Lopez-Lopez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

CONRADO UDIEL LOPEZ-LOPEZ CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:26-CV-1861

SECTION P

VERSUS

JUDGE JERRY EDWARDS, JR.

ANGEL WOLFE, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID J. AYO

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Conrado Udiel Lopez-Lopez,1 a detainee in the custody of the Department

of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”), petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.2 Respondents

oppose the petition. [doc. # 7]. For reasons below, the Court should DENY the petition.

Background

Petitioner is a citizen of Guatemala. [Doc. 1, p. 2]. He entered the United States on

approximately August 27, 2007. Id. “For approximately 19 years following his entry,

Petitioner maintained stable housing and employment, has no criminal history and has three

United States Citizen children.” Id. On an unknown date, DHS “processed” Petitioner,

“placed [him] into full § 240 removal proceedings,” and released him on bond. [Id., p. 8]. He

“then lived in the United States for over seven years before being detained from the interior.”

Id. On April 7, 2026, ICE detained Petitioner during a traffic stop. [Id., p. 2].

Petitioner filed this proceeding on June 3, 2026. He claims that the Government is

violating his right to due process by failing to afford him a bond hearing. [Id., p. 10]. He

1 Petitioner’s ‘A-Number’ is 221-483-162.

2 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under 28

U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court.

argues inter alia, “The government’s blanket refusal to afford a bond hearing, the basic

procedural safeguard distinguishing lawful civil detention from punishment, violates both

statutory command and constitutional guarantee.” Id. Respondents opposed the petition on

July 8, 2026. [Doc. 7]. Petitioner did not file a reply.

On July 20, 2026, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed.3 Petitioner has

until approximately August 19, 2026, to appeal the removal order.

Law and Analysis

I. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 versus 8 U.S.C. § 1226

The Fifth Circuit has held that aliens who have not been admitted may be detained

without bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) even when they have been present in

the United States for many years. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir.

2026). In reaching its conclusion, the court analyzed the meaning of “seeking admission” and

“applicants for admission” in 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Id. The court concluded that “applicants for

admission,” which includes all aliens who have not previously been admitted to the United

States, are necessarily “seeking admission” and, therefore, subject to mandatory detention

under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Id.

Here, Buenrostro-Mendez governs Petitioner’s detention status: he is detained under

Section 1225. “If the officer determines at the time of the interview that an alien has a

credible fear of persecution (within the meaning of clause (v)), the alien shall be detained for

further consideration of the application for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis

added). “Any alien subject to the procedures under this clause shall be detained pending a

final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until

removed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (emphasis added). “Subject to subparagraphs (B)

3 https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited

and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining

immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a

doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section

1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

Plainly, Section 1225 does not authorize release on bond. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138

S. Ct. 830 (2018). Petitioner is, therefore, not statutorily entitled to bond or a bond hearing.

The Court should dismiss his statutory claim accordingly.

II. Due Process

Petitioner claims that the Due Process Clause entitles him to a bond hearing. In Ford

v. Ducote, et al., 2020 WL 8642257 (W.D. La. Nov. 2, 2020), the district judge opined in

pertinent part:

In Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959

(2020), a Sri Lankan national was stopped 25 yards after crossing the

southern border of the United States. He was detained for expedited

removal. An asylum officer rejected his credible fear claim. Thuraissigiam

then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in which he, for the first time,

asserted a fear of persecution and requested a new opportunity to apply for

asylum. In reversing the appellate court, the Supreme Court found the

detention did not violate the Due Process Clause. Although not a case of

unreasonable detention, the case is important as to Due Process rights for

illegal aliens. Citing Nishimare Ekin v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660

(1892), the Court held that with regard to foreigners who have never been

naturalized or acquired any domicile or residence in the United States, “‘the

decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers

expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.’” 140 S. Ct. at 1977.

In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), Kim had entered the United States

lawfully and had resided in this country for over 10 years before committing

a crime, which made him deportable. Like Ford, Kim argued his mandatory

detention violated due process when no determination had been made

whether he posed a danger to society or a flight risk. Also, like Ford, Kim

asked for an individualized bond hearing which was not authorized under

the statute. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit found the detention without a bond hearing violated Kim’s due

process rights. In reversing the District Court and Ninth Circuit, the

Supreme Court held detention during these proceedings did not violate

Kim’s due process rights.

Also, like Ford, Kim relied on the case of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678

(2001). In Zadvydas, two aliens were held pending removal after final order

of deportation. However, no country would take them, so their detention

continued for years beyond the 90–day removal period of 8 U.S.C. §1231(a).

The Supreme Court held that “once removal is no longer reasonably

foreseeable, continued detention is not authorized by the statute.” Id. at 699.

The Supreme Court concluded that six months was a presumptively

reasonable period of detention, beyond the removal period, to remove aliens

ordered deported. Id. at 702.

The Kim Court held that Zadvydas was materially different because the

detention of the aliens in Zadvydas was “indefinite” and “potentially

permanent.” Therefore, the correct standard to apply is to determine

whether Ford’s detention is “indefinite” or “potentially permanent.”

Ford’s detention is not “indefinite” or “potentially permanent.” Ford’s

detention ends when the removal proceedings end. Ford’s focus on

“unreasonable detention” is incorrect. As long as Ford’s detention is not

“indefinite” nor “potentially permanent,” Ford’s due process rights are not

violated. See also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830 (2018).

2020 WL 8642257 at *2-3.

Here, Petitioner is not constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing. See Demore v. Kim,

538 U.S. 510, 531, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 155 L. Ed. 2d 724 (2003) (“Detention during removal

proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”).4 As in Ford, Petitioner’s

detention is not indefinite or potentially permanent. An immigration judge ordered him

removed on July 20, 2026, and Petitioner has until August 19, 2026, to appeal to the Board

of Immigration Appeals.5 Accordingly, the Court should deny Petitioner’s claim. Petitioner

may re-file his claim should his detention become indefinite or potentially permanent.

4 See also Romero v. Tate, 2026 WL 1067566, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2026); Bekboev v. Vergara, 2026

WL 1011244, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 14, 2026); Mlaih v. Noem, 2026 WL 787536, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar.

19, 2026).

5 https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation

III. Procedural Due Process

Petitioner does not claim that the Government violated his right to procedural due

process. At best, he cites Mathews v Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), an oft-cited case

involving procedural due process. But Petitioner does not ever claim that he lacked

procedural due process or that he lacked notice and an opportunity to be heard before the

Government deprived him of liberty. Petitioner only seems to claim that absent a bond

hearing, Respondents are violating his right to due process. Out of caution, the undersigned

examines an ostensible claim of lack of procedural due process.

Preliminarily, the undersigned highlights that the two issues—procedural due

process and the statutory interpretation of Sections 1225 and 1226 as addressed above—

overlap but are distinct. Even though Petitioner is detained under Section 1225 and subject

to mandatory detention by statute, his statutory and regulatory statuses do not foreclose his

procedural due process claim.6

Next, courts “examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks

whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the

[government]; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation

were constitutionally sufficient.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460

(1989) (internal citations omitted).

A. Liberty Interest

“No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law[.]” U.S.

CONST. AMEND. V. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United

States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or

6 See Marceau v. Noem, 2026 WL 368953, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2026) (“Marceau’s constitutional

interest in her liberty exists above and apart from the Immigration and Nationality Act and attendant

regulations.”) (citing A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025)).

permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “Freedom from imprisonment—

from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of

the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690.

In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the

requirements of procedural due process applied to parole revocations. The Court first noted

that “the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of

unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on

others.” Id. at 482. Buttressing the parolee’s interest in liberty is the society’s interest “in

not having parole revoked because of erroneous information or because of an erroneous

evaluation of the need to revoke parole” and its interest “in treating the parolee with basic

fairness.” Id. at 484.

The Supreme Court explained that parole “enables [the parolee] to do a wide range of

things open to persons” who have never been in custody or convicted of any crime, including

to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring

attachments of normal life.” Id. at 482. “Though the [government] properly subjects [the

parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring and seeking

authorization to work and travel, his “condition is very different from that of confinement in

a prison.” Id. “The parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be

revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions.” Id. Therefore, a parolee possesses

a protected interest in his “continued liberty.” Id.

Here, Petitioner’s release on bond was similar to the parole described in Morrissey.

His release, for example, allowed him—with the Government’s explicit permission—the

freedom to live, work, associate, and establish ties in the United States. Thus, Petitioner had

a protected liberty interest in his release.7

B. Procedures Attendant Upon Petitioner’s Deprivation

“The right to prior notice and a hearing is central to the Constitution’s command of

due process,” as it “ensure[s] abstract fair play to the individual” and “minimizes

substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations.” United States v. James Daniel Good Real

Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993). “The constitutional minimum of due process guarantees that

notice and an opportunity to be heard be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner.” Gibson v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 700 F.3d 227, 239 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fuentes v.

Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The opportunity to

present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a

fundamental due process requirement.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,

546 (1985). “‘[T]he root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause” is “‘that an individual be

given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant protected interest.’”

Id. (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S.

113, 127, 110 S. Ct. 975, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990) (“Applying [the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424

U.S. 113, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976)] test, the Court usually has held that the

Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty . .

. . ” (emphasis in original)).

7 See, e.g., O.F.C. v. Almodovar, 2026 WL 74262, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2026) (“Both immigration

parolees and those released on immigration bond are free to live their lives in this country and to form

the . . . enduring attachments of normal life. . . . While released on bond, Petitioner was able to resume

his life with his U.S.-citizen wife and his young U.S.-citizen children (one of whom was born while

Petitioner was released). . . . The Court has little difficulty concluding that if the Government wishes

to strip Petitioner of that liberty and these attachments, it must do so in a manner consistent with due

process.”) (internal quotation marks, quoted source, and record citation omitted).

Here, Petitioner does not argue that he was denied notice and an opportunity to be

heard, which are both key components of due process. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 (“The

essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond.”). And

even assuming Petitioner did not receive adequate process before his re-detention, he does

not plead a violation of his right to procedural due process because he only seeks a bond

hearing.

Petitioner appears to argue that the potential error in failing to provide a bond

hearing is detaining an individual who is not a flight risk or a danger to society. However,

as explained above Respondents are statutorily required to detain him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.

Thus, even if a neutral decisionmaker determined that he was not a flight risk or a danger,

Respondents would still detain him.

In Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003), the statute at issue

required all sex offenders to register so that their information could be published. The

respondent, a convicted sex offender, argued that the law violated his procedural due process

rights by requiring him to register without a hearing as to whether he was “currently

dangerous.” Id. at 6. Rejecting the argument, the Court opined, “Plaintiffs who assert a right

to a hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts they seek to establish in

that hearing are relevant under the statutory scheme.” Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Whether

the respondent was not dangerous was “of no consequence” under the statute because it

required registration of all convicted sex offenders. Id. at 7.

Here, whether Petitioner is a risk of flight or danger is largely irrelevant to whether

the Government must—under relevant statutory and regulatory schemes—detain him and

remove him.8 Relevant issues, for example, include his identity, whether there were any

8 To be sure, noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) may be released on parole for “urgent

humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” if they “present neither a security risk nor a risk

relevant changed circumstances, his citizenship, whether he was ever admitted or paroled,

when he entered this country, and whether he is entitled to protection from removal. The

Government has provided, and is providing, process after detaining him in the form of a

Notice to Appear,9 the ability to respond to the Government’s motions, the opportunity to be

heard in a hearing or via motion(s), the opportunity to present evidence, and a potential

appeal. See Clavijo v. Thompson, 2026 WL 923310, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2026) (“8 USC

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), mandates detention of those falling within the definition of ‘applicants for

admission’ without regard to any individualized custody determination concerning

dangerousness or flight risk. And the Fifth Circuit in Buenrostro-Mendez has now

determined that such detention lawfully applies to ‘applicants for admission’ like Petitioner.

A hearing as to dangerousness or flight risk is thus irrelevant to the lawfulness of his

detention under the statute.”).

Accordingly, the Government has not violated Petitioner’s right to procedural due

process. The Court should dismiss this ostensible claim.

Recommendation

For reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Conrado Udiel Lopez-

Lopez’s petition be DENIED AND DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by

this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and

of absconding.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). Thus, a determination that Petitioner

is neither a flight risk nor a danger is not completely irrelevant. Here, however, Petitioner does not

contend that he is entitled to release for urgent humanitarian reasons or for significant public benefit.

And even if he did, he had and has the opportunity to present such a contention in his removal

proceedings. If the Secretary of Homeland Security agreed, then Petitioner could attempt to

demonstrate that he is neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding.

9 [Doc. 7-1, p. 5].

Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may

respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy

of any objections or response to the district judge at the time of filing.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the

proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within

fourteen (14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame

authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking

either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court,

except upon grounds of plain error.

In Chambers, Lafayette, Louisiana, this 4th day of August, 2026.

United Staten Mapireate Judge

10