The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
:
Christopher F.,1 :
: Case No. 2:24-cv-3148
Plaintiff, :
: Judge Graham
v. :
:
Commissioner of Social : Magistrate Judge Litkovitz
Security, :
:
Defendant. :
OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Christopher F. (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action for judicial review of
the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying
Plaintiff’s applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). See Statement of
Errors, doc. 8. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)
which found Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors unpersuasive and recommended that the
Commissioner’s final decision be affirmed. Doc. 11. Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R
are now before the Court and ripe for ruling. Doc. 12. For the reasons that follow, the
Court OVERRULES the objections, ADOPTS the R&R, in full, and therefore
AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision and DISMISSES this matter.
1 Pursuant to General Order 22-01, due to significant privacy concerns in social security
cases, any opinion, order, judgment, or other disposition in social security cases in the
Southern District of Ohio shall refer to plaintiffs only by their first names and last initials.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Social Security
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must suffer from a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death
or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) (DIB), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (SSI). The impairment
must render the claimant unable to engage in the work previously performed or in
any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Regulations promulgated by the Commissioner establish a five-step sequential
evaluation process for disability determinations:
1) If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, the
claimant is not disabled.
2) If the claimant does not have a severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment – i.e., an
impairment that significantly limits his or her physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities – the claimant is
not disabled.
3) If the claimant has a severe impairment(s) that meets or
equals one of the listings in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the
regulations and meets the duration requirement, the
claimant is disabled.
4) If the claimant’s impairment does not prevent him or her
from doing his or her past relevant work, the claimant is
not disabled.
5) If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work,
the claimant is not disabled. If the claimant cannot make
an adjustment to other work, the claimant is disabled.
Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 404.1520(b)-(g)).
The claimant has the burden of proof at the first four steps of the sequential
evaluation process. Id.; Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 548 (6th Cir.
2004). Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case by showing an inability to
perform the relevant previous employment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful employment and that
such employment exists in the national economy. Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 652; Harmon
v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 289, 291 (6th Cir. 1999).
Judicial Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s determination is limited in scope by 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) and involves a twofold inquiry: (1) whether the findings of the ALJ
are supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ applied the correct
legal standards. See Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009);
see also Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir. 2007).
The Commissioner’s findings must stand if they are supported by “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting Consolidated
Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence consists of
“more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance.” Rogers v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). In deciding whether the
Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court considers
the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1978).
The Court must also determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards in the disability determination. Even if substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s conclusion that the plaintiff is not disabled, “a decision of the Commissioner
will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that
error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial
right.” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746); see also Wilson,
378 F.3d at 545–46 (reversal required even though ALJ’s decision was otherwise
supported by substantial evidence where ALJ failed to give good reasons for not
giving weight to treating physician’s opinion, thereby violating the agency’s own
regulations).
Objections to a Report and Recommendation
If a party raises timely objections to the report and recommendation of a
magistrate judge, the court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of
the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the court
“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Hardy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
554 F. Supp. 3d 900, 904 (E.D. Mich. 2021) “The filing of objections provides the
district court with the opportunity… to focus attention on those issues-factual and
legal-that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” Hardy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 554
F. Supp. 3d 900, 904 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (quoting United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d
947 (6th Cir. 1981) and Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d
435 (1985)). Therefore, “only those specific objections to the magistrate's report made
to the district court will be preserved for appellate review.” Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of
Tchrs. Loc. 231, Am. Fed'n of Tchrs., AFL-CIO, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).
SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
Neither party raises any issues with the Magistrate Judge’s recitation of the
ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in the R&R:
The ALJ applied the sequential evaluation process and made
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. [Plaintiff] meets the insured status requirements of
the Social Security Act through June 30, 2025.
2. [Plaintiff] engaged in substantial gainful activity
during 2022 (20 CFR 404.1520(b) and 404.1571 et
seq.).
3. However, there has been a continuous 12-month
period(s) during which [plaintiff] did not engage in
substantial gainful activity. The remaining findings
address the period(s) [plaintiff] did not engage in
substantial gainful activity.
4. [Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments:
Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, Asthma, Migraine, Traumatic
Brain Injury, Obstructive Sleep Apnea, a history of
Degenerative Joint Disease of the Bilateral Shoulders -
status/post Rotator Cuff and Bicep Repair procedures,
a history of a healed, nondisplaced Fracture of the
Coccyx, Degenerative Joint Disease of the Bilateral
Knees, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, Anxiety, and
Major Depressive Disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
5. [Plaintiff] does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in
20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
6. After careful consideration of the entire record, the
[ALJ] finds that [plaintiff] has the residual functional
capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b), except he could stand and/or walk for 4
hours in an 8-hour work day; he could sit for 6 hours in
an 8-hour workday; he could occasionally climb ramps
and stairs; he should avoid climbing ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; he could occasionally stoop, kneel, or
crouch; he should avoid crawling; he could
occasionally reaching overhead with the bilateral upper
extremities; he [could] frequently push and/or pull,
handle, and finger with the bilateral upper extremities;
he should avoid exposure to hazards, including moving
machinery, heavy machinery, and unprotected heights;
he should avoid commercial driving; he should avoid
concentrated exposure to extreme loud noises, such
as that found at a rock concert; he should avoid
concentrated exposure to vibrations, such as with a
jackhammer; he should avoid concentrated exposure
to fumes, odors, dust, gases, and pulmonary irritants;
he could perform simple, routine tasks with few
detailed instructions, but should avoid fast pace work
or jobs with strict production quotas; he could tolerate
occasional changes and occasional decision-making in
a static work environment, where any changes are well
explained; and he could tolerate occasional, but
superficial interactions with coworkers, supervisors,
and the public, where superficial is defined as that
which is beyond the performance of job duties and job
functions for specific purpose and a short duration.
7. [Plaintiff] is unable to perform any past relevant work
(20 CFR 404.1565).
8. [Plaintiff] was born [in] . . . 1978 and was 41 years
old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-
49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR
404.1563).
9. [Plaintiff] has at least a high school education (20
CFR 404.1564).
10. Transferability of job skills is not material to the
determination of disability because using the Medical-
Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that
[plaintiff] is “not disabled,” whether or not [plaintiff] has
transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
11. Considering [plaintiff]’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there are
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that [plaintiff] can perform (20 CFR 404.1569
and 404.1569a).
12. [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as defined
in the Social Security Act, from January 20, 2020,
through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).
(Tr. 2004-22).
Doc. 11, # 2332-34. 2
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff encourages the Court to consider all the arguments he presents in his
Statement of Specific Errors; however, his objections to the R&R are narrower.3
As the Magistrate Judge stated in the R&R, Plaintiff alleged two errors related
to step four of the sequential evaluation process. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
2 Page numbers following the “#” symbol refer to the ECF PAGEID numbering system. Page
numbers following “Tr.” refer to the pagination of the administrative record.
3 As noted above, the Court need only conduct de novo review “of those portions of the report
or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). The Court reviews the remaining portions of the R&R—to which no objection is
made—for clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, advisory committee note (“When no timely objection
is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record
in order to accept the recommendation.”).
improperly dismissed the findings of psychological consulting opinion sources that
plaintiff should be limited to one- or one-to-three step tasks. Second, Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ improperly substituted her own definition of “superficial interaction” for
purposes of her RFC determination.
As to the first assignment of error, the Magistrate Judge discussed the two
medical opinions at issue (one of which was based upon the findings of the other) and
the ALJ’s assessment of the same. See doc. 11, # 2335-42. The Magistrate Judge found
that the ALJ adequately explained the consistency and supportability factors in
discounting each opinion. Id. Plaintiff raises no objection regarding this portion of the
R&R, and the Court finds no clear error on the face of the same.
Plaintiff’s objections focus instead on the second assignment of error, regarding
the ALJ’s definition of “superficial interaction.” In a nutshell, Plaintiff, at the
administrative hearing, pressed for a definition of the phrase which would have been
work-preclusive, while the ALJ used a definition which was accounted for in the RFC
determination. Plaintiff’s proffered definition came from a separate decision by the
Appeals Council in an unrelated case.
The Magistrate Judge found Plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive, observing that
“decisions of the appeals council are not binding in unrelated cases” (doc. 11, # 2343
(citing Markcus C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:22-cv-1917, 2023 WL 1783514, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 2023) (report and recommendation), adopted, 2023 WL 2162261
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 2023))) and reasoning that “the ALJ alone is responsible for
determining a plaintiff’s RFC.” Id. at # 2344 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c)). However,
the Magistrate Judge further noted that “the relevant question… is not whether the
ALJ explained why she adopted a particular definition of the term
‘superficial’…rather, the question is whether an ALJ’s chosen definition of the term
superficial is ‘supported by substantial evidence’ and ‘not contradicted by other record
evidence.” Id. at # 2346 (quoting Richard S. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:22-CV-2176,
2023 WL 2805347, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 2023), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 2:22-CV-2176, 2023 WL 6318135 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2023)).
In his objections, Plaintiff agrees with and reiterates the Magistrate Judge’s
articulation of the relevant question. See doc. 12, # 2350. However, he argues that the
Magistrate Judge “seems to misinterpret the purpose of the reason behind submitting
the definition of superficial from the appeals council.” Id. at # 2351. Plaintiff contends
that he was not intending to “claim that the ALJ was required to adopt a certain
definition,” but “was providing evidence regarding a potential definition for the term
‘superficial’ interaction.” Id. Ergo, Plaintiff reasons, the ALJ’s definition is
contradicted by other record evidence.
The Court is skeptical as to whether Plaintiff can convert portions of a non-
binding decision into “record evidence” that the ALJ must explain away. Plaintiff’s
argument appears to depend on that framework to conjure, at most, an articulation
error on the part of the ALJ for failing to “[explain] why her definition was better
suited than the definition provided by the Appeals Council.” Doc. 12, # 2352.
Regardless, Plaintiff concedes that “the term [(‘superficial’)] was found to be
supported by substantial evidence as the ALJ included it in the [RFC].” Id. at # 2351.
“Thus,” Plaintiff continues, “the question is what does that term mean.” Id. But the
ALJ answered that question in the decision when she expressly defined “superficial”
as “that which is beyond the performance of job duties and job functions for specific
purpose and a short duration.” Tr. 2009. That is the definition which is substantially
supported by the record evidence, as Plaintiff concedes. Plaintiff cannot endorse the
substantial support for the ALJ’s definition only to claim that it actually supports the
materially different definition that he prefers. See Betz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No.
3:21-CV-2408, 2022 WL 17717496, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 8, 2022), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:21 CV 2408, 2022 WL 17985680 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 29,
2022) (“the ALJ needed to explain why he determined that [claimant] was limited to
superficial contact as [the ALJ] defined it, and it is sufficient that the record not be
clearly contrary to that definition.”).
In sum, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s objections.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s benefits
determination. Therefore, Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED, the Magistrate
Judge’s R&R is ADOPTED, Plaintiff’s Statement of Specific Errors is
OVERRULED, the Commissioner’s finding is AFFIRMED, and this case is
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James L. Graham
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge
DATE: September 4, 2026