B.L.S.

1

2

3

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

7

8 B.L.S., Case No. 25-cv-05378-PHK

9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

10 v. PLEADINGS AND DISMISSING

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITH

11 WALNUT CREEK SCHOOL DISTRICT, LEAVE TO AMEND

Defendant. Re: Dkts. 30, 39, and 41

12

13

14 INTRODUCTION

15 Plaintiff B.L.S. (“Plaintiff”), a minor, brings this action against Defendant Walnut Creek

16 School District (“Defendant” or “WCSD”) alleging violations of both federal and state law relating

17 to alleged incidents (and resulting harms) at Plaintiff’s school. [Dkt. 1]. Now before the Court is

18 Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. [Dkt. 30]. The Parties filed requests for judicial

19 notice in connection with the instant motion. [Dkts. 39, 40]. The Court heard oral argument on the

20 instant motion on July 1, 2026. [Dkt. 46]. Having considered the briefs and argument of counsel

21 at the hearing, and for the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for

22 Judgment on the Pleadings and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint with LEAVE TO AMEND.

23 BACKGROUND1

24 Plaintiff, at all relevant times, was a minor residing with his mother, Serina Santoleri, in

25 Contra Costa County, California. [Dkt. 1-1 at ¶ 1].

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27

1 These facts are drawn from the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, which the Court accepts as

1 Defendant WCSD is a governmental entity, organized and existing under the laws of the

2 State of California, located at 960 Ygnacio Valley Rd, Walnut Creek, CA 94596. Id. at ¶ 4.

3 Defendant is responsible for the management and administration of all public schools within the

4 district and is also the employer of all district staff. Id.

5 Plaintiff was enrolled in different schools within the WCSD, including Walnut Creek

6 Intermediate School (“WCI”) and Tice Creek School (“Tice Creek”). [Dkt 1-1 at ¶ 2]. During the

7 2022-2023 academic year, Plaintiff was enrolled at WCI. Id. at ¶ 13. While enrolled, Plaintiff

8 experienced severe bullying. Id. at ¶ 12. Throughout the academic year, Plaintiff’s personal

9 belongings, including bikes, scooters, clothing, and electronics were stolen, vandalized, and

10 damaged by other students. Id. at ¶ 13. Additionally, Plaintiff often came home with visible injuries

11 inflicted on him by other students while at school. Id. Plaintiff was also humiliated by WCI staff

12 members, including his teachers and the school principal. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 20. Plaintiff’s mother and

13 grandmother brought issues of this nature to the attention of WCSD employees on multiple

14 occasions but were ignored. Id. at ¶ 14.

15 In August 2023, WCSD transferred Plaintiff from WCI to Tice Creek without properly

16 notifying his guardians. Id. at ¶ 32. His guardians received notice that Plaintiff was being

17 transferred on August 8, 2023, a week before the start of the 2023-2024 academic year. Id. This

18 abrupt transfer uprooted Plaintiff and caused hardship for his guardians, as Tice Creek is

19 substantially further away from Plaintiff’s home. Id. While at Tice Creek, Plaintiff continued

20 suffering excessive bullying by other students, including verbal and physical abuse. Id. at ¶¶ 33,

21 39. Tice Creek was made aware yet did nothing to protect Plaintiff or prevent further harm. Id. at

22 ¶ 33.

23 Plaintiff is diagnosed with ADHD and is therefore entitled to an individualized education

24 plan (“IEP”) under California Law. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 38. Plaintiff alleges that while enrolled at both

25 WCI and Tice Creek, WCSD failed to evaluate and implement an IEP for Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35.

26 Plaintiff’s guardians were in frequent contact with the schools on this issue and were ignored. Id.

27 In October 2023, Plaintiff was finally evaluated at the Sylvan Learning Center. Id. at ¶ 36. At this

1 Id. Because the district failed to evaluate Plaintiff sooner, Plaintiff’s disabilities were not

2 accommodated, and he was unable to maintain expected progress. Id.

3 On August 15, 2024, Plaintiff commenced an action in state court. [Dkt. 1 at 2]. Plaintiff

4 asserts the following claims for relief:

5 1. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Americans with Disabilities Act);

6 2. Violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act);

7 3. Violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 (Unruh Act);

8 4. Violation of Education Code § 220;

9 5. Violation of Constitutional Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983);

10 6. Violation of Safe Place to Learn Act (Cal. Ed. Code § 234);

11 7. Negligence (Cal. Gov. Code §§ 815.2, 820);

12 8. Negligent Supervision, Hiring, and/or Retention (Cal. Gov. Code §§ 815.2, 820);

13 9. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress;

14 10. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and

15 11. Failure to Perform Mandatory Duty to Protect Student.

16 [Dkt. 1-1 at 4]. Defendant removed this case to federal court on June 26, 2025. [Dkt. 1].

17 LEGAL STANDARD

18 “After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for

19 judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is proper when there

20 is no material dispute of fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jensen

21 Family Farms, Inc. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 644 F.3d 934, 937 n.1 (9th

22 Cir. 2011). This standard is “substantially identical” to the standard for determining a motion to

23 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012).

24 “[U]nder both rules, ‘a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as

25 true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.’” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, a court must accept

26 as true all well-pled factual allegations but need not accept as true conclusory factual allegations or

27 conclusions of law. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citation omitted).

1 amend even if no request for leave to amend has been made, unless it is clear that amendment would

2 be futile.” Finley, 2017 WL 1365207, at *2 (citation omitted).

3 DISCUSSION

4 In the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s state

5 law claims are barred and that Plaintiff’s federal law claims are insufficiently pled. [Dkt. 30 at 12,

6 22].

7 I. California Government Code § 915

8 In California, a person asserting a claim for personal injury against a public entity, such as a

9 school district, must present a statutorily compliant written claim for damages (i.e., an administrative

10 government claim) to that entity no later than six months after the cause of action accrued. Cal.

11 Gov. Code § 911.2. This claim presentation requirement applies to minors. Carr v. State of

12 California, 58 Cal. App. 3d 139, 145 (1976) (“It is established beyond controversy that the timely

13 filing of a claim is a prerequisite to the maintenance of an action and that the claim filing requirement

14 is applicable to minors.”). A minor may make an application to submit a late claim up to one year

15 after the initial injury. See Cal. Gov. Code §§ 911.4, 911.6. However, Government Code section

16 945.4 prohibits suit on the underlying allegations when no claim has been presented. Cal. Gov.

17 Code § 945.4.

18 Plaintiff bears the burden of ensuring that his Government Claim was presented to the

19 appropriate public entity. DiCampli-Mintz v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 55 Cal. 4th 983, 991 (2012).

20 Under the California Government Claims Act (“CGCA”), a school district is defined as a “local

21 public entity” rather than as part of the State of California. Cal. Gov. Code § 900.4; Johnson v. San

22 Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 217 Cal. App. 3d 692, 699-700 (1990) (holding that a school district “is a

23 ‘local public entity’ under the claim filing requirements of the [CGCA]”). A claim against a local

24 public entity, such as the District, must be delivered to the entity’s clerk, secretary, auditor, or

25 governing board; or actually received by one of those designated recipients within the statutory time

26 period. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 915(a), (e)(1). Here, Plaintiff presented his claim to the Department of

27 General Services, and not to any of the District’s enumerated recipients.

1 CGCA, thus barring the asserted state law claims. [Dkt. 30 at 9]. Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s

2 failure to present the Government Claim to the District or otherwise ensure that it was delivered to

3 the District prior to filing suit, is fatal to his state law claims.” Id. In opposition, Plaintiff argues

4 that he properly satisfied the claims presentation requirement because “Plaintiff’s state law claims

5 were actually received by the Department of General Services.” [Dkt. 37 at 3].

6 The dispute here centers on a disagreement over statutory interpretation. California

7 Government Code § 915 sets forth requirements for presenting claims against four enumerated types

8 of entities in each subsection of the statute: local public entities (such as the District) (subsection

9 a), the state of California (subsection b), judicial branch entities (subsection c), and universities of

10 the state of California (subsection d). See Cal. Gov. Code § 915(a)-(d). Subsection (e) of the statute

11 then provides four exceptions for sub-subsections under which “[a] claim, amendment, or

12 application shall be deemed to have been presented in compliance with this section even though it

13 is not delivered or mailed as provided in this section[.]” Cal. Gov. Code § 915(e).

14 Plaintiff construes the exceptions provided in § 915(e) broadly as allowing presentation of a

15 claim under any of the exceptions in any sub-subsection in isolation, arguing that the statute states

16 the exceptions under subsection (e) are operative “if any of the following apply.” Specifically,

17 because Plaintiff presented his claim to the Department of General Services, Plaintiff relies on the

18 exception in sub-subsection (e)(2) which provides, “A claim . . . shall be deemed to have been

19 presented in compliance with this section . . . if . . . [i]t is actually received at an office of the

20 Department of General Services.” Cal. Gov. Code § 915(e)(2).

21 Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff’s state law claims were received by the Department

22 of General Services. However, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s catch-all reading of subsection (e) is

23 legally meritless. [Dkt. 38 at 6]. According to Defendant, “Section 915 is organized into four

24 parallel tracks, each pairing a specific category of public entity with its own presentation

25 requirement and corresponding actual receipt exception[.]” Id. As noted above, Section 915(a)-(d)

26 sets forth specific presentation requirements for four categories of governmental entities – and

27 according to Defendant, Section 915(e) sets out four exceptions in sub-subsections 915(e)(1)-(4)

1 subsections 915(a)-(d) (and thus all four exceptions in 915(e) do not apply across the board to all of

2 the preceding subsections 915(a)-(d)). For example, according to Defendant, the presentation

3 requirement for local public entities established in § 915(a) corresponds with the actual receipt

4 exception provided in § 915(e)(1) which states that “[a] claim . . . shall be deemed to have been

5 presented in compliance with this section . . . if . . . [i]t is actually received by the clerk, secretary,

6 auditor, or board of the local public entity.” Cal. Gov. Code § 915(e)(1).

7 As noted, Plaintiff relies on the exception found in sub-subsection 915(e)(2) which allows

8 presentation of a claim to the Department of General Services. Cal. Gov. Code § 915(e)(2).

9 However, under Defendant’s interpretation of the statute, the sub-subsection 915(e)(2) exception

10 applies only to claims against the State of California because (as the second enumerated exception)

11 this (e)(2) exception only applies to claims against the State as detailed in § 915(b) (the second

12 enumerated category of claims). That is, Defendant argues that the exception here does not apply

13 to any other claims in sections 915(a), (c), or (d) because the corresponding exception for 915(a) is

14 found in 915(e)(1) and not 915(e)(2). Under Defendant’s interpretation of the statute, presentation

15 of the claims to the Department of General Services is ineffective because the District is not the

16 State of California (and is not a state agency) and thus using the exception in (e)(2) is erroneous.

17 The case law and legislative history of the statute support Defendant’s interpretation of

18 section 915. Presentment of a claim to the Department of General Services is not a replacement for

19 presentment to a local public entity being sued because the exception in 915(e)(2) does not apply to

20 claims against a local public entity. See Jud. Council of Cal. v. Super. Ct., 229 Cal. App. 4th 1083

21 (2014) (analyzing the legislative history of § 915 and construing each subdivision of subsection (e)

22 as corresponding with one particular subsection (a)-(d)); accord Santana v. Cnty. of Yuba, No. 2:15-

23 cv-00794 KJM-EFB, 2016 WL 1268107, at *29 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2016).

24 In Judicial Council, the entity being sued was a local Superior Court, but the statutory

25 interpretation and analysis is directly on point. There, the public entity being sued was a judicial

26 branch entity and thus presentment should follow 915(c) (the third type of claim). The Judicial

27 Council opinion held that exception in sub-subsection 915(e)(3) applies to such claims (as the

1 Plaintiff here) that presentment to the predecessor of the Department of General Services under the

2 exception found in 915(e)(2) applied because (according to that plaintiff) all of the exceptions in

3 915(e) apply to any type of claim in 915(a)-(d). The Judicial Council court found this argument

4 “absurd” because the predecessor to the Department of General Services (the Victim Compensation

5 and Government Claims Board) has no power to deal with or resolve a claim against a Superior

6 Court – only the Superior Court can resolve such a claim and thus it makes no sense to construe

7 § 915(e)(2) as allowing presentment of such a claim to the Board instead of the Court. See Jud.

8 Council, 229 Cal. App. 4th at 1100; see also Green v. State Ctr. Community College Dist., 34 Cal.

9 App. 4th 1348, 1352, 1360 (finding presentation to the State Board of Control insufficient to satisfy

10 requirement to present government claim to a school district).

11 The Court finds the statutory analysis of these precedents to be persuasive. The Department

12 of General Services does not have the authority to deal with or resolve a claim on behalf of the

13 Walnut Creek School District. On the record presented, only the local public entity has the authority

14 to resolve a claim against the District. Thus, as in Judicial Council, it makes no sense to construe

15 § 915(e)(2) as allowing presentment of a claim to the Department of General Services instead of the

16 School District. Accordingly, under the proper interpretation of the statute, Plaintiff failed to

17 comply with the literal presentment requirements under § 915(a) or the corresponding exceptions

18 found in § 915(e)(1).

19 When determining compliance with the CGCA, courts apply a substantial compliance

20 standard; however, misdirected claims “are only deemed to have substantially complied [with Sec.

21 915] if they are actually received by the entity.” Tamrat v. Rhodes, Case No. 20-cv-01323-PJH,

22 2021 WL 1044292, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2021). Here, there is no pleading that the Walnut

23 Creek School District actually received the claim within the required deadline and no pleading that

24 the Department of General Services forwarded the claim to the District. Accordingly, the substantial

25 compliance doctrine is not satisfied. See Sternberg v. Danville, Case No. 15-cv-01878-SI, 2015 WL

26 9024340, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025). Accordingly, even under the substantial compliance

27 standard, Plaintiff failed to satisfy the presentment requirements under Section 915. For these

1 For all these reasons, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s state law claims. However, the

2 Court GRANTS LEAVE TO AMEND the Complaint to afford Plaintiff and counsel an

3 opportunity to investigate and determine whether there is a Rule 11 basis to plead facts alleging

4 substantial compliance with the presentment requirement.

5 II. Federal Exhaustion

6 Defendant argues Plaintiff’s ADA claim and Section 504 claim are “defective due to the lack

7 of any allegations establishing that Plaintiff exhausted all administrative remedies under the [IDEA]

8 prior to filing suit.” [Dkt. 30 at 22]. “The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) offers

9 federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment to furnish a ‘free appropriate public education’

10 (FAPE) to children with certain disabilities . . . and establishes formal administrative procedures for

11 resolving disputes between parents and schools concerning the provision of a FAPE.” Fry v.

12 Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 154 (2017), citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). When a plaintiff

13 sues under the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for

14 a public school district’s denial of a FAPE, the plaintiff must first exhaust administrative remedies

15 under the IDEA. Fry, 580 U.S. at 159-161, 168 (2017); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (“before the filing of a

16 civil action under [the ADA or Section 504] seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA],

17 the [IDEA’s administrative procedures] shall be exhausted . . .”).

18 Whether the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement applies to a cause of action “hinges on whether

19 a lawsuit seeks relief from the denial of a free appropriate public education.” Fry, 580 U.S. 154 at

20 168. Courts are directed to “look to the substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff’s complaint” to

21 determine whether the claims brought under the ADA or Section 504 must be exhausted like an

22 IDEA claim. Id. at 165. The analysis includes the following issues: “First, could the plaintiff have

23 brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was

24 not a school—say, a public theater or library? And second, could an adult at the school . . . have

25 pressed essentially the same grievance?” Id. at 171 (emphasis in original). If the answers to these

26 questions are “no,” then the claims do concern a FAPE, and are therefore subject to the exhaustion

27 requirements of the IDEA. Id.

1 Act respectively, rely fundamentally on allegations that the District failed to provide a FAPE to

2 Plaintiff. See Dkt. 1-1 at ¶¶ 41, 43 (“Plaintiff has a learning disability protected under the ADA . . .

3 Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff . . . removing him from class and hindering his education

4 . . . [a]s a result of that discrimination, Plaintiff suffered damages . . . and was prevented from

5 receiving the education and degree with which he sought.”). The Complaint also specifically alleges

6 that the District failed to provide a FAPE to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 32 (“lack of FAPE . . . provided to

7 him due to his disability”).

8 Under the Fry analytical framework, the allegations here establish that Plaintiff’s first and

9 second causes of action are subject to the exhaustion requirements of the IDEA. Plaintiff could not

10 have brought a claim against a public theater or library for failure to provide him with a FAPE. An

11 adult visitor or employee of the school cannot enroll in the schools here as a student, and therefore

12 a priori cannot sue the District over the terms and conditions of receiving an education with an IEP

13 which included tutoring, hard-copy homework, and the like. See Fry, 580 U.S. 154 at 172-173

14 (“[C]an anyone imagine the student making the same claim [failure to provide remedial tutoring in

15 mathematics] against a public theater or library? Or, similarly, imagine an adult visitor or employee

16 suing the school to obtain a math tutorial?”). Accordingly, under the applicable legal standards, the

17 ADA and Section 504 causes of action here are subject to administrative exhaustion under the IDEA.

18 Plaintiff argues that he “fully exhausted the administrative remedies available for his claims

19 through federal and California avenues.” [Dkt. 37 at 6]. Plaintiff alleges that he “filed a Complaint

20 with OAH [Office of Administrative Hearings] and saw it through to a mediation agreement,” and

21 “also attempted to obtain resolution through the California Department of Education.” Id. In

22 response, Defendant points out that “Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no allegation that administrative

23 remedies under the IDEA were exhausted prior to filing suit” and that “Plaintiff’s sole evidence of

24 exhaustion is a two-paragraph attorney declaration [in support of Plaintiff’s opposition brief]

25 asserting, in conclusory terms, that a complaint was filed with OAH and a mediation agreement was

26 reached.” [Dkt. 38 at 9-10].

27 In light of the absence of any allegations of exhaustion, the Court may consider whether the

1 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“But in those rare cases where a failure to exhaust is clear from the face

2 of the complaint, a defendant may successfully move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to

3 state a claim.”) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007)). Where, as here, the Complaint

4 contains no allegation of exhaustion whatsoever (and is lacking the allegations regarding exhaustion

5 raised only in the attorney declaration in opposition to the instant motion), the failure to exhaust is

6 apparent on the face of the Complaint. Plaintiff cannot cure the lack of pleading by asserting

7 attorney representations for the first time in his Opposition brief. See Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of

8 Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

9 complaint,” and “a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers.”)

10 (emphasis in original); Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).

11 Plaintiff further argues in opposition that “[w]hen it is improbable that adequate relief can

12 be obtained by pursuing administrative remedies, exhaustion may not be required.” See Dkt. 37 at

13 6 (citing Hoeft v Tucson Unified School Dist, 967 F.2d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir 1992)). While it is true

14 that “the IDEA's exhaustion requirement is not absolute,” Plaintiff has not adequately pled that an

15 exception to the exhaustion requirement applies here. Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303.

16 Plaintiff argues that he “is seeking monetary compensation for the damages he endured” and

17 “[n]either compensatory nor punitive damages are available under the administrative remedies,”

18 thus “because there was no possibility of adequate relief through administrative avenues, Plaintiff

19 is excused from exhaustion.” [Dkt. 37 at 5-6]. The Ninth Circuit has rejected this argument. See

20 K.D. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 816 F. App’x 222, 224 (9th Cir. 2020) (“K.D. also argues that

21 exhaustion would be futile because she seeks monetary damages—which are not available under

22 the IDEA administrative process. We rejected this argument in Paul G. v. Monterey Peninsula

23 Unified Sch. Dist., 933 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2019), where, as here, the damages sought were based

24 on an alleged failure to provide a FAPE.”). Accordingly, the Complaint on its face fails to

25 adequately plead any exceptions to exhaustion should apply here.

26 For all these reasons, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s ADA and Section 504 causes of

27 action. However, the Court GRANTS LEAVE TO AMEND the Complaint to afford Plaintiff and

1 alleging exhaustion or a legally recognized exception to exhaustion.

2 III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

3 Defendant argues that WCSD is immune from Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim because

4 “public school districts are not ‘person[s]’ subject to Section 1983 but are instead considered arms

5 of the state immunized from such claims by the Eleventh Amendment.” [Dkt. 30 at 25] (emphasis

6 removed) (citing Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1992); C.W. v.

7 Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 784 F.3d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 2015) (“It is well-established that a

8 school district cannot be sued for damages under § 1983.”)). At the hearing, Plaintiff conceded this

9 point, admitting that the district itself is immunized from 1983 claims. Plaintiff argued, however,

10 that the “1983 claim will apply to any teacher or employee who is subbed in for a Doe defendant so

11 the claim should not be dismissed.” [Dkt. 37 at 7].

12 For all these reasons (including especially Plaintiff’s concession that the Complaint is

13 defective on this issue), the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Section 1983 cause of action. However,

14 the Court GRANTS LEAVE TO AMEND the Complaint to afford Plaintiff and counsel an

15 opportunity to investigate and determine if there is a Rule 11 basis to substitute Doe Defendants

16 with named individual defendants.

17 IV. Judicial Notice

18 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court must take judicial notice of certain facts “if a

19 party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2).

20 Under Rule 201, a court is supplied with necessary information when the supplied information and

21 facts are “not subject to reasonable dispute because [they] (1) [are] generally known within the trial

22 court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose

23 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

24 Both Parties submit requests for judicial notice in connection with the instant motion for

25 judgment on the pleadings. See Dkts. 39, 41. Plaintiff requests judicial notice of the legislative

26 history of California Government Code Section 915. [Dkt. 41]. Defendant requests judicial notice

27 of the same. [Dkt. 39]. Defendant also requests judicial notice of a document titled “Government

] for the State of California Department of General Services. /d. at 3. Defendant further requests

2 || judicial notice that the FAQ directs users to the “Departments list” and that the “Departments list”

3 does not include the Walnut Creek School District, or any other public school district. /d. at 4.

4 At oral argument, both Parties withdrew all objections to these requests for judicial notice.

5 || Additionally, to the extent the Parties seek judicial notice of legislative histories, it is questionable

6 || whether judicial notice is even necessary. See Mollaei v. Otonomo Inc., 651 F.Supp.3d 1135, 1139

7 {| (N.D. Cal., 2023) (“Judicial notice of legislative facts is unnecessary”). In any event, because the

8 || Parties have withdrawn their objections, the requests for judicial notice are GRANTED.

9 CONCLUSION

10 For all the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Judgment

11 on the Pleadings and DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint with LEAVE TO AMEND to the extent

12 || and on the grounds noted herein. Additionally, the Court GRANTS the Parties’ requests for judicial

13 notice. [Dkts. 39, 41].

14 This Order RESOLVES Dkts. 30, 39, and 41.

3 15

A 16 || ITISSO ORDERED.

i 17 || Dated: September 4, 2026

18 □

19 '

PETER H. KANG

20 United States Magistrate Judge

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