The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 IVAN ALEJANDRO ZAMORA No. 2:25-cv-3234-DMC-P
BLANCO,
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Plaintiff,
13 ORDER
v.
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GAVIN NEWSOM, et al.,
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Defendants.
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18 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
19 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 13.
20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
22 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was
23 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel.
24 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or
25 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can
26 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
27 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
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1 Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a
2 “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
3 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See
4 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)).
5 These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim
6 and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996).
7 Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific
8 defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this
9 standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law
10 when the allegations are vague and conclusory.
11 Following transfer of this action from the United States District Court for the
12 North District of California, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint as of right under Federal
13 Rule of Civil Procedure 15. See ECF No. 13. In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff names the
14 following as defendants: (1) California Governor Gavin Newsom; (2) the Warden at the Tracy
15 Reception Center, Socorro Salinal; (3) Rockley; (4) C. Brooks; (5) J. Pedroso; (6) Y. Franco; (7)
16 Ascencio; (8) F. Rodriguez; and (9) T. Woodson. See id. at 1.
17 While the nature of Plaintiff’s allegations and claims is not clear, what is clear is
18 that Plaintiff has failed to establish a causal link between any of the individually named
19 defendants and a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory rights. More specifically, the
20 Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and can identify substantive allegations as
21 to Defendants Newson and Salinal only. No other named defendants are mentioned in the first
22 amended complaint. Where Newson and Salinal are mentioned, Plaintiff alleges their liability
23 based on their status as supervisory personnel. As explained below, such allegations are
24 insufficient under § 1983. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend consistent with the
25 foregoing legal principles.
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1 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual
2 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See
3 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A
4 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of
5 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform
6 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
7 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
8 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See
9 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth
10 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional
11 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
12 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their
13 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no
14 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional
15 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id.
16 Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation
17 of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may be liable even
18 where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. Cnty of San
19 Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). A supervisory defendant may also be
20 liable where he or she knew of constitutional violations but failed to act to prevent them. See
21 Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; see also Starr v. Baca, 633 F.3d 1191, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011).
22 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such
23 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.
24 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.
25 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in
26 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. “[A] plaintiff must plead that
27 each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated
28 the constitution.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
1 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
2 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire
3 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is
4 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See
5 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to
6 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended
7 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if
8 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make
9 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be
10 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
11 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the
12 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
13 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
14 each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between
15 each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167
16 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
17 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the
18 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at
19 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply
20 with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).
21 See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
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] Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
2 1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint, ECF No. 13, is dismissed with leave to
3 | amend; and
4 2. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date
5 || of service of this order.
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7 | Dated: August 4, 2026 Svc
8 DENNIS M. COTA
9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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