Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CLE   RK

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 9/3/2   026

--------------------------------------------------------------X U.S. DISTRICT COURT

MULTI-STATE PARTNERSHIP FOR EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

PREVENTION, LLC, LONG ISLAND OFFICE

Plaintiff,

ORDER

-against-

24-CV-00013 (JMW)

SAMUEL KENNEDY and KENNEDY

TECHNOLOGY MK,

Defendants.

--------------------------------------------------------------X

A P P E A R A N C E S:

Kathleen R. Fitzpatrick

KRF Legal

249 Smith St, #118

Brooklyn, NY 11231

-and-

Peter Brown

Peter Brown & Associates PLLC

260 Madison Avenue, 16th Floor

New York, NY 10016

Attorneys for Defendants

No further appearances

WICKS, Magistrate Judge:

Multi-State Partnership for Prevention, LLC (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against

Defendants Samuel Kennedy (“Kennedy”) and Kennedy Technology MK, (“KTMK” and

collectively, the “Defendants”) for inter alia invalidity of copyright and non-infringement of

copyright claims arising out of Plaintiff's development of computer software program developed

in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. (See generally, ECF Nos. 22, 106.)

The parties are amid fact discovery, which is set to close on October 2, 2026. (See

Electronic Order dated 4/11/2026.) However, Counsel for Defendants, Kathleen R. Fitzpatrick of

the KRF Legal Firm (“Fitzpatrick”), and Peter Brown of the firm of Peter Brown & Associates

PLLC (“Brown” and together with Fitzpatrick, “Counsel”), filed a motion to be relieved as

counsel pursuant to Local Civil Rule 1.4, due to irreconcilable conflicts and a breakdown in the

attorney-client relationship. (See ECF No. 139.) Though afforded an opportunity to oppose this

application, neither Plaintiff nor Kennedy has filed opposition. (See Electronic Order dated

8/20/2026; ECF No. 140.) For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Withdraw as counsel for

Defendants (ECF No. 139) is GRANTED.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Rule 1.4 of the Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and

Eastern Districts of New York governs the withdrawal of counsel.

[A]n attorney who has appeared for a party may be relieved or displaced only by

order of the court. Such an order may be issued following the filing of a motion to

withdraw, and only upon a showing by affidavit or otherwise of satisfactory reasons

for withdrawal or displacement and the posture of the case, and whether or not the

attorney is asserting a retaining or charging lien. … All motions to withdraw must

be served upon the client and (unless excused by the court) upon all other parties.

Proof of such service upon the client shall be filed on the docket in each case where

withdrawal is sought.1

Local Civ. R. 1.4(b).

“Whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw as counsel is within the sound discretion

of the district court.” Finkel v. Fraterrelli Brothers, Inc., No. 05-CV-1551 (ADS)(AKT), 2006

WL 8439497, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2006) (citing Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir.

1 As part of the motion, Counsel submitted a Certificate of Service that this motion to withdraw and

supporting documents have been served upon all Defendants through service to Kennedy on August 19,

2026. (See ECF No. 139-1.)

1999)). “In determining whether to grant a motion to withdraw as counsel, ‘district courts ...

analyze two factors: the reasons for withdrawal and the impact of the withdrawal on the timing

of the proceeding.’” Schwartz v. AMF Bowling Ctr., Inc., 746 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (E.D.N.Y. 2024)

(quoting Blue Angel Films, Ltd. v. First Look Studios, Inc., 08-CV-6469 (DAB)(JCF), 2011 WL

672245, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011)). New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct

(“NYRPC”)2 neatly divide the bases for withdrawal into two broad categories, namely,

mandatory (see NYRPC Rule 1.16(a)) and optional (see NYRPC Rule 1.16(c)). The Rule has

recently updated as of July 1, 2026. See Joint Order of the Departments of the N.Y. State Sup.

Ct., Appellate Division, (June 1, 2026),

https://www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/rules/comments/orders/AdministrativeOrder-

JointAppDivOrder-RulesOfProfessionalConduct-Rule1-16-RiskAssessments-060126signedr.pdf

The latest amendments to Rule 1.16 mandates attorneys to “make reasonable efforts to inquire

into and assess the facts and circumstances of each engagement.” NYRPC 1.16(a).

With this framework in mind, the Court addresses the instant application.

DISCUSSION

Fitzpatrick and Brown seek to withdraw pursuant to NYRPC 1.16(c)(4), 1.16(c)(7), and

1.16(c)(10), which provide:

(4) the client insists upon taking action with which the lawyer has a fundamental

disagreement;

***

(7) the client fails to cooperate in or otherwise renders the engagement unreasonably

difficult for the lawyer to carry out;

2 “The New York Rules of Professional Conduct govern the conduct of attorneys in federal courts sitting

in New York as well as in New York State courts.” Steele v. Bell, No. 11-CV-9343 (RA), 2012 WL

6641491, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2012) (citation omitted); see also Rapaport v. Finkelman, No. 24-

CV-5942 (JGLC), 2026 WL 2583071, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2026) (internal citations omitted) (“Courts

typically ‘look to New York Rules of Professional Conduct for guidance on motions to withdraw.’”)

***

(10) the client provides informed consent to the lawyer's termination of the engagement.

NYRPC 1.16(c)(4), (7), (10).

Having considered the declarations in support of this motion, the circumstances for

optional withdrawal have been clearly established, namely, Counsel’s inability to resolve

conflicts over litigation strategies thereby causing a breakdown in the attorney-client

relationship. “[T]he existence of an irreconcilable conflict between attorney and client is a proper

basis for the attorney to cease representing his client.” Winters v. Phountain PH Holdings Corp.,

No. 23-CV-01668 (JMA)(JMW), 2024 WL 198381, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2024) (quoting

Casper v. Lew Lieberbaum & Co., No. 97-CV-3016 (JGK)(RLE), 1999 WL 335334, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Importantly, “[m]any Courts have held that such a breakdown is sufficient to

warrant withdrawal.” Vorburger v. Perfect Moving and Storage LLC, et al., No. 25-CV-6387

(DEH), 2026 WL 2283392, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2026); see id. (quoting PWV Consultants

LLC v. Chebil Realty LLC, No. 20-CV-9030 (LTS)(JW), 2022 WL 20527354, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

Oct. 18, 2022) (“Satisfactory reasons for withdrawal include ‘the client's failure to pay legal fees,

a client's lack of cooperation — including lack of communication with counsel, and the existence

of an irreconcilable conflict between attorney and client.’”)); see also City Merch. Inc. v. Tian

Tian Trading Inc., No. 19-CV-09649 (MKV), 2021 WL 119075, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2021)

(collecting cases) (“Several courts have found that serious disagreements over litigation strategy

and a breakdown in communication between attorney and client are grounds sufficient for

withdrawal.”); Papadatos v. Home Depot U.S.A, Inc., No. 21-CV-3208 (WFK)(JMW), 2022 WL

2612353, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2022) (“When a client makes it unreasonably difficult for an

attorney to effectively carry out representation for the client, that is sufficient grounds to grant a

motion to withdraw.”)

The lack of opposition from Plaintiff and the Defendants also suggests that withdrawal is

the appropriate course here. Doe v. Holy Bagel Cafe II, Inc., No. 15-CV-03620 (MKB)(JMW),

2024 WL 4708707, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2024) (“[C]onsidering the absence of opposition by

Defendant Sanchez, withdrawal is appropriate.”) Indeed, as set forth in Brown’s declaration,

Kennedy has consented to this application. (ECF No. 139-2 at ¶ 9.) Such consent is yet another

ground that warrants withdrawal. See Steele, 2012 WL 6641491, at *3 (granting a motion to

withdraw pursuant to Rule 1.16(c)(10)). Therefore, the grounds for withdrawal under Rule

1.16(c) have been satisfied.

Furthermore, pursuant to EDNY Local Civil Rule 1.4(b), an attorney seeking to withdraw

as counsel of record must indicate whether a retaining or charging lien is being asserted. Here,

Counsel affirmatively represent that they will not be asserting or retaining a charging lien. (See

ECF Nos. 139-2 at ¶11; 139-3 at ¶ 5.)

As a result of this motion being granted, a stay is appropriate. A thirty-day stay of

proceedings will provide sufficient time and opportunity for Defendants to retain substitute

counsel, and for new counsel to become familiar with the matter. “Courts often find it

appropriate to grant a short stay in order to alleviate any possible prejudice to the client whose

counsel is withdrawing and allow the client time to find new counsel.” Bueno v. Allcity Med.,

P.C., No. 22-CV-2216 (JGLC)(KHP), 2023 WL 7001398, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2023); see

Allen v. Krucial Staffing, LLC, No. 20-CV-2859 (JGK), 2022 WL 2106447, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June

9, 2022) (granting a thirty-day stay of proceedings after granting a motion to withdraw to ensure

that plaintiffs have time to retain new counsel or decide to proceed pro se); Jimenez v. Garvies

Point Bagel Corp., No. 24-CV-04449 (SJB)(JMW), 2025 WL 3299442, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7,

2025) (same). Notably, Counsel has also requested that a short stay be granted. (See ECF Nos.

139-2 at ¶ 15; 139-3 at ¶ 6.)

Therefore, Counsels’ motion to withdraw is granted.

CONCLUSION

The Motion to Withdraw as counsel for Defendants (ECF No. 139) is GRANTED. All

proceedings in this case are stayed until October 5, 2026, so that Defendants are afforded the

opportunity to retain substitute counsel.3 The parties shall appear for an in-person Status

Conference in the Central Islip Courthouse, Courtroom 1020, on October 13, 2026, at 11:30

a.m., before the undersigned. Outgoing counsel is directed to serve a copy of this Order upon

Defendants at their last known addresses and email addresses and file proof of service on ECF

on or before September 4, 2026.

Dated: Central Islip, New York

September 3, 2026

S O O R D E R E D:

James M. Wicks

/S/

JAMES M. WICKS

United States Magistrate Judge

3 Defendant Kennedy Technology MK is on notice that it may not appear pro se and must retain

counsel. “A person who is not an attorney may only represent themselves in a pro se action; they may not

represent another entity.” Krick v. Raytheon Co., No. 23-CV-8093, 2024 WL 4441029, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.

Oct. 8, 2024), appeal denied, 757 F. Supp. 3d 342 (E.D.N.Y. 2024); see also La Barbera v. Fed. Metal &

Glass Corp., 666 F. Supp. 2d 341, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Such a failure to obtain counsel constitutes a

failure to defend because corporations cannot proceed in federal court pro se.”) (citing Shapiro, Bernstein

& Co. v. Contl Record Co., 386 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam)). Failure to appear with

counsel could lead to a recommendation of default. See Testaccio v. Rahim, No. 21-CV-1916 (JS)(AYS),

2021 WL 1999411, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2021) (this “rule has been applied to dismiss any action or

motion filed by a corporation purporting to act pro se.”)