Small

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

SHANNON SMALL PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 4:25-cv-04087

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Shannon Small (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social

Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application for

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Titles

XVI and Title II of the Act.

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all

proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and

conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 7. Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues

this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed her disability application for a period of disability and DIB on May 3, 2023,

and for SSI on April 25, 2023. (Tr. 68).1 In her application, Plaintiff alleged being disabled due

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to partial symptomatic epilepsy with partial complex seizures, not contractible with status

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___.” The

transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.” and refer to the document

filed at ECF No. 12. These references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF

page number.

epilepticus, average of three to four seizures monthly, morbid obesity, and diabetes. (Tr. 405).

Plaintiff alleged an onset date of January 26, 2023. (Tr. 68). Plaintiff’s applications were denied

initially on December 21, 2023, and again upon reconsideration on August 7, 2024. Id.

Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her denied applications, and this request

was granted. (Tr. 68). An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) conducted the hearing on February

3, 2025. (Tr. 88-108). At this hearing, Plaintiff was present and represented by Gregory Giles. Id.

Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”), Phunda Yarbrough, both testified at the hearing. Id.

On February 20, 2025, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 68-78). In this

decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through

December 31, 2028. (Tr. 70, Finding 1). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of January 26, 2023. (Tr. 70, Finding 2).

The ALJ found Plaintiff had severe impairments of obesity, diabetes mellitus, obstructive sleep

apnea, and epilepsy. (Tr. 71. Finding 3). Despite being severe, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did

not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity

of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 72, Finding 4).

The ALJ also determined Plaintiff had the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to

perform sedentary work with the exception of could occasionally climb ramps and stairs; no

climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolding; could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and

crawl; no exposure to hazards such as moving mechanical parts or unprotected heights; and no

exposure to extreme heat or extreme cold. (Tr. 72-73, Finding 5).

The ALJ then determined Plaintiff was unable to perform any Past Relevant Work

(“PRW”). (Tr. 76, Finding 6). However, based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and

RFC, the ALJ found there were jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that she can

perform, such as all out operator with 14,650 jobs in the national economy, addresser with 28, 000

jobs in the national economy, and document preparer with 21,500 jobs in the national economy.

(Tr. 77, Finding 10). Based upon these findings, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has not been disabled

under the Act from January 26, 2023, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 78, Finding 11).

On October 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 2. Both parties filed

appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 17, 19. Accordingly, the matter is now ripe.

II. Applicable Law

In reviewing this case, the Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a

preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to

support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).

If substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion, the Court cannot reverse simply

because substantial evidence also supports a different outcome. Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963,

968 (8th Cir. 2010); Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, “if after

reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the

evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s

decision.” Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2005); Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,

1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden

of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least

one year and prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See 42 U.S.C.

§§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998). The Act

defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff

must show his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve

consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses

the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently

engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;

(3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling

impairment listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education,

and work experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to

perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the

burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove there are other jobs in the national economy that the

claimant can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder

only considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of their RFC if the final

stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

III. Discussion

In her appeal brief, Plaintiff raised the following arguments: (1) the ALJ improperly

evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints; (2) the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s RFC; and

(3) the ALJ’s step-five determinations were not supported by substantial evidence. ECF No. 17.

Defendant argues (1) the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints; (2) substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC finding; and (3) substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step-

five findings. ECF No. 19.

A. Evaluation of Subjective Complaints

Looking first at Plaintiff’s claims that the ALJ improperly evaluated her subjective

allegations of disability, the Court finds the ALJ did not err. In assessing the subjective allegations

of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler,

739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz

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v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007). The factors to consider are as follows: (1) the

claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the

precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication;

and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.

The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective

allegations of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor if the ALJ

acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective

allegations. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). If the ALJ properly applies

these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective

allegations are not entirely valid, the ALJ’s determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.

Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s

2 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis

of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for

relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your

pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping

on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required

the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007).

Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

subjective allegations “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them

[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.

When discounting a claimant’s allegations of pain, the ALJ must make a specific evaluation

of a claimant’s subjective allegations, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony,

addressing any inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d

1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a

sufficient reason to find a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not

the existence of pain, but whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of

substantial gainful activity. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).

Based upon the Court’s review, there is no basis for reversal on this issue. See, e.g.,

Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing an ALJ may discount a

“claimant’s subjective complaints . . . if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole”). In the

present action, the ALJ fully complied with Polaski in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective

allegations. (Tr. 73-76). Indeed, the ALJ opinion outlined Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and

noted inconsistencies between those allegations and the record. Id.

Most notably, the ALJ noted that there were several medical records which suggested

various providers over the years had voiced concerns that her untreated obstructive sleep apnea

was the cause of her seizures. Id. at 73. The ALJ also pointed to several instances in which Plaintiff

had failed to take her anticonvulsant as prescribed which was followed by a seizure. Id. at 73-76.

The ALJ noted that, when taken properly, Plaintiff’s prescribed medications of Keppra and

Topamax kept her seizures “fairly well-controlled”. (Tr. 75). The ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s

sporadic failure to take her medications properly as well as leaving a potential cause of her seizures

untreated was proper in his decision to discount her subjective complaints. Failure to comply with

medical treatments has upheld as a reason to discount a Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. See

Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 802 (8th Cir.2005) (“A failure to follow a recommended

course of treatment . . . weighs against a claimant’s credibility.” ); Shannon v. Chater, 54 F.3d 484,

487 (8th Cir.1995) (“failure to seek medical treatment may be inconsistent with a finding of

disability”). Further, the ALJ considered the testimony of both of the treating nurse practitioners

and determined them to be unpersuasive. The ALJ cited various exhibits which were inconsistent

with both women’s testimony in coming to that conclusion. “An ALJ may decline to credit a

claimant’s subjective complaints ‘if the evidence as a whole is inconsistent with the claimant’s

testimony.’” Julin v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Barnhart, 471 F.3d at

907.

Additionally, the ALJ pointed to Plaintiff’s continued work and various daily activities as

being inconsistent with the testimony of the severity of her impairments. (Tr. 75). Plaintiff

testified that she continued to work during her claimed period of disability, working 16 hours every

other weekend as a private sitter. Id. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff stated in an April 2024

report that she was going to the gym and that her only physical complaint was nausea as a result

of a new medication she was taking. These inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints and her activities diminish her credibility. See Riggins v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 689, 692 (8th

Cir.1999) (finding activities such as driving his children to work, driving his wife to school,

shopping, visiting his mother, taking a break with his wife between classes, watching television,

and playing cards were inconsistent with plaintiff’s complaints of disabling pain). An ALJ may

discount subjective complaints of a plaintiff when there are such inconsistencies in the record, as

was properly done here. Therefore, the Court find the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial

evidence in the record as a whole.

B. RFC Determination

In this matter, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform sedentary work as

defined in 20 CFR §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) “except can occasionally climb ramps and

stairs; no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolding; can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch

and crawl; no exposure to hazards such as moving mechanical parts or unprotected heights; and

no exposure to extreme heat or extreme cold.” (Tr. 72-73, Finding 5). Plaintiff argues the ALJ

erred in this RFC determination, specifically asserting that the ALJ’s assessment was made

“without the benefit of any consultation examination. ECF No. 17, p. 8. However, substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.

Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is

required to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). This RFC

determination must be based on medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function

in the workplace. See Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2004). The ALJ should

consider “‘all the evidence in the record’ in determining the RFC, including ‘the medical records,

observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of his

limitations.’” Id. (quoting Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019 (8th Cir. 2002)). The Plaintiff

has the burden of producing documents and evidence to support his or her claimed RFC. See 42

U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206. The mere fact a claimant has a

long list of medical conditions does not demonstrate that person is disabled; instead, the RFC

determination is a function-by-function analysis. See SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996).

“The RFC assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that result from an

individual’s medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, including the

impact of any related symptoms.” Id.

The ALJ, however, bears the primary responsibility for making the RFC determination and

for ensuring there is “some medical evidence” regarding the claimant’s “ability to function in the

workplace” that supports the RFC determination. Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 703-04 (8th Cir.

2001). Furthermore, this Court is required to affirm the ALJ’s RFC determination if that

determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See McKinney v.

Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2000). Under 20 C.F.R. § 1519a(a), a consultative examination

may be ordered if the necessary information may not be obtained from the claimant’s medical

sources. “‘[I]t is reversible error for an ALJ not to order a consultative examination when such an

evaluation is necessary for him to make an informed decision.’” Freeman v. Apfel, 208 F.3d 687,

692 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting Dozier v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 274, 276 (8th Cir.1985)) (alteration in

original). If, however, the medical records before the ALJ provide sufficient medical evidence to

determine whether the claimant is disabled, a consultative examination is not required. Martise v.

Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 926-27 (8th Cir.2011); accord Johnson v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 316, 320 (8th

Cir.2010); Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 749–50 (8th Cir.2001).

In his opinion, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s alleged impairments and discounted those he

found were not credible. (Tr. 73-76). The ALJ considered the results of objective diagnostic tests

and examination findings and discussed these in his decision. Id. The ALJ also considered the

findings of medical consultants and considered Plaintiff’s testimony and function reports in

assessing her RFC. Id. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination. Further, there

was sufficient evidence for the ALJ to make an informed decision as to Plaintiff’s RFC. Because

the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by sufficient medical evidence, this Court finds the

ALJ’s RFC determination should be affirmed.

C. Step Five Determination

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s step five determination is not supported by

substantial evidence. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the “ALJ has shirked [his] responsibility

to assess Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, develop the record, find support for his RFC

assessment, and, ultimately, properly assess whether Plaintiff can perform work existing in

significant number in the national economy.” ECF No. 17, pp. 8-9.

The Court also finds Plaintiff’s additional arguments unpersuasive. The ALJ looked to the

testimony of the VE as well as the opinions of medical staff through evidence presented to fully

develop the record in the instant case. As discussed previously, the ALJ properly assessed

Plaintiff’s RFC and his conclusion is supported by the record. Based upon this assessment, an ALJ

is entitled to rely upon the opinion of a vocational expert as to the number of jobs in the economy

which could be performed by someone with Plaintiff’s RFC. See Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926

(8th Cir. 2004) (citing Weiler v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir.1999)). Therefore, the Court

finds that the ALJ did not err in his determination that there were jobs in significant numbers in

the national economy Plaintiff could perform.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits

to Plaintiff, is supported by substantial evidence and the decision is AFFIRMED.

ENTERED this 31st day of August 2026.

Spencer G. Singleton

/s/

HONORABLE SPENCER G. SINGLETON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE