Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 SERGIO ARIBU COMAS Case No. 1:26-cv-04387-KES-CDB (HC)

(A-Number: 039-137-919),

12 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

Petitioner, (1) DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF

13 HABEAS CORPUS, (2) DENY AS MOOT

v. RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS,

14 AND (3) DENY AS MOOT PETITIONER’S

WARDEN OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF

15 ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., COUNSEL

16 Respondents. (Docs. 1, 2, 8, 9)

17 14-Day Objection Period

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19 Petitioner Sergio Aribu Comas (“Petitioner”), a federal immigration detainee proceeding

20 pro se, initiated this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

21 2241 on June 8, 2026, while in custody of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at

22 the Central Valley Annex facility, where he remains detained. (Doc. 1). Respondents are the

23 unnamed Warden of the Central Valley Annex Detention Facility; the unnamed Acting Field Office

24 Director of the ICE San Francisco Field Office; the unnamed Acting Director of ICE; the unnamed

25 Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); and the unnamed Acting United

26 States Attorney General (collectively, “Respondents”). Id. at 1.

27 After the Court set a briefing schedule (Doc. 7), Respondents filed a motion to dismiss (Doc.

28 8) and Petitioner filed a traverse (Doc. 10). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned

1 recommends that Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

2 I. Relevant Background

3 The relevant facts are taken from the parties’ respective filings. See (Docs. 1, 8, 10).

4 Plaintiff is a native and citizen of Cuba who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent

5 resident on September 22, 1988. In August 2024, Petitioner was sentenced to a 30-month term of

6 incarceration in Florida for violation of probation related to a conviction for aggravated assault with

7 a weapon, and was notified upon release from custody in November 2025 that he was subject to a

8 hold by ICE. He was detained in Jacksonville, Florida, then transferred to El Paso, Texas, and

9 transferred again to the Central Valley Annex facility in McFarland, California. (Doc. 1 at 6-7;

10 Doc. 8 at 1-2; Doc. 8-1; Doc. 8-2 at 14).

11 On December 10, 2025, Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear charging him as

12 removable from the United States due to his conviction for an aggravated felony. (Doc. 8-3). On

13 February 23, 2026, Petitioner was ordered removed by an immigration judge. Any appeal of the

14 removal order was due by March 25, 2026; Petitioner did not file an appeal and the order became

15 final on March 26, 2026. (Doc. 8 at 2).

16 The undersigned takes judicial notice that the immigration judge ordered removal on

17 February 23, 2026, and no appeal was received.1

18 II. Governing Authority

19 Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United

20 States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A district court considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus

21 shall “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should

22 not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not

23 entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in

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1 See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited Aug. 6, 2026, using

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Petitioner’s A-Number and nationality); Daniels-Hall v. National Edu. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-

99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is appropriate to take judicial notice of this information, as it was made

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publicly available by government entities ... and neither party disputes the authenticity of the web

27 sites or the accuracy of the information displayed [ ] therein.”); Argueta v. Walgreens Co., 760 F.

Supp. 3d 1028, 1034 (E.D. Cal. 2024) (taking judicial notice of information on federal government

28 agency’s website).

1 custody upon the legality of that custody, and [] the traditional function of the writ is to secure

2 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas

3 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that custody is in violation of the U.S.

4 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

5 III. Discussion

6 Petitioner asserts a single claim for relief for violation of the Due Process Clause of the

7 Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See (Doc. 1 at 17-18).

8 A. Mandatory 90-Day Removal Period

9 “Where an alien falls within [the Immigration and Nationality Act] statutory scheme can

10 affect whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of review process

11 available to him if he wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark,

12 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). A removal order becomes final upon the earlier of either “(i)

13 a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration

14 of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of

15 Immigration Appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(47)(B); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39. Once an order of removal

16 is final, the “Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90

17 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain

18 the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). “While removal proceedings are in progress, most aliens

19 may be released on bond or paroled. After entry of a final removal order and during the 90–day

20 removal period, however, aliens must be held in custody.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 683

21 (2001).

22 Here, Petitioner was ordered removed by an immigration judge on February 23, 2026, with

23 a deadline to appeal the order no later than March 25, 2026. “Whether or not Petitioner appealed

24 the order of removal is significant here. If the decision was not appealed, then Petitioner’s removal

25 order would have become administratively final, and Section 1231(a)’s mandatory detention

26 scheme would apply … However, if Petitioner did appeal that decision, the order would not be

27 final, rendering Section 1231(a) inapplicable.” Cedeno v. Warden of Golden State Annex, No. 1:26-

28 cv-03611 (EJD), 2026 WL 1475818, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2026) (citing cases; emphasis in

1 original).

2 There is no evidence in the record that an appeal was filed and the 30-day window to appeal

3 has expired. See (Docs. 8, 10); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(b)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(c). The Executive

4 Office for Immigration Review’s database reflects that no such appeal was received. Thus,

5 Petitioner’s order of removal is administratively final and Petitioner must be held in custody for the

6 90-day removal period. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683; Martinez Reyes v. Warden of Mesa Verde

7 Det. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-1877-TLN-JDP, 2026 WL 1162728, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2026)

8 (“Here, petitioner was ordered removed on March 20, 2026. The order became final on April 21,

9 2026, which is when petitioner’s allotted time for an appeal expired. Consequently, petitioner is

10 subject to mandatory detention during his removal period, which runs through July 20, 2026.”)

11 (citation omitted).

12 The removal period begins on the “date the order of removal becomes administratively

13 final.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). As the order of removal became final on March 26, 2026, the

14 mandatory detention period ran until June 24, 2026. “As many courts have held, once a removal

15 order becomes final triggering the Government’s detention authority under § 1231(a), claims of

16 error arising from pre-removal-order detention become moot.” Quizhpe Macas v. Warden,

17 California City Det. Ctr., No. 1:26-cv-03046-DJC-EFB (HC), 2026 WL 1506814, at *3 (E.D. Cal.

18 May 29, 2026) (citing cases). Petitioner’s “due process right to be free from unduly lengthy

19 detention, however, only attaches once the 90-day period of mandatory detention expires; in other

20 words, there is no cognizable liberty interest in being free from detention during that 90-day

21 period.” Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533 at 682-83).

22 B. Detainment Beyond the Removal Period

23 “An alien ordered removed [1] who is inadmissible ... [2] [or] removable [as a result of

24 violations of status requirements or entry conditions, violations of criminal law, or reasons of

25 security or foreign policy] or [3] who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to

26 the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the

27 removal period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of supervision ....” Zadvydas,

28 533 U.S. at 682 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6); alterations in original). “Applying the canon of

1 constitutional avoidance because a statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a

2 serious constitutional problem,’ the Supreme Court read an implicit limitation into § 1231(a)(6)

3 and held that the statute limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably

4 necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States.” Vishal v. Chestnut, 811 F.

5 Supp. 3d 1179, 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (citations and quotations omitted). “Thus, after a

6 presumptively reasonable 6–month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there

7 is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must

8 respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.

9 The 90-day removal period for Petitioner, requiring mandatory detention, ended on June

10 24, 2026. The six-month period found presumptively reasonable by the Supreme Court does not

11 run until September 26, 2026. Courts within this circuit have found that this six-month period of

12 detention does not need to be consecutive to reach the limit established in Zadvydas. See Jaranow

13 v. Bondi, 819 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1236 (W.D. Wash. 2026) (citing cases). In other words, any other

14 period of time a petitioner has spent in civil immigration detainment following a final entry of

15 removal, and separate from the current period of detention, may be considered in regard to the

16 presumptively reasonable period of time. See Tang v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-01473-RAJ-TLF, 2025

17 WL 2637750, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2025) (“Here, Mr. Tang was detained for 92 days

18 following his order of removal in 2011, and has been in custody for 113 days as of this order. Thus,

19 his total period of confinement exceeds six months and is not presumptively reasonable under

20 Zadvydas.”).

21 There is no indication in the record that Petitioner was in immigration custody following an

22 order of removal at some other instance in time. Additionally, time spent in custody on criminal

23 charges does not count toward this period. See Jaranow, 819 F. Supp. 3d at 1236. Thus, the six-

24 month period of presumptively reasonable detainment following a final order of removal has not

25 run.

26 The fact that a noncitizen has been in immigration custody following a final order of

27 removal for a period less than six months does not necessarily foreclose a claim that the detention

28 is unlawful under Zadvydas. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 384 (2005) (“Zadvydas did not

1 hold that the statute authorizes detention until it approaches constitutional limits; it held that, since

2 interpreting the statute to authorize indefinite detention (one plausible reading) would approach

3 constitutional limits, the statute should be read (in line with the other plausible reading) to authorize

4 detention only for a period consistent with the purpose of effectuating removal.”) (emphasis in

5 original). “The six-month presumption of reasonability under Zadvydas is ‘just that—a

6 presumption.’” Burunsuzyan v. Noem, No. 5:26-cv-00049-RGK-AGR, 2026 WL 246067, at *5

7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2026) (quoting Clark, 543 U.S. at 387).

8 Regardless, it is Petitioner’s burden to provide “good reason to believe that there is no

9 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” after which the government

10 “must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Here,

11 Petitioner does not provide any argument in support of there being no significant likelihood of

12 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See (Docs. 1, 10). Cf. Burunsuzyan, 2026 WL

13 246067, at *5 (noting evidence in the petitioner’s favor that immigration and other government

14 officials repeatedly advised the petitioner of its unsuccessful efforts to obtain travel documents

15 from Syria); Nunez Sanchez v. Warden, Central Valley Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-04368-

16 DJC-CKD, 2026 WL 2214195, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2026) (“Petitioner argues that the

17 Government is not attempting to effectuate his removal to Cuba, and Respondents have not asserted

18 otherwise. As for removal to Mexico, Petitioner contends that removable is not likely in the

19 foreseeable future as Respondents have offered ‘nothing beyond the Notice of Removal issued four

20 months ago’ and have no ‘tangible’ plans for removal. Petitioner has met his initial burden.”).

21 Thus, as the six-month period of presumptively reasonable detention has not run and

22 Petitioner has not met his burden under Zadvydas, the undersigned will recommend that the petition

23 be denied.

24 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

25 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

26 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be DENIED;

27 2. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 8) be DENIED as moot;

28 3. Petitioner’s motions to appoint counsel (Docs. 2, 9) be DENIED as moot; and

1 4. The Clerk of the Court be DIRECTED to close this case.

2 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

3 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after

4 | being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections with

5 | the Court. Any objections filed should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

6 | and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without leave of Court and good cause

7 | shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party

8 | wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF

9 | document and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity.

10 | Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when

11 | reviewing these findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

12 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in

13 | the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing

14 | Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

15 | ITIS SO ORDERED.

'© | Dated: _ August 11, 2026 | Wr bY

17 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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