The opinion
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued April 10, 2026 Decided September 4, 2026
No. 24-7038
RONDA L. DAVIS, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
KARONE GRAY, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
APPELLEE
Consolidated with 24-7039
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:10-cv-01564)
Anna Wells, Student Counsel, argued the cause for
appellants. With her on the briefs were Aderson B. Francois,
Supervisor, and Alexandra Neuhaus-Follini and Cailey
McByrne, Student Counsel.
Holly M. Johnson, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia,
2
argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Brian
L. Schwalb, Attorney General, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor
General, and Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor
General. Graham E. Phillips, Deputy Solicitor General,
entered an appearance.
Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and RAO,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO.
RAO, Circuit Judge: In 2010, the District of Columbia
Child and Family Services Agency laid off more than one
hundred employees in order to implement significant budget
cuts. Some of those former employees filed a class action
lawsuit alleging race and age discrimination. After the district
court granted summary judgment for the District, this court
resurrected the plaintiffs’ race-based disparate impact claims
with respect to two employment practices. On remand, the
plaintiffs made a prima facie case of racial disparate impact
with respect to these practices. But because the District showed
the practices were consistent with business necessity, and the
plaintiffs did not demonstrate an adequate alternative practice,
the district court again granted summary judgment for the
District.
Once an employee makes a prima facie case of disparate
impact, Title VII requires the employer to show that the
challenged employment practice is “consistent with business
necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Title VII’s
business necessity test requires only that an employment
practice reasonably fit with a legitimate interest of the
employer. The District has shown that the two challenged
employment practices reasonably fit with its legitimate
interests in making necessary budget cuts while still providing
important public services. And the plaintiffs have not presented
3
an adequate alternative practice that similarly serves the
District’s legitimate interests. The district court properly
rejected the plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims, and we affirm.
I.
The Child and Family Services Agency is the District’s
child welfare agency. The Agency employs hundreds of social
workers who support struggling families and respond to reports
of child abuse and neglect. D.C. Code § 4-1303.01a(b). The
Agency’s social workers carry out these job responsibilities
with support from other Agency employees.
Following the recession of 2007 to 2009, the District faced
a substantial revenue shortfall.1 The D.C. Council passed a
Fiscal Year 2011 budget that reduced the Agency’s annual
funding by $12.1 million and eliminated 52 full-time positions.
To comply with these cuts, the Agency implemented a
reduction in force (“RIF”) that terminated 115 employees. The
RIF involved two employment practices.
First, the Agency eliminated the Social Work Associate
(“SWA”) and Social Service Assistant (“SSA”) positions,
resulting in the firing of 70 employees. SWAs and SSAs
supported social workers in different ways. SWAs provided
substantive support, such as performing casework and
conducting interviews. SSA duties were more administrative,
involving tasks like accompanying social workers to home
visits, driving Agency clients to appointments, and preparing
records. Reflecting these differing responsibilities, SWAs were
required to hold a bachelor’s degree in social work and be
1
The following summary of the case background is taken from our
prior decision in Davis v. District of Columbia (“Davis I”), 925 F.3d
1240, 1244–47 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
4
licensed to perform social work, whereas SSAs were not
required to have a bachelor’s degree or a social work license.
The Agency replaced the 70 terminated SWAs and SSAs
with 38 Family Support Workers (“FSW”), a new position
created to implement the RIF. The FSW position is a hybrid of
the SWA and SSA positions, which the Agency created to
assist social workers more efficiently. FSW duties include
performing casework, accompanying social workers on home
visits, driving Agency clients to appointments, and
interviewing children and families. Because some of these
duties mirror those of SWAs, the Agency requires FSWs to
possess similar, although not identical, qualifications. FSWs
generally must hold a bachelor’s degree in social work or a
related social services field, like psychology or sociology.
When initially hiring FSWs, the Agency gave priority to the
terminated SWAs and SSAs, as well as other employees let go
in the RIF. The Agency ultimately rehired 18 former
employees, including 6 former SWAs and 10 former SSAs, for
the FSW position.
Second, to meet its lower budget, the Agency made
individual decisions to terminate 45 additional employees
across different offices and divisions. The Agency eliminated
positions it found unnecessary, consolidated other positions,
and fired additional employees. These individual terminations
were based on consultations with the Agency’s deputy
directors and senior managers in charge of the various offices
and divisions.
Former Agency employees brought a class action lawsuit
against the District, alleging race and age discrimination under
Title VII and D.C. law. After several years of discovery, the
district court granted summary judgment for the District on all
claims. As relevant to this appeal, the district court rejected the
5
plaintiffs’ race-based disparate impact claims because the
plaintiffs did not challenge a specific employment practice,
which is a threshold requirement for a Title VII claim.
The plaintiffs appealed, and this court mostly affirmed the
district court’s decision. Davis v. District of Columbia (“Davis
I”), 925 F.3d 1240, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2019). With respect to the
disparate impact claims, however, the panel held that the
plaintiffs had challenged the two employment practices that
made up the RIF and that these practices were sufficiently
specific to support a Title VII claim.
On remand, the district court applied Title VII’s burden-
shifting framework for disparate impact claims. The district
court first held the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of
racial disparate impact from the two challenged employment
practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (requiring
plaintiff claiming disparate impact to make a prima facie case
by showing a “particular employment practice … causes a
disparate impact on the basis of” a protected characteristic).
Specifically, the court found that black Agency employees
were overrepresented in the RIF. The burden thus shifted to the
District to show that the challenged employment practices were
“job related for the position[s] in question and consistent with
business necessity.” See id.
After years of additional discovery and briefing, the
district court again granted summary judgment for the District.
The court first held the District carried its burden to show the
two challenged employment practices were job related and
consistent with business necessity. While acknowledging that
this court has not articulated a test for business necessity, the
district court concluded that an employer could demonstrate
business necessity by showing an employment practice was
“reasonably consistent with a legitimate business need.” Davis
6
v. District of Columbia (“Davis II”), 2024 WL 756640, at *9,
*13 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2024).
The court held that both of the District’s employment
practices were consistent with business necessity. The
elimination of the SWA and SSA positions was consistent with
the Agency’s undisputed need to cut costs and its determination
that it would be effective to employ a new teaming model in
which a smaller number of FSWs could provide social workers
with both substantive and administrative support. The
termination of 45 other employees across different offices and
divisions also was consistent with the Agency’s mandate to cut
costs while minimizing the impact of the terminations.
The district court next held the plaintiffs failed to carry
their burden to set forth an adequate “alternative employment
practice” that served the District’s interests just as well but with
less disparate impact. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) &
(C). Because the District carried its Title VII burden and the
plaintiffs could not carry theirs, the court granted summary
judgment for the District. The plaintiffs timely appealed.
II.
We review the district court’s entry of summary judgment
de novo. Bunting v. D.C. CVS Pharmacy, LLC, 172 F.4th 36,
39 (D.C. Cir. 2026). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
III.
For an employer to carry its burden to show that an
employment practice is consistent with business necessity
under Title VII, the challenged practice must reasonably fit
7
with the employer’s legitimate interests.2 Because both of the
disputed employment practices were consistent with the
District’s legitimate interests in making necessary budget cuts
while continuing to provide important public services, the
District carries its burden.
A.
This court has not previously articulated the test for
business necessity in the Title VII context. We now hold that
to satisfy the business necessity test, an employer must show
only that the challenged employment practice reasonably fits
with the employer’s legitimate interests.
1.
Congress provided disparate impact liability for
employment decisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. In doing so, Congress
explicitly stated that it was “codify[ing] the concepts of
‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).” 105
Stat. at 1071, § 3(2). We therefore interpret the statutory text in
light of these decisions.
To rebut a prima facie showing of disparate impact, an
employer must show the challenged employment practice is
2
At the second step of Title VII’s burden-shifting framework, the
employer must show the challenged employment practice is both
“job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Because the parties do
not separately dispute job relatedness, we follow the parties in
focusing only on the business necessity prong.
8
“consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i). Starting with the first half of the phrase, an
employment practice must be “consistent with” business
necessity. This requires only some relationship or
compatibility between the employment practice and an
employer’s interests. See Consistent, Black’s Law Dictionary
(6th ed. 1990) (“Having agreement with … something else;
accordant; harmonious; congruous; compatible; compliable;
not contradictory.”). The use of the stronger phrase “required
by business necessity” in other subsections of Title VII
confirms that “consistent with” means a looser fit than showing
that a practice is required. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2)
(“A demonstration that an employment practice is required by
business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim
of intentional discrimination.”) (emphasis added); see Pulsifer
v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2024) (“In a given
statute, … different terms usually have different meanings.”).
“Consistent with” is best understood to direct a reasonable fit
between an employment practice and business necessity.
Moving to the second half of the phrase, Congress codified
the Supreme Court’s articulation of business necessity from
cases predating Wards Cove. 105 Stat. at 1071, § 3(2). Those
precedents support a fairly expansive conception of business
necessity as including a range of employer interests. In Griggs,
the Court stated that business necessity is the “touchstone” of
disparate impact liability and that an employment practice that
produced a disparate impact could nonetheless survive
litigation if it served as a “reasonable measure of job
performance.” 401 U.S. at 431, 436. Subsequent decisions of
the Court made clear that the business necessity defense
required showing only that an employment practice served an
employer’s “legitimate interest.” See Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); see also N.Y.C. Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979) (“legitimate
9
employment goals”); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487
U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality) (“legitimate business
reasons”). Such legitimate interests were recognized broadly to
include, among other things, safety, efficiency, employee
ability, and job performance. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998
(plurality); Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 n.31; Albemarle Paper, 422
U.S. at 425, 433; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. Because Congress
expressly codified these Supreme Court decisions, “business
necessity” is best read to refer to an employer’s broad set of
legitimate interests.
The Supreme Court confirmed this interpretation in Ricci
v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).3 The Court assessed
whether firefighter promotion examinations were consistent
with business necessity under Title VII. Id. at 587–89. Citing
its pre-Wards Cove decision in Albemarle Paper, the Court
explained that the inquiry turned on whether the examinations
comported with the employer’s legitimate interests. See id. at
578. The examinations passed muster because they were
related to the duties of the relevant senior positions. See id. at
587–89. Consistent with the statutory text and the decisions
codified by the 1991 Act, Ricci reinforces that for an
employment practice to be consistent with business necessity,
an employer must simply show that the practice is compatible
with its legitimate interests. See also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. &
3
Our sister circuits have also adopted a similar understanding of Title
VII’s business necessity test. See, e.g., Abril-Rivera v. Johnson, 806
F.3d 599, 606–08 (1st Cir. 2015) (concluding that “legitimate
business justifications” like cost and safety satisfied the business
necessity test); El v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 242 (3d
Cir. 2007) (holding an employer’s hiring policies “need not be
perfectly tailored to be consistent with business necessity”); cf. Reyes
v. Waples Mobile Home Park Ltd., 91 F.4th 270, 277 (4th Cir. 2024)
(in the Fair Housing Act context, reasoning that a business necessity
is merely a legitimate interest and “need not be a do-or-die matter”).
10
Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S.
519, 541 (2015) (explaining that the business necessity test is
satisfied by a “reasonable measurement of job performance”)
(cleaned up).
2.
The plaintiffs challenge this conception of the business
necessity test, but their arguments cannot be squared with the
text of Title VII or with the Supreme Court decisions that
Congress codified.
First, the plaintiffs argue the business necessity test
requires that an employment practice be essential to the
employer’s business. As already explained, this interpretation
finds no support in the text of Title VII, which requires that a
practice simply be “consistent with,” not required by, business
necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). To support their
interpretation, the plaintiffs mine isolated quotes from two of
this court’s Title VII disparate impact decisions, which used
the term “necessary” in reference to the business necessity test.
See Davis I, 925 F.3d at 1248–49, 1253; Anderson v. Zubieta,
180 F.3d 329, 344–45 (D.C. Cir. 1999). But Davis I and
Anderson did not purport to define the scope of “necessity” or
“necessary,” nor did they address the precise contours of the
business necessity test. The passing mentions of “necessary”
are irrelevant because that term is “susceptible of various
meanings” depending on context. Necessary, Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th ed. 1990); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819) (recognizing the word “necessary”
does not have a “fixed character” but rather “admits of all
degrees of comparison”). These cases do not support the
plaintiffs’ position.
Moreover, the plaintiffs’ interpretation is logically
inconsistent with Title VII’s burden-shifting framework. After
11
an employer satisfies the business necessity test, plaintiffs may
still succeed in their disparate impact claim if they can offer an
adequate alternative employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(ii) & (C). But if an employment practice must be
essential to meet the business necessity test, then there will be
no alternative employment practices that a plaintiff can put
forth to satisfy the employer’s interest. Under the plaintiffs’
interpretation, the third step of the burden-shifting framework
would be wholly superfluous. Focusing the business necessity
test on legitimate business interests gives meaning to each
statutory step in the disparate impact analysis.
Second, the plaintiffs contend that the 1991 Act forecloses
a conception of the business necessity test that focuses on
legitimate business interests. In Wards Cove, the Supreme
Court described business necessity as the “legitimate
employment goals of the employer.” 490 U.S. at 659. Since
Congress intended for the 1991 Act to overrule Wards Cove,
the plaintiffs claim, this court cannot adopt a conception of
business necessity akin to that used in Wards Cove. It is true
that Congress codified the conception of business necessity
applied in Supreme Court decisions “prior to Wards Cove.” 105
Stat. at 1071, § 3(2). As already explained, those decisions
conceived of business necessity as encompassing an
employer’s legitimate interests. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998
(plurality); Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 n.31; Albemarle Paper, 422
U.S. at 425; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. Even if those decisions
understood business necessity in a manner similar to that
expressed in Wards Cove, the 1991 Act directs us to follow
them.4
4
Commentators have debated the precise relationship between the
1991 Act and Wards Cove. Compare Michael Carvin, Disparate
Impact Claims Under the New Title VII, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1153,
1162 (1993) (“Since Wards Cove was simply an interpretation and
12
In sum, to rebut a prima facie case of disparate impact, an
employer must demonstrate that a challenged employment
practice is consistent with business necessity. That test is met
by showing that a practice reasonably fits with the employer’s
legitimate interests.
B.
Applying the business necessity test, we conclude that the
two challenged employment practices reasonably fit with the
District’s legitimate interests in making required budget cuts
while maintaining public services.
1.
The elimination of the SWA and SSA positions satisfied
the business necessity test because it reasonably fit with the
Agency’s legitimate interests. As a government entity, the
Agency’s legitimate interests include complying with
budgetary constraints set by the District and providing public
services. See Lyng v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, &
Agr. Implement Workers of Am., UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 373
(1988) (acknowledging the “fiscal integrity of Government
programs” as a “legitimate concern of the State”) (cleaned up).
application of Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove …, the
Act’s codification of the concepts embodied in those pre-Wards Cove
cases provides no basis for the Supreme Court to depart from Wards
Cove.”), with Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 387, 391
(1996) (arguing that the business necessity analysis of Wards Cove
“met with congressional disapproval” and Congress implemented a
“stricter standard” in the Act). We need not wade into this debate
because the Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove clearly
articulate the scope of business necessity, and we follow those
decisions as required by the 1991 Act.
13
The District slashed the Agency’s funding, thereby requiring
substantial cost cuts to achieve a balanced budget. To continue
providing important public services, the Agency did not fire
any of its frontline social workers but decided to cut other
employees providing substantive and administrative support.
In making these cuts, the Agency considered the changing
nature of its work, including that total caseloads had declined
over the previous seven years while the average case had
become more complex.
The Agency’s solution was to fire all 70 SWAs and SSAs
and hire 38 employees into the new FSW role. By taking that
action, the Agency decreased its employee headcount and
effectuated a substantial budget cut. The Agency could not
guarantee that 38 employees would provide the same level of
support as 70 employees had previously provided. But the
creation of the new FSW role was intended to efficiently
deploy the Agency’s reduced resources, especially in light of
the fewer but more complex cases that confronted its social
workers at the time. FSWs are charged with handling
substantive social work and therefore must possess a bachelor’s
degree in a social services field. Although the substantive
responsibilities of FSWs are similar to those of SWAs, FSWs
are also tasked with administrative duties previously performed
by SSAs. As the district court recognized, the Agency’s new
teaming model was a “practical choice” that responded to both
the need for budget cuts and the changing nature of the
Agency’s work. Davis II, 2024 WL 756640, at *15.
Because the Agency’s employment practice was
compatible with its legitimate interests, it was consistent with
business necessity.
The plaintiffs raise several arguments against this
conclusion. First, they maintain the district court improperly
14
treated the Agency differently from private employers. Second,
the plaintiffs dispute the Agency’s motivations, arguing that
employee workloads surged after the RIF and employees dealt
with complex cases prior to the RIF. Third, the plaintiffs
contend the Agency should have used objective metrics to
terminate only the lowest performing SWAs and SSAs, rather
than eliminating those positions entirely. Finally, the plaintiffs
doubt the necessity and effectiveness of the FSW position,
which they maintain does not serve the Agency’s interests.
The plaintiffs fail to establish a genuine dispute of material
fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. Because public
and private entities have distinct constraints and interests, the
district court correctly appreciated that the business necessity
test has “different contours in the context of a government RIF
versus a private-sector RIF.” Id. at *12. With regard to the
Agency’s motivations, a decrease in caseloads over a seven-
year period is not inconsistent with an increase after the RIF
reduced total staffing numbers. Likewise, it can of course be
true that employees dealt with some complex cases before the
RIF and that the average case was becoming more complex
over time. Moreover, because the Agency’s elimination of the
SWA and SSA positions reasonably fit with its legitimate
interests, there was no need to use metrics to terminate only
some employees.
Finally, the plaintiffs’ criticisms of the FSW position are
not persuasive. The Agency designed the FSW position as a
hybrid of the SWA and SSA roles. Because FSWs perform
substantive social work not assigned to SSAs and
administrative work not assigned to SWAs, the FSW duties are
not identical to those of either previous role. That some SSAs
may have performed substantive work later assigned to FSWs
does not overcome the difference in formal job responsibilities,
15
or the fact that only FSWs are required to hold a bachelor’s
degree in a social services field.
With regard to the effectiveness of FSWs, the plaintiffs
point to negative employee feedback received after the RIF.
The question, however, is whether the Agency’s action was
consistent with its legitimate interests at the time of the action.
Faced with budget cuts, the Agency reasonably determined that
the new teaming model would be effective. Post hoc factual
assertions do not undermine a decision that was otherwise
reasonable and consistent with business necessity at the time it
was made.
In sum, the business necessity test requires only a
reasonable, not a perfect, fit between an employment practice
and an employer’s legitimate interests. As the Supreme Court
has admonished, courts must avoid “interpreting disparate-
impact liability to be so expansive as to inject racial
considerations into every [government] decision.” Inclusive
Communities Project, 576 U.S. at 543 (cleaned up).
2.
The second challenged employment practice, the
Agency’s termination of 45 other employees across multiple
offices and divisions, was also consistent with business
necessity.
The decision to fire these employees satisfied the business
necessity test because it reasonably fit with the Agency’s
legitimate interests in implementing budget cuts while still
providing important public services. The District cut more than
$12 million in funding from the Agency’s FY 2011 budget, and
the Agency was required to make personnel reductions that
would minimize the impact on its primary function of
providing public services to children and families. After the
16
Agency’s director consulted with his deputy directors and other
senior level managers, the Agency fired 45 employees across
multiple offices and divisions. The specific reason for
termination varied within this group: some employees were
fired as part of a shift to a new teaming model that required
fewer resources, others were dismissed because their positions
were deemed superfluous, and still others were let go because
they held low-level administrative or temporary positions that
were deemed nonessential to the Agency’s primary functions.
The plaintiffs challenge this second employment practice
as inconsistent with business necessity in two ways. First, they
frame the terminations as acts of unbridled discretion that could
not be compatible with an interest in providing public services.
But the Agency’s leadership consulted with deputy directors
and senior managers to understand which employees could be
let go in a way that minimized impacts on the Agency’s
delivery of public services. Given their responsibilities, these
officials were well equipped to answer that question.
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertions, the Agency was not
required to use objective performance metrics to justify every
employment practice. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 991 (plurality)
(“Some qualities—for example, common sense, good
judgment, originality, ambition, loyalty, and tact—cannot be
measured accurately through standardized testing
techniques.”). Facing the hard constraint of a substantially
reduced budget, the Agency based its decisions primarily on
the relative importance of individual employees to the
Agency’s work. The District has shown that Agency managers
were capable of deciding which employees were amenable to
termination on a case-by-case basis.
Second, the plaintiffs try to create a genuine dispute of
material fact by claiming the Agency’s explanation for firing
17
these 45 employees was inconsistent—the Agency relied on
seniority while also stating there were no uniform criteria used
for the terminations. We see no inconsistency. The Agency
explained it relied on seniority to fire 12 employees who were
in non-critical administrative or temporary roles. At the same
time, it clarified that the remaining 33 employees were let go
for other reasons, including shifts to new teaming models. The
Agency suitably explained that it relied on seniority to fire
some employees and did not rely on any uniform criteria to fire
all 45.
The termination of 45 employees across offices and
divisions was consistent with the Agency’s business necessity
because it reasonably fit with the need to implement budget
cuts while maintaining public services.
IV.
Because the District has satisfied the business necessity
test for each of the two challenged employment practices, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to present an adequate
alternative practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) & (C).
The plaintiffs must show an alternative practice that would
similarly serve the District’s legitimate interests but result in
less disparate impact. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 578.
The plaintiffs fail to carry their burden. They argue that the
Agency should have given fired employees a preference when
hiring for the new FSW role.5 But there is no genuine dispute
5
On appeal, the plaintiffs waited until their reply brief to propose
another alternative: that the Agency comply with various D.C.
municipal regulations that the RIF allegedly violated. Not only is this
argument forfeited, but it also fails because plaintiffs do not explain
how following those regulations would have reduced the disparate
impact of the RIF.
18
that the Agency did give fired employees preference when
hiring FSWs. For example, while the FSW position generally
requires a bachelor’s degree in a social services field, the
Agency considered former SSAs with a bachelor’s degree in
any field. The Agency also interviewed qualified former
employees before external candidates. The Agency ultimately
hired 18 former employees into the FSW role, including 6
former SWAs and 10 former SSAs.
The plaintiffs recognize this fact but argue the Agency
should have adopted an even stronger hiring preference that
would have resulted in the hiring of more former employees.
This argument fails because the proposed alternative practice
is not sufficiently specific. See Allen v. City of Chicago, 351
F.3d 306, 313 (7th Cir. 2003) (criticizing the proposal of
“vague” alternative employment practices that, if accepted,
“would frustrate [Title VII’s] statutory scheme”). To the extent
that the plaintiffs gesture at requiring the Agency to rehire
SSAs who lacked any bachelor’s degree, this proposal would
not have similarly served the District’s legitimate interests
because those SSAs were not equally qualified for the FSW
role. See Johnson v. City of Memphis, 770 F.3d 464, 472 (6th
Cir. 2014) (concluding that plaintiffs are “obligated to prove
equally effective alternatives”) (cleaned up).
***
Title VII’s business necessity test requires that an
employment practice reasonably fit with a legitimate interest of
the employer. The District has shown that the two challenged
employment practices were compatible with its legitimate
interests in implementing significant budget cuts while still
preserving the Agency’s capacity to provide important public
services. And because the plaintiffs have not identified an
adequate alternative practice that would similarly serve the
19
District’s interests, their disparate impact claims fail. We
therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment for the
District.
So ordered.