Kurtz

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THOMAS KURTZ, : CIVIL NO. 3:25-CV-2320

:

Plaintiff, : (Judge Munley)

:

v. :

: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Factual Background

This case comes before us for a legally mandated screening review of the pro

se plaintiff’s pleadings. The plaintiff, Thomas Kurtz, appears to be currently confined

in a civil commitment at a mental health facility in New York state. (Doc. 10). Kurtz

has filed a civil complaint with this Court which, frankly, is largely

incomprehensible. (Doc. 2). However, to the extent that this pleading can be

understood, it seems that Kurtz is attempting to bring federal civil rights claims

against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, a Hyundai care dealership in Hazleton,

Pennsylvania, and a woman who owned a Hyundai that was serviced at this

dealership. (Id.)

While Kurtz’s complaint demands a great deal from the reader, it seems to

allege that faulty maintenance of this car, which was owned by another and was

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of great moment to Kurtz because he was apparently charged with arson in New York

state based upon this conflagration. (Id.) Kurtz’s complaint alleges that these charges

violate his Constitutional rights and asks that this Court enjoin the defendants from

blaming him for this 2017 vehicle fire. (Id.)

Along with this complaint, Kurtz sought, and obtained, leave to proceed in

forma pauperis. However, Kurtz was placed on notice that the Court would conduct

a preliminary screening review of the legal sufficiency of this pleading. (Doc. 9).

This case has now been referred to the undersigned for the purpose of

conducting this review. Upon review, for the reasons set forth below, we find that the

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Therefore, we recommend that the complaint be dismissed.

II. Discussion

A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints–Standard of Review

This Court has an ongoing statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review

of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the

complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a

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granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint,

the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving

standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d

929 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of

Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently

with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from

simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring

a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion

to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,

20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s

bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court

need not “assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not

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Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions

will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which

relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss,

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of

the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id. at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain

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allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of

mere speculation. As the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the

factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District

Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true but

may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to

show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words,

a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.

A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

Two years after Fowler, the Third Circuit further observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for

overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The

plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard

when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).

This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts

“merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-

step analysis:

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to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement for relief.” Id.

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).

In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the

requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what

a complaint should say and provides that:

(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and

plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the

court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional

support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which

may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and

conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations that

are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.

Judged against these legal guideposts, for the reasons set forth below it is

recommended that this complaint be dismissed.

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In our view, this complaint is flawed in several different ways.

1. These Claims Seem Time-Barred

At the outset, the civil rights claims advanced by the plaintiff seem time-barred

by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. When conducting a screening review

of a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court may consider whether the

complaint is barred under the applicable statute of limitations. As the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently explained when it affirmed the

screening dismissal of a pro se complaint on statute of limitations grounds:

Civil rights claims are subject to the statute of limitations for personal

injury actions of the pertinent state. Thus, Pennsylvania's two year

statutory period applies to [these] claims. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d

360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000). The limitations period begins when the plaintiff

knows or had reason to know of the injury forming the basis for the

federal civil rights action. Gera v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 256

Fed.Appx. 563, 564-65 (3d Cir. 2007). Although we have not addressed

the issue in a precedential decision, other courts have held that although

the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, district court may

sua sponte dismiss a complaint under § 1915(e) where the defense is

obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is

required.

Smith v. Delaware County Court 260 F. App’x. 454, 455 (3d Cir. 2008).

It is well-settled that claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the principle

federal civil rights statute, are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal

injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). In Pennsylvania, the

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calculating this limitations period, a cause of action accrues for statute of limitations

purposes when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that constitutes

the basis of the cause of action. Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of

Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); see also, Nelson v. County of

Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010 (3d Cir. 1995).

To be sure, this two-year limitations period may be extended based upon a

continuing wrong theory. However, the plaintiff must make an exacting showing to

avail himself of this ground for tolling the statute of limitations. Thus, it is well settled

that the “continuing conduct of [a] defendant will not stop the ticking of the

limitations clock [once] plaintiff obtained requisite information [to state a cause of

action]. On discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must choose to sue or

forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir.

1998) (quoting Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F. 2d 356, 360 (3d Cir.

1986)). See also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 266-68 (3d Cir. 2000). Instead:

The continuing violations doctrine is an “equitable exception to the

timely filing requirement.” West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744,

754 (3d Cir.1995). Thus, “when a defendant's conduct is part of a

continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing

the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an

instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would

otherwise be time barred.” Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of

Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir.1991). In

order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that the

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acts.” West, 45 F.3d at 755 (quotation omitted). Regarding this inquiry,

we have recognized that courts should consider at least three factors: (1)

subject matter-whether the violations constitute the same type of

discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2)

frequency-whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated

incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-whether the act had a degree of

permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of and duty

to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would

continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. See

id. at 755 n. 9 (citing Berry v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State

Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1983)). The consideration of “degree

of permanence” is the most important of the factors. See Berry, 715 F.2d

at 981.

Cowell v. Palmer Township. 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001).

In this case, when we focus upon the most important of these factors, the

plaintiff’s perceived degree of permanence of injury, it is readily apparent that the

injury claimed by Kurtz would have been apparent at the time he was charged with

arson based upon what he alleges was the failure of the defendants to properly

maintain a Hyundai automobile. Yet, the complaint avers that this fire and arson

charge in New York took place in 2017, some nine years ago, well beyond the

limitations period set by law. Kurtz provides no justification for this delay, and we

can perceive of no reason why Kurtz’s complaint should not be barred by the

applicable two-year statute of limitations. Therefore, this tardy claim fails.

2. The Complaint Violates Rule 8

In addition, dismissal of this complaint is warranted because this pleading fails

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must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It is well-settled that: “[t]he Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that

each averment be ‘concise, and direct,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1).” Scibelli v. Lebanon

County, 219 F. App’x 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, when a complaint is “illegible

or incomprehensible[,]” id., or when a complaint “is not only of an unwieldy length,

but it is also largely unintelligible[,]” Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 F. App’x 785, 787

(3d Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly appropriate.

See, e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 F. App’x 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v. New Jersey State

Superior Court, 260 F. App’x 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos v. Cohen, supra;

Scibelli v. Lebanon County, supra; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d

448, 450 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005).

Dismissal under Rule 8 is also proper when a complaint “left the defendants

having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action],”

Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App’x 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when

the complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, 441

F. App’x 109 (3d Cir. 2011). Similarly, dismissal is appropriate in “those cases in

which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible

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110 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)

(quotations omitted)); Tillio v. Northland Grp. Inc., 456 F. App’x 78, 79 (3d Cir.

2012). Further, a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 8 when the pleading is

simply illegible and cannot be understood. See, e.g., Radin v. Jersey City Medical

Center, 375 F. App’x 205 (3d Cir. 2010); Moss v. United States, 329 F. App’x 335

(3d Cir. 2009) (dismissing illegible complaint); Earnest v. Ling, 140 F. App’x 431

(3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing complaint where “complaint fails to clearly identify which

parties [the plaintiff] seeks to sue”); Oneal v. U.S. Fed. Prob., Civ. No. 05-5509, 2006

WL 758301 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2006) (dismissing complaint consisting of

approximately 50 pages of mostly-illegible handwriting); Gearhart v. City of

Philadelphia Police, Civ. No. 06-0130, 2006 WL 446071 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006)

(dismissing illegible complaint).

In its current form, Kurtz’s complaint is largely unintelligible. Kurtz complains

about a criminal arson charge he faces in New York; yet he sues the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania, a Pennsylvania car dealership, and a Pennsylvania resident. The role

of these named defendants in Kurtz’s New York state criminal case is entirely

unclear. Thus, the complaint leaves “the defendants having to guess what of the many

things discussed constituted [a cause of action].” Binsack, 438 F. App’x at 158. In

such settings, Rule 8 calls for the dismissal of this complaint which is “so confused,

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disguised.” Tillio, 441 F. App’x at 110.

3. Kurtz’s Complaint Fails on Its Merits

Finally, this complaint fails on its merits on several scores. For example, to the

extent that the plaintiff seeks to sue private parties alleging federal civil rights

violations, he fundamentally misconstrues the reach of the federal civil rights statute,

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

It is well established that § 1983 does not, by its own force, create new and

independent legal rights to damages in civil rights actions. Rather, § 1983 simply

serves as a vehicle for private parties to bring civil actions to vindicate violations of

separate and pre-existing legal rights otherwise guaranteed under the Constitution

and laws of the United States. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). Therefore, any analysis of the legal

sufficiency of a cause of action under § 1983 must begin with an assessment of the

validity of the underlying constitutional and statutory claims advanced by the

plaintiff.

In this regard, it is also well settled that:

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federally protected

rights caused by persons acting under color of state law. The two

essential elements of a §1983 action are: (1) whether the conduct

complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state

law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of a federally

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Boykin v. Bloomsburg Univ., 893 F.Supp. 409, 416 (M.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d, 91 F.3d

122 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Thus, it is essential to any civil rights claim

brought under § 1983 that the plaintiff allege and prove that the defendants were

acting under color of law when those defendants allegedly violated the plaintiff’s

rights. To the extent that a complaint seeks to hold private parties liable for alleged

civil rights violations, it fails to state a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

since the statute typically requires a showing that the defendants are state actors. Am.

Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). These principles also

apply here and compel the dismissal of any federal civil rights claims lodged against

the private parties named in Kurtz’s complaint.

Finally, beyond noting that this automobile was registered in Pennsylvania,

Kurtz’s complaint is bereft of any facts which would support a claim against the

Commonwealth. This is significant since “the Supreme Court has long recognized a

state's right to use its police powers to ‘require the registration of such vehicles and

the licensing of their drivers,’” Earl v. Harris, No. 23-1063, 2023 WL 3580700, at *1

(3d Cir. May 22, 2023) (quoting Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622

(1915)). Therefore, the fact that the state performed a function that is well within its

rights by registering this car does not give rise to any form of legal liability against

the Commonwealth and Kurtz’s § 1983 claim against Pennsylvania should be

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4. Kurtz’s Complaint Should Be Dismissed With Prejudice

We recognize that in civil rights cases, pro se plaintiffs often should be

afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in

its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247,

253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result

in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, the

plaintiff’s complaint is profoundly flawed in many ways which cannot be cured by

any more artful form of pleading. Therefore, granting further leave to amend would

be futile and would result in undue delay. Accordingly, the complaint should be

dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

III. Recommendation

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the

Plaintiff’s complaint, (Doc. 2), be DISMISSED.

The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,

recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the

disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen

(14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file

with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,

written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the

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made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set

forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however,

need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where

required by law, and may consider the record developed before the

magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of

that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall

witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with

instructions.

Submitted this 3rd day of August 2026.

S/ Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

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