Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA J S -6

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 8:26-cv-01378-MRA-RAO Date August 12, 2026

Title Pamela Anne Mitchell v. John Jeffrey Mitchell et al.

Present: The Honorable MONICA RAMIREZ ALMADANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Melissa H. Kunig None Present

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:

None Present None Present

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO REMAND [12]

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion to Remand. ECF 12. The Court read and

considered the briefing related to the Motion and deemed the matter appropriate for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L.R. 7-15. For the reasons stated herein, the

Court GRANTS the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 10, 2026, Petitioner Pamela Anne Mitchell (‘Petitioner’) filed a Verified

Petition against Respondents Kimberly Mitchell Rohde and John Jeffrey Mitchell, Co-Trustees of

the J. & C. Mitchell Family Trust dated May 14, 2015 (the “Trust’”) (collectively, “Respondents”),

in the Orange County Superior Court, asserting the following claims: (1) Compel Appraisal and

Distribution; (2) For Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (3) For Removal of Co-Trustees; and (4) For

Appointment of Private Professional Fiduciary. ECF 1 at 2. The petition arises from

administration of the Trust following the deaths of the settlors John F. Mitchell and Carol A.

Mitchell (“Settlors”) in 2024. Jd. Petitioner, who is the daughter of the Settlors, is a beneficiary

and co-trustee of the Trust. ECF 1-1 4 5. Respondents are also children of the Settlors, co-

trustees, and beneficiaries of the Trust. Jd. ¥ 4.

On May 13, 2026, Respondent Kimberly Mitchell Rohde removed this action to federal

court, arguing that Petitioner’s claims “necessarily raise substantial, disputed questions of federal

law.” Jd. 15,2026, Respondent John Jeffrey Mitchell filed a Request for Joinder in the

notice of removal. ECF 3.

On June 22, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Motion to Remand. ECF 22. Both

Respondents oppose the Motion. ECF 15, 16.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA J S -6

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 8:26-cv-01378-MRA-RAO Date August 12, 2026

Title Pamela Anne Mitchell v. John Jeffrey Mitchell et al.

LEGAL STANDARD

It is axiomatic that “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). They may exercise jurisdiction only

when authorized by the Constitution or a statute. Jd. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant

may remove a matter to federal court where the district court would have original

jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The propriety of removal

“may later be tested in the federal court, either on a motion by a party to remand, or by the court

on its own motion.” Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cu.

1979). The party seeking removal bears the burden of proving its propriety. Duncan v. Stuetzle,

76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). “The removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt

about the nght of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska

Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566

(9th Cir. 1992)).

DISCUSSION

In the notice of removal and in their oppositions to the instant Motion, Respondents argue

that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because the “central dispute is

whether trustees may lawfully distribute estate assets before federal estate tax liability is

determined.” ECF 1 at 3. Respondents claim that federal law, particularly 26 U.S.C. § 6324,

might expose them to personal liability for receiving or holding estate property for unpaid estate

taxes. Jd. According to Respondents, although Petitioner’s claims for distribution of assets

arise under state law, “[a] court cannot compel distribution here without determining whether such

distribution would violate federal law or expose Defendant to personal liability.” Jd. at 4.

Petitioner argues that this matter must be remanded because federal question jurisdiction

does not exist by virtue of Respondents’ assertion of a defense under federal law, and distribution

under the trust “can be made notwithstanding the federal tax issue.” ECF 12 at 5. Petitioner

further argues that this matter falls within the “probate exception” to federal jurisdiction because

Petitioner’s claims “involve the internal administration of a trust and are within the exclusive

jurisdiction of California probate courts.” Jd. at 6.

When, as here, removal is based on the assertion of federal question jurisdiction, the Court

looks to the face of a well-pleaded complaint to determine whether a cause of action is created by

federal law or whether the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a

substantial question of federal law. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Op Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808

(1988) (Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)).

“{I]t must be clear from the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint that there is a federal

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA J S -6

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 8:26-cv-01378-MRA-RAO Date August 12, 2026

Title Pamela Anne Mitchell v. John Jeffrey Mitchell et al.

question.” Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996).

Looking at the underlying petition, it is clear that the causes of action asserted by Petitioner

are not created by federal law, but rather by state statutes governing the administration of trusts.

ECF 1-1 at 9-12. Petitioner specifically seeks: (1) immediate independent appraisal by a

qualified licensed appraiser and a distribution of assets in accordance with the Trust; (2) damages

for Respondents’ alleged breach of fiduciary duty under California Probate Code §§ 16002(a)

and 16060; (3) removal of co-trustees under California Probate Code §§ 16400, 16420(a)(5), and

17200, and (4) appointment of private fiduciary to administer the Trust. According to the

Petition, “Respondents have taken the position that updated appraisals and division should be

delayed until receipt of the IRS closing letter.” Jd. at 6. Although Petitioner’s allegations

potentially implicate issues under federal law, that is not sufficient to confer federal question

jurisdiction because “the mere reference of a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state

law claim into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state

law claim.” Easton v. Crossland Mortg. Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997).

Apparently recognizing that Petitioner’s claims do not arise under federal law,

Respondents rely on Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314

(2005), and its progeny to argue that Petitioner’s claims create federal question jurisdiction

because they “necessarily raise substantial, disputed questions of federal law,” ECF 1 at2. Under

the Grable doctrine, a state law claim may create federal question jurisdiction if it raises a federal

issue that is “actually disputed and substantial.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 314. Respondents argue

that such an issue exists here because Petitioner’s claims raise the question “what effect federal

estate tax law has on the trustees’ duties and exposure while the Petition seeks to impose liability

and remove them for withholding distribution.” ECF 15 at 6. According to Respondents,

“federal law creates continuing lien and personal-liability risks that justify withholding

distribution until those risks are resolved or adequately protected against.” Jd. at 12. Under

Respondents’ own framing, federal law is implicated only to the extent that it provides a defense

or justification for their alleged failure to distribute the trust assets. Respondents nevertheless

claim that Petitioner’s claims arise under federal law pursuant to Grable because “Petitioner has

made the tax-based withholding itself the challenged act.”

The Court is not persuaded by this recasting of the Petition. Petitioner alleges that

“Respondents have unreasonably delayed valuation and distribution of the Trust assets” in

violation of the Trust instrument itself. ECF 1-1 at9—10. It is Respondents, not Petitioner, who

raise federal law as a defense to Petitioner’s claims. Nothing in Petitioner’s causes of action

requires Petitioner to plead or prove any federal issue except to the extent necessary to defeat

Respondents’ assertion that federal law relieves them of liability. Under such circumstances,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA J S -6

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 8:26-cv-01378-MRA-RAO Date August 12, 2026

Title Pamela Anne Mitchell v. John Jeffrey Mitchell et al.

federal question jurisdiction does not exist. Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179,

1183 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he existence of a defense based upon federal law is insufficient to

support jurisdiction.”). Indeed, even if the on/y disputed issue in this matter was whether federal

law justified withholding distributions under the Trust, that is not sufficient to confer federal

question jurisdiction. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 14 (“[A] case may not be removed to

federal court on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's

complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the

Respondents concede that the closest analog in the caselaw that supports removal is Grable

itself. In Grable, the IRS seized real property owned by Grable to satisfy a federal tax

delinquency, and it gave Grable notice by certified mail before selling the property to the buyer,

respondent Darue Engineering & Manufacturing (“Darue”). Grable, 545 U.S. at 310. Grable

then brought a quiet title action against Darue in state court, claiming that Darue’s title was invalid

because federal law required the IRS to give Grable notice of the sale by personal service, rather

than by certified mail. Jd. at311. Darue removed the quiet title action to federal court, arguing

that Grable’s claim of title “depended on the interpretation of the notice statute under federal law.”

Id. The Supreme Court held that the case warranted federal jurisdiction because “[w]hether

Grable was given notice within the meaning of the federal statute is . . . an essential element of its

quiet title claim, and the meaning of the federal statute is actually in dispute.” Jd. at 315.

Here, by contrast, Respondents fail to explain how any issue of federal law constitutes an

“essential element of” Petitioner’s claims related to the Trust. Petitioner alleges that

Respondents have failed to timely valuate or distribute Trust assets, failed to provide access to

financial documents of the Trust, failed to act impartially, and failed to take many of the steps

necessary in Trust administration. No element of those claims requires Petitioner to prove

anything under federal law, which distinguishes this matter from Grable. As Respondents

themselves put it, the distribution of Trust assets may “leave trustees or recipients exposed to

personal liability if tax remains unpaid when due.” ECF 15 at11. But Respondents tellingly do

not explain how that possibility bears on any element Petitioner must prove to prevail on the

claims asserted in the Petition. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9 (recognizing federal

question jurisdiction exists “where the vindication of a nght under state law necessarily turned on

some construction of federal law” (emphasis added)). Here, construction of federal law is not

necessary to vindicate Petitioner’s state law rights regarding the trust—t arises solely by virtue

of Respondents’ concern about their personal exposure under federal law. Neither Grable nor

any other authority identified by Respondents suggest that federal question jurisdiction exists

under such circumstances.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA J S -6

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 8:26-cv-01378-MRA-RAO Date August 12, 2026

Title Pamela Anne Mitchell v. John Jeffrey Mitchell et al.

The Court is also not convinced that the federal issue identified by Respondents is

“substantial,” as is required to exercise jurisdiction under Grable. The purported delay in

distribution based on the IRS closing letter is merely one allegation in what Petitioner describes

as a “pattern” of “exclusion ofa co-trustee from material information and vendor communications,

unilateral financial actions affecting liquidity, refusal to establish neutral valuation procedures,

and sustained failure to engage in structured division planning.” ECF 1-1 at 2—3. For example,

Petitioner alleges that she was denied access to various records and files from the settlor’s

residence; that Respondents continued corresponding with tenants and managing operational

aspects of Trust properties while simultaneously claiming to have “paused” trust administration;

that Respondents denied Petitioner regular access to the Trust properties; that Respondents failed

to provide written accounting, reconciliation, or record production; that Respondent Kimberly

Mitchell Rohde made a material omission that directly affected Trust decision-making; that

Respondents promoted reliance on a “Broker Opinion of Value” (“BOV’”) rather than a neutral

appraiser; and that trust liquidity decisions have been implemented without a defined joint

deliberate process. Jd. at 4-8. Respondents do not explain how federal law provides a defense

to or otherwise absolves them of liability for this alleged conduct. In other words, whether those

alleged acts constitute breach of fiduciary duties as trustees does not turn on any federal question.

See Shriners Hosps. for Child. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 5:16-CV-03460-EJD, 2017 WL

57339, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017) (granting motion to remand where “disagreement over

[federal law] or tax consequences to the Trust are peripheral rather than central to the issues

requiring the court to determine the settlor’s intent and to interpret the trust instrument’).

Petitioner’s claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of California state probate courts

under California law. California Probate Code § 17000(a) confers exclusive jurisdiction of

“proceedings concerning the internal affairs of trusts” to the superior court, and Section 17200(b)

defines “internal affairs” as including proceedings for settling accounts and providing an

accounting to the beneficiaries, removing a trustee, and/or compelling redress of a breach of the

trust. See Cal. Prob. Code § 17200(b). The relief sought in the underlying petition includes “a

change in trustee . . . and the redress of a breach of the trust by way of financial compensation,”

and which “clearly falls within the purview of the state probate court.” Kibbey v. Kibbey, No.

2:21-CV-01479-RGK-JC, 2021 WL 5798049, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2021) (dismissing case of

lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it “involve[d] the internal affairs ofa trust”). “Because

the claims alleged in the [Petition] are within the state probate court’s exclusive jurisdiction,

subject matter jurisdiction is lacking in accordance with the probate exception.” Ledeux v.

Anthony, No. C 19-4068 SBA, 2019 WL 11555276, at *3—4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2019) (dismissing

claims which, “at their core, are that [the trustees] wrongfully administered the Trust”); Solomon

v. Ling, No. CV 16-08216 RGK (SS), 2017 WL 8109984, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2017)

(dismissing claim for tortious breach of trustee duty for lack of jurisdiction because claim was “an

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA J S -6

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 8:26-cv-01378-MRA-RAO Date August 12, 2026

Title Pamela Anne Mitchell v. John Jeffrey Mitchell et al.

issue related to the internal affairs of the trust which probate court has exclusive jurisdiction”).

Because the Petitioner’s state law claims do not necessarily raise a substantial disputed

issue of federal law, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter over this action. Removal

under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) was therefore improper on that basis, and the motion to remand is

hereby GRANTED.

IV. ATTORNEYS’ FEES

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) allows a party to recover attorney’s fees and costs related to an

improper removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“An order remanding the case may require payment

of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.”).

Improper removal generally occurs when removal “was objectively unreasonable.” Grancare,

LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 552 (9th Cir. 2018). “Removal is not

objectively unreasonable ‘solely because the removing party’s arguments lack merit, or else

attorney’s fees would always be awarded whenever remand 1s granted.”” Jd. (quoting Lussier v.

Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008)).

As explained above, the Court holds that this matter does not raise a substantial, disputed

question of federal law, and that the probate exception deprives the Court of jurisdiction.

However, given that there is no Ninth Circuit case law directly addressing the issues herein, the

Cout finds that Respondents’ arguments, although unmeritorious, were not objectively

unreasonable. The Court therefore declines to order payment of attorneys’ fees or costs to

Petitioner. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Stern, No. C 02-5126 SI, 2003 WL 22114268, at *3 (N.D.

Cal. Sept. 8, 2003) (denying request for fees after remanding case falling within probate

exception).

Vv. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Motion to Remand [12] is GRANTED. The case

is remanded to Orange County Superior Court, Case No. 30-2026-01559743-PR-TR-CMC.

IT ISSO ORDERED.

Initials of Deputy Clerk mku