Hollander

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

SKYE ENERGY VENTURES, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:25-cv-274-SPC-KRH

RICHARD J. HOLLANDER, et al.

Defendants.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

At issue is Defendants Richard Hollander and Southern Logistics Financial,

Inc.’s Motion for Attorney Fees. (Doc. 47). Plaintiff Skye Energy Ventures, LLC

responded in opposition. (Doc. 48). The Court already determined that Defendants

are entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending against

Plaintiff’s Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”)

claim. (Doc. 46). As explained below, the undersigned recommends awarding

Defendants $16,360 in attorney’s fees.

Background

This action has a long history for a case that never got past the pleadings.

Over roughly 10 months, Plaintiff filed three separate complaints—each asserting

Florida and federal RICO claims, along with eight other counts. (Doc. 1; Doc. 19;

Doc. 30).

Initially, the Court dismissed the RICO claims with leave to amend. (Doc.

27). It then dismissed those same claims with prejudice. (Doc. 36). Plaintiff tried

resurrecting the RICO claims based on purported newly discovered evidence, but

the Court disagreed. (Doc. 45). Following that string of rulings, the Court held

Defendants were entitled to fees for defending the Florida RICO claim and directed

the parties to meet on a reasonable amount. (Doc. 46 at 5).

They did not agree. So Defendants filed this Motion, seeking $28,440 in fees.

(Doc. 47 at 22). That figure represents 71.1 hours of attorney time at $400 per hour,

which was a voluntary reduction from the 79 hours reflected in counsel’s bill. (Doc.

47-1). Plaintiff doesn’t dispute the hourly rate. It does, however, dispute the

number of hours expended—arguing Defendants made no meaningful effort to

allocate their billed time between the Florida RICO claim (for which fees are

recoverable) and the nine other counts in the case (for which they are not). What’s

more, Plaintiff says that bill entries reflect improper block billing, and the time

spent litigating the amount of fees itself is not compensable. (Doc. 48 at 2-13).

Legal Standard

Since entitlement is clear, the Court must now determine the amount of an

award of reasonable attorney’s fees. M.D. Fla. Local R. 7.01(a)-(c). The Florida

RICO statute provides:

The defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees

and court costs in the trial and appellate courts upon a finding that

the claimant raised a claim which was without substantial fact or legal

support. In awarding attorney’s fees and costs under this section, the

court may not consider the ability of the opposing party to pay such

fees and costs.

Fla. Stat. § 772.104(3). The statute therefore provides for recovery of “reasonable”

attorney’s fees. Id.

State law governs this substantive question of fees. See McMahan v. Toto,

256 F.3d 1120, 1132 (11th Cir. 2001). Florida (and federal) law applies the lodestar

framework for making that fee determination. Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe,

472 So. 2d 1145, 1150 (Fla. 1985); Bell v. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., 734 So. 2d 403,

406 (Fla. 1999).

Under that approach, courts multiply the number of hours reasonably

expended by the reasonable hourly rate. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v.

Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999). Once calculated, this lodestar figure

may be adjusted up or down depending on the circumstances. See id.

Discussion

The analysis proceeds in three parts. First, the Court addresses counsel’s

hourly rate. Second, this inquiry fleshes out the contested question of the number

of hours reasonably expended. And third, the Court calculates the lodestar.

1. Hourly Rate

The Court begins with the easier question of counsel’s rate. Here, $400 per

hour is reasonable.

A reasonable hourly rate is the “prevailing market rate in the relevant legal

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills,

experience, and reputation.” Id. at 436 (quoting Norman v. Hous. Auth. of

Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988)). The applicant bears the

burden of establishing the claimed market rate. See Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427. The

Court may also use its own experience in assessing the reasonableness of attorney’s

fees. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1297.

This record supports Defendants’ requested, undisputed rate. Nearby judges

approved similar rates in comparable RICO litigation on more than one occasion.

In Omnipol, A.S. v. Worrell, for example, the court approved a $350 hourly rate

for RICO defense counsel with seven years of experience. No. 8:19-cv-794-VMC-

TGW, 2022 WL 18157514, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2022), R&R adopted, 2023 WL

130730 (Jan. 9, 2023). Likewise, in Oke v. Prontowash, LLC, the court approved

the same $350 rate in another federal RICO matter. No. 8:23-cv-2558-WFJ-TGW,

2024 WL 4894230, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2024). And more to the point, Judge

Steele recently approved the very rate that Defendants seek here—$400 per hour—

for this same attorney in a discrimination case. Jones v. Hogan Servs., Inc., No.

2:25-cv-211-JES-NPM, 2025 WL 3462532 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2025). Counsel’s

credentials bear out the reasonableness of that figure as well; he has practiced for

sixteen years and holds board certification in Employment Law. (Doc. 47 at 14-16).

Drawing from my familiarity with federal litigation in Southwest Florida,

expertise about the market value of services litigators provide, and considering the

unopposed rate, I recommend that $400 per hour be adopted as a reasonable rate.

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

The more contested question is how many of the hours Defendants billed

were reasonably expended in defense of the Florida RICO claim specifically.

Defendants ask the Court to award fees for 71.1 hours. (Doc. 47 at 19). Plaintiff, by

contrast, contends that no more than 21.89 hours can be attributed to RICO-

related work. (Doc. 48 at 11).

The answer lies somewhere in between. Having reviewed the billing records,

heavy dispositive motions practice, and competing submissions here, I find that

neither party claims a reasonable award. Instead, my recommendation is a middle

course grounded in the actual record—not either party’s characterization of it.

A. Full Intertwining Fails

Defendants’ primary position is that the Florida RICO claim was so

intertwined with the remaining nine counts that no meaningful allocation between

them is possible, so the Court should treat the entire 71.1-hour request (accounting

for a voluntary ten percent reduction) as compensable. (Doc. 47 at 17-19). The

undersigned cannot agree.

Where, as here, a party is entitled to fees for only some of the claims litigated

in a case, the Court must examine the relationship between those claims to

determine the appropriate scope of any fee award. Durden v. Citicorp Tr. Bank,

FSB, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2011). If the claims involve a common

core of facts and related legal theories, a full fee may be awarded unless the movant

spent a separate and distinct amount of time on claims for which fees are not

authorized. Id; Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 846 F.3d 1159, 1167 n.3

(11th Cir. 2017).

Courts find true intertwining of claims when the operative pleadings are so

tangled and poorly organized that it is functionally impossible to divide into

discrete, separately defensible claims. Filippova v. Mogilevsky, No. 18-80044-

CIV, 2019 WL 1216150, at *6-7 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2019), R&R adopted, 2019 WL

1216205 (Mar. 7, 2019). But a movant’s own characterization of the scope of

intertwined work does not control that inquiry where the record itself allows the

Court to calculate a more precise allocation. Durden, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-11

(rejecting the movant’s proposed 50% self-reduction as insufficient and imposing

a larger, independently calculated reduction); see also Runion v. Bernard, No.

2:20-cv-718-JLB-KCD, 2022 WL 18492497, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2022)

(rejecting the characterization because each motion to dismiss followed a

consistent structure where discrete sections were devoted to separate claims).

The same conclusion follows here, for two reasons.

First, Plaintiff’s pleadings weren’t of a shotgun character that produced full

intertwining like Filippova. The complaint in Filippova ran 277 pages and 1,565

paragraphs, which was described as “mind numbing” and “at best incoherent and

riddled with redundancy,” among “the worst examples of civil complaints this

Court has ever seen.” 2019 WL 1216150, at *6. The issues here were more

segregable and distinct.

Second, and independently, Defendants’ own motions to dismiss undercut

their intertwining argument just as the motions in Runion defeated the same

argument. Both motions organize their RICO arguments into identifiable,

separately captioned sections that are visibly—and logically—distinct from the

sections addressing the other counts. (Doc. 23 at 11-17; Doc. 34 at 7-18).

Simply put, the Court can excise unrecoverable (or unsupported) figures

rather than swinging a hatchet at the bills to account for partially recoverable fees.

See DJ Lincoln Enters., Inc. v. Google, LLC, No. 20-CV-14159-

Rosenberg/Reinhart, 2022 WL 4287640, at *12 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2022), R&R

adopted, 2022 WL 3754182 (Aug. 30, 2022) (awarding fees under § 772.104(3)

with a 60% across-the-board cut). The undersigned therefore declines to award the

full 71.1 hours on an intertwining theory and instead evaluates the billing records

category by category, as set out below.

B. Federal RICO Time is Recoverable

Although Defendants’ entitlement to fees rests on the Florida RICO statute

specifically, the Court finds time spent defending against the related federal RICO

claim is properly included in the award as well.

Again, a full fee is appropriate where the claims at issue share a common

core of facts and related legal theories such that no separate and distinct time was

spent on one over the other. Durden, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1306. That describes the

relationship between the federal and Florida RICO counts at issue. Both counts

turned on the identical defect—Plaintiff’s repeated failure to plead a viable RICO

enterprise. Across both rounds of 12(b)(6) briefing, these claims were analyzed

under the same Rule 9(b) particularity standard, enterprise requirement, and

pattern-and-continuity demand. Indeed, the Court stated that “in addressing the

federal RICO claim, [it] inherently addresses the Florida RICO claim (Count II) as

well.” (Doc. 36 at 3 n.2).

The undersigned, therefore, recommends that time devoted to the RICO

claims generally be treated as an undivided category.

C. Block Billing Requires Scrutiny

Many of the disputed entries combine several distinct tasks into a single,

undifferentiated figure. That practice is itself a documentation problem

independent of the claim-allocation question. Block billing prevents the Court

from determining which portion of the fees billed on a particular date is

recoverable and which is not, and “warrants a reduction of the number of hours”

where fees are recoverable for only some of the work an entry describes. Kearney

v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1377 (M.D. Fla. 2010).

The remedy is not automatic exclusion of every block-billed entry; nor is it

license to abandon the inquiry as unworkable. A court may instead use its own

judgment to reach a reasonable figure. The goal is “rough justice,” not “auditing

perfection,” and a court may rely on its overall sense of the litigation and

reasonable estimates in allocating an attorney’s time. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826,

838 (2011). This Court took exactly that approach in Runion, evaluating each

block-billed motion to dismiss, rather than attempting to parse minutes out of an

undifferentiated entry.

I believe that the Court should follow the same approach here. In doing so,

any ambiguity that block billing leaves unresolved is construed against the fee

applicant—who bears the burden of documenting hours with sufficient

particularity to permit review. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303.

D. First Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23)

For the first dispositive motion, which was 24 pages, Defendants request

$9,400, representing 23.5 hours of work:

Date Description Hours Amount

5/15/2025 Review amended complaint; 2 $800

Outlining arguments for MTD;

Teleconference with client.

5/16/2025 Continue outlining arguments for 3.5 $1,400

MTD, researching case law re: same,

Prepare redline of CMR.

6/3/2025 Drafting MTD and legal researching 5 $2,000

re: same.

6/4/2025 Continue drafting of MTD and legal 3.9 $1,560

research; Telephone conference with

client.

6/9/2025 Editing and drafting RICO sections 4.6 $1,840

of MTD, researching case law re

same; Teleconference with client;

Reviewing additional documents

provided by client.

6/11/2025 Finalizing MTD and editing same. 1.5 $600

6/12/2025 Final revisions and filing MTD; 2 $800

Telephone conference with client.

6/20/2025 Review and analyze Plaintiff’s 1 $400

response to MTD.

Total 23.5 $9,400

This briefing wasn’t like the perfunctory, case-quoting brief that warranted

a fifty-percent reduction in Runion. Its RICO section applies Rule 9(b), the

enterprise requirement, and the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine specifically to

Plaintiff’s pleaded allegations, rather than regurgitating abstract law. (Doc. 23 at

11-17). But the motion’s primary theory rested on the Paymaster Services

Agreements and their exculpatory and hold-harmless provisions. (Doc. 23 at 6-11).

That was a threshold argument—unrelated to RICO—occupying a substantially

larger share of the motion.

Weighing the genuine quality of the RICO argument against how much of

the motion’s overall effort it actually represents, the Court recommends 12 hours

be awarded—totaling $4,800.

The undersigned does not suggest that 23.5 hours was an unreasonable

amount of time to spend drafting a thorough dispositive motion addressing ten

claims. The problem is not that the hours billed are excessive in theory; Defendants

can only recover fees for the RICO portion of that work, which was never the whole

object that the motion tried to accomplish. Awarding the full 23.5 hours simply

because the time as a whole appears reasonable would effectively require Plaintiff

to underwrite Defendants’ defense of the nine other counts as well, which is

precisely the outcome that § 772.104(3) was designed to prevent. See Chodorow v.

Moore, 947 So. 2d 577, 579-80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Durden, 763 F. Supp. 2d

at 1306.

E. Second Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 34)

For work on the next motion, which was 26 pages, Defendants request

$6,200, representing 15.5 hours of work:

Date Description Hours Amount

7/21/2025 Review and analyze 2nd amended 5 $2,000

complaint and attached exhibits;

Compare allegations to prior pleadings;

Review order granting MTD; Begin

outlining arguments for renewed MTD

and begin drafting same

7/22/2025 Continued drafting MTD and legal 2.4 $960

research re same

7/27/2025 Continued drafting renewed MTD. 2.5 $1,000

7/28/2025 Attend Rule 16 conference; Review 2.2 $880

CMSO; Finalizing renewed MTD;

Teleconference with client.

8/11/2025 Reviewing and analyzing Plaintiff’s 3.4 $1,360

responses to renewed MTD; Comparing

arguments to Court’s prior order granting

MTD; Outlining possible reply brief re

RICO counts; Telephone conference with

client.

Total 15.5 $6,200

This motion presented the opposite circumstances from the recycled

motions in Runion. It responded to new substantive allegations in the Second

Amended Complaint—i.e., kickback, alter ego, third enterprise, and reworked

pattern-and-continuity theories. (Doc. 30 ¶¶ 26-27, 34). In fact, RICO issues

occupied the largest single section of that motion, spanning roughly eleven of its

twenty-six pages and addressing six distinct sub-issues in detail. (Doc. 34 at 7-18).

Given the genuinely new and substantial nature of this work, the undersigned

recommends 12 hours—for a total of $4,800.

As with the first motion to dismiss, this is not a finding that the 15.5 hours

billed were unreasonable in the aggregate. That time may well reflect what drafting

a twenty-six-page motion addressing ten counts actually required. The point

remains the same as in Section D: only the portion of that work devoted to the

RICO claim is recoverable. Together, Sections D and E yield 24 recoverable hours,

in place of the 39 hours Defendants seek.

F. RICO-Specific Order Review and Pre-Motion Letter

Plaintiff specifically objects to each of the following entries, characterizing

each as work that “is not work on the RICO claim.” (Doc. 48 at 4, 8, 10-11).

Date Description Hours Amount

5/5/2025 Drafting detailed email to OC .6 $240

regarding deficiencies in federal

complaint; Responding to email from

opposing counsel.

6/30/2025 Review and analyze order granting .5 $200

MTD in part.

8/20/2025 Reviewing and analyzing order .5 $200

dismissing RICO counts with

prejudice; Telephone conference with

client.

11/17/2025 Reviewing and analyzing order .3 $120

denying Rule 59 motion.

1/14/2026 Reviewing and analyzing order .5 $200

granting entitlement to attorney’s

fees; Telephone conference with

client.

Total 2.4 $960

Neither party’s position on these entries is satisfying, though for different

reasons. A bare assertion that an entry “is not work on the RICO claim,” repeated

across various unrelated entries without engaging what each entry describes, falls

short of the specific and reasonably precise objection Barnes requires. 168 F.3d at

428. Still, it would be impractical to demand that counsel specify (in every entry

across a ten-count case) exactly which claims a given task or claim touches.

Defendants’ own billing nonetheless undercuts their position as to these five

entries specifically. Where bills affirmatively describe an entry as reviewing the

order “dismissing RICO counts with prejudice” or “granting entitlement to

attorney’s fees” under RICO, counsel himself supplied the specificity that Plaintiff’s

more generalized objections otherwise lack, so he cannot then argue that allocation

is impractical. Instead of Plaintiff’s generic objections or the absence of context, it

is Defendants’ own billing descriptions that settle which entries are compensable.

Combined with the pre-motion letter, which focuses on RICO’s Rule 9(b)

predicate act and intracorporate conspiracy defects, the undersigned recommends

that all 2.4 hours be recoverable in full—totaling $960.

G. Fees for Rule 59(e) Opposition

The following entries do not appear among Plaintiff’s itemized objections,

(Doc. 48 at 10-11):

Date Description Hours Amount

9/16/2025 Reviewing and analyzing 2.2 $880

Plaintiff’s rule 59 motion;

Outlining response and legal

research re same.

9/17/2025 Reviewing Rule 59 motion and all 6 $2,400

its attachments; Drafting response

to Rule 59 motion and

finalizing/filing same.

Total 8.2 $3,280

Where a fee opponent has not lodged a specific objection to a particular

entry, the Court will not, on its own initiative, search the record for reasons to cut

it. Fox, 563 U.S. at 838 (Federal “courts need not, and indeed should not, become

green-eyeshade accountants.”). These entries also reflect substantive work

defeating Plaintiff’s attempt to resurrect the dismissed RICO claims. (Doc. 45). The

undersigned recommends all 8.2 hours are recoverable—totaling $3,280.

H. Motion for Entitlement to Fees

Defendants request $2,280 for litigating entitlement to fees and the amount,

representing 5.7 hours of work:

Date Description Hours Amount

8/28/2025 Begin drafting motion for 3.9 $1,560

entitlement to attorney’s fees, legal

research re same.

8/29/2025 Finalizing and editing motion for 1.4 $560

entitlement to attorney fees, filing

same.

9/26/2025 Reviewing and analyzing Plaintiff’s .4 $160

response to motion for entitlement

to attorney fees.

Total 5.7 $2,280

Defendants filed a motion for entitlement to fees. (Doc. 38). The Court

granted that request. (Doc. 46). “It is settled that in litigating over attorney’s fees,

a litigant may claim fees where entitlement is the issue, but may not claim

attorney’s fees incurred in litigating the amount of attorney’s fees.” N. Dade

Church of God, Inc. v. JM Statewide, Inc., 851 So. 2d 194, 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2003). The undersigned recommends that this number is reasonable, and that

Defendants should be awarded $2,280.

I. Case Development, Discovery, and Client Communication

Plaintiff specifically objects to each of the following entries (Doc. 48 at 5-7,

9-10):

Date Description Hours Amount

4/16/2025 Reviewing federal complaint; Meeting with 2 $800

client to discuss case, obtain factual

background and plan strategy.

4/17/2025 Reviewing documents related to 1.5 $600

transaction provided by client, comparing

same against documents attached as

exhibits to federal complaint.

4/29/2025 Reviewing financial documents related to 1.1 $440

transaction provided by client.

6/11/2025 Drafting affidavit of client; Telephone 1.7 $680

conference with client.

7/30/2025 Reviewing Plaintiff’s discovery requests; 3.1 $1,240

Begin outlining objections; Telephone

conference with client.

7/31/2025 Drafting objections and responses to 2.7 $1,080

discovery requests.

7/31/2025 Reviewing file; Drafting Initial Disclosures .7 $280

8/14/2025 Drafting and revising responses to 1.4 $560

discovery requests.

Total 14.2 $5,680

Fees for work attributable equally to a RICO claim and to other claims are

not recoverable, because they would have been incurred regardless of whether

Plaintiff had asserted a RICO theory. Fernau v. Enchante Beauty Prods., Inc., No.

18-cv-20866, 2021 WL 1520755, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2021), R&R adopted, 2021

WL 1152835 (Mar. 26, 2021). None of these entries mentions RICO, and each

would have been required to defend the other counts regardless. While there may

have been RICO issues in the early discovery, the Court has no way to know. So

Defendants dropped their burden in this area. And the undersigned recommends

that all 14.2 hours be excluded.

J. Administrative and Clerical Tasks

Plaintiff also objects to each of the following entries (Doc. 48 at 5-6, 8-9):

Date Description Hours Amount

5/4/2025 Drafting notice of appearance, notice 2.3 $920

of related cases, interested persons

disclosure and notice of lead counsel

(and filing same); Outlining

arguments for MTD.

5/6/2025 Email correspondence to OC. .1 $40

5/7/2025 Reviewing email from OC; Preparing .2 $80

and filing notice to court re: plaintiff

to file an amended complaint.

5/21/2025 Email to OC. .1 $40

5/22/2025 Review email from OC; Prepare and .2 $80

file motion for enlargement of time.

6/13/2025 Drafting and filing updated 3.01(g) .1 $40

certificate.

7/10/2025 Reviewing Plaintiff’s unopposed .1 $40

motion for enlargement of time and

order granting same.

9/10/2025 Reviewing plaintiff’s motion for .1 $40

enlargement, order granting same.

Total 3.2 $1,280

Time spent on simple ministerial tasks such as filing a notice of appearance

is not compensable. N. Dade Church of God, 851 So.2d at 196. So the notice of

appearance, notice of related cases, interested-persons disclosure, notice of lead

counsel, and the 3.01(g) certificate are not compensable. The May 4 entry also

combines some purely clerical filings with “outlining arguments for MTD,” a

substantive task; this constitutes improper block billing. Kearney, 713 F. Supp. 2d

at 1377. The undersigned declines to shift this drafting time into Section D because

five other entries already account for outlining and drafting the first motion to

dismiss. The May 6 and May 21 entries are deficient too because neither identifies

the subject of the correspondence. Inadequately documented entries do not permit

the Court to assess whether the work was reasonable or related to the RICO claims.

Rowe, 472 So.2d at 1150. The entries for May 4, May 6, May 21, and June 13 are

excluded in full.

The remaining four entries stand on different footing. The May 7 and May

22 entries each reflect the preparation and filing of a substantive notice or motion,

not ministerial work. The July 10 and September 10 entries reflect review of both

a short unopposed motion and the resulting endorsed order. At .1 hours (six

minutes) apiece for reviewing two related, brief filings, those entries do not raise

an unreasonableness concern. The Court recommends .6 hours for these four

entries, totaling $240.

K. Litigating the Amount of Fees

Plaintiff objects to the following entries:

Date Description Hours Amount

1/30/2026 Attend scheduled 3.01(g) conference .5 $200

with Plaintiff’s counsel, who did not

attend.

2/3/2026 Attend scheduled 3.01(g) conference. .2 $80

2/17/2026 Begin drafting motion for attorney’s 2.5 $1,000

fees, researching same.

2/19/2026 Drafting motion for attorney’s fees. 3.1 $1,240

Total 6.3 $2,520

As stated above, fees incurred litigating the amount of a fee award, as

distinct from entitlement to one, are not recoverable. N. Dade Church of God, 851

So. 2d at 196. In general, Florida courts don’t allow “attorney’s fees incurred in

litigating the amount of attorney’s fees.” Id.; but see Mallas v. Mallas, 326 So. 3d

704, 706-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021). Applying the standard to the relevant

statute, the Court recommends excluding the fees incurred due to briefing the

amount of fees (i.e., no fees for fees). Mallas, 326 So. 3d at 707. The undersigned

therefore recommends all 6.3 hours be excluded.

3. Lodestar Analysis

Having sorted the billing records into these categories, the Court arrives at

the final calculation. “When a district court finds the number of hours claimed is

unreasonably high, the court has two choices; it may conduct an hour-by-hour

analysis or it may reduce the requested hours with an across-the-board cut.” Bivins

v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Loranger, 10 F.3d

at 783). What a court may not do is combine the two approaches to the same hours,

since doing so risks discounting the same time more than once. Id. at 1351-52. The

undersigned avoids that pitfall here by treating each category of billed time only

once. No hours have been discounted under more than one theory.

Of the 79 hours reflected in the original bill, I recommend the following as

recoverable: 12 hours for the first motion to dismiss, 12 hours for the second

motion to dismiss, 2.4 hours for RICO-specific order and pre-motion letter, 8.2

hours for the Rule 59(e) opposition, 5.7 hours for the motion for entitlement to

fees, and .6 hours for the four entries related to reviewing and drafting substantive

motions. As for the other entries, the Motion should be denied.

Accordingly, these determinations yield 40.9 recoverable hours. Multiplying

that figure by the $400 reasonable hourly rate produces a lodestar of $16,360.

RECOMMENDED:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Doc. 47) be GRANTED and

DENIED in part.

2. The Court should arrive at a lodestar amount of $16,360 in

attorney’s fees payable to Defendants.

In Fort Myers, Florida, on August 3, 2026.

Kevin R: Huguele

United Sta agistrate Judge

Notice to All Parties

A party has fourteen days from this date to file written objections to the

Report and Recommendation’s factual findings and legal conclusions. A party’s

failure to file written objections “waives the right to challenge on appeal the district

court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.” 11th Cir. R. 3-

1. To expedite resolution, parties may file a joint notice waiving the

fourteen-day objection period.