Happy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HAPPY HAPPY, A# 246 607 675,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-01977

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

WARDEN of Pike County

Correctional Facility, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM

On July 15, 2026, the petitioner, appearing through counsel, filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.

In this petition, Happy Happy, a native and citizen of India, challenges

the legality of his pre-removal immigration detention without an

individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). At the time

of filing, Happy was being held in the custody of United States

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Pike County

Correctional Facility, located in Pike County, Pennsylvania.

I. BACKGROUND

Happy initially entered the United States without inspection at or

near Lukeville, Arizona, on or about February 7, 2023. Happy was

encountered by United States Border Patrol shortly thereafter and

detained briefly. Resp. Ex. 1, Doc. 6-2. On or about February 10, 2023,

Happy was released from custody under an order of release on

recognizance. Pet. Ex. B, Doc. 1-3. Upon his release, Happy was served

with a Notice to Appear, DHS Form I-862, dated February 10, 2023,

which declared him to be subject to removal as an “alien present in the

United States who has not been admitted or paroled,”1 and which

directed him to appear for a hearing before an immigration judge in

Chicago, Illinois, on May 31, 2023. Pet. Ex. A, Doc. 1-2; Resp. Ex. 2, Doc.

6-3.

After entering the United States, Happy appears to have

established residence in or near Williamsport, Pennsylvania. On or about

October 3, 2023, Happy timely applied for asylum and withholding of

removal by filing a Form I-589, Application for Asylum with U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). Pet. Ex. C, Doc. 1-4.

His asylum application has not yet been adjudicated. At the time of his

arrest and detention, Happy had been gainfully employed at a

1 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring him to be an “arriving

alien” was checked. Pet. Ex. A, Doc. 1-2; Resp. Ex. 2, Doc. 6-3.

convenience store, and he has no criminal history. Resp. Ex. 1.

On July 4, 2026, Happy was encountered by ICE officers at his place

of employment. Happy was detained by ICE and transported to a local

ICE office in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, for processing. Resp. Ex. 1.

Happy was subsequently transported to Pike County Correctional

Facility, where he remains in civil immigration detention. Happy has

been denied any opportunity to post bond or to be released on other

conditions.

II. DISCUSSION

Since the United States began restricting

immigration into this country in the late 19th century,

it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking

entry into the country and those already residing

within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line”

who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do

not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded

to persons inside the United States. But once a

noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal

circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to

due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s

borders, “whether their presence here is lawful,

unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction

between noncitizens who have entered and reside in

the United States and those who have not yet entered

“runs throughout immigration law.”

, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1113 (D. Idaho 2025)

(first quoting , 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then quoting

, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) (citations omitted).

Consistent with this distinction, “[t]wo statutory sections govern

the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225 and 1226.” , 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal.

Sept. 23, 2025), , No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As

concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law

authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens

into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the

Government to detain certain aliens pending the

outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”

, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added).

Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is

present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an

‘applicant for admission.’” , 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2).

Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who ( ) are arriving in the

United States, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or

have been physically present in the United States for less than two years

without being admitted or paroled, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (the

“designation provision”),2 ( ) are inadmissible either for

misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to

the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); § 1182(a)(6)(C) (inadmissibility based

on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) (inadmissibility for lack of

documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited

removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien

expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which

case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final

determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have

2 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of

aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of

aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security,

§ 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii), but the current scope of that designation is “the full

scope of statutory authority,” and thus all aliens who have not been

admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been

physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year

period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited

removal under § 1225(b)(1).

, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025);

, 962 F.3d 612, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic overview

of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii));

, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),

, ___ F. 4th ____ (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2026).

such a fear, until removal. § 1225(b)(1)(B).

, 962 F.3d 612, 618–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (summarizing

expedited removal provisions); , 811 F.

Supp. 3d 274, 291–92 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same);

, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 59–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),

, ___ F. 4th ____ (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2026).

Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader . . . catchall provision” that applies

to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the

United States.3 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); , 583 U.S. at 287.

Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary

(not expedited) removal proceedings. § 1225(b)(2)(A);

§ 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration

judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory

detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A); § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of

Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting

3 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to

those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not

relevant here. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B).

removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on

land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be

returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather

than be detained); , 809 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (“Section

1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow

humanitarian parole.”).

Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to

detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of

removal proceedings.” , 583 U.S. at 289. Such aliens who are

already present in the United States may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c).

Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for

these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a

warrant issued by the Attorney General,[4] an alien may be arrested and

detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from

the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that

4 This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has

been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in

the applicable regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2);

§§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b).

such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain

pending. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide

that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that

such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the

alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8),

1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities5 are tasked with an initial bond or

custody determination, §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the

alien may request an individualized bond hearing before an immigration

judge, §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); § 1003.19 (setting out

procedures for the review of bond determinations by immigration judges).

, 586 U.S. 392, 397 (2019) (“If the alien is

detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the

Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge

(both exercising power delegated by the Secretary); and the alien may

secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that

he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.”) (citations

omitted). An adverse bond determination by the immigration judge can

5 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue

arrest warrants. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8).

be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 U.S.C.

§§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(3).

, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (3d Cir. 2018) (summarizing § 1226(a)

bond procedures).

Finally, “Section 1226(c) . . . carves out a statutory category of

aliens who may be released under § 1226(a).” , 583 U.S. at

289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require

mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond

hearing under § 1226(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may

only be released under very narrow circumstances involving a

determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is

necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a

flight risk or a danger to the community. § 1226(c)(4);

, 583 U.S. at 289.

The petitioner in this case, Happy Happy, has been detained by

immigration authorities without a bond determination pending

disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.6 In his petition,

6 The parties do not dispute that the petitioner has been detained

without an opportunity for release on bond pursuant to § 1225(b)(2).

Happy argues that, because he was detained within the interior of the

United States, he is not properly subject to mandatory pre-removal-order

detention under § 1225(b)(2). Rather, he contends that he may only be

properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires that he be given an

opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. In addition to this

statutory argument, Happy argues that his pre-removal detention

without an opportunity to be considered for release on bond violates his

Fifth Amendment due process rights.

In opposition, the respondent argues that § 1225(b)(2) does properly

apply to the petitioner, and that it prescribes mandatory detention.

Moreover, the respondent argues that applying § 1225(b)(2) here

comports with due process.

The Third Circuit has recently addressed these very same legal

questions under materially identical facts in a precedential opinion.

, ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 2546223

(3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026). In , the Third Circuit held that,

contrary to the respondent’s position, “for § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, the

noncitizen must do more than be an ‘applicant for admission.’” at *3.

Rather, “to fall within § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s ambit, an ‘applicant for admission’

must engage in present or ongoing action to gain ‘admission,’ that is,

‘lawful entry . . . into the United States after inspection and

authorization by an immigration officer.’” (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(13)(A) (ellipsis in original). In other words, to be subject to

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), an “applicant for admission” must “engage in an ongoing

affirmative act to ‘seek[] admission’ to the United States.” at *4;

at *5 (Ҥ 1225(b) governs noncitizens arriving to the United States

whereas § 1226 governs those already within our borders.”).7

7 , 175 F.4th 61, 73, 75 (2d Cir.

2026) (“Section 1226(a) plainly applies to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who

are present in the United States, but charged as inadmissible for entering

the country without inspection and admission. . . . Section 1225(b)(2)(A)

applies to those noncitizens who present themselves at a port of entry for

admission, or who cross the physical border into the United States but

are apprehended at the ‘threshold of initial entry.’”);

, 175 F.4th 828, 856 (7th Cir. 2026) (“[T]he

text, statutory context, legislative history, and long-standing Executive

practice all confirm that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to ‘applicants for

admission’ who are seeking lawful entry at the border or ports of entry

and not to noncitizens unlawfully living in the country’s interior.”);

, 175 F.4th 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2026)

(“The text and statutory structure of the INA, bolstered by the long

history of detention across our immigration laws and the congressional

purpose in passing IIRIRA, yield the conclusion that no-bond detention

generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful entry to the country,

and not to aliens who are simply present here.”);

, 175 F.4th 713, 732 (6th Cir. 2026) (holding that noncitizens

without lawful status who had lived in the United States for years were

As in , Happy is no longer seeking admission into the

United States. At the time of his arrest and detention, he was not actively

attempting to come into the United States at a border or port of entry.

Rather, he is already here, having resided within the United States for

an extended period of time. “Because § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to

[Happy] as [he] [was] not detained at the border, [his] detention[] [was]

not “seeking admission” and thus were not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s

mandatory detention scheme); , 180 F.4th 1226,

1239 (10th Cir. 2026) (“The only time a noncitizen can be said to be

seeking admission is when he is seeking to enter the United States at the

border. Since § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those seeking admission,

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) is likewise limited to the border.” (footnote omitted));

at 1248 (“§ 1225(b)(2)(A) applies at the border while § 1226(a) applies to

the interior.”); , 183 F.4th 909, 931 (7th Cir. 2026)

(holding that, “based on the INA’s text, structure, and history,” a

noncitizen, who entered the United States without inspection and was

detained after living there for several years, “is present in the United

States without admission and is not ‘seeking admission,’” and he “is

therefore not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and is eligible for a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a)”); , 183 F.4th 1160, 1172 (9th Cir.

2026) (“[Section] 1225(b)(2)(A), based on its text and context, is best

construed as applying to aliens entering the United States at the border.

Section 1226, by contrast, is best understood as governing inadmissible

and deportable aliens present in the interior of the United States.”);

, ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 2352042, at *11 (1st

Cir. Aug. 13, 2026) (“In sum, our careful study of the disputed statutory

texts leads us to join the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and

Eleventh Circuits in holding that noncitizens . . . who are present in the

United States without admission are not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s

mandatory detention provision, but rather, are governed by § 1226.”).

unlawful under that provision of the INA.” at *7.

Moreover, the Third Circuit also concluded that the

petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing violated the Due Process

Clause. at *8. As in , we assess this petitioner’s due

process claim by considering the factors: “(1) the private

interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an

erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and

the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural

safeguards, and (3) the Government’s interest, including the function

involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or

substitute procedural requirement would entail.” at *9 (quoting

, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). First, as in , we conclude that “mandatory

detention implicates [Happy’s] constitutionally protected interest in

avoiding physical restraint.” (quoting , 521 U.S.

346, 356 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, we too

conclude that “the absence of an opportunity for a neutral decisionmaker

to assess whether [Happy] [is] dangerous or [a] flight risk[] presents a

high risk of erroneously depriving [Happy] of [his] liberty interest.”

(citations omitted). Third, on the record before us, we likewise conclude

that “the Government’s legitimate interest in preventing the release of

dangerous noncitizens and those who might fail to appear at future

hearings does not outweigh the other two factors here, particularly when

[this] non-criminal individual[] [was] detained absent evidence that [he]

is dangerous or a flight risk, and the Government has not argued that [a]

bond hearing[] [is] unduly burdensome.” at *10 (citation omitted).

Thus, we conclude that the factors weigh in the

petitioner’s favor, and his detention without a bond hearing violated his

procedural due process rights.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that, because he is

not actively seeking admission and has been living in interior of the

United States for an extended period of time, the petitioner’s continued

mandatory detention without a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful. Accordingly, we will grant the petition and

order the petitioner’s immediate release from custody.

, No. 26-603, 2026 WL 401189 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2026) (granting

immediate release), ,

___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 2546223 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026);

, No. 25-cv-05930, 2025 WL 3296300 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2025)

(same), , ___ F.4th

____, 2026 WL 2546223 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026).

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: September 2, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge