The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
______________________________________
KRYSTA K.,
DECISION
Plaintiff, and
v. ORDER
FRANK BISIGNANO,1 Commissioner of 24-CV-614-LGF
Social Security, (consent)
Defendant.
______________________________________
APPEARANCES: FREDERICK LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SARAH A. FREDERICK, of Counsel
4467 South Buffalo Street
Orchard Park, New York 14127
MICHAEL DiGIACOMO
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Attorney for Defendant
Federal Centre
138 Delaware Avenue
Buffalo, New York 14202
and
MORRIS LINDSEY WILLIAMS
Special Assistant United States Attorney, of Counsel
Social Security Administration
Office of Program Litigation
OFFICE 2
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on May 7, 2025, and,
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d), is substituted as Defendant in this case. No further action is required to
continue this suit by reason of sentence one of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
JURISDICTION
On April 3, 2026, the parties to this action consented pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c) to proceed before the undersigned in accordance with this court’s June 29, 2018
Standing Order (Dkt. 29). The matter is presently before the court on motions for
judgment on the pleadings filed by Plaintiff on March 3, 2025 (Dkt. 13), and by
Defendant on April 30, 2025 (Dkt. 19).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Krysta K. (“Plaintiff”), brings this action under Titles II and Title XVI of the
Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial
review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s
applications (“applications”) filed with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) on
March 31, 2021, for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of
the Act, and on June 22, 2021, for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI
of the Act (together, “disability benefits”). AR2 at 295-96. Plaintiff alleges she became
disabled on August 26, 2020, based on alcoholism, short term memory problems,
alcohol neuropathy, depression, bipolar disorder, addiction disorder, anxiety, and
seizures. AR at 328. Plaintiff’s applications initially were denied on November 22, 2021,
AR at 130, 131, and upon reconsideration on March 2, 2022. AR at 168, 169.
Plaintiff timely filed a request for an administrative hearing (“hearing”), AR at 245,
which was granted with the hearing held via teleconference on February 10, 2023
2 References to “AR” are to the Bates-stamped pages of the Administrative Record electronically filed by
Defendant on August 29, 2024 (Dkt. 6).
before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Anna Wright (“the ALJ”), in Buffalo, New York.
AR at 49-95. Appearing and testifying at the hearing by telephone were Plaintiff,
represented by Sara Ann Frederick, Esq., with impartial vocational expert (“VE”) Rocco
J. Meola also appearing and testifying by telephone. On July 26, 2023, the ALJ issued
a decision denying Plaintiff’s claims, AR at 8-24 (“ALJ’s Decision”), which Plaintiff timely
appealed to the Appeals Council. AR at 289. On April 26, 2024, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision, rendering it the Commissioner’s
final decision. AR at 1-7. On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action seeking
review of the ALJ’s decision denying Plaintiff disability benefits.
On March 3, 2025, Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 13)
(“Plaintiff’s Motion”), attaching the Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 13-1) (“Plaintiff’s Memorandum”). On April 30,
2025, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 19) (“Defendant’s Motion”),
attaching the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Support of His Cross Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and in Response to Plaintiff’s Brief Pursuant to Local Rule
5.5 (Dkt. 19-1) (“Defendant’s Memorandum”). Filed on July 22, 2025, was Plaintiff’s
Reply (Dkt. 28) (“Plaintiff’s Reply”). Oral argument was deemed unnecessary.
Based on the following, Plaintiff’s Motion should be DENIED; Defendant’s Motion
should be GRANTED.
FACTS3
Plaintiff Krysta K. (“Plaintiff”), born March 23, 1993, was 27 years old as of her
alleged disability onset date (“DOD”) of August 26, 2020, and 30 years old as of July 26,
2023, the date of the ALJ’s decision. AR at 19, 292, 295. Plaintiff lives in a house with
her family including her parents and her daughter,4 AR at 76, 77-78, 352, 949, 956,
graduated from high school where she attended regular classes, AR at 60, 329, and
also completed training as a certified nursing assistant. AR at 61, 329. Plaintiff does
not drive but depends on others for rides and cannot go out alone because she needs
assistance with walking. AR 355-56. Plaintiff’s driver’s license was suspended following
an automobile accident in which Plaintiff was driving while intoxicated. AR at 950.
Plaintiff does not need any help with self-care or grooming, cares for her minor child with
some help from her mother, prepares meal for her family, and does laundry, watches
television, picks up the house, and socializes with others including going to the movies
and engaging in social gatherings on a weekly basis. AR 353-56. Plaintiff’s past work
includes as an attendant in an arcade, a certified nursing assistant in a nursing home, a
home health aide for a home care agency, a cashier in a retail establishment, in food
prep at a grocery store, and as a night auditor in a hotel, AR at 312, but Plaintiff ceased
working on August 26, 2020 because of her alleged disabling condition. AR at 295.
3 In the interest of judicial economy, recitation of the Facts is limited to only those necessary for
determining the pending motions for judgment on the pleadings.
4 Plaintiff’s parents have custody of Plaintiff’s daughter because of Plaintiff’s history of alcohol abuse. AR
at 667.
Beginning in 2016, Plaintiff also occasionally performed work on the computer for her
father’s paving company but ceased performing that work in August 2020.5 AR at 62.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff has a history of alcohol abuse which she described
on September 27, 2020 as drinking two cans of Four Loko6 and a half bottle of rum per
day. AR at 1098. According to Plaintiff, when she attempts to discontinue consuming
alcohol, Plaintiff develops a sensation of pins and needles in her legs which progressed
to weakness in her lower extremities causing her to fall. AR at 1098. On September 11,
2019, Plaintiff fell down the stairs (“the fall”) but did not seek treatment for any injuries
from the fall until September 16, 2019, when Plaintiff presented to the emergency
department of Kenmore Mercy Hospital (“Kenmore Mercy”) complaining of a
progressively worsening headache, dizziness, and a bruised tailbone. AR at 439.
On July 1, 2020, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident (“the accident”)
which caused her to lose consciousness, and sustained knee and neck pain. AR at
476, 489. Plaintiff initially did not seek medical treatment for her injuries from the
accident, but on July 6, 2020, Plaintiff presented to Kenmore Mercy’s emergency
department for treatment. AR at 476. Diagnostic imaging tests of Plaintiff’s right knee,
right tibia and fibula, and right ankle, as well as a chest X-ray were normal. AR at 481-
83, 485, and CT of Plaintiff’s cervical spine showed no fracture or subluxation but
possible spasm. Id. at 484-85.
5 In September 2020, Plaintiff attempted to return to working for her father but Plaintiff maintains her
impairments rendered Plaintiff unable to perform the work. AR at 63.
6 Four Loko is a malt beverage containing between 8% and 14 % ABV (alcohol by volume), roughly the
equivalent of 4 to 8 shots of standard 80 proof liquor, and sold in 23.5 oz cans. See fourloko.com, last
visited September 1, 2026.
From August 27, 2020, to September 21, 2020, Plaintiff was hospitalized at
Kenmore Mercy for complaints of severe bilateral leg weakness and numbness in her
feet with muscle wasting in the lower extremities and poor musculature observed
throughout. AR at 517, 521, 525, 592. Despite multiple diagnostic tests, including MRI
of the lumbar spine that revealed a small central disc protrusions at L4-L5 and L5-S1,
with mild spinal canal narrowing at L4-L5, but without any neuroforaminal stenosis at
either L4-L5 or L5-S1, but no structural abnormality within the brain, thoracic and lumbar
spines explaining Plaintiff’s symptoms. AR at 519. With no specific cause of Plaintiff’s
lower extremity weakness and numbness identified, Plaintiff’s diagnoses upon discharge
on September 21, 2020, included bilateral lower extremity weakness and paresthesia
(sensation of pins and needles), alcoholic polyneuropathy, abnormal liver function tests
attributed to drinking alcohol, bipolar disorder, and mixed anxiety and depressive
disorder. AR at 521. Plaintiff was discharged from Kenmore Mercy to Williamsville
Elderwood subacute rehab for further therapy, however, she left against medical advice
(“AMA”), before Plaintiff’s case presentation, and returned home to drink. AR at 720,
1298.
On September 27, 2020, Plaintiff presented to the Emergency Department (“ED”)
of Erie County Medical Center (“ECMC”) in Buffalo, New York with complaints of an
inability to ambulate because of pain and the sensation of pins and needles in her feet,
and seeking treatment for alcohol withdrawal and detoxification. AR at 720. Plaintiff
was admitted to ECMC from September 27, 2020 until October 8, 2020 for alcohol
withdrawal and detoxification. AR at 720, 736. At that time, Plaintiff estimated she was
drinking a liter of rum every day. Id. Upon her discharge on October 8, 2020, Plaintiff
was to transfer to another rehabilitation facility but instead returned home where she
consumed alcohol. AR at 736. Later on October 8, 2020, Plaintiff’s boyfriend placed an
emergency 911 call reporting Plaintiff was unable to walk and Plaintiff was brought by
ambulance to ECMC’s emergency department where Plaintiff complained of weakness
and an inability to walk. Id. On October 9, 2020, Plaintiff was admitted to ECMC with
diagnoses of acute alcohol intoxication, bilateral lower extremity weakness, and history
of a conversion disorder.7 Id. at 741. During her hospitalization at ECMC, Plaintiff was
educated with regard to conversion disorder and how the disorder was the likely cause
of Plaintiff’s lower extremity weakness. Id. at 745. Upon accepting the conversion
disorder diagnosis, Plaintiff “improved markedly in regards to her ability to attempt
weight bearing with her entire body weight,” could transfer from a bed to a wheelchair
using a sliding board, and her “overall future attitude towards life” improved. Id.
On November 5, 2020, Plaintiff was discharged from ECMC to Terrace View
(“Terrace View”), a subacute rehabilitation facility operated by ECMC with the
anticipation that Plaintiff would full regain her ability to walk and to achieve personal and
career goals. AR at 743, 745, 1224. Plaintiff was an inpatient at Terrace View until
December 18, 2020. AR at 692, 702. While at Terrace View, Plaintiff received regular
physical therapy, made adequate progress with her lower extremity weakness, and was
able to ambulate with a walker upon discharge on December 18, 2020. AR at 1298.
Since 2018, Plaintiff received mental health treatment from BestSelf Behavioral
Health (“BestSelf”) including counseling and medication management. AR at 331-32,
7 According to evidence provided to the Commissioner by Plaintiff, a conversion disorder is “a mental
health disorder that causes physical symptoms.” AR at 32.
799-939, 1313-1569. In connection with her disability benefits application, on October
16, 2021, Plaintiff underwent an internal medicine examination by consultative physician
Susan Dantoni, M.D. (“Dr. Dantoni”), who observed Plaintiff walked with an antalgic gait,
lifting her right foot “as if she has a right foot drop, but she does not have a right foot
drop . . . .” Plaintiff could not walk on heels and toes, and squat was 50% of normal, but
Plaintiff used no assistive device, stance was normal, Plaintiff needed no help changing
for the examination or getting on and off the exam table, was able to rise from a chair
without difficulty, and Plaintiff’s cooperation and effort with the exam were good. AR at
956. The rest of the examination was within normal limits and Dr. Dantoni diagnosed
Plaintiff with a history of a fall with head injury, history of difficulty walking, memory
lapse, and history of alcoholism, and assessed Plaintiff’s prognosis as “fair.” Id. at 958.
Dr. Dantoni opined that Plaintiff “has moderate to marked limitations for prolonged
standing, prolonged walking, and climbing stairs due to her dyscoordination of her feet
and her strange gait.” Id. Dr. Antoni continued that because of poor balance, Plaintiff
“should avoid environments with unprotected heights such as ladders and scaffolds,”
and recommend Plaintiff undergo a mental health evaluation. Id. On that same date,
Plaintiff underwent a psychiatric evaluation by consultative psychologist Christine
Ransom, Ph.D. (“Dr. Ransom”), who diagnosed major depressive disorder, currently
stabilized on treatment, unspecified anxiety disorder, currently stabilized on treatment,
history of alcohol dependence in remission since October 2020 with Plaintiff currently in
treatment, and, based on Plaintiff’s reported medical diagnosis, difficulty walking and
standing. AR at 949-53.
On November 19, 2021, Plaintiff’s medical records were reviewed by State
agency medical consultants B. Stouter, M.D. (“Dr. Stouter”), and P. Roy-Petrick, PhD
(“Dr. Roy-Petrick”), in connection with the SSA’s review of Plaintiff’s disability benefits
application, AR at 104-09, 123-26. Dr. Stouter opined that because of Plaintiff’s physical
impairments, Plaintiff can occasionally lift and/or carry 20 lbs., frequently lift and/or carry
10 lbs., stand and/or walk for a total of two hours in an 8-hour workday, and sit for a total
of about six hours in an 8-hour workday. AR at 106, 123. Dr. Stouter also assessed
Plaintiff with postural limitations including that she can occasionally climb ramps, stairs,
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and
crawl, and Plaintiff needed to avoid even moderate exposure to such hazards as
machinery and heights. Id. at 107-08, 123-24. Dr. Roy-Petrick’s psychological
assessment of Plaintiff determined Plaintiff has the non-severe mental impairments of
depressive, bipolar, and related disorders, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders,
and somatic symptoms and related disorders, AR at 102, 119, which posed mild
limitations to Plaintiff’s ability to understand, remember, and apply information, interact
with others, concentrate, persist or maintain pace, and adapt or manage oneself. Id. at
102-03, 119-20. Plaintiff’s symptoms included loss of sensation, malaise, weakness,
fatigue, and limitations for social interaction limitations, and ability to adapt. Id. at 104,
121. On February 28, 2022, State Agency review physician G. Wang, M.D. (“Dr.
Wang”), confirmed Dr. Stouter’s findings. AR at 143-46, 161-64. On March 2, 2022,
State Agency review psychologist L. Dekeon, Ph.D. (“Dr. Dekeon”, confirmed Dr. Roy-
Petrick’s determination. AR at 138-42, 157-60.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard and Scope of Judicial Review
A claimant is “disabled” within the meaning of the Act and entitled to disability
benefits when she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§
416(i)(1); 1382c(a)(3)(A). A district court may set aside the Commissioner’s
determination that a claimant is not disabled if the factual findings are not supported by
substantial evidence, or if the decision is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3); Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003). In
reviewing a final decision of the SSA, a district court “is limited to determining whether
the SSA’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were
based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It is not, however, the district court’s function to
make a de novo determination as to whether the claimant is disabled; rather, “the
reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including contradictory
evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn” to determine
whether the SSA’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. Id. “Congress has
instructed . . . that the factual findings of the Secretary,8 if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive.” Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir.
8 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, the function of
1982).
In short, the issue is not whether substantial evidence supports the claimant’s
argument, but “whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.” Bonet ex rel.
T.B. v. Colvin, 523 Fed.Appx. 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) (italics in original). “Under this ‘very
deferential standard of review,’ ‘once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject those facts only if
a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.’” Id. at 58-59 (quoting Brault
v. Social Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (italics in original).
2. Disability Determination
The definition of “disabled” is the same for purposes of receiving Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act as for SSI benefits under Title XVI of
the Act. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) with 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a). The applicable
regulations set forth a five-step analysis the Commissioner must follow in determining
eligibility for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. See Bapp v.
Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 1986); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir.
1982). The first step is to determine whether the applicant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity during the period for which the benefits are claimed. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(b) and 416.920(b). The second step is whether the applicant has a severe
impairment which significantly limits the physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities, as defined in the relevant regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and
416.920(c). Third, if there is an impairment and the impairment, or its equivalent, is
listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the regulations (“Appendix 1” or
“the Listings”), and meets the duration requirement of at least 12 continuous months,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services in Social Security cases was transferred to the
Commissioner of Social Security, effective March 31, 1995.
there is a presumption of inability to perform substantial gainful activity, and the claimant
is deemed disabled, regardless of age, education, or work experience. 42 U.S.C. §§
423(d)(1)(A) and 1382a(c)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d). As a fourth
step, however, if the impairment or its equivalent is not listed in Appendix 1, the
Commissioner must then consider the applicant’s RFC which is the ability to perform
physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding the limitations
posed by the applicant’s collective impairments, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f), and
416.920(e)-(f), and the demands of any past relevant work (“PRW”). 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(e) and 416.920(e). If the applicant remains capable of performing PRW,
disability benefits will be denied, id., but if the applicant is unable to perform PRW
relevant work, the Commissioner, at the fifth step, must consider whether, given the
applicant’s age, education, and past work experience, the applicant “retains a residual
functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy.” Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks
and citation omitted); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c) and 416.960(c). The burden of proof is
on the applicant for the first four steps, with the Commissioner bearing the burden of
proof on the final step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) and 416.920(a)(4); Burgess v.
Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008). All five steps need not be addressed because
if the claimant fails to meet the criteria at either of the first two steps, the inquiry ceases
and the claimant is not eligible for disability benefits, but if the claimant meets the
criteria for the third or fourth step, the inquiry ceases with the claimant eligible for
disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920.
In the instant case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status
requirements for DIB through September 30, 2025, AR at 13, and has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) since August 26, 2020, Plaintiff’s alleged disability
onset date (“DOD”).9 AR at 14. The ALJ found Plaintiff suffers from the severe
impairments of a conversion disorder, and alcoholism, id., but that other medically
determinable impairments including a lumbar spine impairment at L4-L5, bipolar
disorder, anxiety and depression, did not significantly limit Plaintiff’s physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities and thus are not severe, id. at 14-15, and Plaintiff’s
alleged alcoholic neuropathy and memory issues are non-medically determinable
impairments. Id. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments meeting or medically equal to the severity of any listed
impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. at 15. Despite her
impairments, the ALJ found Plaintiff retains the RFC to perform sedentary work as
defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), with additional limitations including
that Plaintiff can occasionally climb, balance, kneel, crouch, and crawl, occasionally
work around unprotected heights, perform simple routine tasks, and make simple work-
related decisions. Id. at 15-17. Although Plaintiff is unable to perform past relevant
work, AR at 17, the ALJ found that Plaintiff, based on her age, high school education,
work experience, and RFC, could perform work existing in significant numbers in the
national economy including as a document preparer, scale operator, and table worker.
Id. at 17-18. The ALJ further found that evidence in the record established Plaintiff’s
9 The ALJ observed that Plaintiff worked after the alleged DOD, but that such work activity did not rise to
the level of SGA. AR at 14.
history of alcohol abuse has been in remission since September 2020 and, thus, was
not material to the RFC determination. AR at 18. Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff
was not disabled as defined in the Act since Plaintiff’s alleged DOD of August 26, 2020,
through the date of the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 18-19.
3. Analysis
In support of her motion, Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed legal error by
improperly substituting her non-medical opinion as a lay person for the opinion of a
psychiatrist or psychologist regarding her mental limitations which at step 2 of the
sequential analysis the ALJ determined were non-severe, Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 10-
19, and for the opinion of a medical doctor with regard to Plaintiff’s physical limitations
for which the ALJ failed to develop the record by failing to obtain records pertaining to
the treatment Plaintiff received at Elderwood (“the Elderwood records”), id. at 19-28, and
failing to include in the RFC determination that Plaintiff required the option to alternate
between sitting and standing at will (“sit-stand option”). Id. at 28-37. In opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion and in support of Defendant’s Motion, Defendant argues the ALJ’s RFC
determination reasonably accommodated Plaintiff’s mental impairments, Defendant’s
Memorandum at 6-12, and physical impairments. Id. at 12-17. In reply, Plaintiff repeats
her argument that the ALJ erroneously determined Plaintiff’s mental impairments were
non-severe, Plaintiff’s Reply at 3-6, and failed to obtain the Elderwood records regarding
Plaintiff’s conversion disorder, id. at 6-8, and failed to include a sit-stand option in
Plaintiff’s RFC determination. Id. at 8-12. There is no merit to Plaintiff’s arguments.
As regard’s Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred at step 2 of the sequential
analysis by failing to consider Plaintiff’s mental impairments to be severe impairments,
Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 10-19, the Second Circuit considers such errors harmless
provided the ALJ proceeds with the subsequent steps of the analysis during which the
effects of the subject severe and non-severe impairments are clearly considered. See
Stanton v. Astrue, 370 Fed.Appx. 231, 233 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting the ALJ’s decision
included consideration of the combination of the plaintiff’s severe and nonsevere
impairments and the combined effects of all symptoms in formulating the RFC, thus
rendering harmless any error by the ALJ in failing to consider the plaintiff’s neuropathy a
severe impairment); Brenda D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 1856905, at * 4
(W.D.N.Y. May 10, 2021) (citing Reices-Colon v. Astrue, 523 Fed.Appx. 796, 798 (2d
Cir. 2013) (because the ALJ specifically considered the plaintiff’s anxiety and panic
attacks during the subsequent steps of the sequential analysis, any error at step 2 in
failing to find such impairments were non-severe was harmless)). Here, the ALJ the
ALJ specifically stated that she considered Plaintiff’s conversion disorder and
alcoholism to be severe, Plaintiff’s lumbar spine impairment at L4-L5 was non-severe,
and that Plaintiff also has non-medically determinable impairments of alcoholic
neuropathy and memory issues. AR at 14. The ALJ also stated that she considered all
of Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms attributed to those impairments Plaintiff claims, AR at 15-
16 (referencing AR at 328 (Disability Report-Adult, completed in connection with
Plaintiff’s disability benefits applications). Significantly, Plaintiff’s claimed impairments
include alcoholism, short-term memory problems, alcohol neuropathy, depression,
bipolar disorder, addiction disorder, anxiety, and seizures. AR at 328. Relevantly, “an
ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence submitted,” and “failure to cite
specific evidence does not indicate that such evidence was not considered.” Brault, 683
F.3d at 448 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the record establishes
the ALJ considered all of Plaintiff’s alleged impairments – whether severe, non-severe,
or not medically determinable – in combination as required. Stanton v. Astrue, 370
Fed.Appx. at 233 n. 1 (noting any error by the ALJ in failing to consider an impairment
severe at step 2 was rendered harmless where the ALJ’s decision included
consideration of the combination of the plaintiff’s severe and nonsevere impairments
and the combined effects of all symptoms in formulating the RFC). There is thus no
merit to Plaintiff’s argument.
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing to obtain records pertaining to the
treatment Plaintiff received at Elderwood (“the Elderwood records”), resulting in an
impermissible gap in the record. Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 25-28. In particular, at the
administrative hearing, the ALJ agreed to issue a subpoena for the Elderwood records,
AR at 55-56, 94, but Elderwood’s response to the subpoena was a letter indicating there
was not record that Plaintiff was ever employed there. AR at 311. Plaintiff argues
because the ALJ did not follow up with a correction that medical – not employment –
records were requested, the administrative record is incomplete and thus cannot
support the Commissioner’s determination that Plaintiff is not disabled. Plaintiff’s
Memorandum at 25-28. In opposition, Defendant argues that the response received
from Elderwood that Plaintiff was never an employee at most establishes that it is
unclear whether there is a gap in the record for which the ALJ was not required to
account. Defendant’s Memorandum at 14 (“While the ALJ must attempt to fill in any
‘clear gaps’ in the administrative record, ‘where there are no obvious gaps . . . and
where the ALJ already possesses a complete medical history,’ the ALJ is under no
obligation to seek additional information.” (quoting Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79 n.
5 (2d Cir. 1999))). In reply, Plaintiff argues the ALJ impermissibly failed to obtain the
Elderwood records regarding Plaintiff’s conversion disorder. Plaintiff’s Reply at 6-8.
Here, a careful and thorough review of the administrative record establishes that
although Plaintiff was, on September 21, 2020, discharged from Kenmore Mercy to
Elderwood, she left Elderwood against medical advice several days before Plaintiff’s
case presentation, and returned home to drink. AR at 720, 1298. Although it is not
clear from the record precisely when Plaintiff left Elderwood, that Plaintiff reported she
left, against medical advice, “because she wanted to drink alcohol a couple of days
before presentation,” AR at 720, and went to ECMC’s emergency department on
September 27, 2020 seeking “detox from alcohol,” AR at 725, and complaining that she
was unable to ambulate unless she is drinking alcohol, AR at 726, establishes that
Plaintiff was not at Elderwood for more than, at most, a few days and did not
successfully participate in any therapy or complete any rehabilitation program at
Elderwood. Accordingly, even if any medical records for Plaintiff’s brief stay at
Elderwood exist, they cannot be sufficiently substantial that the ALJ’s failure to obtain
them creates an obvious gap in the administrative record requires remand. As such,
this argument is without merit.
Plaintiff also argues the ALJ, by failing to find any medical opinion persuasive,
improperly substituted her own “common sense” or “lay opinion” for a medical opinion in
formulating the RFC determination. Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 10-19 (mental
impairments), and at 19-28 (physical impairments). The ALJ was not required to
formulate an RFC that mirrors any medical opinions in the record because the ALJ is
“entitled to weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [i]s
consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 Fed.Appx. 53, 56 (2d Cir.
2013) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971)) (the RFC need not
correspond to any particular medical opinion; rather, the ALJ weighs and synthesizes all
evidence available to render an RFC finding consistent with the record as a whole);
Castle v. Colvin, 2017 WL 3939362, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2017) (The fact that the
ALJ's RFC assessment did not perfectly match a medical opinion is not grounds for
remand.). To the contrary, the burden lies with the plaintiff, not the Commissioner, to
provide evidence establishing the RFC. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a); see
also Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The applicant bears the
burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential inquiry....”); Poupore v. Astrue,
566 F.3d 303, 305-06 (2d Cir. 2009) (The burden is on Plaintiff to show that he cannot
perform the RFC as found by the ALJ.). Here, the ALJ in this case properly analyzed
the opinion evidence and the other evidence of record when developing Plaintiff's RFC.
Relevantly, the ALJ is not required to obtain or rely on any medical opinion where
there is no evidence establishing the Plaintiff is experiencing any symptoms from a
claimed impairment. See Lewis v. Colvin, 548 F. App'x 675, 678 (2d Cir. 2013) (ALJ not
required to accept the plaintiff’s claims or impairment that are based only on the
claimant’s subjective complaints). Further, in the instant case, as regards Plaintiff’s
physical impairments, the ALJ’s formulation of an RFC limiting Plaintiff to sedentary
work with some additional postural and environmental restrictions is consistent with Dr.
Dantoni’s opinion rendered after examining Plaintiff on a consultative basis, AR at 958,
as well as the opinions of State agency medical consultants Dr. Stouter, AR at 104-09,
123-26, and Dr. Wang. AR at 143-46, 161-64. Consultative examiners and State
agency medical consultants are deemed to be highly qualified physicians who are
experts in Social Security disability evaluations and an ALJ is entitled to rely upon their
opinions, which can also serve as substantial evidence. See Camille v. Colvin, 652
Fed.Appx. 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2016) (consultative physician’s report may constitute
substantial evidence); Petrie v. Astrue, 412 Fed.Appx. 401, 405-06 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513a and 416.913a, Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir.
2004), and Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1983)).
Further, insofar as the ALJ did not find Dr. Ransom’s opinion persuasive, Dr.
Ransom found Plaintiff had no limitations posed by her mental health impairments. AR
at 952. That the ALJ rejected Dr. Random’s opinion that Plaintiff’s mental impairments
did not limit Plaintiff’s ability to work, AR at 949-53, in favor of the State Agency review
psychologist Dr. Roy-Petrick who assessed Plaintiff with mild limitations in all four
domains of functioning set forth as the “paragraph B criteria” for mental health
impairments, AR at 102-03, the ALJ thus accepted the more limiting opinion regarding
Plaintiff’s mental health which, even if erroneous, was harmless. See Ramsey v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 830 Fed.Appx. 37, 39 (2d Cir. 2020) (affirming the district court’s
decision upholding the ALJ’s decision although “the ALJ occasionally deviated from the
consultative examiners’ recommendations to decrease [the plaintiff]’s RFC based on
other evidence in the record, exemplified by the ALJ’s determination that [the plaintiff]
should not interact with the public. The ALJ committed no error by determining the
scope of [the plaintiff]’s RFC because that is his responsibility.” (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2) (explaining that the Commissioner has the “final responsibility” for
determining, inter alia, a claimant’s RFC); Ellen A. v. Saul, 2021 WL 1087949, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2021) (even if the ALJ errs by formulating an RFC that is technically
unsupported by the record because it assesses greater limitations than contained within
the medical opinions of record, such error is harmless); Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
2020 WL 4333340, at *3 n. 2 (W.D.N.Y. Jul. 28, 2020) (noting “Plaintiff also appears to
take issue with how the ALJ evaluated the opinion of the non-examining state agency
consultant, but precisely what fault Plaintiff finds is not clear. As far as the Court can
tell, it appears that the ALJ found Plaintiff to be more limited than the state agency
consultant.”); Wynn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F.Supp.3d 340, 347-48 (W.D.N.Y.
2018) (finding the ALJ properly assigned “little weight” to the opinions of consultative
medical sources that “included fewer mental and physical work-related limitations” than
the ALJ included in the RFC assessment). There is thus no merit to this argument.
Nor did the ALJ’s RFC assessment fail to accommodate Plaintiff’s mental impairments,
especially Plaintiff’s asserted poor memory. In particular, although Plaintiff maintains
she has memory issues, there is evidence in the record establishing that Plaintiff
reported doing work on the computer for her father’s paving company. See, e.g., AR at
894 (BestSelf progress note dated June 25, 2021, reporting that Plaintiff “has been back
working with her date a little bit”); 898 (BestSelf progress note dated July 7, 2021 that
“Client identified her family and employment as her main support for recovery”); AR at
906 (BestSelf progress note dated July 16, 2021, that Plaintiff reported she “continue[d]
to work, and that going to work gets [Plaintiff] motivated and active.”). That Plaintiff
continues to work is evidence that Plaintiff’s mental impairments do not prevent her from
working. See Lovell v. Colvin, 137 F.Supp.3d 347, 354 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (no remand
necessary where ALJ rejects Plaintiff’s subjective complaints based on Plaintiff’s own
expressed desire to work).
Additionally, at counseling sessions at BestSelf between February 23, 2021 when
Plaintiff, following her discharge from Terrace View, resumed mental health care with
BestSelf, and November 17, 2021, the last dated progress note in the record, Plaintiff
was repeatedly assessed as presenting with no significant issues regarding her mental
status which included mood and affect, appearance and behavior, speech, thought
content, cognition/process, and motor function that would reasonably bear on whether
Plaintiff suffered from a severe memory impairment. AR at 796-939, 959-1080. Further,
at the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that she plays board games and on the
computer with her nine-year old daughter, AR at 77-78, and can follow a recipe. AR at
78. Accordingly, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s mental impairment’s do not
impact Plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related functions is supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s failure to incorporate into the RFC determination a
sit-stand option. Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 29-33, Plaintiff’s Reply at 8-12. In
opposition, Defendant argues that because no treating source ever assessed Plaintiff
with any limitation to sitting, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could perform only
sedentary work which limits standing and walking to a total of two hours in an 8-hour
workday, sufficiently accommodated Plaintiff’s exertional limitations. Defendants’
Memorandum at 15-16. Plaintiff’s objection lacks merit
Initially, it is observed that although as of September 2020, Plaintiff claimed she
was unable to walk, an impairment that was attributed to a conversion disorder, at an
annual physical on September 3, 2021, Plaintiff was “ambulatory at baseline,” i.e., able
to walk on her own in her everyday state of health. AR at 1281. This is consistent with
Plaintiff’s statements at the administrative hearing that she was unable to walk and used
a wheelchair while hospitalized at ECMC from September 27, 2020 until November 5,
2020, at which time she was discharged to Terrace View where she began to ambulate
using a walker. AR at 83-84. Plaintiff used the walker for about six months after which
she was able to ambulate with a cane for approximately six more months. Id. Plaintiff
denies having any physical therapy or occupational therapy since being discharged from
Terrace View on December 18, 2020. AR at 70-71. As of the hearing on February 10,
2023, Plaintiff remained able to walk without an assistive device. AR at 83.
The ALJ formulated an RFC that limited Plaintiff to a less than full range of
sedentary work based on several postural and mental limitations. AR at 15. Relevantly,
Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and
occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.
Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain
amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties.
Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other
sedentary criteria are met.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a).
“The vocational term ‘occasionally’ means occurring from very little up to one third of the
workday.” Edward M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2026 WL 1613959, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June
5, 2026) (citing SSR 83-10,10 1983 WL 31251, at *5 (Jan. 1, 1983)). Further, “a marked
limitation in walking is not inconsistent with sedentary work.” Rudolph M. v. Comm'r of
10 “SSR” is an acronym for “Social Security Ruling.” Social Security Rulings are agency rulings “published
under the authority of the Commissioner of Social Security and are binding on all components of the
Administration. These rulings represent precedent final opinions and orders and statements of policy and
interpretations that [the SSA] ha[s] adopted.” 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1).
Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 9639934, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2021) (citing Perez v. Chater, 77
F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996) (sedentary work involves up to two hours of standing or
walking and six hours of sitting in an eight hour work day); DeRosia v. Colvin, 2017 WL
4075622, at *20-21 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2017) (moderate to marked limitations for
prolonged standing and walking was consistent with the conclusion that the claimant
could perform sedentary work); Love-Dennis v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2020
WL 4784584, at 5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2020) (moderate limitations in standing and
walking supports determination that claimant was limited to sedentary work). It is
significant that only Plaintiff imposed a five-minute limitation to standing and walking by
testifying as much at the administrative hearing. AR at 79-80. Further, the
administrative record is silent as to any limitation to Plaintiff’s ability to sit. Nor has any
treatment provider commented that Plaintiff must be able to sit and stand at will.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s limiting Plaintiff to only two hours total standing and walking is
well-within the requirements for sedentary work and is consistent with Dr. Dantoni’s
opinion that Plaintiff “has moderate to marked limitations for prolonged standing, [and]
prolonged walking . . . .” AR at 958.
To summarize, here, there are no issues of fact which, if decided in the Plaintiff’s
favor, would compel a reasonable factfinder to reach a determination contrary to the
ALJ’s decision. Bonet ex rel. T.B., 523 Fed.Appx. at 58-59. Under this “very deferential
standard of review,” Brault, 683 F.3d at 448, the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff was not
disabled between the date of her disability benefits application and the date of the ALJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and no remand for
consideration of any additional records is warranted.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion (Dkt. 13) is DENIED; Defendant’s Motion
(Dkt. 19) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the file.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Leslie G. Foschio
_____________________________________
LESLIE G. FOSCHIO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DATED: September 1, 2026
Buffalo, New York