, and the individual defendants Clifford Stanley and

27 Robert Hill-Venn as BBBB supervisors. ECF No. 6 at 1-2. The proposed class includes

28 everyone who worked as a bail agent for BBBB in the four years prior to the commencement of

1 the action. ECF No. 6 at 3. The FAC asserts that the class members, including plaintiff, were

2 compensated based on a fixed salary and commission basis that did not compensate for overtime,

3 despite the class members working more than 8 hours per workday. ECF No. 6 at 5, 9.

4 Defendants also failed to provide itemized wage statements (id. at 10), reimburse for expenses

5 incurred in the discharge of their duties (id. at 11), either authorize 30-minute uninterrupted meal

6 periods or pay premium wages for such periods missed (id. at 12), either authorize a 10-minute

7 rest period per every four hours worked in a period or pay premium wages for such periods

8 missed (id. at 12-13), or pay all amounts owed within 72 hours of an employee’s discharge (id. at

9 10-11).

10 On May 20, 2026, plaintiff moved for certification of a class consisting of current and

11 former BBBB bail agents who worked for the company on or after March 25, 2020, and various

12 subclasses. ECF No. 31. This motion is currently pending before the assigned district judge.

13 Defendants filed the current motion to compel further responses on June 15, 2026, asserting that

14 the discovery at issue relates to their intended opposition to the motion for class certification.

15 ECF No. 41.

16 LEGAL STANDARD

17 As a general rule, discovery may be obtained regarding “any nonprivileged matter that is

18 relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ.

19 P. 26(b)(1). Courts can limit discovery when:

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(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,

21 or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient,

less burdensome, or less expensive;

22 (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain

the information by discovery in the action; or

23 (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule

26(b)(1).

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25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Courts can also issue protective orders “to protect a party or person

26 from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

27 26(c)(1). Such an order can, inter alia, forbid disclosure or discovery, specify terms and

28 conditions thereof, limit the scope to certain matters or prohibit discovery as to certain matters,

1 and prohibit the parties from sharing confidential commercial information or limit how they do

2 so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A), (B), (D), (G).

3 A. Requests for Production of Documents

4 RFPs ask a party to “produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to

5 inspect, copy, test, or sample…items in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control[.]”

6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). For such purposes, documents are in the responding party’s “control” if

7 the party has “the legal right, authority, or practical ability to obtain the materials sought upon

8 demand[,]” such as from an affiliate corporation. U.S. Intern. Trade Commission v. ASAT, Inc.,

9 411 F.3d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Camden Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Marubeni America

10 Corp., 138 F.R.D. 438, 441 (D.N.J. 1991)); SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 194 F.R.D. 469, 471-72

11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

12 Responsive documents include “any designated documents or electronically stored

13 information…stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if

14 necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form[.]” Fed. R. Civ.

15 P. 34(a)(1)(A). In general, however, a party need not produce electronically stored information

16 from sources that are “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” Fed. R. Civ.

17 P. 26(b)(2)(B). If the responding party shows this is the case, the court may still order discovery

18 and set conditions thereof if the propounding party shows good cause, in light of the limitations in

19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).

20 Any objections to a request must state whether any responsive materials were withheld as

21 a result, and the propounding party must permit inspection of any responsive documents not

22 withheld based on such objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

23 B. Interrogatories

24 “[T]to the extent it is not objected to,” every interrogatory must “be answered separately

25 and fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). “An interrogatory response must be

26 complete in itself, explicit, and responsive[,]” but whether a particular response meets this

27 standard “must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis in light of the particular question being

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1 asked.” V5 Technologies v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 297, 305 (D. Nev. 2019). As with RFPs,

2 any objections “must be stated with specificity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4).

3 C. Requests for Admission

4 RFAs may ask a party to admit the truth of “facts, the application of law to fact, or

5 opinions about either” or “the genuineness of any described documents.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36

6 (a)(1). If the party’s response does not admit the truth of such an RFA:

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the answer must specifically deny it or state in detail why the

8 answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it. A denial must

fairly respond to the substance of the matter; and when good faith

9 requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter,

the answer must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the

10 rest. The answering party may assert lack of knowledge or

information as a reason for failing to admit or deny only if the party

11 states that it has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it

knows or can readily obtain is insufficient to enable it to admit or

12 deny.

13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 (a)(4).

14 D. Motions to Compel

15 A propounding party may move for an order compelling a party to answer an

16 interrogatory or produce documents responsive to an RFP if it fails to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P.

17 37(a)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv). A discovery response that is evasive or incomplete constitutes a failure to

18 respond. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). Propounding parties may also move for a determination of the

19 sufficiency of an answer or objection to RFAs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(6). If a court does not find

20 the RFA answer compliant with the Federal Rules, it may either treat the RFA as admitted or

21 order the party to file a supplemental answer. Id.

22 ANALYSIS

23 A. Interrogatories about the Claims

24 Interrogatory Nos. 4, 8, and 11 ask about the substance of the claims and how they support

25 plaintiff’s motion for class certification. Specifically, they ask how plaintiff’s claims are typical

26 and representative of the claims of the putative class members, and what common issues of law or

27 fact bind them all. ECF No. 47 at 3. Aside from vaguely responding that all class members

28 “were subjected to the same unlawful policies and practices[,]” plaintiff objected to these as

1 invading the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges. Id.

2 Defendant argues that such a vague answer, without even identifying the policies and

3 procedures at issue, is impermissibly vague in light of such boilerplate objections. Id. at 3-4.

4 Plaintiff responds by citing Heitkoetter v. Domm, which refused to compel responses to

5 interrogatories that “systematically track all of the allegations in an opposing party's pleadings,

6 and that ask for ‘each and every fact’ and application of law to fact that supports the party’s

7 allegations[.]” Id. at 4 (quoting No. 1:22-CV- 0368-KES-BAM, 2024 WL 4979149, at *3, 2024

8 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219314 at *7 (E.D. Cal., Dec. 4, 2024) (quoting Aldapa v. Fowler Packing Co.

9 Inc., 310 F.R.D. 583, 591 (E.D. Cal. 2015))). The interrogatories in Heitkoetter, however,

10 literally asked for “all facts on which you base” each denial in the responding party’s answer to

11 defendant’s counterclaims. 2024 WL 4979149, at *2, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219314 at *4.

12 Plaintiff also cites Aldapa, which concerned a request for production of “all documents related to

13 any of the allegations in the complaint.” 310 F.R.D. at 591. Both cases involved discovery

14 requests far broader than the interrogatories at issue here, which essentially ask plaintiff to outline

15 the arguments that he would have to make in his motion for class certification. See Fed. R. Civ.

16 P. 23(a)(2)-(4). Plaintiff cannot reasonably contend that making those arguments, either in his

17 motion or in his responses, would breach attorney-client or work product privilege.

18 The motion to compel further responses to Interrogatory Nos. 4, 8, and 11 is therefore

19 granted.

20 B. Alternate Employers

21 Interrogatory No. 15 asks for the names of all bail bond businesses from whom plaintiff has

22 earned income since October 2019. ECF No. 47 at 5. Plaintiff responded that he worked for Bail

23 Hotline before working for BBBB, and did not work for anyone else during his time with BBBB.

24 Id. As to his time after, however, plaintiff argued such an inquiry is irrelevant to the case and

25 therefore an unreasonable invasion of his privacy. Id.

26 Defendants now argue that the requested information is relevant to their argument that

27 plaintiff has rerouted prospective employees to a competitor business, and therefore cannot be

28 trusted as an adequate class representative. ECF No. 47 at 5-6. Defendants support this by citing

1 emails and related documents concerning Benton’s former company cell phone. ECF No. 47 at

2 50-55. BBBB Human Resources employee Chantel Hill-Venn had called that number on April 3,

3 2024 after plaintiff’s termination, only to find that he still answered the phone with “This is

4 Mike.” ECF No. 47 at 50. After Hill-Venn hung up, plaintiff texted her from the home phone

5 listed on his BBBB business card, saying he “missed” the call and identifying himself as “Mike

6 the bail bondsman.” Id. at 52-53. She concluded that plaintiff had forwarded calls from his

7 former work phone to his personal phone, which was against company policy and had been one of

8 the reasons he was previously fired. Id. at 50. BBBB removed the call forwarding on April 9.

9 Id. at 54.

10 Plaintiff disputes this narrative because while the text said that “Mike” “missed” the call,

11 Hill-Venn says the call connected long enough for plaintiff to identify himself. Id. at 6-7. This

12 could be a purely semantic distinction without a difference, as one might colloquially say they

13 “missed a call” if the call connected but the caller did not say anything to the recipient after he

14 answered the phone. More pressingly, assuming that plaintiff did in fact forward calls to his

15 personal phone number, he now asks how that would be relevant to his adequacy as a

16 representative. Id. at 6.

17 The connection between the two is not as remote as plaintiff asserts. If plaintiff was in

18 fact forwarding calls to his cell phone, the question becomes why. BBBB is right to wonder if

19 plaintiff then used these calls to siphon customers to other businesses. If he is now working for a

20 BBBB competitor, and especially if he used BBBB resources and connections to advance his

21 career in such a company, he has a vested interest in financially damaging BBBB that the putative

22 class does not share.

23 Plaintiff cites the fact that he has already denied in discovery that he received any BBBB

24 calls or business since his termination. Id. at 6. He also asserts that defendant refused to produce

25 Hill-Venn for a deposition about these emails. Id. at 7. Aside from the fact that plaintiff could

26 move to compel such deposition himself, he is correct that these raise doubt as to whether

27 plaintiff in fact engaged in misconduct that affects his credibility. Yet even plaintiff

28 acknowledges that this motion does not turn on a final adjudication of this factual dispute. Id. at

1 6. That defendants have presented enough evidence to suggest the existence of a genuine dispute

2 entitles them to further discovery about the matter.

3 Finally, plaintiff reiterates his privacy objection, asserting that defendants cannot “delve

4 into [his] personal finances following [his] employment separation” from BBBB. Id. at 7. This

5 overstates the nature of this interrogatory. Plaintiff cites no authority suggesting a valid privacy

6 interest in the names of the companies he has worked for since leaving BBBB, particularly those

7 in the same industry.

8 The motion to compel further responses to Interrogatory No. 15 is granted.

9 C. Non-BBBB Bail Bonds Business and Income

10 RFP Nos. 4-6 collectively ask for written communications, notes therefrom, and call and

11 text logs reflecting any discussions of “bail related services with individuals who work with bail-

12 bonds companies other than Defendant BBBB, between October 2019 to date.” ECF No. 47 at 7,

13 9-10. Plaintiff responded that no such documents existed for the duration of his employment with

14 BBBB, but objects to the rest as irrelevant and an unreasonable invasion of privacy. Id. at 7, 9-

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16 RFP No. 8, meanwhile, asks for documents reflecting any income plaintiff earned since

17 October 2019 by engaging in conduct that he was only able to engage in because he held a Bail

18 Agent license, whether with BBBB or a competitor. Id. at 13. As with RFP Nos. 4-6, plaintiff

19 denied earning such income from anyone other than BBBB during his employment there,

20 advising defendants to check their own records for such income. Id. at 14. As for the period after

21 his termination, plaintiff again objects based on relevancy and privacy. Id. at 13.

22 As with Interrogatory No. 15, these RFPs seek information that could negatively impact

23 plaintiff’s ability to serve as representative of the class he seeks to certify. ECF No. 47 at 8.

24 Taking calls that rightfully belonged to BBBB, letting the customer think they are speaking to

25 someone acting in the capacity of a BBBB representative, and redirecting them to another

26 company, could constitute fraud, theft or misappropriation. Id. at 8. This affects plaintiff’s

27 suitability as class representative and is therefore relevant even for records postdating plaintiff’s

28 employment, though defendants are willing to narrow the request to such records predating June

1 2024. Id. As discussed above, the evidence regarding call forwarding from plaintiff’s former

2 work phone to his personal one gives this theory enough credence to merit further discovery. See

3 supra B.

4 Plaintiff responds that the requested production would, at best, give defendants a list of

5 plaintiff’s bail bond clients over an eight-month timespan. ECF No. 47 at 9. Defendants would

6 then have to ask each of them which number they called when they first met plaintiff – his

7 personal line or his BBBB phone. Id. at 9, 15. Plaintiff asks why defendants could not instead

8 ask for all documents supporting their allegation that he diverted BBBB business to competitors.

9 Id. at 9, 15.

10 Whether discovery is unreasonably cumulative hinges on the burden plaintiff would face

11 when complying with such an order, not the burden of the propounding party when following up

12 on such production. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). Plaintiff provides no evidence that

13 responding to his proposed inquiry would be less burdensome than the RFPs at issue. Aside from

14 a blatant denial that he ever engaged in such redirection, he would likely need to review the exact

15 same documents that defendants are instead asking him to produce outright so they can handle the

16 inspection themselves.

17 The motion to compel further responses to RFP Nos. 4-6 and 8 is granted.

18 D. Circumstances of plaintiff’s termination

19 RFA Nos. 3, 15, and 19 ask plaintiff to admit that while working for BBBB, he referred a

20 prospective bail agent seeking employment with BBBB to another bail bond company; asked for

21 a raise after doing so; and was reprimanded by Robert Venn for such a referral. ECF No. 47 at

22 15. Plaintiff objects that none of these matters are relevant to the claims underlying this action,

23 and now describes these RFAs part of a “harassing fishing expedition[.]” Id. at 15-16.

24 Defendants respond that such dishonest conduct reflects on plaintiff’s credibility as a

25 representative of the class he seeks to certify. Id. at 16. As discussed above, the evidence of call

26 forwarding renders this contention more than speculative, and entitles defendants to further

27 discovery as to plaintiff’s credibility and conflicts of interest. See supra B-C. The motion to

28 compel supplemental responses to RFA Nos. 3, 15, and 19 is granted.

1 E. Unemployment Insurance Application Discovery

2 RFP No. 7 asks for production of any records related to unemployment insurance

3 compensation applications field with the California Employment Development Department

4 (“EDD”) based on his employment with BBBB, “including but not limited to applications,

5 notices, findings of fact, decisions issued, appeals, and the results of any appeals.” ECF No. 47 at

6 12. Aside from objecting based on relevance, plaintiff argues that these documents were

7 privileged under California Unemployment Insurance Code sections 1094(a), 1094(b), and 2111.

8 Id. Plaintiff invokes this privilege again in response to RFA Nos. 10-14, which collectively ask

9 him to admit that plaintiff filed two EDD claims and gave a different reason for his termination

10 from BBBB on each application. Id. at 17.

11 When “state law supplies the rule of decision” in a civil case, state law governs whether a

12 privilege exists. Fed. R. Evid. 501. This action that was removed to federal court based on

13 diversity jurisdiction, with the first amended complaint mostly asserting claims based on the

14 California Labor Code. ECF No. 6 at 8-13. Privilege is therefore governed by state law, under

15 which any information obtained by the EDD in administering the California Unemployment

16 Insurance Code is confidential and inadmissible in civil proceedings. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code §

17 1094(b). The California Supreme Court has confirmed that these sections of the Code reflect a

18 legislative intent to create an evidentiary privilege. Crest Catering Co. v. Superior Court of Los

19 Angeles County, 62 Cal.2d 274, 277 (Cal. 1965).

20 Defendants argue that this privilege only precludes the use of such EDD records to

21 establish some offset against lost wages as a form of damages, which is not an issue here. ECF

22 No. 47 at 18. The Unemployment Insurance Code includes no such limitation. It instead states

23 that the information released to the EDD is inadmissible in any action of special proceeding that

24 neither arises out of the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Code nor is listed in section

25 1095 thereof. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 1094(b). Defendants make no effort to identify which

26 exception applies here, nor has the court found one that does.

27 The asserted privilege permits plaintiff to decline to answer RFP No. 7 and RFA Nos. 10-

28 14. The motion to compel further responses to these requests is denied.

1 F. Admissions as to meal and rest breaks

2 RFA Nos. 20 and 21 ask plaintiff to admit he was “able to take” meal and rest breaks “but

3 chose not to take them.” ECF No. 47 at 18-19. RFA No. 23 asks whether anyone at BBBB

4 “prevented” plaintiff from taking meal breaks, whereas RFA No. 25 asks if anyone at BBBB

5 “discouraged” him from doing so. Id. at 18. RFA Nos. 22 and 24, respectively, ask the same

6 regarding rest breaks. Id. at 19. In response to each RFA, plaintiff “denies Plaintiff was advised,

7 authorized, and permitted to take” the corresponding type of period “in accordance with

8 California law.” Id. at 18-19, 46-48.

9 These responses somewhat reflect plaintiff’s simultaneous objection that the terms “meal

10 breaks” and “rest breaks” were undefined, vague, and ambiguous as used in these RFAs. Id.

11 Plaintiff reiterates this objection when opposing this motion, arguing that these terms have

12 specific definitions under the California Labor Code and applicable Wage Orders. Id. at 20. In

13 other words, because defendants’ definition of a meal break and rest period in these RFAs was

14 unclear, plaintiff qualified his response to define these terms based on the laws underlying his

15 claims.

16 The definitional scope of “meal break” and “rest break” is not the basis for defendants’

17 motion, however. Defendants argue that there is a difference between whether plaintiff was

18 “able” to take meal or rest breaks, rather than being discouraged or prevented, and whether he

19 was “advised, authorized, or permitted” to do so. Id. In other words, defendants argue that

20 plaintiff answered an RFA that was never propounded rather than the ones that were. Id.

21 The court agrees with defendants’ conclusion, but not with its reasoning. The difference

22 between “able” and “permitted” could be just a semantic distinction, as both ability and

23 permissibility concern whether plaintiff actually could take whatever break he was entitled to

24 take. Yet by combining “permitted” with “advised” and “authorized” into a single denial for each

25 break, plaintiff makes it unclear which one of these he denies occurred. His denial could mean

26 that no one “advised” him to take a break and therefore did not think to take one, or it could mean

27 that he tried to take one but then was prohibited by a supervisor and therefore not “permitted” to

28 take one. This also renders such a compound answer, which focuses on actively granting

1 permission to take such breaks, completely nonresponsive to RFAs concerning whether anyone

2 tried to keep plaintiff from taking them.

3 The motion to compel further responses to RFA Nos. 20-25 is granted. Plaintiff must

4 answer each RFA individually, using the same language as the RFA at issue, without providing

5 compound responses that make it unclear which part constitutes the basis for any denial. Plaintiff

6 may, however, explain how any breaks that he did take differ from meal and rest periods as

7 defined in the California Labor Code and applicable Wage Orders.

8 G. Sanctions

9 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5), when a motion to compel is granted

10 the court must award to the moving party reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, unless

11 certain exceptions apply. Exceptions include where the opposing party’s response or objection

12 was substantially justified (Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii)) and where “other circumstances

13 make an award of expenses unjust” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(iii)).

14 Here, the motion to compel was granted in part, and denied in part. In such circumstances

15 the court may still apportion fees. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(c). However, at no point during the

16 joint statement do defendants request such fees. Additionally, as discussed above, the majority of

17 discovery requests for which this motion is granted are based on the same premise – investigation

18 into plaintiff’s suitability as a class representative – whereas plaintiff prevailed in showing an

19 evidentiary privilege that defendants failed to fully acknowledge. No party is clearly more

20 culpable than the other, such that plaintiff should be monetarily penalized.

21 The court finds that no award of sanctions is appropriate.

22 CONCLUSION

23 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

24 1. Defendant’s Motion to Compel (ECF No. 41) is:

25 a. GRANTED as to Interrogatories 4, 8, 11, and 15

26 b. GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 4-7 and 8, for any responsive documents

27 predating June 2024

28 c. GRANTED as to RFA Nos. 3, 15, and 19.

1 d. GRANTED as to RFA Nos. 20-25, with instructions to answer each RFA

2 separately, using the same language as each individual RFA, but with leave to

3 include information as to how any breaks plaintiff took while working for

4 BBBB differed from meal and rest periods as defined by applicable law; and

5 e. DENIED as to RFP No. 7 and RFA Nos. 10-14.

6 2. Plaintiff is ORDERED to respond to all Interrogatories and RFAs for which this

7 || motion is granted, and turn over all documents responsive to the RFPs for which this motion is

8 | granted, within 10 days of this order.

9 IT IS SO ORDERED.

10 | DATED: August 12, 2026 ~

11 Ahan —Chone

ALLISON CLAIRE

12 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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