Burns

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RICHARD BURNS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:26-cv-165-MAB

)

TNI TRANSPORTATION, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

Presently before the Court is Defendant TNI Transportation, Inc.’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 10). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) is

DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On February 12, 2026, Richard Burns (“Plaintiff”) filed his Complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. as amended (the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, or “the

ADA”) (see Doc. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff’s Complaint advances four counts of ADA

violations against Defendant TNI Transportation, Inc. (“Defendant”): (1) disability-based

discrimination (Count I), (2) disability-based harassment (Count II), (3) failure to

accommodate (Count III), and (4) retaliation (Count IV) (Id. at 1). Plaintiff has

osteoarthritis in his right hip and has suffered from this condition since 2009 (Id. at 3).1

As a result of his hip condition, Plaintiff retained a valid medical examiner’s certificate

1 In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court takes the well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. E.g., Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC, 978 F.3d 507, 512-13 (7th Cir. 2020).

from the Department of Transportation, which medically certifies him to drive without

restriction (Id.). Defendant offered Plaintiff employment after Plaintiff successfully

passed Defendant’s background check and drug screen (Id.). Plaintiff was informed that

he had been “hired” and would be scheduled for his road test (Id.). When Plaintiff arrived

at his road test on November 11, 2025, he used a cane to walk to the truck he was

scheduled to drive for the test (Id.). Upon seeing Plaintiff walking with a cane,

Defendant’s Safety Manager stopped the test from moving forward and told Plaintiff that

he would need to speak with the recruiter about Plaintiff’s medical condition (Id. at 4).

The next day, Defendant rescinded Plaintiff’s offer of employment (Id. at 5).

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC (Doc. 1-2), received a

Notice of Right to Sue letter (Doc. 1-3), and then filed his Complaint in federal court (Doc.

1). Defendant filed the present Motion to Dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies (Doc. 10, p. 1). Specifically, Defendant contends that

the EEOC prematurely granted Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue Letter prior to the

completion of the EEOC’s statutorily-required 180 day investigation period (Id. at 3).

Plaintiff responded that he properly exhausted his administrative remedies with the

EEOC, and Defendant replied (Docs. 19, 23).

LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) addresses the legal sufficiency of the

plaintiff’s claim for relief, not the merits of the case or whether the plaintiff will ultimately

prevail. Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014); Gibson v.

City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the

Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor. E.g., Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC, 978 F.3d 507, 512-13 (7th Cir. 2020).

However, “legal conclusions and conclusory allegations . . . are not entitled to this

presumption of truth.” Dix, 978 F.3d at 513 (quoting McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d

611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S, 555, 557 (2007)). “[W]hile a complaint does not need

‘detailed factual allegations’ to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it must allege

sufficient facts ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Dix, 978 F.3d at 512-

13 (quoting League of Women Voters of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 757 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir.

2014)).

Additionally, while “a plaintiff is not required to anticipate and refute defenses in

his complaint,” a plaintiff’s complaint may be properly dismissed by the Court “[o]nly

when the plaintiff pleads itself out of court—that is, admits all the ingredients of an

impenetrable defense—may a complaint that otherwise states a claim be dismissed under

Rule 12(b)(6).” Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004).

DISCUSSION

Defendant’s threshold argument in its Motion is that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies. However, the Court is not persuaded. At the pleading stage,

Plaintiff is not required to “anticipate—much less refute—a possible affirmative

defense.” Luna Vanegas v. Signet Builders, Inc., 46 F.4th 636, 645 (7th Cir. 2022). Rather, all

Plaintiff must do is provide enough factual information to state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face. Camasta, 761 F.3d at 736. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he

satisfied all of the administrative prerequisites before filing suit (Doc. 1, p. 2). Specifically,

Plaintiff alleges that he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC; that he received

a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the EEOC; and that he then filed his Complaint in

federal court within the next 90 days after his receipt of the Right to Sue letter (Id.).

Moreover, Plaintiff attaches exhibits to his Complaint that demonstrate his completed

administrative steps (Docs. 1-2, 1-3). Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged all that

is required of him to plead that he exhausted his administrative remedies. See Briedecker

v. Garnett Wood Prods., Inc., No. 3:20-cv-253-MAB, 2021 WL 376620 at *3 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 5,

2021) (“Here, all the complaint says is that Plaintiff received a right to sue letter from the

EEOC…Plaintiff did not plead anything more regarding the charge he filed with the

EEOC. Thus, nothing on the face of the complaint compels the conclusion that Plaintiffs

failed to file a timely charge with the EEOC and thus failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies prior to filing suit.”).

It is well settled that Plaintiff has no obligation to allege facts in the Complaint that

would negate an affirmative defense. See, e.g. Mosely v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago,

434 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 2006). In fact, courts typically refrain from dismissing a case on

a motion to dismiss based on an affirmative defense. United States v. N. Tr. Co., 372 F.3d

886, 888 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted

whether or not some defense is potentially available.”); United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d

838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[C]omplaints do not have to anticipate affirmative defenses to

survive a motion to dismiss.”); Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690

(7th Cir. 2012) (“[C]ourts should usually refrain from granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions on

affirmative defenses [because] Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim for

relief, and . . . . [t]he mere presence of a potential affirmative defense does not render the

claim for relief invalid.”).

The one exception to this general rule—when a case may properly be dismissed at

the pleading stage based on an affirmative defense—is when “the allegations of the

complaint . . . set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense.” Hyson

USA, Inc. v. Hyson 2U, Ltd., 821 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2016). However, that exception is

not applicable in this instance. Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficiently pleads that he exhausted

his administrative remedies and there is nothing on the face of the Complaint that

compels the conclusion that Plaintiff failed to exhaust. See Mosely v. Bd. of Educ. of City of

Chicago, 434 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 2006) (a plaintiff has no obligation to allege facts

negating an affirmative defense and finding “nothing on the face of [plaintiff’s] complaint

compels a conclusion that she failed to exhaust.”); Vance v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No.

24 C 1111, 2024 WL 3823176, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2024) (denying motion to dismiss

because the plaintiff’s complaint “does not compel a conclusion that he failed to exhaust

administrative remedies before filing suit.”); Zimny v. Geneva Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 304,

718 F. Supp. 3d 776, 786 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (denying motion to dismiss on the basis of

exhaustion because the face of the plaintiff’s complaint did not “compel[] a conclusion”

that the plaintiff failed to exhaust) (citation omitted).

In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant also contends that the statute is clear that the

EEOC must wait 180 days to complete its investigation, or dismiss the charge, prior to

issuing a Notice of the Right to Sue letter (Doc. 10, p. 3). Defendant relies on Simler, noting

that the Court found that the EEOC engaged in only a 15-day investigation of the

plaintiff's charge of discrimination, which is not consistent with the requirements of 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Simler v. Harrison County Hosp., 110 F.Supp.2d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2000).

However, as Plaintiff correctly notes, Simler was decided on a motion for summary

judgment, with a developed evidentiary record, not on a motion to dismiss, where the

well-pleaded facts are taken as true and all reasonable inferences are made in the

plaintiff's favor (Doc. 19, p. 6).

Defendant also raises the argument (in its reply brief) that the EEOC does not have

the authority to go against the plain language of the statute and issue an early Notice of

Right to Sue letter (Doc. 23, p. 3). However, whether the EEOC has the authority to grant

an early Notice of Right to Sue letter is an issue well beyond the face of the pleadings and

thus not appropriate for the Court to consider in a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. All that is

required by Plaintiff in his initial pleading is “short and plain statement[s] of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555; see also

F.R.C.P. 8(a). Plaintiff has met this standard.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant TNI Transportation, Inc.’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 10) is DENIED

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 31, 2026 im

ark Uh

wane NE

United States Magistrate Judge

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